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Abstract  
Gender justice is an important component of contemporary international criminal law. 
Feminist scholars and practitioners have been instrumental in advancing gender law reform 
within international criminal law and a key outcome has been the prosecution of conflict 
related sexual violence, in particular through the work of the Ad Hoc Tribunals for Rwanda 
and the Former Yugoslavia, as well as analysis of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts 
of Cambodia. This thesis argues that, despite these important gains with respect to gender 
justice in international criminal law, there has been inadequate attention to women as 
potential perpetrators, defendants, and suspects of international crimes. In addressing the 
absence of female defendants from prosecution under international criminal law, I argue that 
expectations with regard to gender are reproduced in international criminal law without 
sufficient understanding of the diversity of gender as a power relation reproduced 
intersectionally with other power relations. Following Engle’s work on the hypervisibility of 
women as victims of sexual violence, the thesis analyses female defendants in legal and 
cultural contexts to examine female violence in armed conflict, beyond gendered meanings. 
Furthermore, through drawing on feminist approaches from MacKinnon to Kapur, to examine 
constructions of gender, sexuality, race and class, within law, the thesis challenges narrow 
assumptions with respect to gender in armed conflict that collapse into stereotypes of raced 
victimhood and sexual vulnerability.  
Gender is understood, not as a form of identity, but as a power arrangement that is implicated 
in racial, ethnic, classist, and socio-economic understandings of conflict and of culture. Thus, 
enhanced understanding of the complexity of gender in armed conflict is advocated through 
the study of female defendants. The thesis highlights representations of women accused of 
international crimes in the ICTY, ICTR, and the ECCC, and identifies tensions between 
international and domestic dialogues as a result. The study of the ICTY demonstrates the 
friction between the pursuit of gender justice and the limited gendered narratives women are 
represented through in depictions of the conflict in the Former Yugoslavia. Similarly, in the 
ICTR the thesis demonstrates a racialised preoccupation with violence that further reproduces 
gender, minus its complex relation with race stereotypes. In the study of the ECCC the 
absence of female defendants is analysed via tensions between local and international 
perceptions of political leadership, law, and gender. This is not a study of the stories of 
individual female defendants; rather the research explores how understandings of gender, 
international law, and armed conflict shift when female defendants are positioned as the focus 
of analysis.   
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Chapter One 
Encountering the Female Defendant  
in International Criminal Law 
  
“Nothing about being socially constituted as women restrains us from simply 
becoming violent ourselves.” 
Judith Butler1 
In 1991, amid ongoing hostilities, the armed conflict in the Yugoslavian territories 
began to engulf the region in violence. The impetuses included a reimagining of 
national identities, through the rise of new political leadership, in addition to a severe 
economic crisis. Both factors played an important role in creating an environment that 
encouraged armed conflict, which in turn renewed past hostilities.2 The armed conflict 
included high levels of torture and sexual violence as well as the deaths of an 
estimated 250,000 lives between the years of 1991-1995.3  
 
In 1995, in an effort to escape the armed conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rasema 
Handanovic travelled to Austria. In 1996, Handanovic immigrated to the United 
States, after having been granted refugee status. In 1998, Handanovic married Ismet 
Yetisen and later gave birth to a son. Upon becoming a naturalised US citizen in 2002, 
she settled in Oregon with her parents. When Handanovic and Yetsen divorced in 
2002, Handanovic became a single mother taking sole custody of their child. In 2009, 
Handanovic sought counselling for post-traumatic stress disorder, which was said to 
have been the result of the violence she experienced during the armed conflict in the 
Former Yugoslav Republic, including an instance where she was the victim of a 
sexual assault. Over the period when Handanovic was settling and making a new life 
for herself and her family in the US, the War Crimes Chamber of Court of Bosnia-
                                                          
1 Butler, Precarious Life: The Power of Mourning and Violence (2006) 42. 
2 See Orford, 'Locating the International: Military and Monetary Interventions after the Cold War' 
(1997) 451. 
3 While these specific dates are listed, it is acknowledged that the hostilities and loss of life extended 
beyond these years. It is also clear that the reasons behind the conflict are far from simplistic, and will 
be detailed further in Chapter 4.  
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Herzegovina was established to investigate instances of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes.4  
 
In 2010, the War Crimes Chamber issued an arrest warrant for Handanovic.5 The 
arrest warrant alleged Handanovic had committed war crimes while she was a part of 
the Zulfikar Special Purposes Detachment during an attack in Trusina, in 1993. 
Handanovic was alleged to have executed three civilians, as well as three soldiers who 
had surrendered to her unit. The US authorities arrested Handanovic in 2011.6 This 
was reported as a surprise to her friends and family.7  
 
Handanovic was eventually extradited to Bosnia-Herzegovina where she entered into 
a plea agreement with the Prosecutor of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Court, agreeing to 
testify against her former fellow soldiers, Mensur Memic, Dzevad Salcin, Senad 
Hakalovic, Nedzad Hodzic, Nihad Bojadzic and Zulfikar Alispago.8 After pleading 
guilty in 2012 and reading a statement of remorse to the victims’ families in court, 
Handanovic was sentenced to five and a half years in prison.9 Handanovic was the 
first woman found guilty of war crimes in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Court. Stories of 
violence against women, particularly sexual violence in the Former Yugoslav 
Republic (FYR) conflict, are well represented internationally. Handanovic’s story 
disrupts victim narratives because she is found guilty as a perpetrator. Importantly, 
her story also alerts us to the layers of law from international courts, often identified 
through the work of the ICTY, to domestic courts, such as the less well known War 
Crimes Chamber of Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
 
This thesis examines the representation of female defendants in feminist scholarship 
and under international criminal law, from the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
                                                          
4 Terry, ‘Beaverton women due in Bosnian court Wednesday to face war crimes accusations’ (Oregon 
Live, 27 December 2011); Jung, ‘Family and friends weep as magistrate refuses to release Beaverton 
women accused of Bosnian war crimes’ (Oregon Live, 16 April 2011); ‘OSCE mission issues report on 
war crimes trials in Bosnia and Herzegovina courts’ (OSCE Newsroom, 23 March 2005). 
5 In the Matter of the Extradition of Rasema Handanovic, United States District Court, D. Oregon, 
Portland Division, 829 F.Supp.2d 979 D. Or. (2011). 
6 ibid. 
7 Jung, ‘Family and friends weep as magistrate refuses to release Beaverton women accused of Bosnian 
war crimes’ (Oregon Live, 16 April 2011). 
8 ‘Rasema Handanovic’s plea bargain agreed’ (Balkan Insight, 13 March 2012). 
9 ‘Five and a half years for Rasema Handanovic’ (Balkan Insight, 30 April 2012). 
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former Yugoslavia (ICTY), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and 
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). The ICTY and 
ICTR, founded in 1993 and 1994 respectively by a United Nations Security Council 
Resolution, were the first international courts established to try war crimes since the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, after World War II.10 The ICTY and ICTR tried 
violations of the laws or customs of war, crimes against humanity, genocide and grave 
breaches of the 1949 Geneva conventions. The ECCC, established in 2003 by a joint 
agreement between the United Nations and the Cambodian Government, tries crimes 
found in international law as well as Cambodian law.11 This thesis recognises that 
domestic criminal law processes have also prosecuted women involved in the armed 
conflicts of the Yugoslavian Territories, Rwanda, and Cambodia.12 The importance 
and influence of both national and international criminal justice processes in 
conjunction with Western feminist intervention and international media focus will be 
explored throughout this thesis.  
1. Research Questions  
This thesis inquiries into how gender is represented under international criminal law. 
My primary research question is: why are women, who participate or are accused of 
participating in criminal acts during armed conflict, an under-recognised area of 
women’s experience in armed conflict? Branching from this central research question, 
the thesis engages the following questions: Do understandings of gender, law, and 
violence shift if female defendants are centred within analysis? How do popular 
representations of gender infiltrate international courts and tribunals, including 
representations of female defendants in the media? Given the likely continued 
importance of complementarity in the future development of international criminal 
law, how can the discussion of female defendants aid in greater understanding of the 
benefits of local justice processes?  
 
 
                                                          
10 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, adopted by Security 
Council Resolution 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993); Statute of the International Tribunal for 
Rwanda, adopted by Security Council Resolution 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994). 
11 Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution 
of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, as amended, Reach Kram No. 
NS/RKM/1004/006 (2004). 
12 The domestic legal processes will be detailed further in each of their respective chapters.  
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1.1 Do understandings of gender, law, and violence shift if female defendants are 
centred within analysis? 
Under international criminal law no distinction is made between women and men and 
each can be held, under the law, culpable for international crimes.13 Female 
defendants just as male defendants have the potential to be tried under international 
criminal law.14 Nevertheless, this is not evident in the jurisprudence of international 
criminal courts and tribunals given that Biljana Plavšić, was the only woman tried by 
the ICTY,15 and Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, was the only woman brought before the 
ICTR.16 The ECCC has indicted two women, Ieng Thirith and Im Cheam. However, 
Thirith was deemed unfit for trial due to a medical condition and Cheam’s case was 
dismissed in February 2017.17 Additional limited jurisprudence has emerged from the 
Special Court of Sierra Leone with cases against Margaret Fomba Brima, Neneh 
Binta Bah Jallow, Anifa Kamara, and Esther Kamara, as well as in the International 
Criminal Court via the indictment of Simone Gbagbo.18 Having so few women 
brought before international courts and tribunals gives the impression that very few 
women have participated as aggressors during these conflicts. Overall, the ICTY 
indicted 161 persons, the ICTR indicted 93 individuals, and the ECCC accused 9 
persons. Despite the lack of female defendants in the ICTY, ICTR and ECCC, as 
compared with the total number of accused persons, women have been documented to 
have been involved in every aspect of the hostilities in the Former Yugoslavia, 
Rwanda, and Cambodia.19 Unlike international courts and tribunals, increased 
evidence of female defendants appears throughout domestic prosecutions of 
                                                          
13 UNGA, ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’ A/CONF.183/9 (1998) (Last Amended 
2010). 
14 This statement refers to the ‘gender neutral’ language in the definitions of crimes in the statutes of 
the International Courts and Tribunals.  
15 Prosecutor v Plavšić (Initial Indictment) IT-00-39 & 40/1 (3 April 2000) [hereinafter Plavšić Case].  
16 Prosecutor v Nyiramasuhuko and Ntahobali (Amended Indictment) ICTR-97-21-1 (2001); 
Prosecutor v Nyiramasuhuko et al (Judgement and Sentence) ICTR-98-42-T (2011) [hereinafter 
Nyiramasuhuko Case].  
17 Prosecutor v Ieng Thirith (Decision on Reassessment of Accused Ieng Thirith's Fitness to Stand Trial 
Following Supreme Court Chamber Decision of 13 December 2011) 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC (2012) 
[hereinafter Ieng Case]; Im Cheam (Closing Order Disposition) 004/D308/ECCC/OCIJ (2017). 
18 Prosecutor v Gbagbo (Indictment) ICC-02/11-01/12 (2012). 
19 Coulter, ‘Female Fighters in the Sierra Leone War: Challenging the Assumptions’ (2008) 55; Coulter 
notes that 10-30 percent of all fighters in the Sierra Leone War were women; see Hogg, “I never 
poured blood”: Women accused of genocide in Rwanda’ (L.L.M. thesis, McGill University) on file 
with McGill University (2001). 
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international crimes, where women have been accused of murder, torture, abuse, and 
sexual violence.20  
1.2 How do popular representations of gender infiltrate international courts and 
tribunals, including representations of female defendants in the media? 
Reports of women perpetrating crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide 
are also in media reports on the FYR, Rwanda, and Cambodia.21 In addition, women 
have been documented as taking up positions of leadership which has granted them 
the ability to use their status to affect great harm across each of these conflicts.22 
While this thesis does not focus on individual women who were involved in 
perpetrating crimes the armed conflicts, as a way to dissect their character or unearth 
reasons for their participation, it is interested instead in understanding the effect their 
presence has on conversations around identities such as gender, race, class, ethnicity, 
and socio-economic status.  
 
Implicated in this analysis is the role of leadership (in crime), which is required in 
order to be tried before an international court or tribunal. A common counterargument 
against studying female defendants in international law is that women were not in the 
position of leadership and thus cannot be brought before international criminal courts. 
This counterargument to this position is discussed later in this chapter. However, what 
this idea also implies is the possibility that those actors involved in post-conflict 
justice processes (i.e. Western feminist, legal practitioners, and media outlets) do not 
“see” women as potential defendants and therefore do not “see” female leadership.  
                                                          
20 Other cases include: Richburg, ‘Rwandan nuns jailed in genocide’ (Washington Post, 9 June 2001); 
Martinez, ‘Kentucky woman indicted for Bosnian war crimes’ (CBS News, 18 March 2001); ‘Dutch 
Yvonne Basebya jailed for Rwanda crimes’ (BBC News, 1 March 2013); Cerkez, ‘US Extradites War 
crimes suspect to Bosnia’ (NBC News, 27 December 2011); Seguegila, ‘Women lied about role in 
Rwanda genocide, U.S. jury says’ (CNN News, 22 February 2013); ‘Bosnia arrests ‘Female Monster’- 
wife of warlord ‘Serb Adolf’’ (Mirror UK, 22 December 2011); Oliver, ‘The US single mother who 
was actually a war criminal: killer becomes first woman to be convicted of Bosnian war crimes’ (Daily 
Mail, 1 May 2012); ‘Catholic nun jailed for 30 years for her part in Rwandan genocide’ (USA Today, 
10 November 2006); ‘Rwanda jails journalist Valerie Bemeriki for genocide’ (BBC News, 14 
December 2009); Becker, ‘Chieu Ponnary, 83, first wife of Pol Pot, Cambodian despot’ (The New 
York Times, 3 July 2003); Crane, ‘Female cadres of the Khmer Rouge (Phnom Penh Post, 1 August 
2015); ‘Ieng Thirith: 'First Lady' of Cambodia's Khmer Rouge dies while facing charges of genocide, 
crimes against humanity’ (ABC News Australia, 22 August 2015). 
21 ibid. 
22 This refers to the cases of Plavšić, Nyiramasuhuko, Gbagbo, and Thirith, as women in leadership 
roles.  
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When recounting the start of the Rwandan genocide, many refer to the plane crash 
and assassination of President Habyarimana on 6 April 1994, however only few recall 
that Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana was assassinated 7 April 1994.23 Uwilingiyimana 
was the nation’s first female prime minister, and is an example of the presence of 
female leadership that existed prior to the armed conflict. The position of women in 
post-conflict Rwanda has been celebrated by the United Nations for being first in the 
world for women’s participation in Parliament and seventh in the world for women in 
ministerial positions, as of January 2017.24 However, Hogg states that before the 
conflict, women were working in the government as well as heads of households, and 
thusly should not be defined along traditional assumptions of women’s subjugation.25 
Other women, who were not in particular positions of power before the armed 
conflict, still significantly contributed to the violence of these armed conflicts, further 
solidifying women’s participation.26  
 
The research that underpins this thesis makes clear that women actively participate in 
the commission of violence in all wars. However, under international criminal law, 
female defendants are far from prevalent in court jurisprudence which implies that the 
few who do make their way into a courtroom are exceptional examples.27 With the 
limited number of female defendants, international criminal law conveys that females 
who perpetrate violence are outside of the normal conduct women employ during 
conflict.28 This produces an incomplete depiction of women’s roles in armed conflict 
within international criminal jurisprudence. Furthermore, female defendants, who 
have been brought before the courts and tribunals, have often found that their identity 
                                                          
23 The example here is not to make a judgment on the Prime Minister’s actions in office, but rather to 
highlight the existence of female leadership that predates the genocide.  
24 'Women in Politics 2017 Map’ (UN Women Website) available at: 
http://www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2017/4/women-in-politics-2017-map. 
25 Hogg, “Women’s participation in the Rwandan genocide: mothers or monsters?” (2010) 73, 75. 
26 Hogg (n 19) 67-71. 
27 Hogg (n 19) 51 and 62; In the Rwandan context, a list was published after the conflict citing those 
who were involved in the genocide separating them into punishable categories by Rwandan law. 
Category 1 being the worst offenders, as of March 2001 included 2,898 people, 51 of those were 
women. The list includes a section which separates ‘intellectuals’, as those who held positions of 
power, eight women were included in this section which represented the most powerful women for the 
period that the genocide occurred. The Rwandan government acknowledged the positions of females in 
leadership roles, yet the ICTR has only brought one women before the Tribunal.  
28 See Sjoberg and Gentry, Beyond Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Women’s Violence in Global Politics 
(2015).  
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as a woman is highlighted. In Nyiramasuhuko’s case, her identity as a mother, was 
emphasised by the fact that she was tried with her son, Arsène Shalom Ntahobali, and 
accused of facilitating and encouraging her son to commit crimes.29  
 
During the trial at the ICTR, Ntahobali, was accused of rape. Witness TA, when 
recounting her experiences, was asked to identify her assailant.30 Witness TA 
identified him as “Shalom, the son of Pauline Nyiramasuhuko”.31 Media outlets also 
highlighted Nyiramasuhuko’s role as a mother32 and ICTR prison guards reportedly 
referred to Nyiramasuhuko as ‘Mama’ inside the Tribunal.33 Nyiramasuhuko’s role as 
a mother is portrayed as a defining part of her participation in the genocide. 
Associating Nyiramasuhuko with motherhood makes the fact that she is on trial for 
international crimes appear all the more shocking and further emphasises that her 
actions are not typically associated with female experiences in armed conflict. Instead 
of questioning Nyiramasuhuko and Ntahobali’s political ideology, the long term goals 
they hoped to achieve by participating in the genocide, or rather how 
Nyiramasuhuko’s role as a Minister afforded her great power, descriptions and 
debates remain focused on Nyiramasuhuko as a ‘failed mother’. The continued 
stereotyping of Nyiramasuhuko’s actions as a mother who ‘encouraged her son to 
kill’, simultaneously prevented discussions around Nyiramasuhuko as a leader and 
analysis of the intersection of her class, ethnicity, and gender, which would have 
allowed greater understanding of the Rwandan genocide.  
1.3 How can the discussion of female defendants aid in greater understanding of the 
benefit of local justice processes? 
As international criminal law continues to develop, the role of complementarity will 
become an essential component when determining the position of post-conflict 
international legal justice processes. In this thesis, the work of local courts in trying 
women who participated in the armed conflict, is highlighted to show that justice 
                                                          
29 Nyiramasuhuko Case (n 16) para 2633, 2651, 2657, 2683-2702. 
30 ibid para 2633. 
31 ibid. 
32 Sasan Shoamanesh, ‘Nyiramasuhuko: The Mother Who Awarded Rape for Murder’ (The Huffington 
Post, 9 August 2011). 
33 Bouwknegt, ‘ICTR Record Breaking Case Comes to a Close’ (Radio Netherlands Worldwide, 24 
June 2011). 
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projects need to extend beyond the international and into domestic spaces. Looking at 
domestic spaces allows the exploration of varying understandings of gender, race, 
class, ethnicity, and socio-economic status that exist between the international and 
national, which influence legal actors and proceedings. Engaging in domestic legal 
structures, within this research, underscores that the post-conflict justice process does 
not end with international courts and tribunals. 
 
In the following section of this chapter, I introduce the aims of this work, namely, the 
relationship between Western feminist intervention and international criminal law 
which underscores the way international law engages with the female defendant. In 
section three, I discuss the larger objectives of the thesis. The methodology of the 
thesis will be discussed in section four. Section five highlights common 
counterarguments against the study or research worthiness of female perpetrators, 
defendants, and suspects. Section six details the structure of the thesis, indicating the 
main focus of each chapter. Finally, section seven discusses the audience of the thesis 
and the importance of my central argument to the pillars of international criminal law 
and feminism. 
2. Aims 
My aim in this thesis is to position female defendants at the centre of this research, in 
order to understand the ways in which international criminal law, and Western 
feminist interventions, alongside international media coverage of armed conflicts, 
shape and give meaning to the international perception of women involved in armed 
conflict. In commencing this thesis, I explore how focus on female defendants shifts 
assumptions with respect to female victimhood in armed conflict. As the actions of 
international actors after armed conflict indicate, the assumption that women are 
victims is perpetually reinforced. Therefore, the international justice system has 
limited understanding of the roles female defendants have in armed conflict. By 
studying the way international criminal law, Western feminist interventions, and 
media representations influence the perceptions of an armed conflict, it becomes 
possible to question the presumptions around the way race, class, ethnicity, and 
gender identities influence the mainstream conflict narrative. Throughout this thesis, I 
argue that ultimately international criminal law in its current manifestation has 
reproduced gendered tropes regarding women’s agency in armed conflict which also 
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limits the capacity for justice. In analysing the representation and narratives on female 
defendants, the influences of law and feminism on women’s lives is enhanced so as to 
dispel the idea that men are the primary actors both during and after armed conflict.  
3. Objectives   
Present within the judgements handed down by international tribunals and courts, 
international criminal trials have the ability to tell the history of leadership and 
responsibility in an armed conflict and therefore embed a conflict narrative 
constructed by the courts themselves.34 An aspect of female leadership shown 
throughout the thesis is that women’s leadership in conflict is often overlooked before 
and during armed conflict. When examining the cases from the conflicts in the Former 
Yugoslav Republic, Rwanda, and Cambodia, the factual findings present within the 
judgements from the ICTY, ICTR, and ECCC only minimally account for the 
presence of women’s involvement in the hostilities of war. The experiences of women 
who participate in the armed conflict are perceived to be incidental to the larger 
history of the armed conflict and are not recognised as a subject necessary to 
understand context of the armed conflict. Yet, after the armed conflict in Rwanda, 
women’s participation in government, despite its current authoritarian shape, is often 
celebrated. However, female leadership preceding and during the genocide is rarely 
appreciated, including female leaders, officials, and military actors who committed 
international crimes.  
 
When women are not written into the history of armed conflict through the work of 
the tribunals and courts, then the concept that men perpetrate violence and women are 
the victims of violence remains tied to the international criminal legal structure. 
Again, in Rwanda, this allows a construction of the contemporary governance of the 
state as different from before the genocide because of the presence of women 
currently in parliament. The history of women’s political leadership is thus only 
partial, ignorant in its understudy and representation of local gender norms and 
appeasing model of post-conflict justice that incorporates an extremely simplistic 
                                                          
34 See Buss, ‘Expert Witnesses and International War Crimes Trials: Making Sense of Large-Scale 
Violence in Rwanda’ in Zarkov and Glasius (Eds.) Narratives of Justice In and Out of the Courtroom 
Former Yugoslavia and Beyond (2014).   
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account of gender.  In particular, international courts and tribunals uphold a binary of 
victim and violator which the lack of female defendants serves to underscore.  
 
One of the key objectives of this thesis is to dislodge the assumption that women are 
only victims in armed conflict and to explore how both law and gender might be 
understood differently if female defendants were brought into focus. Kapur identifies 
that the international women’s rights movement as strengthening a female 
victimisation rhetoric through the focus on violence against women.35 Kapur argues 
that international human rights campaigns on violence against women have reinforced 
a negative view on women’s experiences of sex and sexuality.36 Kapur notes that the 
discussion of ‘metanarratives’ on women as victims has often equated all women with 
the same experience of sexual violence and objectification.37 Kapur has criticised 
MacKinnon’s work for essentialising women and gender, through assuming gender is 
the basis of women’s oppression and that women must “prioritise issues of sexuality 
and sexual violence”.38 I return to this critique in Chapter Four, in order to combat the 
dominant narratives of women’s experiences in armed conflict that assumes women 
must always be the victim and vulnerable.  
 
Engle has also recognised the influence of feminists in post-conflict spaces. She notes, 
feminists who worked in various institutions and NGOs, around the ICTY and ICTR, 
often appeared to assume all women were “powerless victims, incapable of defending 
themselves or speaking out to defend others, but also of taking sides or participating 
in war”.39  Engle’s book review of Hemingway’s For Whom the Bell Tolls provides a 
platform for discussing alternative perspectives of women’s experience in armed 
conflict, beyond assumptions around women’s victimhood. In the review, Engle 
highlights the lack of recognition of women’s participation in armed conflict, which 
in some cases includes women who commit crimes.40 Engle also importantly notes 
that men can be “agents of kindness” during armed conflict and are not implicitly    
                                                          
35 Kapur, ‘The Tragedy of Victimisation Rhetoric Resurrecting the Native Subject in 
International/Post-Colonial Feminist Legal Politics’ (2002) 2. 
36 ibid 37. 
37 ibid 10. 
38 ibid 9.  
39 Engle, ‘Feminism and Its (Dis)contents: Criminalizing Wartime Rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ 
(2005) 780. 
40 Engle, ‘Judging Sex in War’ (2008) 952-953. 
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violent.41 Engle’s book review moves through fictional and non-fictional conflict 
narratives and their usefulness in dislodging assumptions around gender, armed 
conflict, and sexual violence, which inevitably become a part of legal systems post-
conflict. While other academic texts specifically engage with female perpetrators, 
defendants, and suspects in more detail, Engle’s review has become the main source 
of inspiration early on in this thesis, as her work highlights the need for nuance in 
armed conflict narratives around female participation. While the thesis builds on the 
ideas of Engle, it similarly desires to dislodge the gendered assumptions around 
women’s experiences in armed conflict.  
 
Throughout the thesis, I use the focus on female defendants as a tool to interrogate the 
understanding of gender in international courts and tribunals. Analysing gender 
essentialism enables this work to undertake a discussion that challenges the 
assumption that the female gender is equated with being a victim of sexual violence 
and objectification. Evidence of female defendants in international criminal law 
displays a small form of subversion to stereotyped notions of how women are 
imagined to experience armed conflict.42 The thesis questions how women experience 
conflict beyond victim narratives, accepting the discomfort of recognising and 
“seeing” women’s violence, including the most extreme violence that constitutes 
international crimes. The thesis also analyses the limited understanding of gender 
produced via feminist accounts that prioritises conflict related sexual violence, often 
to the exclusion of women’s diverse experiences of armed conflict.43  If more 
examples of females who commit crimes were recognised in international law, then 
gender stereotypes around female victimhood might be rendered with greater 
complexity,44 as would women’s experiences of armed conflict. Those who consider 
sexuality to be the source of women’s oppression must recognise that some females 
can be aggressors too, some of whom have used their position to exploit other 
females’ sexuality and that many actors (regardless of gender) might be both 
                                                          
41 ibid 955. 
42 ‘Interview with Judith Butler’ (Think Big, 19 February 2001). 
43 See True, 'The Political Economy of Violence Against Women: A Feminist International Relations 
Perspective' (2010). 
44 Bouris, Complex Political Victims (2007) 28-29. When referring to the need to see the complexity of 
women’s experiences, I utilise the perspective Bouris takes when stating that the victim in ‘modern 
political conflicts' is an underdeveloped area of study. Likewise, Bouris questions the identity of 'the 
victim' which appears to be a ‘given’ when assessing individual’s roles in armed conflict.   
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victim/survivor and defendant during armed conflict.45 The objective is twofold: one, 
to capture some of the diversity of women’s experiences in conflict and two, to 
develop a nuanced feminist analysis of international criminal law beyond sexual 
violence in armed conflict.  
4. Methodology  
This thesis focuses analysis on three types of materials: first, court judgments, 
indictments, and reporting from both international and national cases pursuing 
international prosecutions; second on media reports from both international and 
national news agencies; and third, feminist engagement with international courts and 
tribunals. In particular, US and other Western feminisms have prioritised both 
academic and legal transformation through attention to conflict related sexual 
violence. The thesis undertakes a doctrinal analysis of a range of narratives that 
inform and represent the development of international criminal since the early 1990s.  
I also look at examples of women who were not brought before international courts, 
but were suspected of committing crimes related to those particular conflicts.46  
 
Similarly, Linton’s work focuses on Women Accused of International Crimes 
(WAIC),47 however this thesis only peripherally engages with WAIC. Linton’s work 
focuses on a transdisciplinary study, whereas the thesis stays within the frame of 
international criminal law. The purpose of this research is to understand the way the 
courts, both international and domestic, handle cases of female defendants of 
international crimes, in order to discern if there is a gender, racial, or class basis 
present when law engages with female’s who commit crimes.  
 
This section will discuss critical legal studies, moving to feminist methods, as well as 
the need to look at gender, beyond the lens of victim feminism. The thesis also 
analyses the way the media, both international and local, describes and represents 
female defendants, as this provides a perspective from outside the courts. The media 
is often the only source of information regarding female perpetrators, defendants, and 
                                                          
45 Nyiramasuhuko Case (n 16).  
46 ‘Other Cases’ (n 20). 
47 Linton, ‘Women Accused of International Crimes: A Trans-Disciplinary Inquiry and Methodology’ 
(2016). 
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suspects who were not brought before international courts and tribunals. These 
accounts are useful in understanding the way gender and race have been highlighted 
in the media’s coverage. For example, Azra Bašić, who was arrested in Kentucky, US 
in 2011, was a Croatian national who was a former member of the Croatian army.48 
After the conflict in Yugoslavia, Bašić immigrated to the US and settled in Kentucky, 
supporting herself by working in a sandwich factory while also taking jobs bathing 
elderly nursing home patients.49 The US authorities accused Bašić of committing war 
crimes at three different camps in Bosnia.50 The US media also reported that those 
who knew her were shocked at these allegations, they called her ‘lovely’ and could 
not reconcile her actions in Bosnia with her care for the elderly in Kentucky.51 Bašić 
was also known as “the mistress of life and death”, which was noted in international 
media reports.52  
 
This brief example highlights the way the media is able to reproduce gender binaries 
and stereotypes, as her care for the elderly is juxtaposed with her militant criminal 
background, and her gender is highlighted against her acts of violence. The media 
included statements from neighbours who expressed their shock, highlighted that she 
cared for the elderly, and used the word ‘lovely’ in reports to associate Bašić with her 
assumed femininity.53 It is as if the media is suggesting that a person cannot be both 
caring and violent. This is just one way where the media uses gendered perceptions to 
call attention to the gender of female defendants. Other examples from cases not 
brought before international courts and tribunals are used in my research to draw out 
the way the global media networks contribute to the production of narratives around 
female defendants, which reflect simplistic gender tropes that then inform dominant 
legal narratives. This example also highlights the importance of complementarity and 
                                                          
48 Barrouquere and Schreiner, ‘‘Lovely’ Ky. Woman Accused of Horrific War Crimes’ (NBC News, 
18 March 2011). 
49 ibid. 
50 ibid. 
51 ibid. 
52 Burgess, ‘Mistress of life and death’ gets 14 years for Balkan war crimes’ (The National, December 
2017). 
53 ibid. 
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subsequently develops the discipline, as Bašić was later convicted in The Court of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.54 
 
In the ICTR, Pauline Nyiramasuhuko was tried with her son, which drew attention to 
her role as a mother.55 Nyiramasuhuko was portrayed in the international media as a 
monster, as well as a mother.56 It was noted by one media outlet that Nyiramasuhuko 
was referred to as ‘mama’ inside the tribunal itself.57 Other news organisations cited 
the fact that she was a mother as something that seemingly made her crimes worse 
because she had given birth to a child.58 These descriptions are extremely telling in 
the way actions are interpreted where gender is involved. Her gender was seen as 
paramount to the accounts of her behaviour. Nyiramasuhuko’s relationship with her 
son, a man, retains primacy in the stories of her crimes, rather than her own agency. 
Her motherhood becomes a preoccupation of news agencies, as Nyiramasuhuko’s 
behaviour is outside of what is considered to be proper parenting. Sjoberg and Gentry 
state: “When we lose the mothers to the dark side, all is lost”.59 This highlights the 
implicit assumptions around women’s allowable behaviour in armed conflict and their 
impact on the society at large. While Nyiramasuhuko’s cases is analysed further in 
Chapter Five, it is with this information from various cases on female defendants and 
other examples of female accused that I begin to develop a fuller account of the ways 
in which the female defendant is interpreted and understood in both law and media 
representations of legal processes and outcomes. The thesis examines references to 
gender, race, and class, examples of language that singles out female defendants as 
opposed to male, and identifies patterns in the way female defendants have been 
addressed and identified. My methodology seeks to work against the reductive 
approach to gender that has resided in conflict related sexual violence work. I will 
explore and refine this analysis in Chapters Four, Five, and Six.  
                                                          
54 Prosecutor of Bosnia and Herzegovina v Azra Bašić (Judgement) S1 1 K 018557 17 Kri (27 
December 2017). 
55 Sperling, ‘Mother of Atrocities: Pauline Nyiramasuhuko’s role in the Rwandan genocide’ (2005) 
649.   
56 Moshenberg, ‘The Rwandan glass ceiling’ (Africa is a Country, 29 June 2011).  
57 Bouwknegt, ‘ICTR record breaking case comes to a close’ (Radio Netherlands Worldwide, 24 June 
2011).  
58 Sasan Shoamanesh, ‘Nyiramasuhuko: the mother who awarded rape for murder’ (The Huffington 
Post, 9 August 2011). 
59 Sjoberg and Gentry (n 28) 78. 
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This thesis, being a doctrinal analysis, understands law as a discourse that interacts 
with other normative structures. Shepherd discusses the analysis of discourse as 
“systems of meaning-production” as well as having the ability to represent, structure, 
and understand certain things is useful in order to think about the broader structures 
implicated in this work.60 Shepherd’s work moves through different discourses on 
gender, violence, and armed conflict. Drawing on Shepherd’s discourse model calls 
into question the very structures of the international system.61 The legal system is 
already comprised of multiple conceptions of women and gender. For example, 
women are primarily victims, as garnered from the WPS agenda, women are ‘evil 
monsters’ when they do engage in criminal acts,62 or women are the resilient 
peacemakers who need to be ‘let into the fold’ with regard to post-conflict justice.63  
 
Shepherd also draws out the institutionalised conceptions of women and how this 
prevents women, who fall outside these pre-set ideals, from being acknowledged.64 
Shepherd’s work is useful for a study of international criminal law because it 
articulates the notion of an ‘idealised’ version of women, which I argue is found 
within international criminal law. This ideal purports that men hold power while 
women are void of agency.65 Working through cases and examples of female 
defendants, Shepherd’s approach is useful in order to identify the rhetoric of female 
victimisation in which international criminal law, the international legal system, 
gender, race, class, violence, and armed conflict intersect and produce a discourse on 
female defendants, confining them to narrow definitions with a lack of autonomy, 
such as the production of Nyiramasuhuko as a mother rather than an agent. Women’s 
assumed lack of power and agency66 will also be explored in relation to female 
defendants.  
 
                                                          
60 Shepherd, Gender Violence and Security Discourse as Practice (2008) 20.  
61 ibid. 
62 ‘Bosnia arrests ‘Female Monster’ wife of warlord ‘Serb Adolf’’ (Mirror, 22 December 2011). 
63 Shepherd (n 60) 88, 89. 
64 ibid 40-43.  
65 ibid 41. 
66 This thesis is not undertaking a singular focus on ‘agency’. The use of the term ‘agency’ in the thesis 
highlights the gender binary that exists between victims and agents. Discussing ‘agency’, therefore, 
disrupts assumptions of the female victim in armed conflict. See Sjoberg, ' Agency, Militarized 
Femininity and Enemy Others: Observations from the War in Iraq' (2007). 
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I argue that law’s present engagement with females, who commit crimes, has aided 
international law’s current classification of women (as victims) by reinforcing already 
limiting binaries. This extends on from Sjoberg and Gentry’s argument that women’s 
actions are constructed to fit into one of three predefined categories, ‘mother’, 
‘monster’, or ‘whore’.67 Sjoberg and Gentry navigate through these three narratives 
but more importantly draw attention to their existence through examples. These are 
then not just theories, but an actual discourse that plays out in the public sphere, often 
simultaneously moving through multiple narratives of mother, monster, and whore. 
Sjoberg and Gentry are very clear in stating that they do not advocate that women 
commit more crimes, or blame feminists for intentionally elevating women’s 
supposed morality to the point that women who commit crimes are not recognised. 
Sjoberg and Gentry rightly state that the violent acts women commit can sit alongside 
a discourse on women as victims of sexual violence in armed conflict.   
 
My work will also take a theoretical approach which draws on different theories 
found in gender studies, feminist legal studies, and critical legal studies, to inform and 
critique the work of international criminal law, and Western feminist interventions. 
An extended discussion of the theoretical framework is given in Chapter Two and 
Three. This thesis also acknowledges law’s connection to historical, economic, social 
and political factors allowing for a socio-legal approach. The usefulness of a socio-
legal approach for this thesis is in the understanding that an analysis of law is directly 
linked to the social environment in which law exists. Thus, both the presence and 
understanding of the female defendant is linked to legal structures and processes as 
well as the surrounding society. This is why the thesis includes a socio-legal 
perspective.  Throughout the thesis, I highlight the lack of visibility of female 
defendants in academic work, but do not undertake an explicit description of their 
crimes. Feminist and gender studies, alongside the methods of critical legal studies, 
offers a way to engage that is more reflective of the specific situation and allows for a 
deep structural analysis rather than mere description. 68  
 
                                                          
67 Sjoberg and Gentry (n 28). 
68 Chimni, ‘An Outline of a Marxist Course on Public International Law’ (2004) 1-2; Chimni defines 
MILS, ‘as an ensemble of methods, practices, and understandings in relation to the identification, 
interpretation, and enforcement of international law’. 
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The decision not to describe the crimes that women were found guilty of committing 
or accused of committing was purposeful. The rationale for this decision is based on 
the tendency, in academic texts, to explicitly detail international crimes that are 
otherwise irrelevant to the analysis. However, this point is also connected to the thesis 
focus on analysing the discourse on female defendants and perpetrators, rather than a 
cataloguing of the crimes and prosecutions of specific female defendants. While the 
work of analysing specific cases is undertaken, as is the case in Chapters Four and 
Five with the discussion of Plavšić and Nyiramasuhuko, this work serves to illuminate 
the surrounding dialogues in relation to both perpetrators rather than a specific 
account of their actions that lead to prosecution.   
 
Engle discusses the human rights agenda, and suggests that the focus on the exclusion 
of women and the subsequent need to include women in human rights provisions, 
highlights a structural bias within the legal discourse.69 One of the critiques Engle 
makes is that when women’s rights are discussed as a matter of primacy, it is often 
assumed that this is enough ‘work on women’s issues’ to satisfy existing 
inadequacies. Engle argues that this approach ignores the underlying issues and the 
possibility that disagreements amongst women exist.70 This thesis contributes towards 
a dialogue that does not assume one feminism or approach is inherently more 
‘feminist’ than another. There is not one set of ‘common issues’ that define women 
and discussing a topic like female defendants, which may highlight negative actions 
of women, and is not outside the lens of feminism. While the topic of female 
defendants may incite disagreements amongst feminists, I argue throughout the thesis 
that it is still a necessary part of feminist dialogues.71  
 
The following discussion will first introduce critical legal studies, followed by the 
work of MacKinnon, in order to establish the understandings of gender shared by 
radical feminists and the application of these standards to international criminal law. 
This section will critique MacKinnon’s work, which I argue contributes towards a 
feminist scholarship that frames women’s sexuality as the central site of gendered 
                                                          
69 Engle, ‘International Human Rights and Feminism When Discourses Meet’ (1991-1992) 517. 
70 ibid. 
71 Charlesworth, ‘Talking to Ourselves? Feminist Scholarship in International Law’ in Kouvo and 
Pearson (Eds.) Feminist Perspectives on Contemporary International Law (2011) 23.  
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harms. Ultimately, the thesis moves towards the work of Engle, Kapur, and 
Charlesworth in order to combat the exclusive focus on women’s sexual vulnerability 
as the predominant experience of women in armed conflict.  
4.1 Critical legal studies as a precursor to feminist methods  
In the context of this work, critical legal studies (CLS), is used in order to explore the 
deficiencies within international law, and informs the epistemology. International 
critical legal theory identifies that the failures of international law are a part of the 
system itself, such that the deficits in international law are ‘structural’ and deeply 
embedded.72 Beckett lists different issues that CLS scholars view as inadequacies 
within international law, such as “gender biases, racialised exclusions, and 
differentiations; class, poverty, and exploitation; cultural imperialism; and hidden 
violence.”73 CLS aims to expose these issues and rejects ideas of universality, 
objectivism, and neutrality.74 CLS scholars argue that there is no universal truth or 
impartiality, as these claims are often representative of a certain group in a specific 
point in time.75 As Carty notes, “in fact the cultural choices of each society are largely 
attributable to the peculiarities of its history, beliefs etc.”76  
 
Within CLS, Steinberg and Zasloff have identified language as a producer and 
reproducer of relationships and binaries, which often close off international law from 
developing more fully.77 Koskenniemi describes the indeterminacy of international 
law by stating that it “remains indeterminate because it is based on contradictory 
premises and seeks to regulate a future in regard to which even single actors’ 
preferences remain unsettled.”78 Koskenniemi asserts that the individuals who work 
within international law carry conflicting points of view, which is inevitable due to 
the uncertainty embedded in how international law may need to function in the future. 
Thus, Koskenniemi states that it is then possible “to defend any course of action,” as 
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it is essential for legal rules to adapt to the changing landscape.79 While this can be 
seen as beneficial to international law, it also challenges its efficacy and strength, as it 
supports the flexibility of laws, which are in theory supposed to be definite.80 
Koskenniemi states that a consensus in international law refers to the dominance of 
what is purported to be the ‘neutral’ or universal position.81 In turn, perceptions of 
female defendants are influenced by an embedded discourse that represents and 
reproduces gender in the law. Female defendants, as a focus of study, illuminate how 
very specific gendered tropes re-emerge in law and are assumed to be universal.  
 
Throughout the thesis, I am particularly interested in how binaries carry embedded 
gendered assumptions. For example, Kennedy writes on the problems of the 
victim/violator binary, as law uses language to identify and simultaneously limit those 
who fall into either category.82 The victim is limited to a specific role void of 
autonomy, while the violator can be seen as nothing other than a person who harms, 
irrespective of their own particular circumstances. Drawing on CLS methods to 
analyse female defendants is beneficial, as they have been affected by gender, racial, 
and class biases in law, as well as language, all of which limit their relationship with 
the law. Female defendants are constrained by assumptions associated with their 
gender, coupled with their other identity markers, which often automatically equate 
women with a victim status in law. To use CLS as a means to critique the construction 
of female defendants in international law encourages the further examination of the 
power structures in international criminal law that have prevented decision-makers 
from viewing women as political leaders, and thus potentially responsible for 
international crimes – all borne from a preoccupation with women as victims.  
4.2 Moving to feminist methods  
Radical feminism, in this case highlighted by the work of MacKinnon, is important to 
understand as it has shaped the understanding of women’s roles in armed conflict and 
given prominence to issues of conflict related sexual violence, particularly crimes of 
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sexual violence committed against women. While this work highlights radical 
feminism and later moves to work such as Engle, Kapur and Charlesworth – all of 
whom reject the gender essentialism found in radical feminist academic scholarship – 
there are many other areas of feminist legal theory that do not fall under the purview 
of the thesis.83 
 
MacKinnon’s work on international law has centred on women’s experiences in 
armed conflict. She was a key advocate for the establishment of the ICTY and ICTR, 
pushing the courts to address the women who were victims of the sexual violence that 
occurred during both armed conflicts.84 MacKinnon also encouraged the courts to 
include more charges of sexual violence in their prosecutions,85 and supported the 
concept of ‘rape as genocide.’86 With MacKinnon and other feminists who shared her 
views, the Ad Hoc Tribunals developed a new focus on women in international 
criminal law. During this time, feminists used the conflicts in the FYR and Rwanda, 
as well as female victims, as an entrance point into the conversation on international 
law, which had long been silent on women, particularly in relation to armed conflict.87  
 
MacKinnon’s advocacy also incorporated ‘the women question,’ as she sought to 
include the experience of female victims in the work of the courts and advocated for 
more male superiors to be charged with inciting rape.88 In her writing, she notes how 
the ICTR found it difficult to charge men, not with the acts they committed 
themselves, but the acts which other men committed on their behalf, which was key 
when accusing one of inciting rape.89 MacKinnon further states that the underlying 
impression given by the prosecutors is that men would not likely commit murder 
without orders, yet they would likely rape on their own, without the orders of a 
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superior.90 This, she says, falls into the ‘boys-will-be-boys’ narrative and shows that 
the members of the ICTR do not believe that the rapes were truly the fault of the 
leaders.91 MacKinnon also states that there was a willingness to drop rape charges, 
especially when murder charges were retained, which she stated showed the tribunals’ 
lack of efforts to prosecute sexual violence.92 MacKinnon explains that there seems to 
be a higher standard of credibility for witnesses to rape than for witnesses to murder, 
and that all of these instances combined demonstrate a push towards impunity.93  
 
I agree with MacKinnon’s frustrations over the prosecution of rape; however, my 
concern with MacKinnon’s work is the hypervisibility and exclusive focus on 
conflict-related sexual violence, which produces a narrow account of women’s 
experiences in armed conflict concentrating on women’s sexual vulnerability. If rape 
always makes women victims, then it is more likely that women will be defined by 
their experience of sexual violence. MacKinnon’s work within the tribunals shows her 
efforts to examine the law while taking into account the experiences of women. 
However, it was within her efforts to include more law, which addresses the female 
victim, that MacKinnon contributed to a victim narrative. This, in turn, emphasised 
women as victims of sexual violence.94 This victim feminism emerged as international 
criminal law began to grow with the creation of the ICTY and ICTR, and the concern 
is that other feminist approaches are displaced or suppressed by the dominance of 
MacKinnon’s approach.  
 
This thesis highlights the importance of alternative feminist approaches to women’s 
experiences in armed conflict beyond the work of MacKinnon and other radical 
feminist scholarship coming from the United States and other Western spaces. 
Notably, Charlesworth states that “feminist methods emphasise conversations and 
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dialogue rather than the production of a single, triumphant truth.”95 The feminist 
methods used in this thesis challenge the hypervisibility of conflict related sexual 
violence, as well as the role of narratives, through the work of Engle.96 Kapur’s work 
develops feminist legal methodology beyond gender essentialism, recognising that 
multiple identity markers influence women’s experiences.97 This thesis also uses 
feminist methods to question the gendered tropes around women, as Charlesworth 
does with the question: “are women peaceful?”98 Similarly, Ní Aoláin, Haynes, and 
Cahn acknowledge that their study comprises of a host of feminist methodologies in 
order to develop their analysis; in order to work through different subject matter, 
different feminist theories are needed.99 Likewise, I utilise different strands of 
feminism in order to analyse the connection between gender, law, armed conflict and 
the female defendant.  
 
In order to analyse female defendants as gendered within international criminal law, 
critical legal studies provides a methodology for analysing the power structures and 
influences that are predicated upon female defendants. Critical legal studies questions 
the supposed dominant values of the international legal system,100 allowing for a 
discussion of women’s experiences in armed conflict beyond that of victimhood, 
which has preoccupied mainstream analysis of gender and armed conflict. A 
discussion of radical feminism lays the foundation for how women’s experiences in 
armed conflict were understood and interpreted with the development of international 
criminal law in the 1990s. Both feminist legal theory and critical legal studies provide 
the space to critique the ways in which law and gender can be understood differently 
through the analysis of female defendants. 
5. Female Defendants in International Criminal Law: Beyond Counting and 
Towards Justice 
There are common counterarguments that surface when female defendants are 
discussed. This section will address the most prevalent arguments against the study of 
                                                          
95 Charlesworth, ‘Feminist Methods in International Law’ (2004) 379. 
96 Engle (n 40). 
97 See Kapur, ‘Erotic Justice: Law and the New Politics of Postcolonialism’ (2005). 
98 See Charlesworth, ‘Are Women Peaceful? Reflection on the Role of Women in Peace Building’ (2008). 
99 Ni Aoláin, Haynes, and Cahn, On the Frontlines: Gender, War, and the Post-Conflict Process (2011) 4. 
100 Kennedy, The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism (2004) 328. 
  
35 
 
female defendants. In my attempt to dispel the arguments against my thesis, I do not 
intend to trivialise the issues presented or ignore the larger histories that exist within 
each claim. Instead, I recognise that every thesis topic undertaken will need to be 
defended, but defending the study of female defendants is not necessarily based upon 
the strength of argumentation. The counterarguments that surface when female 
defendants are discussed underscore all of the work in this thesis, and expose 
fundamental issues around gender, feminism, and international law. This section will 
highlight each of these counterarguments and in doing so re-establish the need for an 
analysis of female defendants with feminist accounts of armed conflict and 
international armed conflict.  
5.1 Lack of numbers 
One of the key criticisms of the study of female defendants is that there are not 
enough women who commit international crimes to warrant academic attention. 
Typically, this argument relies on counting the numbers of women brought before 
international courts; little attention is paid to the complementary role of domestic 
courts in prosecuting these crimes.  This line of reasoning intimates that a female 
defendant’s actions have not reached the same level of frequency as male defendants. 
Since men are still statistically more often accused of violence in armed conflict, 
those who follow this line of thinking reject the need to interrogate women’s actions, 
as their existence is seen as an aberration and exception, thus not warranting 
significant research. 
 
The problem with this argument is that it wrongly assumes that the number of women 
documented as taking part in armed conflict is accurate and void of gender bias. This 
counterargument also wrongly assumes that female defendants would be 
acknowledged if their actions increased in frequency. However, if the number of 
women who committed international crimes suddenly increased, then I would argue 
that the amount of stereotypical reactions to their presence would also increase. This 
would ultimately result in a lack of understanding around the reasons why women 
participate in violence and rely on stereotypical explanations to avoid further 
interrogation. Currently, when women are identified as defendants, Western society 
responds with shock and condemnation based on the fact that they are women. This 
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reinforces the view that female defendants are an aberration from the way women 
normally act.  
 
The actions of females accused need to be explained, as their crimes confront how 
women are assumed to 'behave'. In order to achieve this, the greater range of women’s 
roles in supporting armed conflict are dismissed. This creates a circular argument that 
refutes any possibility of women acting voluntarily to support armed conflicts, as well 
as the fact that their role in armed conflict might not necessarily be a result of their 
gender, but possibly due to their position in society. However, as Charlesworth has 
shown, inherent gender essentialism exists within international legal spaces, which 
confines women to essentialised roles.101 Therefore, a study of gender rather than a 
study of women proposes an analysis of how gender assumptions and stereotypes are 
continually reproduced by legal structures. Asking ‘the woman question’ is not just 
about identifying spaces where women are absent, but instead, analysing the 
assumptions made around the question itself. In other words, if it has already been 
predetermined that ‘women are peaceful,’ then feminism does not disrupt, but instead 
reasserts, the gendered status quo. 
 
Women who support armed conflict through traditional gender roles, i.e. caring for 
the wounded, moving supplies, cooking, and so on, are not considered to be directly 
involved in perpetrating crimes. However, the assumption exists that women who 
undertake roles ‘behind the scenes’ in armed conflict are innocent, less culpable, or 
forced to take part. Successful military or non-military forces require a high level of 
unseen labour that facilitates the work of those directly involved in perpetrating 
violence. When men are involved in administrative work during armed conflict, they 
are seen as either in power, making key decisions, or supporting the conflict by other 
means. In either case, the men involved in these actions are not assumed to have been 
coerced to take part. The lack of autonomy that exists in discourse around women 
engaging in armed conflict rests on the belief that women do not have agency within 
the conflict or the larger society. This assumes that women who perform ‘behind the 
scenes’ tasks do not vehemently support the armed conflict themselves, and are not 
decision-makers during periods of hostility. While I am not suggesting that women 
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who, for example, cook for paramilitary forces should be classified as female 
defendants, but the example above is meant to highlight the differences between the 
perception of men and women’s agency in armed conflict. 
 
The number of women who perpetrate crimes in armed conflict is irrelevant, as the 
focus on numbers ignores the larger issue of access to power in society. This assumes 
that if women ran governments state violence would be eradicated. However, the 
existence of female leaders such as Plavšić in the FYR and Nyiramasuhuko in 
Rwanda demonstrate that women in power can exhibit the same weaknesses as men, 
which is an area of feminist international legal scholarship that has yet to be 
sufficiently addressed. To presume that women would need to perpetrate the same 
number of crimes as men before further interrogation of female defendants is 
warranted also assumes that there is nothing to be gained from examining all of the 
various roles women play in armed conflict.  
5.2 Harming women who experience sexual violence in armed conflict 
Another common perception is that focusing on women who commit international 
crimes takes attention away from those women who are harmed by conflict-related 
sexual violence. This argument highlights the struggle women face to gain recognition 
internationally for the violence they experience in armed conflict; in particular, sexual 
violence. Likewise, this argument assumes that if there is an acknowledgement that 
women also perpetrate violence during conflict, including sexual violence, then the 
work done to combat sexual violence against women will no longer take focus or 
appear necessary. International law attempts to stop sexual violence against women in 
armed conflict, but in doing so, it has made women appear hyper-vulnerable, 
therefore requiring special protection. These two elements rely on each other: ‘she’ is 
vulnerable so deserves protection, time, money, resources, and due to the 
hypervisibility of women as victims of sexual violence, ‘she’ remains all the more 
vulnerable.  
 
This counterargument is grounded in the concern that exposing the violence women 
perpetrate would convince people that women are not worthy of their time or 
attention, even when they are victims of violence, because they have been exposed to 
be violent themselves. The argument also suggests that if women are identified as 
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defendants, this might also lose all women a seat at the negotiation table – although 
male violence has never lost men a seat at the negotiating table, or a place in the 
decision-making process. Some would suggest that drawing attention to female 
defendants is almost celebrating a ‘race to the bottom,’ joyously declaring that women 
can be just as ‘bad’ as men. However, I am not satisfied with these claims, and I am 
not content, as a woman, with having a place in international law if I am restricted by 
which topics I may or may not discuss. It is as if international law has finally opened 
up to women, allowing them to voice concerns over sexual violence, and because of 
this, women have accepted the accompanying limitations. This argument also infers 
judgement upon anyone who decides to examine international criminal, humanitarian 
law, or armed conflict instead of focusing on women as victims of sexual violence.  
 
Throughout the thesis, I work from the premise that research on female defendants 
can and should sit alongside research on women as victims. What both topics have in 
common is the recognition of women’s diverse and gendered experiences in armed 
conflict. This does not mean that women are only female defendants or victims; they 
can be both, or neither. What is important to understand from each of these debates is 
the nuance that exists within armed conflict, and the gendered limitations in 
international criminal law which ignore these aspects of women’s lives. This thesis is 
not a celebration of female defendants as an expression of female agency, but an 
inquiry into how gendered assumptions are produced in legal accounts of female 
violence.  
5.3 Irrelevant to international criminal law  
A criticism that focuses primarily on the mechanism of international criminal law 
purports that if female defendants are an area of study, then they should reside in the 
area of gender or feminist studies. This argument states that female defendants do not 
belong in academic work around international criminal law, as international criminal 
legal analysis is not benefited by a discussion on female defendants.  
 
Mainstream approaches to international criminal law may not identify the relevance 
of analysing legal responses to female defendants, but that does not mean that 
feminist approaches do not have resonance within the realm of international criminal 
law. Feminist approaches to international criminal law have steadily expanded since 
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the 1990s and the creation of the Ad Hoc Tribunals. International criminal law 
benefits from the analysis of female defendants for a multitude of reasons. Namely, 
female defendants identify flaws in the structure of international criminal law, which 
can lead to its repair. At a moment when international criminal law seems to be losing 
ground, with more and more states leaving the International Criminal Court, and more 
critiques waged against the work of the present court as well as past international 
criminal mechanisms, international criminal law needs to refocus and readjust. I am 
not arguing that this thesis solves the issues faced by international criminal law at this 
moment,102 but what a study on female defendants can achieve is the recognition that 
the work undertaken through international criminal law’s mechanisms has, in many 
cases, limited the way gender, race, ethnicity, class and sexuality are represented. In 
this thesis, I explore gender as an embedded bias in law that interlocks with other sites 
of bias through the analysis of legal representations of female defendants.  
5.4 A minor issue   
Lastly, there is a criticism that states that the study of female defendants is a minor 
issue that only exists as an area of extremely specialised study which does not 
influence the larger tenets of international law or feminist studies. This 
counterargument also links to my previous point, reiterating that there are other issues 
more deserving of attention than female defendants. To be clear, this study does not 
find more of an issue with female defendants’ actions than the actions of male 
defendants. Criminal acts are wrong no matter who perpetrates them, and drawing 
attention to female defendants does not celebrate their actions. The reason it is 
necessary to analyse female defendants is partially due to the shock and condemnation 
people express when confronted with women who commit crimes because they are 
women, and not because of the appalling nature of the crime itself. There is often the 
perception that the criminal act is worse when a woman is found to be the perpetrator. 
This thesis identifies the ways in which the international media, feminists, and 
international law are reflective of the Western perspective. Upon interrogating the 
existence of female defendants and their interaction with the international media, 
feminists, and international law, larger issues around women’s existence in society are 
                                                          
102 See Rogers, ‘International Criminal Court’ (2018); de Hoon, ‘The Future of the International 
Criminal Court. On Critique, Legalism and Strengthening the ICC’s Legitimacy’ (2017). 
  
40 
 
highlighted. What becomes especially apparent is our hesitation to recognise women 
who do not fit under the category of either victim or peacemaker.  
 
5.5 The future of research on female defendants 
The future of research on female defendants remains tenuous.103 One of the 
aspirations of this work has been to illuminate the nuances around the study of female 
defendants, and the reasons why they remain on the periphery of conflict narratives, if 
they exist at all. This in turn seeks to highlight the greater extent of women’s roles in 
armed conflict, which should aid in future post-conflict justice. My concern is that 
female defendants will continue to be excluded from conflict narratives, absent in the 
histories of future courts or tribunals, and treated as aberrations by international media 
outlets. If this were to be realised, international criminal law would not benefit, and 
nor would feminist studies. From a practical standpoint, with the recent rise of women 
involved in terrorist activities, women will continue to play a predominant role in 
committing violence, and always have.104 In order to better prevent such crimes, 
women must be seen to be a part of potential violence. However, due to the presumed 
religious affiliation of the women involved in terrorist activities, there is a larger 
concern that the same mistakes will be repeated as they were in the FYR, Rwanda, 
and Cambodia. The intersection of gender, race, sexuality, class, ethnicity, religion 
and colonialism needs to be better understood in order to properly assess the existence 
of female terrorists.  
 
International criminal law must adapt in order to meet the needs of the diverse 
situations to which it is required to respond. If international criminal law continues to 
remain rigid and incapable of moving beyond gender assumptions of women who are 
accused of perpetrating international crimes, then international law is unable to live 
up to its potential. It is possible that international criminal law may transform into a 
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hybrid system that that includes international and local legal perspectives, as well as 
aspects of the Asia Pacific Women’s Hearings, which allow for a more transformative 
relationship for those affected by the violence.105 Up to this point, there has not been 
an international forum that has moved beyond gendered assumptions with regard to 
women accused of international crimes. At the very least, this thesis represents one 
more perspective that highlights the multiplicity of women’s roles in armed conflict. I 
am hopeful that the work done within this thesis will contribute towards a reimagining 
of international criminal law’s assumptions about the gendered experiences of victims 
and violators.  
6. Structure  
Chapter Two will define the following key terms used in this thesis: ‘gender,’ 
‘feminism,’ ‘perpetrator,’ ‘defendant,’ ‘suspect’ and ‘narrative.’ The reason for 
defining my terminology is to clearly detail my approach when utilising these words 
throughout the thesis. Chapter Two contains a literature review of key scholarship on 
female perpetrators, defendants and suspects, including the work of Smeulers, Linton, 
Hogg and Sjoberg and Gentry. This chapter also examines scholarship that informs 
my theoretical framework, utilising the work of Charlesworth, Kapur, Engle, and 
Halley.  
 
Chapter Three highlights the development of international criminal law, as well as the 
relevant elements from the wider subject of international law, which are necessary to 
discuss in order to understand the position of the female defendant in international 
criminal law and Western legal interventions. The major developments of 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law in the second half 
of the twentieth century are also introduced in this chapter, with special attention to 
women’s rights and the international community’s turn to humanitarian concerns, 
which has resulted in the increased focus on conflict-related sexual violence within 
international law. Chapter Three also details the liberal and radical feminist agendas 
within US and Western feminist histories which have focused on conflict-related 
sexual violence against women. Each of these areas of international legal 
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development are essential to establish prior to undertaking the work in the following 
chapters.  
 
Chapters Four, Five, and Six of the thesis focus on a specific international criminal 
intervention, with Chapter Seven synthesising the information gathered in the 
previous three, in order to understand the connection between local transitional justice 
projects and domestic courts as spaces of prosecution of international crimes and 
international law. Chapters Four, Five, and Six take into account Western feminist 
interventions, international criminal law, and the media – primarily the global media 
based in the US and the UK. Each chapter builds upon the work of the previous 
chapter in order to map the evolution of women’s autonomy in international criminal 
law through the lens of the female defendant. Chapters Four through Six each 
demonstrate a unique post-conflict situation and the different elements that influence 
the understanding of female defendants in each context, although it is argued that each 
situation – while specific – speaks to the wider conceptions held by the international 
legal community pertaining to women’s experiences in armed conflict.  
 
Chapter Four focuses on the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, along 
with the media campaign that influenced the international response to the crisis in the 
1990s, including the UN military intervention and the feminist intervention that 
focused on addressing sexual violence. The role of Western feminist interventions in 
influencing the work of the ICTY is discussed and analysed. Each of these elements 
fit into the construction of women as victims during the armed conflict of the FYR, 
and therefore contribute to the fiction that women were not perpetrators of violence 
and crime. This set the framework for developments in international criminal law over 
the following two decades. The trial of Biljana Plavšić is analysed in Chapter Four to 
highlight how her case reinforces notions of femininity, while simultaneously citing 
her crimes as an aberration from women’s usual activities in armed conflict. Local 
processes will also be taken into account in Chapter Four. The focus on sexual 
violence jurisprudence by international criminal law and Western feminist 
intervention created a narrative of women as victims in armed conflict. I argue that 
the hypervisibility of women as victims in the conflict and the reliance on gender 
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binaries by the ICTY limits the visibility of female defendants, as women’s 
experiences in the FYR remain tied to sexual vulnerability.106 
 
Chapter Five analyses the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, again focusing 
on the global media attention that highlighted the volatility of Africa and also 
distanced (Western) viewers from the genocide and its aftermath. The ICTR is 
examined through the case of Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, which details an example of a 
female perpetrator who was charged for inciting acts of sexual violence, offering a 
unique perspective on the representation of both masculinity and femininity in 
international criminal law. The Gacaca Courts will also be discussed in relation to 
female defendants. I also analyse the assumptions around race in accounts of the 
Rwandan genocide in order to interrogate the reactions of the international 
community, including the role of Western feminist interventions that supported the 
establishment and development of the ICTR, the role of international media and the 
contours of international criminal law. This analysis underscores the complexity 
around recognising the female defendant as an autonomous agent before the law and, 
in particular, the necessity of understanding how perceptions of race and gender 
function to reproduce specific outcomes within international law.107  
 
Chapter Six analyses the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, which 
is unique in terms of the number of female defendants brought before the court and 
mentioned in court documents. Ieng Thirith, Khieu Ponnary, Yun Yat and Im Chaem 
are all recognised as having been instrumental to the Khmer Rouge regime. However, 
the problems within the ECCC, as well as the Western conceptions of women and 
marriage in Cambodia, create an assumption that the women in the Khmer Rouge did 
not have any ‘real’ form of agency during the genocide.108  
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Chapter Seven analyses the binary constructed between the international and the local 
through law, and international criminal law in particular, in order to gather insight 
into the way gender and female defendants are constructed given the importance of 
complementarity in international criminal law. The insights from this thesis in relation 
to international criminal law are discussed in Chapter Seven, as well the ways in 
which they can be applied to create an international justice system that enlarges, 
rather than reproduces, perceptions of gender and gendered experiences, as well the 
ways that culture, race and class are reproduced within international law. In Chapter 
Seven I argue that the movement of knowledge between the international and the 
local with regards to international law and armed conflict needs to be rethought. The 
future of international criminal law must include the nuances garnered from 
examining female defendants. These nuances are at once gendered in our perceptions 
and reactions. Yet ultimately, this thesis highlights the need to recognise that women 
who commit international crimes are human in their abuse of power, rather than 
excessive or aberrant in their performance of gender.   
 
In this thesis, I assert that due to international criminal law and Western feminist 
interventions influenced by both media representations of women’s experiences and 
the armed conflicts themselves, female defendants have not featured as a part of 
mainstream conflict narratives. The benefits of analysing female defendants within 
international criminal law become apparent when a gender analysis is applied. 
Overall, the thesis contributes to an original and innovative analysis of the gendered 
tropes within international criminal law: not from the assumption of women’s sexual 
vulnerability, but rather an acceptance that women can also play leadership roles in 
the commission of international crimes.  
7. Audience 
This project should be read through the main tenets of international criminal law and 
international law itself, as opposed to simply an addition to the work on law and 
gender that only speaks to other feminists.109 The audience for this work is both 
international legal academics and those who engage with the work of Western 
feminists in international criminal law. While the relationship between Western 
                                                          
109 Charlesworth, ‘Talking to Ourselves? Feminist Scholarship in International Law’ in Kouvo and 
Pearson (Eds.) Feminist Perspectives on Contemporary International Law (2011). 
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feminism and female perpetrator is an important discussion for feminists who wish to 
interrogate the influence of the Western feminist agenda in the 1990s to international 
criminal law and the Women Peace and Security agenda, this relationship is also 
important for the international legal or international criminal legal scholar. The 
discussion of female perpetrators, defendants, and suspects highlights the complexity 
of women’s experiences during armed conflict, and the limitations faced when 
international criminal law engages with these women. A study of female defendants 
therefore helps us to develop discussions around the role of international criminal law 
in history-telling and narrative production, which is ultimately circumscribed by its 
gendered structure. Returning to the Butler quotation with which the chapter opened, 
seeing women as fully human requires letting go of the image of the peaceful, 
venerable subject of feminist approaches and acknowledging that women will 
sometimes act violently in positions of power.                                              
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Chapter Two 
 Positioning Female Defendants 
 
While female defendants are the focus of the thesis, the goal of this research was 
never to simply recount the stories that lead to women becoming defendants. 
Structuring the thesis around the instances where women participate or are accused of 
participating with the violence of armed conflict provides the space for broader 
gender and legal analysis. Attempting to ascertain the reason why the experiences of 
female perpetrators, defendants, and suspects are outside of mainstream international 
criminal law’s accounts, therefore involves the examination of the much larger 
narrative around feminist strategies in international criminal law. The recent work of 
Halley, Kotiswaran, Rebouche, and Shamir focuses on governance feminism, which 
they define as, “every form in which feminists and feminist ideas exert a governing 
will within human affairs”.1 The topic of governance feminism provides a starting 
point for the work of this chapter, which includes a detailing of the literature and 
theoretical framework that supports and shapes the thesis. 
 
Discussing governance feminism, in the thesis, offers engagement with the work of 
“state, state-like, and state-affiliated power”,2 particularly in its relationship with 
international criminal law. This is illustrated through the discussions on US and 
Western feminist interventions into international criminal law in the 1990s. Halley, 
states that governance feminism has produced many positives, but has also produced 
‘terrible mistakes’, which are important to ‘take stock of':3 this is precisely the work 
the thesis is undertaking. The thesis utilises governance feminism by looking at 
feminist achievements in international criminal law and reevaluating their success 
through the lens of the female defendant. Dominance feminism, found in 
MacKinnon’s scholarship and activism,4 has produced important gains that have 
encouraged the prosecution of conflict related sexual violence. However, in the push 
to see women as victims of sexual violence the female defendant was left out of focus. 
                                                          
1 Halley et al., Governance Feminism: An Introduction (2018) ix. 
2 ibid x. 
3 ibid. 
4 ibid 25-39. 
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At the same time, feminist approaches to armed conflict and international criminal 
law became narrowed to the exclusion of alternative analysis on gender and 
intersectionality. The differences in feminist perspectives are evident in the 
governance.  
1. Terms  
Gender 
Throughout the thesis, my approach to gender finds Scott’s work a starting point; she 
writes that construction of the concept of gender is in no way related to the actual 
physical body, rather it is social organisations that shape how gender is perceived.5 
Masculinity and femininity, therefore, demonstrate relations of power and by defining 
certain aspects of the political or social realm as masculine or feminine create a 
hierarchy.6 Butler discusses gender as something that is different for each individual, 
which is also constructed through language.7 Indeed, for Butler gender comes before 
sex or sex difference. It is through framing debates with gender in mind that shifts the 
focus of this project from only a woman’s perspective to a perspective that can 
incorporate the different social implications masculinity and femininity imply.8 It is 
useful to map the way ideas of masculinity and femininity clash when people describe 
female defendants, as female defendants are charged with crimes in international 
criminal law that are often attributed to men in armed conflict.  
 
Those who seek to describe female defendants often highlight their behaviour as 
shocking, not because the behaviour is shocking but, because they are women and it is 
assumed women do not act in this manner. As a result, female defendant’s actions or 
demeanour are described as unfeminine or masculine, as if they are citing this as an 
excuse for their crime.9 Holland refers to Butler’s notion that ‘natural’ gender 
behaviours require ‘performative acts’ to be constantly reproduced; however, the 
continuity between these ‘natural’ acts may be disturbed when certain actions fall into 
                                                          
5 Scott, ‘Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis’ (1986) 1068-1070. 
6 ibid 1063. 
7 Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (1990 7-13. 
8 ibid. 
9 Drumbl, “She Makes Me Ashamed to Be a Woman”: The Genocide Conviction of Pauline 
Nyiramasuhuko 2011’ (2013) 559. 
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different, ‘unnatural’ categories, much like the female defendant’s actions.10 The 
process of identifying actions as subversive also goes against the ‘normal’ gender 
categories; this is present when female criminals are described as exceptional.11  
 
Charlesworth and Chinkin define gender as capturing “the ascribed, social nature of 
distinctions between women and men—the excess cultural baggage associated with 
biological sex”.12 Gender includes the idea of ‘relationality’ connecting the 
descriptions of what is masculinity and femininity.13 Charlesworth and Chinkin state 
that, sex, as biological difference focusing on the body, is equally as important as 
gender to the study of international law, whereby sex and gender differences shape 
international legal structures.14 Cohn highlights how understandings of gender are 
interconnected to ideas of war. Cohn states: 
 the institutions that are constitutive of the wider economic, political, social, 
and environmental processes formative of war are themselves structured in 
ways that both draw on and produce ideas about gender, that rely on gendered 
individuals in order to function.15 
The way gender is defined and thereby influences legal arrangements is not neutral; 
rather it is hierarchical and embedded in power structures, which privileges certain 
individuals and ideas. The ordering of individuals based on gender produces 
inequalities that can be supported by legal institutions. Gender, however, is not the 
only site of oppression. Race, class, ethnicity, and socio-economic status all 
contribute towards the ordering of individuals, which underscores the importance of 
understanding the intersectionality of gender with other identity markers.16 
 
In order to explore how law limits the ways women are able to express themselves, it 
must also be understood that masculinity is a social concept that prevents men from 
forms of expression that lay outside of the stereotypical tenets of masculinity. 
                                                          
10 Holland, ‘The Enigmatic Lynndie England: Gendered Explanations for the Crisis at Abu Ghraib’ 
(2009) 246-248. 
11 ibid 250. 
12 Charlesworth and Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist Analysis (2000) 3. 
13 ibid. 
14 ibid. 
15 Cohn, Women and Wars: Contested Histories, Uncertain Futures (2013) 3. 
16 See Crenshaw, ‘Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against 
Women of Color’ (1993); Yuval-Davis, ‘Intersectionality and Feminist Politics’ (2006).  
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Therefore, law is equally as important to explore from this perspective. This approach 
invokes a different set of debates that move away from an assumption that all men 
benefit when women are oppressed and toward the idea that men are also affected by 
gendered power structures in law. This is especially the case when someone does not 
wish to identify with either category of man or woman. It is also important to 
acknowledge that women are a socially constructed category that only exists in a 
binary with the socially constructed category of men.17 Each in turn invokes the other 
and a range of assumptions around the performance of femininity and masculinity are 
produced. Law’s ability to reinforce certain aspects of masculinity and femininity as 
well as limit both genders, while retaining ‘gender neutral’ language is a discussion 
that underpins inquiry into an embedded bias in the discourse of international criminal 
law. In this thesis, consider how international criminal law and the US and Western 
feminist intervention understand gender and how that understanding might be 
different when female defendants are the focus of study. 
 
Feminism 
I am careful to recognise the large variance, internationally, in the term 'feminism', 
and I also acknowledge the difference in and amongst Western feminist spaces. When 
discussing feminism the thesis takes a critical feminist approaches that draws on 
critical legal scholarship, and a combination of postmodern work, Butler and Scott, 
and post-colonial methods, Kapur. However, within this thesis, I use 'Western 
feminism' to identify the intervention of feminists from the West, namely the United 
States, into international criminal law in the 1990s, around the topic of sexual 
violence against women in armed conflict. This intervention was a specific radical 
feminist approach connected to MacKinnon’s dominance thesis.18 I further argue that 
the topic of female defendants benefits feminism by exposing the nuance of women’s 
experiences in armed conflict. As a result of the analysis around female defendants, 
stereotypes of women’s peacefulness are disrupted, which contribute towards critical 
legal studies indeterminacy thesis, radical feminism focus on gender and conflict, and 
post-colonial studies desire to look beyond gender in global manifestations. 
                                                          
17 While I continually use the term ‘woman’ throughout the thesis, I recognise the assumption I am 
making. I utilise this term in order to emphasise gender power dynamics. When I write that an 
individual is a ‘woman’ I am doing so based on references already made in international and local 
spaces, which highlights part of the problem. 
18 MacKinnon, Towards a Feminist Theory of the State (1989). 
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Perpetrators, Defendants, and Suspects  
'Female perpetrators' are women who have been found guilty of committing crimes 
during armed conflict, that are illegal under international or domestic law. The 
category ‘female perpetrator’ is narrower than the term ‘female defendant', as it infers 
a successful prosecution of to those women who have been brought before courts or 
tribunals, in both national and international jurisdictions.  
 
My definition of (and focus on) 'female defendants' encompasses all women who 
garner attention from the criminal justice system, by being formally accused, and may 
or may not be found guilty. These women have been indicted for crimes illegal under 
domestic laws of war or international criminal law.19 The term ‘female suspects’, is 
the broadest category and refers to those who are reasonably believed to have taken 
part in illegal acts during armed conflict but have not been formally accused in a court 
of law. A continuum exists encompassing women’s experiences, which includes 
female perpetrators, defendants, and suspects as well as female victims and I argue, in 
order to understand women’s experiences of armed conflict, one must acknowledge 
the extremes of women’s behaviour. 
 
Narrative 
The discussion of narrative throughout this thesis takes on Heathcote’s approach to 
‘law as narrative’. Heathcote states, “law as narrative is a reference to the possibility 
of law as one telling among many rather than presenting law as an objective and 
universal standard.”20 Heathcote highlights the use of narrative in academic work as a 
way to disrupt law’s prominence in societal structures, and as a way of including of 
                                                          
19 See generally, the First Hague Conference (May 18–July 29, 1899) adopted three conventions and 
three declarations and the Second Hague Conference (July 15–October 18, 1907) adopted 13 
conventions and one declaration; See also The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field 75 UNTS 31, adopted in 1864, 
revised in 1949; The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea 75 UNTS 85, adopted in 1949; The Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 5 UNTS 135, adopted in 1929, revision in 
1949; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 75 UNTS 287, 
adopted on 12 August 1949; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) 1125 UNTS 3, 
adopted on 8 June 1977; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) 1125 UNTS 
6098, adopted on June 1977. 
20 Heathcote, ‘Feminist Legal Approaches and International Law on the Use of Force’ in The Law on 
the Use of Force: A Feminist Analysis (2011) 15. 
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experiences outside of mainstream understandings, highlighting the limitations of 
traditional international legal approaches.21 In the thesis 'narrative' is an important 
element that is utilised in order to identify the instances in which international law and 
the Western feminist agenda shapes and gives meaning to the way women’s lives are 
understood during and after armed conflict. In the context of this thesis, narrative is 
also developed through international media coverage of female defendants, which 
frame societal understandings of women who participate in armed conflict, and it is 
that limited viewpoint of women’s roles that this thesis challenges. Narratives have 
developed not only around female defendants, but around women as victims in armed 
conflict, which in turn has limited the visibility of female defendants. In the following 
section three common narratives about female defendants will be detailed. 
2. Literature Review- Exploring Common Narratives 
This section will highlight three narratives that permeate the work around women as 
perpetrators, defendants, and suspects. The three narratives include: the assumption 
that an explanation is needed when women move outside of traditional female roles, 
the justification of female defendants’ presence within international criminal legal 
discourse, and the hypervisibility of women as victims of sexual violence. Each of 
these narratives are evident in Western feminist interventions, international criminal 
law, as well as in international media representations of female defendants. The 
importance of highlighting and refuting each of these claims is to address the tropes 
that limit the acknowledgement of women as defendants in Western feminist and 
international criminal legal discourse. This is linked to a failure to see women as 
political leaders/agents and women as equally vulnerable to corrupting effects of 
power as men. However, before exploring narratives on female defendants, I will first 
discuss the key literature in the field of female defendants.  
 
In their seminal text, Sjoberg and Gentry, use the terms, ‘mothers’, ‘monsters’, and 
‘whores’, which are deeply connected to social constructions of femininity, in order to 
describe the gendered depictions of women who are violent and to highlight that a 
violent woman is often imagined as one or the other.22 Sjoberg and Gentry recognise 
                                                          
21 ibid. Traditional international legal theories include positive law, natural law, and formalism, and 
instrumentalism.  
22 See Sjoberg and Gentry, Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Women’s Violence in Global Politics (2007). 
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the gender bias evident in the reactions to female violence and question the ways in 
which these reactions have shaped legal institutions and global politics. Focusing on 
the categories of ‘mother’, ‘monster’, and ‘whore’ allow Sjoberg and Gentry the 
opportunity to draw out the instances were women who commit violent/criminal acts 
are viewed only through the lens of gender stereotypes, devoid of agency.  
 
Smeuler utilises Sjoberg and Gentry’s work and highlights key issues surrounding the 
topic of female defendants, cataloguing an array of instances where women have 
participated in mass atrocity.23 The gendered stereotypes of armed conflict, the use of 
sexual violence as a weapon of war, the multitude of different ways women 
participate in ‘mass violence’,24 the gendered tropes that surface in literature and the 
media when women are discovered to have taken part in violence and conflict,25 and 
the cases of Plavšić and Nyiramasuhuko,26 are all discussed by Smeulers.27 This is an 
important contribution to the area of female defendants and I build upon Smeulers’ 
work in the thesis. However, Smeulers’ approach and purpose differs to the approach 
of this thesis. While she draws on armed conflict as well as media representations to 
identify the bias that exists when female defendants are discussed, Smeulers also 
explores motives of women who are involved in mass violence.28  
 
The purpose of this thesis is not to explore why women take part in violence, but 
rather to understand if conceptions of gender, violence, and the law shift when female 
defendants are the focus of analysis. Building upon this, I question the gendered 
representations of female defendants found in the media and the narratives produced 
by media sources, which in turn contribute towards understanding how 
representations of female defendants influence international criminal trials and legal 
systems. Another difference between Smeulers’ work and the thesis is my discussion 
of victim feminism (or governance feminism) and the work of US and Western 
feminists in the 1990s, both of which I see as instrumental in the topic of female 
defendants, but is not included in Smeulers analysis.  
                                                          
23 Smeulers, ‘Female Perpetrators: Ordinary or Extra-ordinary Women?’ (2015).  
24 ibid 211-227. 
25 ibid 227-234. 
26 ibid 235-241. 
27 ibid 208-211. 
28 ibid 241-251. 
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Linton’s work is concerned with women accused of international crimes or as she 
abbreviates the phrase, WAIC.29 Linton seeks to develop WAIC as its own area of 
research and highlights the need to better understand women’s roles in ‘atrocity’. 
Linton’s work, like Smeuler’s, offers important scholarship on the topic of female 
defendants and lays the groundwork for some of the key questions in this emerging 
field, such as the relationship of power and leadership to women’s violence.30 
Linton’s focus, however, is ‘trans-disciplinary’ and takes care to identify the presence 
of women in various conflicts,31 utilising the benefits of criminology, psychology, 
scholarship on globalisation, masculinity, femininity, and historical examples of 
women who commit crimes, to understand the new field of WAIC in greater context 
than just the acts of violence themselves (although Linton is interested in this as well).  
 
Linton’s work moves from a more general discussion on female criminality to women 
specifically involved in armed conflicts. Linton recognises that the rhetoric on 
‘women as victims’ has influenced understandings of women who are accused of 
committing international crimes.32 Due to the broad approach in Linton’s work, this 
thesis differs in its narrowness. While Linton does highlights some similar questions 
around victim rhetoric, gender bias, power, and leadership, she points out herself that 
the work ‘raise more questions than answers’,33 which is due to the fact that Linton is 
mapping a new field of study. Alternatively, this thesis is not interested in 
criminology or a discussion of different types of criminal participation, rather I am 
focused on female defendants in order to better understand gender, armed conflict, 
and the law. 
 
Drumbl writes on women’s roles in genocide and specifically on the case of 
Nyiramasuhuko, which was characterised by problematic assumptions about women 
and mothers.34 Drumbl highlighted that the gender neutrality of Nyiramasuhuko’s 
                                                          
29 See Linton, ‘Women Accused of International Crimes: A Trans-Disciplinary Inquiry and 
Methodology’ (2016). 
30 ibid 162. 
31 ibid 164-174. 
32 ibid 200. 
33 ibid 159. 
34 Drumbl (n 9). 
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judgment, despite the gendered media coverage and comments in court,35 may have 
indicated a missed opportunity to interrogate the reality of Nyiramasuhuko’s 
motivation and greater understanding of femininities and masculinities.36  Drumbl 
encourages a viewpoint that recognises the reality of armed conflict and therefore 
women who perpetrate crimes, in order to fully encompass multitude of factors that 
influence those who participate in mass violence. This approach, Drumbl sees as key 
for 'reconciliation and prevention', a viewpoint this thesis also supports.37 Drumbl’s 
work is expanded upon in this thesis, through the discussions on female defendants in 
the FYR and Cambodia. This thesis also implicates Western feminism in its 
interrogation of international legal and media engagement with female defendants.  
 
Sjoberg cites the rhetoric around Boko Haram as an example of idealising gender 
roles for men and women in conflict, and due to this the presence of female 
defendants, within that conflict, are impossible to integrate into this narrative.38  
Similarly, Coulter discusses the presence of female fighters throughout Africa and 
how many fail to see these women as anything but victims, further limiting their 
reintegration into society after the cessation of hostilities.39 Simić and Smeulers detail 
the existence of women as active defendants of violence in the FYR, and focus on the 
need to look beyond stereotypes of women as victims.40 McLeod identifies the biases 
that exist in peacebuilding and peacekeeping in relation to gender. McLeod notes that 
there are normative judgements in the way questions are asked post-conflict, these 
judgements offer embedded assumptions about armed conflict.41  Each of these 
authors detail a different example of women who commit crimes in armed conflict or 
engage in violent activities and the resistance in recognising their participation in 
                                                          
35 ibid 583. 
36 ibid 581. 
37 ibid 599. 
38 See Sjoberg, ‘Women as Wartime Rapists: Beyond Sensation and Stereotyping’ (2016); Halley, 
‘Rape in Berlin: Reconsidering the Criminalisation of Rape in the International Law of Armed 
Conflict’ (2008). 
39 See Coulter, Bush Wives and Girl Soldiers Women's Lives through War and Peace in Sierra Leone 
(2006). 
40 See Forthcoming Simić and Smeulers, “People who know her would never believe this”: Female 
War Crime Defendants in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ in Mouthaan and Jurasz (Eds.), Gendered 
Experiences of Armed Conflict: International and Transitional Justice Perspectives (2018). 
41 See McLeod, ‘Gender and Peace Settlements from a Quantitative Perspective: A global survey’ 
(2014) Working Papers in Gender and Institutional Change. 
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these roles. This resistance exists in the context of academic scholarship, the media, 
and post-conflict justice processes.  
 
In this thesis, I build on the existing scholarship, to develop an extended study of the 
representation of female defendants in international criminal law and in Western 
feminist interventions into international criminal law. However, unlike the existing 
texts my study focuses on legal, media, and feminist representations to provide an 
analysis of international criminal law, its limits and potential. Where Sjoberg and 
Gentry tell the stories and describe key examples, and Coulter or MacKenzie focus 
largely on female combatants, this work seeks to push beyond description toward and 
embedded analysis of female defendants in the context of international criminal law. 
Smeulers, Linton, Drumbl’s contributions all underscore the importance of engaging 
with discussions on female perpetrators, defendants, and suspects. However, my work 
differs in its engagement with the US and Western Feminist interventions into 
international criminal law.  
 
Examining the existence of female defendants during armed conflict as well as 
interrogating the lack of visibility of female defendants in Western feminist dialogues 
and international criminal law, is a way of working through the social constructions 
that dictate what defines a woman. Focusing on female defendants also allows 
international criminal law to be critiqued and some of its inadequacies to be exposed, 
in particular its need to uphold binaries around gender and agency such as 
male/female, which directly corresponds to the binary of violator/victim.  Moreover, 
international legal discourse benefits from the study of female defendants as a means 
to offer new insight into the ways in which international interventions, in the form of 
international criminal law, act as a mode of regulation. The work of Western 
feminism, is also affected and constrained by the current rhetoric that limits the 
representation of women to one of victimhood.42   
 
At the same time, research on female defendants opens up a discussion of Western 
notions of gender, class, and race deployed by those in power in the international 
                                                          
42 See Heathcote and Otto (Eds.), Rethinking Peacekeeping Gender Equality and Collective Security 
(2014). 
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criminal courts and tribunals. As discussed above the link between the 
acknowledgement of female defendants and the understanding that women have the 
ability to perpetrate violence is important to address.  The way women who deploy 
violence are understood within law is not a new area of debate and indeed scholars 
have discussed the general aversion of the academic and legal communities to depict 
females as capable of committing violent crimes.43 For example, Engle notes how the 
ICTY and ICTR has denied women as criminals, political actors, military actors, and 
capable of being in charge of their own sexuality.44 The resistance to seeing women as 
violent is apparent in the lack of visibility around female defendants and functions as 
a corollary to the hypervisibility of women as victims in armed conflict. While the 
ICTR and ICTY do not explicitly deny women’s roles in armed conflict, the Tribunals 
are structured in a manner that more often represents women’s experiences of harm. 
This example shows how the link between the understanding that women are violent 
is connected to the way specific conflicts have characterised women’s roles, leading 
to the lack of acknowledgment of women’s roles in perpetrating crimes. Charlesworth 
states more broadly that international law only addresses women when they are 
victims.45  
 
This project builds upon previous feminist work in international law that analyses the 
hypervisibility of the ‘women as victims’ narrative to stress the necessity of seeing 
females as potentially violent and understanding women’s violence as a predictable 
component of any armed conflict. In addition, this research will also focus special 
attention upon the understanding of female defendants in international criminal law; 
identifying the ways in which the structure of international criminal law is embedded 
within a gendered binary understanding of victim and defendant, which causes the 
entire mechanism of international criminal law to provide limited post-conflict justice. 
 
                                                          
43 See Ehrenreich, ‘Feminism’s Assumptions Upended’ (LA Times, 16 May 2007) 171; Melone, 
‘We’ve Come a Long, and Wrong, Way’ (Tampa Bay Times, 7 May 2004); Gronnvoll, ‘Gender 
(In)Visibility at Abu Ghraib’(2007) 373.   
44 Engle, ‘Judging Sex in War’ (2008) 954-956. 
45 Charlesworth, 'International Law: A Discipline of Crisis' (2002) 389. 
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There have been concerted developments in jurisprudence pertaining to women’s 
involvement in armed conflict within international criminal law since the 1990’s.46 A 
great majority of the jurisprudence that deals with women and war does so through 
the lens of the female victim; with important gains made to recognise the harms 
women experience during armed conflict. From the creation of Ad Hoc Tribunals and 
Special Courts, to the signing of the Rome Statute, international criminal law has 
increasingly addressed sexual violence crimes committed against women in conflict 
situations.47 This has been evident in the ICTY, ICTR, and ECCC among others. 
Considering the large amounts of women who have suffered and suffer in 
contemporary armed conflicts,48 these advancements in jurisprudence signal, at the 
very least, the progression of awareness of women’s experiences of harm during 
armed conflict. While women have and continue to be victimised in multiple ways 
throughout an armed conflicts duration, and while violence is often sexual and 
gendered in nature, this only highlights certain aspects of women’s participation in 
war. It is the actions of the female defendant that are not currently visible in 
international criminal legal discourse.  
2.1 Women outside of traditional female roles  
One of the narratives that affects the way that female defendants are understood 
imagines women in general as non-violent, inherently peaceful, and on the side of the 
‘good’.49 The work of Sjoberg and Gentry details the characteristics women are often 
assumed to inhabit and how the realities of women’s lives and women’s actions, 
which can include violence, confronts these ideas in a manner that begs for 
                                                          
46 ‘Crimes of Sexual Violence’, (ICTY Website) <http://www.icty.org/sid/10312>; Prosecutor v 
Gacumbitsi (Appeals Chamber Judgement) ICTR-2001-64-A (2006);  Prosecutor v Muhimana 
(Appeals Chamber Judgement)  ICTR-95-1 (2007); Prosecutor v Nahimana et al (Appeals Chamber 
Judgement)  ICTR-99-52-A (2007); Prosecutor v Semanza (Appeals Chamber Judgement) ICTR-97-
20-A (2005); Prosecutor vs. Brima et al (Appeals Chamber Judgement) SCSL-2004-16-A (2008); 
Prosecutor vs. Sesay et al (Trial Chamber Judgement) SCSL-04-15-T (2009); Prosecutor v Taylor 
(Trial Chamber Judgement) SCSL-03-01-T (2012); Prosecutor v Katanga (Trial Chamber Judgement) 
ICC-01/04-01/07 (2008). 
47 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, adopted by Security 
Council Resolution 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993); Statute of the International Tribunal for 
Rwanda, adopted by Security Council Resolution 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) UNGA, ‘Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court’ A/CONF.183/9 (1998) (Last Amended 2010). 
48 The fact that they have suffered is apparent. The reason behind the suffering is not as clear. Many of 
the societal and cultures norms that discriminate against women can be seen to have encouraged the 
violence women faced, recognising it is not always the conflict alone.  
49 Sjoberg and Gentry (n 22). 
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justification.50 When discussing the narratives surrounding ‘mother’, ‘monster’ and 
‘whore’ Sjoberg and Gentry state, “these narratives define what violent women are 
(less than women, less than human, crazy, sexualized, or controlled), but they also 
define what all women are (peaceful, incapable of violence, and in the personal rather 
than political sphere).”51 This is the foremost concern of Sjoberg and Gentry, that the 
narratives around violent women marginalise all women, not just those women who 
take part in violent acts.  
 
Charlesworth discusses women and their assumed peacefulness; identifying UN 
documents that have linked women and peace and highlighting situations where 
women have been involved in peace processes post-conflict, displaying a more 
complex picture than the ‘women are peacemakers’ rhetoric would indicate.52 What 
Charlesworth concludes is that women are not necessarily predisposed as 
peacemakers, and assuming so ignores the other elements of their lives and conflict 
situations.53 Furthermore, the women and peace association often assumes women 
definitively suffer the most, which in reality has not been the case in many conflicts.54 
Charlesworth suggests that the assumption that women always suffer the most 
relegates women to the vulnerable victims, however in many cases more men die and 
are held as prisoners as a result of armed conflict, and also suffer sexual violence.55  
Another issue that has played out in the focus on women as peacemakers is the 
conflation of the term ‘women’ with the term ‘gender’.56 Charlesworth sees this as 
problematic as it does not account for the power relations in society or the structures 
that exist which ignores the “performative aspects of gender”.57 Charlesworth’s work 
is especially useful for this thesis as it identifies the ‘women are predisposed to peace’ 
assumption as invalid, which has often been seen as a way to silence debates on 
women as defendants. It also highlights the danger in dialogue that limits women’s 
experiences. The work of Sjoberg and Gentry, and Charlesworth highlight that 
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gendered narratives create gendered assumptions, which become embedded in legal 
structures. The following two examples draw out the relationship between gender, 
narrative, and international crimes. 
 
Examples of women committing acts of violence are often reported in the media with 
links to gender roles; an article on Rasema Handanovic, who was referenced in the 
preface of this chapter, read, “The US single mother who was actually a war 
criminal.”58 The article's headline simultaneously emphasises her role as a mother, 
which focuses the story on the mother/war criminal dichotomy instead of her crimes 
and role in armed conflict, and highlights her ‘single mother’ status which reminds the 
reader that Handanovic falls outside of the heteronormative relationship model. Thus, 
Handanovic’s gender and sexuality are already inscribed, as relative to her crimes. 
More often than not when women are tried before international courts and tribunals 
their actions are related to their gender in ways men’s actions are not. Sjoberg and 
Gentry point to gender norms as a way of punishing women for acting outside of 
expected behaviour.59 Female defendants who are brought before either local or 
international courts are frequently shamed within the media, often based on gender. 
Men are also shamed in the global media, but not for being a ‘bad’ father; instead they 
can be shamed for the crimes they are accused of, while simultaneously be lauded as a 
model soldier or leader.60 
 
When Pauline Nyiramasuhuko was on trial in the ICTR, the US and UK media 
commented on her dress and appearance. This narrative seemingly contradicting the 
violence she perpetrated.61 Nyiramasuhuko was cited as looking like a “dear aunt” 
during trial.62 Similarly, the fact that her son was also on trial was often referred to in 
the press, this reiterated her role as a mother and her ability to steer her son towards 
committing crimes.63 Her own political agency as a leader was ignored for the most 
part. Being tried as a woman is another sort of punishment; women who are tried are 
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shamed because they are women and their gender would dictate that they should not 
have been involved in actions that would lead to criminal proceedings. Reports of 
male defendants do not include commentary on their crime as a violation of their 
masculinity or role as a father, if anything war crimes often solidify evidence of their 
gendered identity.64 War and violence has continued to reinforce and often mirror 
traditional displays of masculinity, which makes it unnecessary to cite emphasis on 
masculinity. International criminal law is designed to censor and punish excesses of 
masculinity, without disrupting their rationale behind male violence. Violence 
committed by men in armed conflict is then expected and allowed. Criminal acts are 
then masculine by definition, which leads to an assumption that men are the default 
defendants, and that peace requires a military masculine actor to understand the 
violence that precedes it. When female defendants often appear in the media tied to 
their gender, and sensationalised accounts of their crimes in relation to their gender 
thus takes the focus instead of the legal implications of their acts or the processes of 
criminal law. 
 
There is a recognised link that the international media has with the ideals in a given 
society. The global media’s inferences also point to an idea that is based within a 
Western notion of gender. Defining “the West” is not particularly straightforward, but 
in this case I am is referring to a predominately white, Christian mind-set evident 
within States in the Global North. The way women are described in the global media 
relies upon stereotypical notions of peace/violence and victim/agents, within Western 
stereotypes of women and men. In Chapter Four, I demonstrate how the media 
representation of the armed conflict positively linked the Western viewer to those 
victims of the conflict in the FYR, creating a sense that the victims ‘are just like you’, 
combined with the Western feminists focus on sexual violence in the FYR, resulted in 
the positioning of women in the FYR as victims of rape. This rhetoric left no space 
for the understanding that women were also defendants. In Chapter Five, I detail the 
media’s focus on Africa as a whole, as still dominated by brutal tribal chaos, this I 
state lead to a distancing of Western audiences from the Rwandan conflict, which 
made the focus on women as defendants more visible in academic texts (as well as in 
the ICTR), with the first women tried and convicted for rape. The constructed 
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distance between the outside viewers of the conflict, which includes the media, 
Western feminists, and legal practitioners in the ICTR, allowed female defendants to 
become more visible. However, this has not lead to a great understanding of women’s 
roles in armed conflict. In the sixth chapter I analyse the ECCC in Cambodia where 
women were more visible within the work of the court, but due to the other factors 
around the ECCC justice in Cambodia the hybrid court has ultimately been 
unsuccessful. Despite this, the time lapse between the conflict and the court may 
account for the higher awareness of women as defendants. However, this knowledge 
is not necessarily moving to the international plane. This dissonance between local 
courts of female defendants and the international courts/tribunals is addressed in 
Chapter Seven, I analyse the link between the international and local to conclude that 
the structure of international criminal law, which relegates women to victims and men 
to defendants, does not allow for women to be agents who perpetrate crimes and by 
extension ignores female political leadership and power. 
 
This work recognises that there exists nuance in the way female defendants are seen 
across societies. Scenes of women carrying machine guns engaging in violent combat 
is not necessarily surprising to those who have grown up with stories of female 
fighters, for example in contemporary Kurdistan, and therefore women who then 
commit crimes in these roles may not be cause for shock. This is not because women 
who are military or political leaders will always commit international crimes. 
However, the thesis argues that moving away from the hyper-focus on conflict related 
sexual violence towards viewing women as agents raises questions about dominant 
narratives in international criminal law.  For example, in Kurdistan where female 
fighters have been a part of the history of women’s involvements in armed conflict, 
female combatants do not feel out of the ordinary.65 The idea, is to be mindful of the 
spaces female defendants are situated in when analysing their actions in relation to 
international criminal law. One of the distinctions I am making between female 
defendants and female combatants is the presumption of criminal activity, soldiers 
carry a different level of privilege, as they required to follow international 
humanitarian law and allowed to kill within legal parameters.66 Predominately, the 
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work on female combatants centres on preventing women and girls from taking up 
arms as well as strategies for reintegrating women and girls who do participate in 
combat back into society.67 However, this thesis is not a study of female soldiers. 
 
The focus on disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration, otherwise known as 
DDR programs, in relation to the female combatant is less about culpability of those 
women who choose to participate in the hostilities of armed conflict and more on how 
to integrate women in a post-conflict climate.68 I am not suggesting that DDR 
programs must include work on punitive measure for female combatants, as this work 
is not within the purview of this thesis, and I do acknowledge that some perspectives 
on DDR take a nuanced view of women and their roles in armed conflict and post-
conflict.69 However, what is useful for this thesis is the difference between the female 
combatant and the female defendant, with the latter involving a display of agency that 
is punishable. Acknowledging women as combatants, while a hard-fought process in 
many cases, appears to be integrated into the work of the UN with much more success 
than the existence and acceptance of female defendants. This work has been 
undertaken by UN programs such as UN Women70 and the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations,71 which recognise the unique needs of female ex-
combatants. One of the solutions to the situation of female combatants, by the 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, is to deploy female peacekeepers to a State 
post-conflict.72 The mere deployment of female peacekeepers is presumed in certain 
contexts to be enough to satisfy the need for a post-conflict gender perspective. 
Scholars such as Heathcote, Otto, Henry, and True, amongst others, have called into 
question the work of UN Security Council Resolutions and their ability to positively 
shape the status of women before, during, and after armed conflict, globally.73 
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Although the greater discussion around female combatants and peacekeeping is not a 
part of the work in this thesis. Nevertheless, drawing out the distinctions between 
female combatants and female defendants, which rests on a difference in culpability, 
emphasises international law’s resistance in engaging with women who have 
committed crimes.  
 
Despite work that recognises women as combatants, and women as defendants, there 
still exists a reliance on filtering women’s actions through traditional roles. When 
women act outside of these roles, their gender is highlighted as well as their 
incompatibility with the qualities of ‘normal’ women. Sjoberg and Gentry state that 
narratives created around violent women also define what ‘normal’ women are, which 
is ‘peaceful and incapable of violence’.74 This further exemplifies that the presumed 
qualities of both violent and non-violent women need to be analysed as they expose 
the ways narratives around women’s behaviour is set within limited gender norms.  
2.2 Justifying women in international criminal law 
As the counterarguments in Chapter One have indicated, the thesis is not suggesting 
that women commit more violent acts during armed conflict than men or that the 
levels of violent crime is equal. However, women do commit international crimes and 
it is possible that many go unnoticed due to the perception that women remain the 
victims during armed conflict. This highlights the need to recognise women as 
political and military leaders who exercise power in ways similar to elite men. 
 
The aim of the thesis is to understand the representation and construction of female 
defendant’s in international criminal law as well as the way gender, race, and class 
interplay upon female defendant’s experience with the law. To that end, the most 
significant limitation was finding cases and examples of women who have been 
indicted, charged, or even suspected of committing crimes relating to the situations 
that surrounded the international courts. International examples of female defendants 
were easier to locate, albeit fewer in number, as the ICTY, ICTR, ECCC court 
documents were readily available through their respective websites. National 
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examples were more difficult to find, while many of the women before the national 
courts in Bosnia and Herzegovina could be located in court documents, they were 
often charged alongside men, meaning that the case title did not use their name, which 
only compounded translation issues when searching through documents. Therefore, 
unearthing examples of female defendants was more commonly done by searching for 
international criminal law in national news websites. Once a woman was identified as 
an alleged war criminal in a national news story, the other people tried in the same 
case were often listed as well.  
 
The examples of female defendants in Rwanda was also primarily found through 
news stories or academic texts on international criminal law. The research that was 
carried out by Hogg, for example, did not indicate women’s names, which made it 
difficult to identify specific women who were involved in the Rwandan genocide.75 
Female defendants found to be ‘hiding’ in the United States made headlines in the 
smaller communities they lived and therefore were broadcasted throughout local 
community media, and later in national news. What is interesting about these 
examples from the US is that the news items often focused on the illegality of the 
accused’s application for citizenship and their gender, highlighting the shock of the 
people who lived and worked around these women upon hearing they were accused of 
war crimes.76 These news story in the US were not particularly focused on the war 
crimes, rather on immigration. These alleged female war criminals lied to the 
government to become a citizen, which shifts the story to a binary of ‘us’, American 
citizens, versus ‘them’, foreigners abusing the system. 
 
Also, in deciphering the cases that are available, there is no way of knowing at this 
stage the way their gender, race, and class have influenced the treatment of female 
defendants or the ways in which those who have interacted with her in relation to the 
court have altered their actions due to her precarity as a female criminal. This thesis 
does not dismiss the possibility for future work that researches into the study of 
behaviours and attitudes of court and tribunal officials. Other limitations relate to the 
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way international criminal law understands female defendants. It is only through the 
language used by the courts in indictments, judgements, and sentencing, or through 
the media that this can be inferred and even still there are few examples to draw upon. 
Female defendants have never been addressed by the UN specifically; therefore, this 
project was required to dissect ‘gender neutral’ language in international criminal law 
to infer the way international law views females who perpetrate crimes.  
 
Charlesworth discusses the roles of men and women in crisis situations and states that 
women are only recognised as being a part of the crisis when they are violated, and 
when that violation is seen as harming their social group.77 Charlesworth writes that 
men are the main focus and seen to be active agents, while women enter only as an 
afterthought.78 Women are on the other side of the binary, and are predominately 
focused upon when they are victims of sexual violence. What Charlesworth states is 
that while men are often seen as defendants they are also simultaneously the “saviour” 
who solves the crisis, saving women in the process. This only leaves room for women 
on the margins, included when men deem it appropriate. While this view is especially 
limiting for women, it captures the view from mainstream conflict narratives.79  
 
The main goals of international criminal law are to end impunity of leaders and to 
punish violations of jus cogens norms,80 and like domestic laws, operates on is a basis 
of wrong and right and a finality of its judgements.  International criminal law follows 
the general principles of criminal law, as well as reconciling itself as a part of the 
international system, dealing with the critiques on the lack of enforcement, State 
consent, and legitimacy.81 International criminal law incorporates different societies, 
cultures, and legal systems while predominantly entering into a situation post-conflict, 
and responding to extreme levels of violence. These characteristics make international 
criminal law a unique form of criminal law, yet also limit the nuance it can contain in 
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its judgements. International criminal law also sustains gender binaries evident in its 
focus on women as victims of sexual violence, positioning women as the continual 
victim in armed conflict. Drumbl, when discussing the existence of binaries in 
international criminal law, argues that there needs to be an understanding of the 
complexity that exists when people commit atrocities.82 Drumbl states, “the 
persecuted may persecute and persecutors themselves may become (or already be) the 
persecuted. Truly understanding atrocity requires an embrace of this bedevilling 
interstitially.”83 In order for international criminal law to dispense justice it needs to 
acknowledge the multitude of experiences that exist in armed conflict, even if they 
supposedly complicate the binary of victim and defendant or right and wrong and, 
perhaps, put dominant gender norms and expectations to the side while such 
assessments are made. 
 
The international criminal legal system should also recognise its part in history telling 
while contributing towards repairing a community. In this process of history telling 
the focus on international criminal law already is implicated in both activities. While 
the need for reparations for victims has been integrated more fully into the language 
of the Rome Statute, international criminal law’s history in this area has been far from 
adequate.84 The response to this argument might underscore that international 
criminal law is not designed to complete all of these goals. International criminal law 
cannot simultaneously punish leaders, tell an accurate nuanced history, charge people 
from each side of a conflict, and rebuild the relationships in a given society. However, 
international criminal law’s role as an international project and through the normative 
value placed upon it by the international community is a part of shaping the way 
gender, race, culture, and ethnicity are understood post-conflict: both in the conflict 
region and internationally.  
 
The background provided in each court case judgement, the media focus, the way 
prosecutors pick cases and conduct trials, the witnesses that are chosen to tell their 
story, and the way the public responds to all of these actions situate international 
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criminal law as an authority when trying to decipher an armed conflict. While 
international criminal law is only one part of the justice process and work needs to be 
done post-conflict at a local level; international criminal law must acknowledge that it 
carries responsibility internationally and therefore, needs to address the issues that 
occur within its framework. Female defendants offer one way into this discussion. 
International criminal law can then question how the stories of those outside main 
conflict narratives be included and what can be learned about the conflict as well as 
the biases of those who work within the system through examining the construction of 
race, class, and gender.  
 
This thesis is not a study of all female defendants in armed conflict,85 it is not a study 
on women’s violence,86 or a study of international humanitarian law and women as 
war criminals, although each of these topics are discussed at different places in the 
text. This thesis is, instead, a study of a specific set of instances, namely the armed 
conflicts in the FYR, Rwanda, and Cambodia, where the existence of female 
defendants is examined in order to understand how women’s sexuality and 
vulnerability is constructed through the media, Western feminist interventions, and 
international criminal law. Despite the low numbers of female defendants in 
international courts and tribunals, significant numbers exist in domestic courts, but it 
is not clear why a certain ‘threshold’ of cases would be required to justify academic 
study. 
2.3 Focus on sexual violence  
Western feminist interventions into crisis in the ICTY and ICTR, focused on women 
as victims of sexual violence and a male and female binary was reinforced. This push 
to identify and punish various forms of sexual violence was an important step, but it 
also had unintended consequences. Western feminists involved in this dialogue 
continued a narrative that unintentionally limited the roles women were seen to fulfil. 
Charlesworth continues her discussion by identifying the sets of contrast that exist 
within international law. Binaries of “objective/subjective, legal/political, 
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logic/emotion, order/anarchy, mind/body, culture/nature, action/passivity, 
public/private, protector/protected” are listed as distinctions having both male and 
female characteristics.87 Charlesworth argues that international law primarily values 
the first (male) characteristic.88 By constructing binaries and connecting them with a 
particular gender they are then limited and little to no movement is allowed between. 
Through the focus on sexual violence in the ICTY the binaries between man and 
woman, defendant and victim were entrenched as an element of international criminal 
law. Without highlighting the different roles of women in the conflict examples of 
female defendants like Plavšić and Nyiramasuhuko are seen as anecdotal and/or 
exceptional; rather than always a potential consequence of political power and the 
breakdown of social conventions during armed conflict. 
 
Victim feminism tends to assume that women’s experience in armed conflict is one of 
sexual violence. Another problem with the rhetoric of victim feminism and 
highlighting the sexual violence in the conflict, besides that it ignores the other roles 
women possess, it also identifies rape as unique to a particular armed conflict. Engle 
states that when women were trying to ascertain stories of rape after the conflict in the 
FYR, they employed the assumption that all women were victims of rape.89 Western 
feminists in and around the ICTY tended to portray Bosnian Muslim women, as 
victims and continued to deny women’s participation.90 Engle also highlights that 
journalists and feminists were frequently frustrated with women’s silence as they tried 
to elicit stories of sexual violence, which made it impossible to view Bosnian Muslim 
women as anything other than rape victims.91 Engle also writes that Serbian men were 
then seen as the ‘typical’ sexual defendant.92  Feminists further suggested that if a 
women took up arms after she was subjected to sexual violence, then she must have 
only done so due to the rape she sustained.93 Engle rejects these assumptions and 
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encourages the recognition of the reality of women’s experiences in armed conflict. I 
return to this discussion again in Chapter Four.  
 
Women involved in the armed conflict as combatants were often seen as reactionary 
by Western feminists, limiting the possibility that women can employ the ideals of 
either side of a conflict and become motivated to take up arms. Sexual violence in the 
conflict is seen as an attack on women as a group because they are women, and while 
that can be seen in certain instances, it also misses the way sexual violence can be 
used against both women and men because of their ethnicity or class.94 Studying cases 
of female defendants and incidents of female violence is not to suggest that they are 
somehow equal to or similar to the crimes men commit, in every instance. It is 
important to interrogate these women’s actions in order to better understand violence 
and the nature of armed conflict. When assumptions are made that rest upon 
preconceived notions about gender, little can be gained, especially when there is an 
implication that women always inhabit certain characteristics. Looking closer at 
female defendants in the following chapters shows the wide array of factors that 
influence the ways in which they are understood. 
 
The narratives that are deployed effectively limit the acknowledgement of female 
defendants is a focus on women as victims of sexual violence, to the extent that it 
becomes the sole measure for women’s experiences in armed conflict. International 
criminal law’s reluctance to incorporate female defendants into the mainstream 
conflict narrative do not rest in a mere lack of statistics, but on the continued 
enforcement of binaries, such as victim and defendant, which remain supported when 
women are seen as victims. The position of assuming that women who act as 
defendants need an explanation for their behaviour underscores the lack of agency 
women are assumed to hold during armed conflict and their link to political and 
military leadership.  
 
The reasons why this thesis focuses on the armed conflicts in the FYR, Rwanda, and 
Cambodia is due to their specific contributions to international criminal law, as it will 
be discussed in Chapter Two. The Ad Hoc Tribunals, ICTY and ICTR, expanded the 
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tenets of international criminal law that had remained dominant since the end of 
World War II, and the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials. From the jurisprudence of the 
ICTY and ICTR, international criminal law was developed and evolved through the 
work of subsequent hybrid courts. However, Ad Hoc Tribunals displayed one type of 
post-conflict justice, which emanated primarily from the international community, 
with little engagement in local justice processes.  The failures of the Tribunals are 
also a necessary part of the narrative of international criminal law’s development. 
Through the work of the international community around both tribunals, a 
preoccupation with women as victims of sexual violence emerged and was a key 
element in unpacking the existence of the female defendant, another reason why the 
FYR and Rwanda conflicts were essential to this thesis.  
 
The ECCC being a hybrid court that took into account the need for a greater link 
between the international and the local, in many ways should have been an answer to 
the failures of the Ad Hoc Tribunals. Unfortunately, the Cambodia court did not 
achieve its initial aims or respond to the issues the resulted from the proceedings of 
the ICTY or ICTR. Another reason for choosing to highlight the work of the ECCC is 
because of its failures. The ECCC was established decades after the atrocities of the 
Cambodian genocide took place, and as a result failed to indict the vast majority of 
leaders responsible, with only four cases before the court. The ECCC also failed to 
significantly address the sexual violence that occurred during the conflict, suggesting 
the hypervisibility of sexual violence in the ICTY and ICTR did not extend to the 
work of the ECCC. This thesis has critiqued the Western feminist intervention for 
focusing on women as victims of sexual violence which resulted in a narrowing of 
women’s roles in armed conflict. However, I am not suggesting the prosecution of 
sexual violence be diminished, but that the Western feminist agenda include the range 
of women’s actions in armed conflict within its purview. Therefore, the limited 
charges relating to sexual violence crimes before the ECCC is most certainly a failure. 
 
Ultimately, the thesis produces an image of women in armed conflict that is not 
limited to that of victim or peacemaker, but one that acknowledges women are 
capable of actively engaging in violence, who believes in a party’s political ideology, 
and supports the affiliated party’s goals during the armed conflict. This thesis is not a 
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call for more women to be tried in criminal courts in order to change the perception of 
women in armed conflict, but it is a call for the criminal justice system not to 
overlook women’s acts in armed conflict due to gender biases that assume women are 
predominantly victims in conflict. In order to achieve this the international criminal 
legal system needs to see women as full agents before the law. 
 
Ní Aoláin, Haynes, and Cahn analyse the different ways women participate in armed 
conflict, but caution against essentialising these roles.95  For example, the authors 
question, “Are women fighters different from women who have not been involved in 
armed combat but who have experienced its effects? Are we simply assuming that 
women who are not active combatants are victims, or that women combatants cannot 
also be victims?”96 This is important to remember, throughout the analysis of female 
defendants in this thesis. Indeed, the thesis critiques the work that has assumed 
women are victims in armed conflict, but at the same time, this work needs to be 
mindful not to limit women to the category of defendant in the pursuit of disrupting 
the gendered binary of victim/violator. 
 
3. Theoretical Framework  
3.1 Beyond female defendants as victims of sexual violence 
Throughout the thesis, I argue that the lack of engagement with female defendants’ 
actions, by international criminal legal mechanisms, is linked to a denial of women’s 
ability to be violent. This denial of female violence is not necessarily conscious or 
purposeful, but rather is embedded in a patriarchal understanding of armed conflict, in 
which men’s lives and actions remain dominant. This is evident in the international 
criminal legal work done around women as victims of sexual violence in armed 
conflict. To consider women as capable of perpetrating crimes women must also have 
the ability to perpetrate violence. Women who are violent are rarely a part of the 
discussion after a conflict.97 The reason women’s violence need to be seen as violent 
is exactly because women are violent. This work is a call to accept what already 
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exists: women are sometimes criminals, including during armed conflict. Recognising 
women’s ability to be violent and commit crimes begins a dialogue that interrogates 
the multitude of gendered ideals women are assumed to hold and the patriarchal 
perceptions dominant in society.   
 
Throughout this thesis I argue that the structure of international criminal law 
perpetuates the notion that females are not common defendants, which opens up into a 
larger debate around the way law deals with complexity. Bouris identifies the need to 
recognise the complexity in modern armed conflict, those involved in armed conflict, 
and in the violence perpetrated.98 She identifies a ‘complex victim’, based on the way 
that individual “engages and is constituted by a particular discourse”, and highlights 
the complexity found within a specific act of victimisation.99 When the thesis uses the 
term ‘complexity’ it is recalling the work of Bouris. While my work does not focus on 
the victim, it still finds Bouris’ work useful in understanding the need to unpack the 
nuance of individual’s roles in armed conflict.100 The gender binary simplifies 
understandings of human relations and actions, which render justifications about 
women’s roles in armed conflict that rest on gender stereotypes, and thus avoid the 
complexity of human decisions.  
 
The relationship that international criminal law has with female defendants links to 
how law genders and constructs subjects, both implicitly and explicitly. International 
law as a system, is most concerned with a certain type of (chiefly female or 
feminised) victim. Some feminist strategies have used international law to organise an 
international response to female victims in conflict, and it is within the debates around 
such strategies where notions of race, class, and gender have also played out.101 Due 
to the perception of women in international law more broadly, women are only seen 
in international criminal law as either victims or contributors to the tribunals or courts, 
as lawyers, staff, advocates, or in rare cases judges. I argue that this draws on a 
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specific radical/liberal feminist model, which is most closely associated with US 
feminism, evident in the Western feminist intervention into international criminal law 
in the 1990s. Whereby Western feminists, both radical and liberal, saw the 
opportunity to bolster national agendas as well as insert a universalised version of 
femininity into the proceedings of the ICTY and ICTR.102 
 
Amongst the flurry of jurisprudence in international criminal law since the 1990s, 
feminist scholars have pursued international criminal legal judgements that deal with 
women’s experiences as victims in war.103 I highlight the development of the victim 
narrative in Chapter Four and Five.104 Feminist scholars encouraged the growth of this 
narrative as an important step into the area of women in international law. MacKinnon 
was one advocate of international criminal law’s work on aiding women who have 
been victimised; along with her view that law was a form of male power, she 
advocated for a stricter reading of crimes that dealt with violence against women.105 
Although subject to considerable critique, MacKinnon’s work should not be 
dismissed entirely, but viewed as an initial step towards women’s recognition in 
international law, albeit from a Western radical feminist perspective.106 The work of 
Western feminists in the 1990s around the ICTY and ICTR, which has permeated into 
the debates, language, and agenda’s visible today, is also regarded by some scholars 
as promoting ‘victim feminism’.  
 
Kotiswaran and Halley develop the analysis of victim feminism as a specific critique 
of MacKinnon and developments on prosecuting sexual violence in international 
criminal law.107 In this thesis I respond to the critical work of Kapur, which identifies 
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the Western feminist as creating ‘victim feminism’ or ‘dominance feminism’.108 
Kapur undertakes a postmodern and post-colonial critique of MacKinnon’s work, 
stating that the ‘dominance feminism’ promoted by MacKinnon positions women as 
‘always already victimised’.109 Western feminists perceive women in developing 
countries to be in need of rescuing and lacking in power and agency, and through their 
attempts to help the women of the Third World, Western feminists have reproduced 
the colonial mind-set.110  
 
Kapur, as well as Mohanty,111 emphasise on disengaging the concept of the Third 
World female victim from the focus of Western feminists. To develop this approach, I 
regard the production of gender in international criminal law as intertwined in ideas of 
gender, race, class, and a post-colonial environment. Halley’s analysis constructs an 
account of victim feminism across various texts,112 and while she initially argues the 
solution might be to ‘take a break from feminism’,113 in later texts she retreats 
somewhat from this position.114 Kapur’s answer is to centre peripheral subjects. Her 
focus is women in the Global South (Kotiswaran undertakes similar work in her study 
of sex work in India).115 This thesis considers female defendants as similarly on the 
peripheries of feminist accounts.  
 
In addition, an adjunct example of the perception of women’s roles in international 
law that pervades from the work done by Western feminists in relation to armed 
conflict is the Women Peace and Security agenda, which I reflect on again in Chapter 
Seven. This agenda has produced Security Council Resolutions that address the 
importance of recognising women as key participants in peacebuilding and 
peacekeeping, counter terrorism strategies, and stressed the need to empower women 
in political and economic realms. The Women, Peace, and Security agenda has 
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focused on women as victims of sexual violence by encouraging the implementation 
of accountability mechanisms through international and local institutions. However, 
the existence of women who participate in combat or commit crimes has had limited 
representation in the Security Council debates or resolutions and women as victims 
has retained primacy.116 The most recent Resolution, 2242, does mention the need to 
gather research on what leads to the radicalisation of women, admitting that women 
too can be involved in extremism and terrorism.117 However, Resolution 2242 also 
suggests that women’s participation in extremism is not entirely voluntary, but rather 
the result of ‘drivers’.118 The United Nations urges member States to undertake 
research in order to identify factors that specifically encourage the participation of 
women in extremism. This reiterates the assumption that for women to participate in 
extremism, terrorism, or indeed violence, there must be a reason that is in some way 
connected to their gender. 
 
Unlike the gendered assumptions in the Security Council’s Women, Peace, and 
Security framework, organisations, including the United Nations, United States 
Agency for International Development, and Governance and Social Development 
Resource Centre, are realising women’s reasons for participating in violent extremism 
are similar to men’s reasons.119  In contrast, Sjoberg and Gentry highlight how the 
field of terrorism studies has tended to see the women who participate in violence as a 
result of extremist views as a product of women’s maternal and nurturing 
characteristics.120 This means that women’s ‘innate’ ability to nurture is seen as so 
powerful it even extends to participating in terrorism, if only for the need to be 
needed. Not only does this limit women’s ability to be agents in their own lives, but it 
reaffirms stereotypical characteristics as inevitable. Furthermore, Resolution 2242 
along with the entire collection of Women Peace and Security resolutions imply that 
once women are fully integrated into society, issues of inequality and gendered 
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violence will slowly be eradicated. This also carries an assumption that once women 
enter typically masculinised spaces, such as armed conflict, DDR programs, 
transitional justice mechanisms, and so on, they will work for ‘good’. This solidifies 
the representation of women as the victims/agents of change and peace, while men are 
relegated to defendants/allies. It is these broader understandings of women and their 
roles that permeate the way women are seen in international criminal law. 
 
The Women, Peace, and Security agenda demonstrates a reliance on binaries of 
female/victim and male/violator. An analysis of the binary of victim/violator evident 
in international criminal law as well as Western feminist intervention into 
international criminal law permeates the work of my thesis. However, this does not 
dismiss the importance of the integration of women’s issues into international law 
since the 1990s. It is true that women are often victims in times of conflict and real 
work should still be done to unpack the reasons behind the gendered violence that 
occurs in armed conflict. However, issues arise when the term ‘woman’ becomes 
equated with the term ‘victim’. Currently, international criminal law reinforces the 
idea that women are predominately victim and are generally acknowledged to be in 
continual need of protection.121 International criminal law recognises women as 
victims and does not also balance this with a sufficient response to women who 
commit crimes or women as combatants.122 This will be demonstrated in this thesis 
through identifying structural issues in international criminal law, as well as problems 
within the discourse of women and armed conflict. The structure of international 
criminal law creates biases that limit the normative understandings of those who work 
within the court which influence the operational elements of courts and tribunals. The 
discourse that is perpetuated by the work of international criminal law solidifies 
women as victims and men as defendants. Influenced by the work of Kapur, Engle, 
and Halley, I seek to move beyond victim feminism. 
3.2 Situating female defendants: representations of gender, race, and class 
Armed conflicts are chaotic, boundaries are blurred, and often the binary of victim 
and violator is not a sufficient way to distinguish all those who were involved in a 
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conflict.123 To say a woman was a victim during a conflict does not eliminate the 
possibility they may also have committed criminal offences. I am not suggesting 
female criminals should be celebrated. I am also not arguing more women should 
necessarily be brought before international courts, as this would not solve the 
problems I propose. To this end, the thesis identifies issues with regard to the way 
women’s participation and agency is perceived during armed conflict and in doing so 
reveals the larger societal problem that relegates women to certain roles, both in and 
after armed conflict.  
 
Throughout the thesis I also consider the restraints that prevent women who commit 
crimes at an international level from becoming a part of the international criminal 
legal discourse, which include the media perception of women who engage in 
violence or are cited as committing crimes, Western feminist work that focuses on 
women as consummate victims, and international criminal laws emphasis on binaries. 
The thesis analyses how law defines women primarily as victims of violence, rather 
than potential aggressors of violence, and in doing so contributes towards a larger 
misunderstanding of women’s agency. While I do not reach into the sociological or 
criminological factors that permeate this issue, I do recognise their importance in 
what could be a broader study somewhere in the future.124 This thesis uses 
international criminal law to focus on female defendants, to demonstrate how the lack 
of visibility of female defendants in international legal studies and feminist studies is 
as a problem that is symptomatic of greater issues around the perception of gender.  
 
In order to address the female defendant and understand her significance it is 
important to first accept the ways in which international law and gender/feminist 
theory, are woven together, as the conceptual framework that surrounds this project. 
There is no possibility of engaging with the female defendant by solely looking at 
international law, gender, race, or class alone, or using only one type of theory. The 
object of this thesis is to analyse the female defendant’s representation in international 
criminal law and in doing so discover the way gender, race and class exist within legal 
constructions and dismissals of female violence. Butler’s work on gender as a product 
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of language and society will be used,125 as well as the work of MacKinnon in order to 
critique her scholarship that has emphasised law’s relationship with the female 
victim.126 The necessity in utilising Butler’s work in relation to international criminal 
law is done to reveal the inadequacies in international criminal law’s current 
manifestation and development. Butler’s work on gender, while not specifically 
relating to the field of international criminal law, exposes the limitations in law’s 
structure and thus highlights the need to expand the narrow conceptions of gender as 
well as the way gender is used by legal structures.  
 
MacKinnon’s work details the contribution of the Western feminist intervention into 
international criminal law with the work of the ICTY and ICTR, while I use Butler’s 
work to question the long term effects of the ICTY and ICTR on the status of women. 
I regard feminist approaches to law as far from uniform and see the tensions within, 
for example the work of MacKinnon and Butler, as important feminist dialogues. This 
project is not concerned with the motives of female defendants, but how the 
relationship between law and female defendants gives evidence to the way law deals 
with complexity.127 The female defendant becomes a tool to look into the limitations 
of the contemporary international legal system, and recognise gender biases 
entrenched in the law. 
 
International criminal law comprises a host of ideals and concepts, it is at once 
addressing people and composed by people who are of different religions, races, 
classes, carry different cultural understandings, and who might hold varied views on 
masculinity and femininity and yet international criminal law continues to project a 
narrow gender ideology for the most part.128 International criminal law is a nexus, 
similar to the manner female defendants cannot be separated from racial, gendered, or 
class frameworks, international criminal law too cannot be separated from the 
frameworks it employs. The approach this thesis takes is a combination of a case 
analysis with a critique drawn from the feminist and legal academic scholarship, 
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alongside an analysis of the representation of female defendants in global, particularly 
Western, media sources.129 Critical legal studies are used as a way of addressing law’s 
bias while drawing on the intersectionality of race, class, and gender, and the 
discussion around victim feminism. The importance of drawing out the way race, 
class, and gender are interconnected is to recognise how each of these modes of 
identity shape and give meaning to the way female defendant’s actions are 
understood.  
 
The thesis consciously moves beyond a descriptive account of the acts and stories of 
individual female defendants. Throughout I analyse the way actions are represented 
and understood by international criminal law, and Western feminist intervention, both 
supported by the media. I am also deciphering the way female defendant’s actions 
disrupt or affirm stereotypes around women in armed conflict. The importance of a 
gender analysis notwithstanding, race and class can also give insights into the 
perception of female defendants. Crenshaw highlights the need to look beyond gender 
as a tool of analysis, as many women’s lives are also influenced by their identity of 
race and class.130 To this end, the perception of female defendants by international 
criminal law, Western feminist intervention, and the media also needs to account for 
the other identity markers that influence all women’s lives, including female 
defendants.    
 
The analysis of feminist debates which surrounded the courts as well as a critique of 
the human rights agenda, inform a larger viewpoint that reading cases alone could not 
accomplish. Gender will be deployed as an analytical tool in to order examine the way 
it is framed in law and to understand the way legal discourse is influenced by 
gender.131 I trace female defendants throughout international criminal law by using 
the judgements and sentencing of the cases brought before international courts as well 
as examples of female defendants who were not necessarily tried on an international 
level, but were accused of committing crimes in the surrounding conflict. Within the 
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context of international law the female defendant is influenced by the concepts of 
gender, race, and class, as well as the rise of the human rights agenda and frame the 
way her actions are interpreted.132 It is my claim that international criminal law 
distances itself from the fact that women are capable of committing violent crimes 
because international criminal law finds it easier to view women as in need of 
protection than to confront the idea that current gender, race, and class binaries are an 
insufficient representation of human behaviour. Currently, international criminal law 
limits every woman’s ability to be seen as capable of displaying a wide spectrum of 
acts, both positive and negative.133 The invisibility of women’s violence is important 
to interrogate as it directly relates to the vulnerability of women’s bodies in armed 
conflict produced by the elevation of the victim subject. 
 
Solely focusing on gender as a tool assumes a singular narrative around women as a 
whole and ignores the other identities women may have.134 To do this is to ignore the 
intersection of gender with race or class, for instance. MacKinnon’s work around the 
tribunals has largely neglected the intersections of race and class. In the ICTY 
MacKinnon, and others who worked at the ICTY,135 were accused of ignoring the 
ethnic differences of women.136 Engle states that feminists tended to emphasise ethnic 
differences between Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims in the ICTY, which 
furthered divisions in the understanding of the harms women experience, but did little 
to interrogate the divisions that were bolstered by the armed conflict.137 Reinforcing 
that rape of Bosnian women by Serbian men was genocide, feminists assumed that the 
women who bore children as a result of the rape would adhere to strict ideas of ethnic 
identities, meaning their children would be Serbian, instead of the ethnicity of the 
mother.138 Brownmiller writes, that Balkan women were stripped of their ethnic and 
religious background and assumed to be victims of rape, evidence of another way 
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ethnicity was shaped in the aftermath of the armed conflict.139 Buss stated that the 
tribunals failed to understand the multiple sites of oppression present around the 
conflict, which included race, religion, ethnicity, class, as well as gender.140 Buss 
noted that women’s experience in conflict would be better served by viewing the 
ways ‘gender intersects and shapes’ other areas of oppression.141 She further states 
that feminists encouraged women’s visibility in international criminal law through 
their work with the tribunals; however, this visibility was ‘superficial’ as it failed to 
take into account the other areas where oppression existed.142 The status of women in 
the FYR before international law is discussed in Chapter Four.  
 
I argue in this thesis that whether or not ‘the women question’ has been asked, 
accepting the outcome of this first stage of feminist intervention is not sufficient. 
Instead this question must be re-asked and complicated by understandings of gender. 
It is not sufficient to just view gender, race, and class alone, these and other areas of 
identity need to be seen as influencing one another.  The female defendant’s 
relationship with race, class, gender, ethnicity, religion, and the distinctions between 
these identities. This leads my focus toward international criminal law’s relationship 
to race and class, understanding that they must be developed in conjunction.  
 
This study must come to its analysis recognising that there are multiple ideas of self, 
women employ,143 and to assume that gender is the only or main tool people are being 
oppressed with, is to ignore men and women who have been discriminated because of 
race as well as cultural and religious backgrounds.144 Gender is understood in this 
study as performative and due to this it is diverse in its representations and meanings 
across communities. This approach can also incorporate other forms of identities. bell 
hooks also writes that it is often the case that those who avoid discussing race in their 
work, do so because they have never had to experience it themselves.145 Kline warns 
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that race’s relationship with feminism can at times be extremely limiting and is 
capable of producing a hierarchy of power between white women and women of 
colour, or as it features in Chapter Five with women on the African continent.146 It is 
from this understanding that race becomes a component within this work’s analysis.  
 
To this end, my positionality as a white US woman is an important aspect that 
influences my larger argument. I am not attempting to assume the perspective of 
women who were involved in the armed conflicts in the FYR, Rwanda or Cambodia. 
Furthermore, I am analysing and critiquing the Western intervention, law, feminism, 
and the media, into these three particular conflicts and establishing the effect this 
intervention has had on international criminal law and international law. Female 
defendants are used as a tool in order to examine and unearth the way Western 
feminist interventions and international criminal law with the international media has 
shaped the perception of women’s roles in armed conflict. Through the analysis of 
female defendants, as well as the reasons why female defendants do not enter into 
mainstream conflict narrative, international criminal laws limitations are exposed.   
 
Class also bares a considerable weight in the way it intersects with race and gender.147 
The idea of intersectionality emphasises the different structures of oppression, these 
sites should not be ranked, but it should be acknowledged that every individual is 
dealing with various influences, which form interlocking sites of oppression across all 
societies and communities.148 Class is another way of understanding the way in which 
the law is shaped and the way the law engages with individuals, including female 
defendants.  Class is also apparent in the distinction between those who create 
international criminal law, judges, lawyers, and members of the UN. I am mindful of 
the role of political economy in peacebuilding and transitional justice and the power 
that results from coercion as well as the ‘resources, benefits, privileges, and authority 
within the home and society at large’.149 However, I am unable to explore this aspect 
fully within the parameters of this thesis.    
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Law does not exist in a world void of influence; it is influenced by power and State 
relations and affected through people’s social influences and viewpoints. 
MacKinnon’s influence in the creation of international criminal law helped to focus 
the tribunals on women as victims, void of racial and classist experiences. This 
viewpoint shaped the way international criminal law understood women’s role in 
armed conflict.150 Critical legal studies lends itself to unpicking the structural bias of 
legal institutions, as well as the language of those institutions which is often 
specialised and set into specific categories that hold “expectations about the values, 
actors, and solutions” deemed appropriate.151 While many have criticised 
MacKinnon’s work, including Halley, her work does well to draw out the ways 
women have been excluded from law.152 When an individual approaches law they 
carry competing notions within their own understandings; similarly, law in practice 
contains conflicting notions. Butler’s concept of gender and MacKinnon’s focus on 
the experiences of women in conflict can both be used to describe the female 
defendant herself as well as her surrounding environment.  
 
Throughout this thesis, attention to positionality accepts that the knowledge a person 
has gained from their own personal experiences is useful, but it must be coupled with 
the idea that the particular experience is only particular.153 Each person only has a 
limited view, influenced by social situations and sets of experiences, and should not 
presume to know how others dealt with a similar situation, as they are within their 
own social constraints and point of view as well.154 There must be a continuation 
beyond personal situations, while never assuming that it is possible to completely 
transcend, as viewpoints are reactional and subjective.155 The reason this knowledge 
is beneficial is because it stresses the importance of being self-critical and recognising 
that there is only an ‘improved perspective’.156 The emphasis of this approach, 
Bartlett stated is on ‘non-arbitrary’ truth, this truth is based upon perspective, which 
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of course is limited and needs to be continually reworked.157 I consider this 
perspective as a tool to examine my own gender, racial, and class assumptions. The 
assumptions I carry interconnect and produce a sense of privilege within my writing. 
This is an important concept to confront from the onset as many Western feminists 
have been criticised for universalising their own experiences and projecting this onto 
the international community as a whole.158  Western feminists have also be cited, as 
mentioned earlier, for ignoring racial, religious, and class experiences, as victim or 
defendant is not the only space for intervention.159 I examine the 
representation/prosecution of female defendants in international tribunals/courts and 
Western media, to make sense of Western discourses/narratives, rather than to draw 
out any ‘truth’ claims about FYR, Rwanda or Cambodia. 
4. Conclusion 
This chapter has detailed the definitions utilised throughout the thesis, namely 
‘gender’, ‘feminism’, ‘female perpetrator, defendant, and suspect’, and ‘narrative’. I 
have also highlighted the key scholarship in the area of female defendants, while also 
drawing out the narratives that have been constructed around different aspects of 
women’s participation in armed conflict, which includes: women outside of 
traditional roles, justifying women international criminal law, and the focus on sexual 
violence. Lastly, I outlined my theoretical framework, in order to situate the thesis 
amongst the existing theories around gender, international law, and women’s 
experiences in armed conflict. The following chapters each contribute towards 
answering the unique questions the thesis poses: how can an analysis of female 
defendants shift the understandings of armed conflict, international criminal law, and 
gender? Do the narratives on women’s participation in armed conflict, garnered from 
international media reports and feminist scholarship, influence international criminal 
legal spaces?  
 
This chapter began with a discussion of governance feminism, and like the authors, I 
agree that there must be continual efforts to critically engage with the projects and 
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products of governance feminism.160 This is not meant to assert that all efforts under 
the banner of governance feminism are inherently flawed, but rather it asserts the need 
to constantly examine the work feminists undertake, reassessing the intended aims 
and outcomes of feminist intervention. The critical engagement with feminist work in 
international criminal law, undertaken in the thesis, is not intended to dissolve 
feminist gains, but to instead bolster future work.    
 
 
                                                          
160 Halley et al. (n 1) 265, 266. 
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Chapter Three 
Positioning International Criminal Law 
 
1. Introduction 
This work focuses on international criminal law, since the 1990s, which brought about 
the establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR.1 However, it is important to briefly look 
back over the history of international criminal law’s growth and its place in 
international law, as well as its critiques. Douzinas and Kennedy’s work in 
conjunction with critical legal studies offers an insight into the creation, aims, and 
current approach of international law, especially international law’s relationship with 
Western States; similarly, Amann, discusses the relationship between political 
participation and international criminal law,2 while feminist scholarship tends to focus 
on gendered crimes before the courts and tribunals rather than the institutions 
themselves.3 These debates relate to the larger theory and methodology of the project 
by underscoring their link to the lack of critical work on the female defendant to the 
growth of international criminal law. It is only after articulating the debates that 
highlight the development of international criminal law through international human 
rights law, international humanitarian law, and feminist methods, that the greater field 
of international law is illuminated. Moreover, this allows for the topic of female 
defendants to retain deeper resonance as a field of study in international law.   
 
In this chapter I focus on the understanding of international criminal which underpins 
the work of the entire thesis. Section two will discuss the context of international 
criminal law, briefly outlining its historical development and continued growth. In 
section three of this chapter I will discuss the connection between international human 
rights law and international criminal law, also recognising the link to international 
                                                          
1 The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials were important as developing the importance of international 
criminal law. However, they were not credited with advancing jurisprudence in the same way as the 
ICTY and ICTR. 
2 See Amann, ‘Impartiality Deficit and International Criminal Judging’ in Schabas, Thakur, and 
Hughes (Eds.) Atrocities and International Accountability: Beyond Transitional Justice (2007); 
Amann, ‘Politics and Prosecutions, from Katherine Fite to Fatou Bensouda’ in Andersen and Crane 
(Eds.) Proceedings of the Fifth International Humanitarian Law Dialogs (2012). 
3 See Buss, ‘Performing Legal Order: Some Feminist Thoughts on International Criminal Law’ (2011). 
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humanitarian law. Section four will situate international criminal law within Western 
feminist approaches, specifically the way women’s roles during armed conflict were 
shaped and understood during the 1990s. Section five will detail the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals and Cambodian Court in order to establish the foundations from which the 
subsequent chapters will emerge.  
2. The Context of International Criminal Law  
International criminal law is a part of the larger body of public international law and 
before the end of WWII and the creation of the Nuremberg Trials there was little 
growth in this area.4 The International Military Tribunal was established by the 
Nuremberg Charter in 1945,5 after which the US led Nuremberg Military Tribunal 
conducted 12 more trials.6 The International Military Tribunal’s objectives were: “to 
punish military leaders for waging aggressive war; to punish persons responsible for 
the commission of war crimes; and to crystallise certain laws of humanity and thereby 
to deter the repetition of genocide.”7 These goals along with the continued 
international recognition of certain human rights,8 which were developed even further 
                                                          
4 See Donovan, ‘The History and Possible Future of International Criminal Law’ (1987); Colleen 
Donovan wrote that International Criminal Law is a part of the larger body of International Law; 
international law seeks the conservation of human rights by states. Donovan’s article, published in 
1987, is a representation of international criminal law before the influx of law in the 1990s and it is 
important to recognise that the idea of international criminal law as a way to safeguard human rights 
has been very much contested. 
5 ibid. 84; The Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials, although they are being credited with the early 
advancement of international criminal law, are also seen as a force of great jurisprudence. However, 
many would argue to the discrimination and unfairness presented in the trials. See Wells, ‘War Crimes 
and Laws of War’ (1984).  
6 The Nuremberg Trials prosecuted crimes that occurred during World War II before the International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Germany. The nations who established and conducted the trials were 
the United States, France, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. This is separate from the US 
based Nuremberg Military Tribunal. See Woetzel, The Nuremberg Trials in International Law (1960); 
Heller, The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal Law (2011).  
7 Donovan (n 4) 84; See Appleman, Military Tribunals and International Crimes (1954) (1972).  
8 Donovan (n 4) 100-101; The following treaties and conventions were given by Donovan as examples 
for the recognition of human rights in international criminal law: Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, UNGA Res. 217, 3 UN GAOR, U.N. Doc. 1/777 (1948); International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, UNGA Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNGA Res. 2200A, 21 
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.16) at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. No. 5) (1940); American 
Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. Official Records OEA/Ser. K/XVI/1.1, Doc. 65, Rev.1, Corr.1 
(1970); UN General Assembly, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, entered into force 12 January 1951; International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination, UNGA Res. 2160A, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.14) at 58, U.N. Doc. 
A/60143, 660 U.N.T.S. 1956 (1966). 
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after the trials began, signalled that the trials were an important force into 
international criminal law’s expansion.9  
 
International criminal law has made continued advances since the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo trials. Amongst the largest developments in international criminal law to date 
is the adoption of the Rome Statute in 1998, which established the International 
Criminal Court, entering into force in 2002.10 The International Criminal Court (ICC) 
was created to end impunity through the formation of a central international institute 
focused on prosecutions of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. 
Despite the fact that the jurisdiction of the ICC is limited,11 the establishment of a 
central international criminal court is a landmark achievement. The ICC signals a 
momentous shift in the consciousness of the international community towards holding 
individuals accountable for violations to the laws of war on a visible international 
scale. This was far from prevalent prior to the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, as the 
prosecution of individuals after World War I was dismal and signalled extreme 
impunity.12 While the work of the International Criminal Court is not a central focus 
of my thesis, it is important to highlight its growth and potential, both in its 
progression of international criminal law and in the future of international criminal 
law. I do not undertake substantial work on the ICC in this thesis, as I am more 
concerned with the shaping of the status of women in international criminal law in the 
ICTY, ICTR and subsequent ECCC, which I see as the impetus to the way the ICC 
understands the role of women in armed conflict.  
 
Concerning the ICC’s contribution towards the topic of female defendants, only one 
woman has been indicted by the International Criminal Court; Simone Gbagbo was 
the former first lady of Côte d’Ivoire accused of crimes against humanity.13 Despite 
this, Gbagbo never physically appeared before the ICC due to a lack of cooperation 
                                                          
9 Donovan (n 4) 100. 
10 UNGA, ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’ A/CONF.183/9 (1998) (Last Amended 
2010). 
11 This will be discussed further in Chapter Six. 
12 An effort to try Turkey for the Armenian genocide was abandoned in 1923 at the Lausanne 
Conference. The prosecution of Germans for war crimes during WWI was done in German courts, 
resulting in widespread impunity. See Popoff, ‘Inconsistency and Impunity in International Human 
Rights Law: Can the International Criminal Court Solve the Problems Raised by the Rwanda and 
Augusto Pinochet Cases’ (2001). 
13 Prosecutor v Gbagbo (Indictment) ICC-02/11-01/12 (2012). 
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with local Ivory Coast authorities, or the willingness of local Ivory Coast authorities 
to prosecute Gbagbo, emphasising a focus on complementarity. The 2017 Côte 
d’Ivoire trial of Gbagbo should be considered flawed, as it resulted in Gbagbo being 
acquitted of war crimes. However, the fact Gbagbo was already serving a 20 year 
sentence for her part in harming national security, which was a successful trial in the 
Ivory Coast, does indicate the existence of local justice pursued by Ivory Coast 
prosecutors and courts.14 Moreover, the ICC’s non-existent support of Gbagbo’s trial 
in the Ivory Coast, due to the lack of conviction for crimes against humanity, indicates 
a narrow approach to complementarity. This does little to dispel the criticisms of the 
ICC as an unsupported brand of universalised international criminal justice.  
 
This example highlights the ICCs lack of flexibility in understanding the importance 
of a local prosecution regardless of specific charges brought, which indicates a 
disconnect between the ICC and its member States on the matter of complementarity. 
Nevertheless, the ICC has major obstacles to overcome before it can be considered to 
be an effective means of international criminal justice. There is a lack of faith in the 
current manifestation of the ICC, evident in suggestions that the court is focused too 
heavily on African States, has a limited budget, and a general inability to pursue the 
extent of international criminals primarily due to the fact major States are not 
members of the Rome Statute,15 i.e. the United States.16 While the issues that exist 
within the International Criminal Court primarily aid the conclusion of this thesis, 
they do not take the central focus in this work’s substantial chapters. The future of 
international criminal law, which I discuss in Chapter Seven, turns back to a 
discussion of the ICC and suggests that if international criminal law is to grow as a 
discipline it needs to absorb the critique found when discussing the relationship 
between female defendants and Ad Hoc Tribunals and hybrid courts in the subsequent 
chapters.   
 
                                                          
14 ‘Côte d’Ivoire: Simone Gbagbo Acquitted after Flawed War Crimes Trial’ (Human Rights Watch, 29 
March 2017). 
15 Clark, 'Law, Politics and Pragmatism: ICC Case Selection in the Democratic Republic of Congo and 
Uganda.' In: Clark and Waddell (Eds.) Courting Conflict? Peace, Justice and the ICC (2008). 
16 Sriram, ‘The International Criminal Court Africa Experiment’ in Sriram and Pillay (Eds.) Peace 
versus Justice: The Dilemma of Transitional Justice in Africa (2009) 
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While the articulation of international criminal law in the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Tribunals was essential for the creation of the ICC, the work done in the ICTY and 
ICTR furthered the understanding of international criminal law as a discipline. Both 
the ICTY and ICTR contributed significantly to international criminal jurisprudence 
and established definitions of criminal acts, which up until this point had not been 
articulated.17  Tallgren asserts that it has been the presence of horrific levels of 
violence that caused the expansion of international criminal law since the 1990s.18 
This combined with the changing international landscape and the dissolving of certain 
blocs of the Cold War, has allowed different States the opportunity to interact with 
each other, which has also encouraged international criminal law’s growth much more 
rapidly.19 The rise in criminal adjudication is an indicator of international criminal 
law’s expansion as one of the fundamental ways of dealing with the aftermath of 
armed conflicts. The international criminal courts and tribunals are examples of such 
instances when the international community chose to impose international criminal 
law. Humphrey argues that tribunals re-emerged, in the form of the ICTY and ICTR, 
as an attempt to prosecute human rights violations when States were ‘unwilling or 
unable’ and to encourage human rights law in circumstances where States did not 
protect their people from such violence.20 Simonovic argues that the establishment of 
the ICTY and ICTR was a ‘selective’ decision made by the international community 
which indicate that there are only certain times in which they are “capable of and 
willing to impose implementation”.21  
 
While I regard the work of international criminal law as an important step in order to 
reimage the definition and functions of sovereignty, I see the international criminal 
structure as a selective enterprise, where the amount of justice possible is directly 
related to the amount of power a State has, or the powerfulness of a State’s ‘friends’.  
Whereby, States that are in positions of power are exempt from prosecution, but are 
still allowed to play an influential part of the ICC, for instance, as found in the US’s 
                                                          
17 The definition of ‘rape’ and ‘sexual violence’ in Akayesu, which will be detailed further in Chapter 
Four. 
18 See Tallgren, The Sensibility and Sense of International Criminal Law (2002) 562, 563. 
19 ibid.  
20 Humphrey, ‘International Intervention, Justice and Reconciliation: the Role of the ICTY and ICTR 
in Bosnia and Rwanda’ (2003) 495-496.  
21 Simonovic, ‘The Role of the ICTY in the Development of International Criminal Adjudication’ 
(1999) 446, 453. 
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position as a permanent Security Council member with the ability to veto cases before 
the ICC. There are those who could argue that despite these criticisms, there needs to 
be an international response to violations of international humanitarian law. Heads of 
States, as well as those in leadership positions including armed forces, or non-State 
forces need to be held accountable and the international community should stand 
united stating, ‘never again’, when atrocities are uncovered. Although I agree with 
this sentiment in principle and while I am not calling for the immediate abolishment 
of international criminal law, I do wonder if presumptions around international 
criminal law’s power has led us to this point. Meaning that if less normative value 
was placed upon international criminal law, then international criminal law, in its 
current manifestation, would be just one part of the justice processes.  This would 
imply that a larger importance would be given to local or alternative transitional 
justice mechanisms, and the international would play a lesser role. Therefore, the 
outcomes of local justice process or alternative spaces of justice might be capable of 
filtering back and influencing the way justice is conceptualised internationally.  
 
While the international justice system rests on binaries between men and women and 
violators and victims, alternative justice spaces can bring more fluidity in what are 
assumed to be definitive gender roles.22 The need for local post-conflict mechanisms 
to filter back to the international is essential not just for conceptions of justice, but for 
the understanding of gender roles in armed conflict. The female victim becomes just 
one manifestation of women’s roles in armed conflict contrasted with the female 
defendant, due to the fact that local nuanced stories of gender experiences, such as 
male victims and female defendants, have a greater chance of being filtered to the 
international. The concept is discussed again in Chapter Seven. 
 
Furthermore, what is embedded in the development and history of international 
criminal law is its complicity in the promotion of men as defendants and women as 
victims. What international criminal law has supported through its development is the 
limited understanding of gender, which will be further assessed in the discussion on 
feminist methods below. The growth in the twentieth century, of international law, 
specifically including the areas of international criminal law, international 
                                                          
22 Alternatively, they can solidify harmful local gender practices. 
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humanitarian law and international human rights law, has been dependent upon the 
promotion of women as victims. It is from this starting point that the thesis begins its 
analysis of the female defendant in the following chapters.  
3. International Human Rights Law and International Criminal Law 
The new emphasis on human rights emerged during the beginning of the 1990s, which 
encouraged accountability and an end to impunity, as demonstrated by the focus on 
international criminal law and establishment of tribunals.23 Douzinas writes that in the 
1990s human rights became the new ideology of the world. He further states, “All 
recent wars and occupations have been carried out wholly or partly in the name of 
human rights, democracy, and freedom. Human rights became part of a political 
philosophy and sociology.”24 Despite the impressive gains afforded individuals by 
human rights provisions,25 I argue, following Douzinas, that human rights have also 
been a way for States to justify abhorrent behaviour, by cloaking military intervention 
or ‘democratic intervention’ in their desire to promote human rights in the Global 
South. Similarly, Chandler argues that human rights are connected to States’ need to 
protect their sovereignty.26 Human rights are used simultaneously to theoretically 
justify violence and to encourage the punishment of those who deploy violence. 
Douzinas argues that human rights have been adopted as a tactic to ensure other non-
Western States seek pro-Western policies using acceptable ‘human rights language’.27  
 
Human rights can offer protection against corrupt power, but they can also be used by 
States to avoid scrutiny of policies abroad (humanitarian intervention) and internally 
(emphasis on civil and political over social and economic rights). However, the 
importance of human rights as a way to articulate the oppression one faces as the 
hands of State or institutions should not be dismissed. Human rights language while 
criticised for becoming the lingua franca of State sponsored entities often promoting a 
neoliberal project, also benefits non-State entities as well. If the international human 
rights agenda employs language that everyone is familiar with, then it stands to reason 
                                                          
23 Zacklin, ‘The Failings of Ad Hoc International Tribunals’ (2004) 541-542.  
24 Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (2007) 12. 
25 Donovan (n 4).  
26 Chandler, ‘The Limits of Human Rights and Cosmopolitan Citizenship’ in Chandler (Ed.) Rethinking 
Human Rights Critical Approaches to International Politics (2002) 31, 134. 
27 Douzinas (n 24) 7, 31, 43. 
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it can also be a way for activists and citizens on the ground to frame their frustrations 
using a language with which States understand. This becomes a way of employing a 
corrupted agenda against those who corrupted it in the first place, resulting in real 
gains.28 Far from the calls for the invocation of human rights by protesters against 
government mistreatment of its citizens, are the State officials who use the language 
of human rights to aid in their State objectives, which do not always carry altruistic 
motives. One of the many issues with the usage of human rights language by State 
institutions is as Kennedy states, the use of human rights as a way to frame violence 
‘on the battlefield’.29 This has also been another linchpin where international human 
rights law and international humanitarian law have been found to be similar, albeit not 
a necessarily positive attribute. Whereby the use of law as a way to justify violence 
and privilege killing is all the more evident.30  
 
Increasingly, the rhetoric of the international human rights agenda has been integrated 
into political speeches and State-centric approaches to garner support for military 
interventions.31 However, the use of human rights as a tool in any circumstance can 
come at a cost, meaning that while I am not calling for the dismantling of the human 
rights agenda, I am calling for critique of the way human rights language is used, and 
to continually assess the so called gains made in the name of human rights. As 
demonstrated through examples found within the link between environmental law and 
human rights, granting someone their human rights can come at the cost of denying 
other rights in the long term.32  
 
                                                          
28 Engle, ‘Feminism and Its (Dis)contents: Criminalizing Wartime Rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ 
(2005) 785-786. 
29  See Kennedy, ‘Lawfare and Warfare’ in Crawford and Koskenniemi (Eds.) Cambridge Companion 
to International Law (2012) 179.  
30 ibid. 
31 President George Bush Jr., State of the Union Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the 
American People, (21 September 2001). In the President’s speech he noted: Afghanistan's people have 
been brutalized - many are starving and many have fled. Women are not allowed to attend school. You 
can be jailed for owning a television. Religion can be practiced only as their leaders dictate. A man can 
be jailed in Afghanistan if his beard is not long enough. The United States respects the people of 
Afghanistan - after all, we are currently its largest source of humanitarian aid - but we condemn the 
Taliban regime. It is not only repressing its own people, it is threatening people everywhere by 
sponsoring and sheltering and supplying terrorists. By aiding and abetting murder, the Taliban regime 
is committing murder. 
32 Cullet, ‘Right to Water in India – Plugging Conceptual and Practical Gaps’ (2012) 62. 
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International criminal law has been used as a way to punish those who violate grave 
breaches of international humanitarian law during armed conflict. The relationship 
between international humanitarian law and human rights is such that international 
humanitarian law interprets and applies human rights ideals and it is the worst of 
international humanitarian law violations that are prosecuted under international 
criminal law. International criminal law has developed the terminology used to define 
genocide and crimes against humanity, the worst violations of human rights law. 
International humanitarian law and international human rights law also developed 
work on women and humanitarian issues, for example, as these areas gained 
prominence into the second half of the twentieth century with the advent of world 
conferences and conventions such as CEDAW,33 the global consciousness turned to 
altruistic aims. These issues became widely accessible through international broadcast 
media in the 1990s,34 led people to international criminal law, as a way of rectifying 
the abuses they saw in the area of international humanitarian law. In particular, 
international criminal law responded to the atrocities women faced in particular with 
the recognition of sexual violence. This recognition of sexual violence has framed the 
way female defendants are understood in armed conflict, as female victims have 
dominated the consciousness around women’s roles in armed conflict. 
 
This critique of international human rights law’s development, situates the project of 
the female perpetrator in a much larger arena than just her association with 
international criminal law, but more widely within the framework of international 
human rights law as well as international humanitarian law. This work highlights the 
political aims behind international criminal law’s expansion, as well as international 
law’s focus on human rights. Some of the intricacies brought forth by addressing the 
female perpetrator are embedded in the problems raised in relation to international 
criminal law, international human rights law, and international humanitarian law. 
However, the quest for recognition of female defendants would possibly expand the 
political aspects of international criminal law and permit further imperialism in the 
                                                          
33 I am referring to the four UN Women World Conferences including: Mexico City in 1975, 
Copenhagen in 1980, Nairobi in 1985, and Beijing in 1995. UNGA, Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women A/RES/34/180 (18 December 1979). 
34 See Thussu and Freedman, War and the Media: Reporting Conflict 24/7 (2003); Bessaiso, 'Media 
Strategies and Coverage of International Conflicts: The 2003 Iraq War and Al-Jazeera' (PhD thesis, 
Cardiff School of Journalism Media and Cultural Studies) on file with Cardiff University (2010). 
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name of human rights. By this I mean that female defendants could be the justification 
for international criminal law’s continued prosecution of individuals outside Western 
States. Therefore, supporting the prosecutions of female defendants before 
international criminal courts would not necessarily reduce Western interventions into 
non-Western States. However, prosecuting more female defendants could disrupt the 
female victim mentality of international criminal law and international human rights 
law, as Western States have used the violation of human rights of non-Western 
women as justification for military intervention.35 The importance of raising 
awareness of these issues around the topic of female defendants in relation to the 
outcomes of this thesis is to illustrate that there is no clear answer or solution to these 
debates. However, what this does illuminate is the complexity of the topic of female 
defendants and the international legal dilemmas that are embedded in this discussion 
as well. I will continue to develop and explain the complexities of this topic 
throughout the thesis, and offer recommendations in Chapter Seven.  
4. Western Feminist Approaches in the Development of International Criminal 
Law 
Through the focus on human rights and the promotion of women’s issues, feminists 
have contributed to the development of international human rights law as well as 
international criminal law in equally substantial ways. Another way international 
criminal law and international human rights law align is in the representation of 
women through predominantly liberal and radical US feminist reform strategies. 
International criminal law has been influenced by radical feminists, as seen in the 
ICTY and ICTR via the focus on female victims of sexual violence, which reproduces 
female sexual vulnerability as the paradigm female experience of conflict.36 Liberal 
feminists have shaped key components of international human rights law through 
creation of The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW) in 1979.  Both radical and liberal feminists were instrumental in 
providing nuance and a ‘women’s’ perspective in these two areas of international 
law.37 However, the liberal and radical strands of feminism would appear to have 
                                                          
35 Bunting, ‘Can the spread of women's rights ever be accompanied by war?’ (The Guardian Opinion, 
2 October 2011). 
36 See Heathcote and Otto (Eds.), Rethinking Peacekeeping Gender Equality and Collective Security 
(2014). 
37 Kapur, ‘Erotic Justice: Law and the New Politics of Postcolonialism’ (2005) 135, 136. 
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extremely different understandings of the way women and gender should exist within 
international law. Despite this both liberal and radical strands work much better 
together than one might expect. Liberal feminist ideals focus on equality and gaining 
access to areas of the law that have traditionally been male dominated, achieved by 
law reform, increased representation, and participation.38 A few areas liberal feminists 
have made developments in are employment and education.  However, an issue within 
the liberal approach is that women are required to enter into a world already 
constructed by men.39 Liberal feminist law reforms do not sufficiently challenge the 
assumption that the law itself is free from male dominance and that once women 
secure places in government or politics, for example, the past inequalities will 
disappear. Moreover, liberal feminism is unable to accommodate the differences of 
women who do not fall in line to their proposed legal reforms, which keep patriarchal 
dominance intact. The critique of liberal feminists further suggests that the biases 
found within the law cannot be irradiated by adding new ‘women focused’ policies, 
rather the law is itself structurally biased.40 Liberal feminists have shaped the 
international human rights agenda, with CEDAW embracing their vision of equality 
between men and women. However, it is not only liberal feminists that have shaped 
the understanding of human rights. 
 
Radical feminists see the inequalities women face as a product of male dominance, 
arguing that political and sexual hierarches that exist in society benefit men, and gains 
made by liberal feminist to aid women still sit within the structure of male dominance. 
Radical feminists, like MacKinnon, see the power held by men within society directly 
linked to the subordination of women found in the legal system. Radical feminists 
specifically focus on sex based harms as the basis of women’s subordination. What 
the liberal feminists and radical feminists have in common is the influence over 
different realms of international law. The work of radical feminists in international 
criminal law, based on a ‘structuralist view of sexual subordination’, resulted in the 
Ad Hoc Tribunals reclassifying the criminality of rape and sexual violence to carry 
                                                          
38 Charlesworth and Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist Analysis (2000). 
39 ibid. 
40 See Lacey and Jackson, ‘Introducing Feminist Legal Theory’ in Barron et al (Eds.) Introduction to 
Jurisprudence and Legal Theory Commentary and Materials (2002). 
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more gravity.41 This displays the tendency of international criminal law to 
acknowledge Western radical feminist’s point of view.  
 
The human rights agenda has presented governments with a useful tactic to garner 
support for their activities by seemingly bolstering the use of human rights. While 
seeking to justify certain wars, such as the armed conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan for 
example, States have often claimed the liberation of women as their motive for armed 
conflict.42 Within the rhetoric linking human rights and the liberation of women, the 
female victim is predominant. Kennedy writes that, the human rights movement has 
continued to increase the prevalence of women depicted through stereotypical victim-
centred roles within legal documentation, and as the human rights discourse continues 
so will these limiting descriptions of women.43 MacKinnon, as well as others,44 
encouraged the inclusion of women in international criminal law by focusing on 
violence against women, and in particular sexual violence.45 This focus has included 
certain experiences of women in law, creating assumptions about all women’s 
experiences of armed conflict. The prevalence of both liberal and radical feminist 
legal reforms in international law, while an important step toward adding gender 
perspectives into global governance debates, has resulted in negative effects by 
reducing the amount of diversity assumed to exist within feminist discourse from the 
perspective of mainstream legal critiques. Both the radical and liberal feminist 
approach ignores feminist approaches across non-Western contexts, which include 
post-colonial feminisms. The Western radical and liberal feminist approach also limits 
women’s diverse experiences in conflict spaces and reproduce women as victims in 
order to gain laws protection reproducing a limited binary of female experiences. 
 
                                                          
41 Halley et al, ‘Rape at Rome: Feminist Interventions in the Criminalization of Sex-Related Violence 
in Positive International Criminal Law’ (2008) 67, 68. 
42 See Al-Ali and Pratt, What Kind of Liberation? Women and the Occupation of Iraq (2009); 
Heathcote and Otto (Eds.), Introduction in Rethinking Peacekeeping Gender Equality and Collective 
Security (2014). 
43 Kennedy, ‘Boundaries in the Field of Human Rights: The International Human Rights Movement: 
Part of the Problem?’ (2002) 105. 
44 See Stiglmayer, Mass Rape: The War Against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1994). 
45 Kapur, ‘The Tragedy of Victimisation Rhetoric Resurrecting the Native Subject in 
International/Post-Colonial Feminist Legal Politics’ (2002); Kapur (n 37) 97-99. 
  
98 
 
International human rights law and international criminal law have both developed 
reforms based on gender, which have included radical and liberal feminist 
approaches. These radical and liberal feminist approaches primarily come from US or 
Western feminist experiences and agendas that have focused on violence against 
women as well as discrimination, instead of equally important feminist topics, such 
as, poverty or labour rights and access to resources. The Western feminist perspective, 
whether it be radical or liberal, has become the voice from which all feminist 
perspectives must be shaped through or contend with, in international legal spaces. By 
positioning the female victim as the focus of mainstream conflict narratives within 
international human rights law, international criminal law, as well as within the 
Women, Peace and Security rhetoric, the Western feminist agenda has continued to 
play a role in limiting the experiences of women, which ultimately has hampered the 
development of international criminal law. Understanding the female victim’s rise to 
prominence within international discourse helps highlight the focus on human rights, 
Western feminist intervention, and the development of international criminal, leading 
to the creation of the ICC, throughout late twentieth century. Since the rise of ‘victim 
feminism’ coincided with the expansion of international criminal law, the relationship 
between international criminal law and the human rights agenda then becomes an 
essential perspective into the way women have been defined and viewed in 
international law. These ideas can be seen in Kapur’s work; she writes that victim 
feminism, present in international criminal law, has aided the international human 
rights discourse in reinforcing narrow views of women, gender, ethnicity, and 
sexuality.46 It is in interrogating these relationships that the place of female 
defendants in international criminal law becomes all the more problematic, as female 
defendants uneasily exist in a space that is influenced by existing binaries found 
within law and relationships of power embedded in the legal discourse itself.   
 
Within the ICTY many feminists, including MacKinnon, did not account for the 
differences in the lived realities of people with different ethnicities or religions, which 
affected the way they experienced violence during the Yugoslavian conflict.47 Some 
feminists assumed all women who were connected to the conflict were raped; 
                                                          
46 Kapur (n 37) 127. 
47 Engle, ‘Judging Sex in War’ (2008) 951-956; Engle (n 28) 784-788. 
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feminists and journalists became increasingly frustrated when women refused to 
discuss their stories.48 This approach was criticised due to the assumption that the 
majority of women were victims of sexual violence, and also because the differences 
in the multiple ethnic groups present a part of the conflict, which influenced the ways 
these groups dealt with sexual violence, were largely ignored.49 To say that 
international criminal law is based upon commonality suggests there is an assumed 
collective understanding, but often, as in the case of certain feminist working in the 
ICTY, that assumed understanding is often from a white Western and Christian 
perspective.  The perception that women from outside of the Global North require 
‘saving’ persists and perpetuates a narrative and undermines representations of the 
breadth of women’s experiences in armed conflicts, including women as defendants. 
 
The perspective I adopt within this thesis, with regards to international criminal law, 
takes into account the surrounding environment of international law that continues to 
shape and give meaning to the normative understanding of international criminal law. 
The influence of critical legal studies (CLS), or rather new approaches to international 
law (NAIL), underscores my work in this thesis, and its fundamental assumptions 
underpin the perspective I take in relation to international law. The indeterminacy of 
law and the influence of power in international law inform my approach,50 as well as 
the use of language which is never free from bias and requires a deconstruction of 
hierarchies as well as the universalisation of legal principles and aims.51 I recognise 
that law’s power has, as in the case of female defendants, influenced the way the 
international community understands women’s roles in armed conflict. Primarily 
amongst these influencing factors are the human rights agenda and the Western 
feminist intervention into international criminal law developments from the mid-
1990s. I am not suggesting that the increased appropriation of human rights by States 
in order to justify abuses should result in a rejection of human rights entirely as a 
mode for empowerment or that feminists are responsible for progressing an 
international criminal legal system that ‘harms’ women.  
                                                          
48 Engle (n 28) 794-795. 
49 ibid. 
50 See Kennedy, ‘The critique of rights in critical legal studies’ in Brown and 
Halley (Eds.) Left Legalism/Left Critique (2002); Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of International Law’ 
(1990); Matsuda, ‘Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations’ (1987). 
51 See Schiff Berman, ‘From International Law to Law and Globalization’ (2005). 
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Another result of the human rights and international criminal law expansion in the late 
1990s, as well as Western feminist intervention, has been a lack of nuance around the 
array of identities both men and women assume during armed conflict. In one of the 
sub-claims evident throughout the thesis, I argue that female defendants’ lack of 
visibility within international criminal legal structures, has further contributed to 
missed opportunities in the development of gendered, racial, and classist 
understandings in armed conflict.  
5.  International Tribunals and Courts 
The relationship between international humanitarian law and international criminal 
law has been touched upon in the previous section, as has the expansion of 
international criminal law in the 1990s. However, I would like to now briefly move 
back to international criminal law’s development and fundamental concepts. First, I 
will focus on two principles of the international criminal legal system. Namely, the 
concepts of individual criminal responsibility and complementarity, both of which are 
necessary to discuss in order to understand the international criminal law’s history and 
grasp the larger picture of international criminal law as a discipline. Traditionally, 
States were the primary subjects of international law and State responsibility, now 
laid out in the Draft Articles on State Responsibility,52 governed the behaviour and 
relationship between States. In respect to the laws of war, the Hague Conventions of 
1899 and 1907 where the first substantial codification of the duties of a State during 
armed conflict.53 Yet, this only cited violations of the Conventions by States, as illegal 
not criminal and individual criminal liability was not recognised as such. However, 
with the creation of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials, the concept of the individual 
responsibility in international criminal law was developed through international 
jurisprudence for the first time.54  
                                                          
52 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1 (November 2001) 
53 See generally, inclusive of separate treaties, the First Hague Conference (May 18–July 29, 1899) 
adopted three conventions and three declarations the Second Hague Conference (July 15–October 18, 
1907) adopted 13 conventions and one declaration. 
54 I do acknowledge that after WW1 the culpability of the German Kaiser was acknowledged in the 
Treaty of Versailles. 
  
101 
 
This shift from State to individual responsibility was articulated in the Judgement of 
the Nuremberg Tribunal,55 which was reiterated again in the more recent Rome 
Statute, stating “crimes against international law are committed by men, not by 
abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the 
provisions of international law be enforced.”56 The Agreement for the Prosecution and 
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal formed in London in 1945,57 established the crimes 
that could be tried before the Nuremberg court, as war crimes, crimes against peace, 
and crimes against humanity.58 Despite the work of Lemkin to articulate the crime of 
genocide,59 and the subsequent creation of The Convention of the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 
1948, genocide was not a crime under the jurisdiction of the Trials.60  
 
Earl argues that while no one was indicted for the crime of genocide in Nuremberg, 
Lemkin’s work was still influential to those who drafted the Nuremberg Charter. This 
is evidenced by the Nuremberg Charter’s description of count three of War Crimes, 
which states:  
they conducted deliberate and systematic genocide, via., the extermination of 
racial and national groups, against the civilian populations of certain occupied 
territories in order to destroy particular races and classes of people and 
national, racial, or religious groups, particularly Jews, Poles, and Gypsies and 
others.61  
The inclusion of the word ‘genocide’ into the United Nations Charter is just one 
example of the way the creation and proceedings of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials 
developed the elements of international crimes, which would eventually be used by 
                                                          
55 United Nations, Charter of the International Military Tribunal - Annex to the Agreement for the 
prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis (8 August 1945); UNGA 
International Law Commission, The Charter and Judgement of the Nürnberg Tribunal: History and 
Analysis Appendix II., A/CN.4/5 (3 March 1949) [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter].  
56 Rome Statute (n 10). 
57 Nuremberg Charter (n 55). 
58 ibid. 
59 Lemkin is regarded as having developed the definition of the term and crusaded tirelessly to have it 
incorporated into the Nuremberg Trials.  
60 Genocide Convention (n 8). 
61 Nuremberg Charter (n 55) 
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the International Criminal Court, articulated in the Rome Statute.62 Influenced by the 
Hague Conventions and the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials there was a need to update 
the previous Geneva Conventions, this resulted in the Geneva Conventions I–IV in 
1949.63 Additional Protocols I and II, of the Geneva Conventions, created in 1977 
further solidified international humanitarian law and the protections entitled in both 
international and non-international armed conflicts. The notion of individual criminal 
responsibility was reaffirmed through the subsequent Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocols, as well as the Genocide Convention.64 Yet, it is through the 
process set in motion by the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials that individual criminal 
responsibility for international crimes developed.65 The ICTY, ICTR, ICC, and other 
international criminal courts and tribunals have subsequently focused on three 
categories of international crimes: grave breaches of the laws of war or war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, genocide, and the crime of aggression, although the later has 
yet to be put under the jurisdiction of the ICC.66  
 
With individual responsibility there is the concern that in prosecuting individuals for 
crimes in international law, the State escapes prosecution. Holding individuals to 
account for criminal acts does not allow them to hide behind the State due to their 
position within the State, to avoid prosecution.67 Yet, the State can be seen to be 
involved in international crimes such as genocide, a crime that involves a systemic 
                                                          
62 Rome Statute (n 10) article 6, 7, 8. 
63 The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field 75 UNTS 31, adopted in 1864, revised in 1949, Article 49; The Geneva Convention 
for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces 
at Sea 75 UNTS 85, adopted in 1949, Article 50; The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War 5 UNTS 135, adopted in 1929, revision in 1949, Article 129; Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 75 UNTS 287, adopted on 12 August 
1949; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Article 146, and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) 1125 UNTS 3, adopted on 8 
June 1977, Article 85. 
64 ibid; Genocide Convention (n 8) article 4. 
65 This is not dismissing the argument for State responsibility of genocide. See, for example, 
Milanović, ‘State Responsibility for Genocide’ (2006). 
66 The crimes are based on charters and conventions that relate to the laws of war as well as the Statutes 
of the ICTR and the ICTY. War crimes were highlighted in the Geneva Conventions as well as 
Additional Protocol II and Art III common to the Geneva Conventions and are defined in the Charter of 
the International Military Tribunal, Nürnberg, of 8 August 1945 and confirmed by resolutions 3 (I) of 
13 February 1946 and 95 (I) of 11 December 1946 by the General Assembly of the United Nations; 
Crimes Against Humanity were defined in the Nuremberg Charter as well as the Tokyo Trial, ICTY, 
ICTR, and SCSL; Genocide Convention (n 8).  
67 UNGA, Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities A/RES/1288 (5 December 1958). 
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operation of extermination, one that is so complex it necessitates the organisation of a 
‘State like’ entity. This was alleged in the Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and 
Montenegro case before the ICJ. 68 While the State is responsible for violations of 
international humanitarian,69 the notion that a State could be held criminally 
responsible was removed by States from the Article on State Responsibility in 1999, 
while a State will still be liable for breaches of international law. The possibility of 
State criminal responsibility could be a future development of international criminal 
law if the crime of aggression is to come under the jurisdiction of the ICC. The 
definition of the crime of aggression indicates an involvement of the State, as the 
crime must involve the actions an individual with control of a State’s political or 
military capacity.70 While the crime of aggression denotes individual criminal 
responsibility, it is implicit that States, as a result, are involved in the commission of 
such crime. In this way, even if the State themselves cannot come under criminal 
jurisdiction, it certainly bares the possibility of offering a way for the international 
community to ‘name and shame’ States whose leaders are involved in the practice. As 
Nollkaemper argues both State and individual responsibility are related and state 
responsibility can “address the systemic causes of individual criminality”.71  
Likewise, the Security Council retains the authority under Article 39 of the UN 
Charter to find States responsible for acts of aggression and to respond if necessary. 
 
Discussing individual responsibility in relation to female defendants draws out 
questions of gender and leadership. Understanding and accepting that female 
defendants exist and also hold positions of power within a State disrupts the 
assumptions that global leadership gender dynamics primarily concern men. 
Moreover, the assumption persists that the defendants brought before international 
courts and tribunals are more likely to be men because political and military leaders 
are more likely to be men. Nevertheless, there are many examples of female leaders 
                                                          
68 Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia-Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro), No. 122 (11 July 1996). 
69 Geneva Conventions (n 63). 
70 Rome Statute (n 10) article 8; For the purpose of this Statute, “crime of aggression” means the 
planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control 
over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its 
character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations. 
71 Nollkaemper, ‘Concurrence between Individual Responsibility and State Responsibility in 
International Law’ (2003) 639. 
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who participate in ordering military action or are involved in actions that would be 
considered to be violent. For example, Margaret Thatcher ordered military action in 
the Falkland Islands, which for some was regarded as a crime of aggression;72 
Condoleezza Rice and Hillary Clinton, two former US Secretaries of State, have been 
accused of being complicit in potential breaches of international law via US 
government military action, such as drone strikes and torture tactics.73  The examples 
of women in the West who exercise military power, which causes violence, are not 
typically represented as defendants. It appears that even if Western military actions 
are considered illegal in international law, those leaders in the West who are involved, 
be it man or woman, are not as readily labelled defendants unlike the leaders outside 
of the West.  
 
While non-western examples such as Nyiramasuhuko and Gbagbo exist, the emphasis 
on their gender by the West would appear to be a fascination of female defendants in 
the Global South by Western audiences. This fascination seems to both ignore the 
complicity of Western female political leaders in violence and render the female 
leadership crimes abroad as abhorrent and exceptional. This indicates that the focus 
on gender is a Western preoccupation that does not manifest in the same way in local 
context, for instance in Rwanda or the Ivory Coast. The prosecution of Gbagbo by 
local courts can be argued to be focused on local politics and not in a preoccupation of 
gender.  
 
The principle of complementarity, found in the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, states that the work of the ICC will be complementary to the work of 
national jurisdictions, and therefore the ICC will only try a case when the State party 
is ‘unwilling or unable to do so’. 74 However, this is not the first time the concept of 
complementarity was practised in international criminal law. After Wold War I, war 
crimes were tried in domestic courts, notwithstanding the Commission on the 
                                                          
72 Thompson, ‘Remembering the Falklands War the Crisis that Defined the Iron Lady’ (National 
Review, 14 June 2017). 
73 Torture: Harden, ‘Condoleezza Rice approved 'torture' techniques’ (The Telegraph, 23 April 2009) ; 
Drone Strikes: Zenko, ‘Hillary Clinton’s Hawkishness Revealed in her Emails’ (Newsweek Opinion, 13 
June 2016); Entous and Barrett, ‘Emails in Clinton Probe Dealt With Planned Drone Strikes’ (The Wall 
Street Journal, 9 June 2016). 
74 UNGA, ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’ A/CONF.183/9 (1998) (Last Amended 
2010) Preamble and Article 1, 17.  
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Responsibilities of the Authors of War and on Enforcement Penalties recommending 
war criminals to be tried by the Allied Tribunals.75 Despite the fact that Germany 
agreed initially to respect the jurisdiction of the court and turn over suspected German 
war criminals, they later refused and a compromise was reached, which resulted in 
Germany trying a small number of those accused by the Allies,76 before their court at 
Leipzig.77 The Versailles Treaty emphasised the need to prosecute individuals if 
Germany did not do so. Article 228 of the Treaty states that the German government 
will respect the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to try individuals before 
military tribunals.78  
 
Article 288 highlights the importance and primacy of international tribunals, or rather 
tribunals outside of Germany’s domestic jurisdiction.79 The agreement to allow the 
German court in Leipzig to carry out trials is an example, El Zeidy states, of 
complementarity.80 The international community, despite having jurisdiction, allowed 
Germany to retain jurisdiction and prosecute individuals in their national courts, 
emphasising the importance of local justice processes. This shows the concept of 
complementarity in practice, despite international courts being given primacy in the 
Treaty of Versailles. This principle was later in echoed in the Rome Statute, which 
theoretically makes the ICC a court of ‘last resort’, giving primacy to national 
jurisdictions.  
 
After Wold War II the International Military Tribunal was established in order to try 
the most senior war criminals, with domestic courts expected to take the majority of 
the prosecutions.81 The rationale behind this was to see a greater number of war 
                                                          
75 El Zeidy, ‘The Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery to Implement International 
Criminal Law’ (2002) 871. 
76 Referring to the Allies and Associated Powers. 
77 El Zeidy (n 75) 872; This is referring to Germany’s initially acceptance of the Versailles Treaty 
(Article 228 and 230) and the later refusal at the Paris Peace Conference by Kurt von Lersner. The 
‘Allies’ compiled a list of roughly 895 persons alleged to be war criminals. Once the compromise was 
reached Germany passed legislation to counter act Article 228.  
78 Treaty of Peace with Germany, Treaty of Versailles (10 January 1920) Article 288. 
79 El Zeidy (n 75) 872. Similarly, after WWI Turkey agreed in the Treaty of Sevres to allow the Allied 
Powers to prosecute individuals. The Treaty of Sevres was never ratified and when the subsequent 
Treaty of Lausanne was put in place it did not discuss prosecution. The situation with Turkey after the 
war was similar to that a German, where domestic prosecution was allowed in order to maintain 
stability within Turkey.  
80 ibid 873. 
81 Nuremberg Charter (n 55). 
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criminal tried in the domestic courts where their crimes occurred, in the territory 
where the individuals they harmed were located.82 However, the Nuremberg Tribunal 
did not have a direct relationship with domestic courts, both the international and 
domestic criminal courts carried different jurisdiction and prosecuted different 
crimes.83  
 
The Nuremberg Tribunal tried those whose offences had no exact geographical 
location; the rest of the suspected criminals were tried within one of the four zones, 
within Germany, set up by the Occupying Powers.84 Due to the fragmentation that 
existed between the four zones, as they were controlled by different powers, the 
Allied Control Council passed Law No. 10, specifying the acts recognised as a 
crime.85 The principle of complementarity after Wold War I and II, while different, 
display a tendency to take into consideration the environment post armed conflict. 
While after both World Wars there was the focus on trying individual internationally, 
there was an understanding that national courts play a key role in the criminal justice 
process. World War I and II are just two examples of the existence complementarity 
principle, subsequent examples include the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, as well as the 
Ad Hoc Tribunals and hybrid courts. Each instance contributing to the understanding 
of complementarity found within the Rome Statute.  
 
Complementarity, while a main principle of the creation of the ICC, is not without its 
critiques as well. Burke–White states that instead of the Office of the Prosecutor 
demonstrating “passive complementarity” where the ICC only steps in with States fail 
to prosecute individuals themselves, the OTP should adopt a policy of, “active 
complementarity” working with and assisting national jurisdictions to encourage 
accountability.86 Trahan suggests that the concept of complementarity with reference 
                                                          
82 El Zeidy (n 75) 874, 875. 
83 ibid 876. 
84 ibid. 
85 For a discussion of the Nuremberg Trials Final Report Control Council Law No. 10 Punishment of 
Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity see Taylor, ‘Final Report 
to the Secretary of the Army on The Nuremberg War Crimes Trials Under Control Council Law No. 10 
(15 August 1949). 
86 See Burke-White, ‘Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and National 
Courts in the Rome System of International Justice’ (2008). 
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to the crime of aggression, may need to be rethought, with primacy to prosecute 
resting with the ICC, due to the fact that national courts may be biased and decide to 
prosecute solely based on the desire to keep prosecution out of the International 
Criminal Court.87  
 
Gbagbo’s case, as discussed briefly above, was tried before local Cote d’Ivoire courts 
in 2015, and has been argued by Heller to be an example of ‘radical 
complementarity’.88 Gbagbo was charged with disturbing the peace, organising armed 
gangs and undermining State security and was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment.89 
However, the ICC stated that despite Gbagbo being sentenced to prison, her charges 
did not reflect the status of crimes against humanity to which she was indicted for by 
the International Criminal Court and therefore the prosecution of Gbagbo, which 
resulted in 20 years imprisonment, was not a successful example of complementarity. 
Heller has stated that despite the focus on sovereignty found in Article 17 of the 
Rome Statute, the article also includes the ‘same conduct’ requirement, which was the 
reason why the ICC did not find the 2015 Ivory Coast trial to be sufficient.  
 
The Office of the Prosecutor stated that the charges were not of ‘substantially the 
same conduct’ as the ones in the ICC indictment. What Heller argues is that ICCs 
reluctance to consider the 2015 Ivory Coast’s prosecution of Gbagbo is too restrictive 
and inconsistent with the ICC Statute.90 Heller concludes that until the ICC re-
evaluates its relationship with local courts it will not fulfil its mandate.91 Heller’s 
work on complementarity illustrates an important argument that I revisit in Chapter 
Seven: focusing on the relationship between domestic law and international law will 
be argued to be an important element in international criminal law’s future 
development. Discussing their history and the debates surrounding these concepts 
illuminates the complexity and interconnectedness of the elements found in 
international criminal law. It also displays the evolving nature of international 
                                                          
87 See Trahan, ‘Is Complementarity the Right Approach for the International Criminal Court’s Crime 
of Aggression- Considering the Problem of “Overzealous” National Court Prosecutions’ (2012). 
88 See Heller, ‘Radical Complementarity’ (2016). 
89 Prosecutor v Gbagbo (Indictment) ICC-02/11-01/12 (2012). 
90 Heller (n 88) 2.  
91 ibid 38. 
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criminal law, especially when viewing international criminal law’s development 
temporally.  
 
The difficulties when dealing with or developing international criminal law can often 
be attributed to its dual nature, international law and criminal law. Tallgren writes of 
this distinction when describing international criminal law, arguing that international 
law is based upon a theoretical commonality between States, all acknowledging 
certain norms or rules and being equal.92 When relating the concept of State sovereign 
equality to international criminal law, one would assume that this would manifest 
itself by ensuring that all those who violate grave breaches of international 
humanitarian law would be brought to justice. However, the privilege and power that 
exists amongst the five permanent Security Council members and their nationals 
provides a shield to the prosecution of the most powerful and their allies.93 Likewise, 
it is unlikely that post-conflict States will have stable internal legal structures for 
prosecuting international crimes in the way that States might have that engage in 
armed conflict abroad.  To assume that international criminal law can be a place of 
equals ignores the inequalities present between those who promote the benefits of 
international criminal law, those States that are subject to the prosecution/indictment 
of nations,94 and those who are most commonly exposed to international criminal 
law’s mechanisms. Assuming international criminal law exists between equals 
dismisses the disparities and problems within certain areas of law that international 
criminal law addresses. Sovereign equality is an important international principle, 
embedded in the UN Charter, and some areas of international law, such as 
international environment law, do develop the idea of common, but differentiated 
responsibility. However, sovereign equality also disguises the histories of imperialism 
and colonialism that continue and perpetuate inequalities. 
 
                                                          
92 Tallgren (n 18) 571, 580, 592.  
93 Specifically referring to the five permanent member of the UN Security Council, US, UK, France, 
Russia, and China, as well as UNSC members and their ‘friendships with States outside the UNSC, i.e. 
US and Israel US. 
94 However, there is evidence of States undertaking the process of  self-referral to the ICC, as in the 
case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo; Press Release of 19 April 2004, 'Prosecutor Receives 
Referral of the Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo'. 
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Criminal law aims to be largely predictable, but it is also is “a local interpreter of 
common values,” as well as being involved with solving problems and preventing 
future ones.95 With international criminal law in many ways functioning as a 
reflection of the Western domestic criminal legal system and international law 
encompassing a great range and scale of law, combining the two has been difficult. It 
is in negotiating the tenets of international criminal law where the law has found 
difficulty. Often the issues that are the most complex have been the sites where 
international criminal law has developed the least, for example sexual violence 
deployed against men which has often been overlooked during and after armed 
conflict,96 as well as the focus of this research, the actions of female defendants. 
These are just two areas where international criminal law has not been properly 
developed. The lack of cases of female defendants perpetuates the notion that 
particular women who have deployed violence and faced prosecution are the 
exception of female behaviour in armed conflict.  
 
Capitalising on the increased attention to human rights and the shock pertaining to the 
atrocities committed during the hostilities in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the United 
Nations Security Council established the ICTY and ICTR. It was determined that the 
situation in the former Yugoslavia constituted, “a threat to international peace and 
security”.97  This declaration was required to activate Article 41 of the Charter, which 
the tribunals are established under. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia was established in 1993 by way of a United Nations Security Council 
resolution.98 Resolution 827 contained the initial statute for the ICTY, that statute 
would be amended nine further times; the ICTYs statute lists the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction and organisational structure.99 The ICTY deals with crimes committed in 
                                                          
95 Tallgren (n 18) 562. 
96 Cases before the ICTY and ICTR, in regards to sexual violence against men, include: Prosecutor v. 
Akayesu, (Trial Chamber Judgement), ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998); Prosecutor v. Mučić et al 
(Trial Chamber Judgement) IT-96-21-T (16 November 1998); Prosecutor v. Furundžija (Trial 
Chamber Judgement) IT-95-17/1-T (10 December 1998); Prosecutor v. Musema (Trial Chamber 
Judgement and Sentence) ICTR-96-13-T (27 January 2000); Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al (Trial 
Chamber Judgement) IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T  (22 February 2001); Prosecutor v. Semanza, (Trial 
Chamber Judgement and Sentence) ICTR-97-20-T (15 May 2003). 
97 UN Security Council Resolution 827, S/RES/827, 25 May 1993. 
98 ibid. 
99 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, adopted by Security 
Council Resolution 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993). 
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the territory from 1991 to 2001 and its jurisdiction is centred upon four groupings of 
crimes: grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws and 
customs of war, genocide, and crimes against humanity.100  
 
In 1994 the UN Security Council created the ICTR, after recognising that the situation 
in Rwanda also constituted “a threat to peace and security” and determining that 
prosecuting those who violated international humanitarian law would help bring peace 
and reconciliation amongst those affected.101 In November 1994 the UN Security 
Council passed the resolution 955, which created the statute for the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.102  The Tribunal was required to prosecute violations 
of international humanitarian law within Rwanda between 1 January 1994 and 31 
December 1994, as well as violations of law committed by Rwandan citizens in 
neighbouring States.103  The ICTR would punish the crimes of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocol II.104 With the creation of the ICTY and ICTR, international 
lawyers began prosecuting crimes that were at one time beyond their reach due to the 
lack of an ‘international criminal code’.105 Until the creation of the Tribunals there 
was not a sufficient legal basis to hold individuals to account for crimes, which was 
established with the Statutes of the two Tribunals. Previously, States were reluctant to 
give up their sovereignty to an international court or tribunal, but the establishment of 
the Ad Hoc Tribunals showed that previous barriers to prosecution, such as State 
sovereignty and the exercise of domestic jurisdiction, could be overcome.  
 
                                                          
100 ibid Article 8. 
101 Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, adopted by Security Council Resolution 955, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]. 
102 ibid. 
103 ibid Article 7. 
104 ICTR Statute (n 101); The violations set forth by the Additional Protocol II and Article 3 common 
to the Geneva Conventions were listed as follows, but not limited to: Violence to life, health and 
physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as 
torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment; (b) Collective punishments; (c) Taking of 
hostages; (d) Acts of terrorism; (e) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault; (f) Pillage; (g) The 
passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgement pronounced by a 
regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognised as indispensable 
by civilised peoples; (h) Threats to commit any of the foregoing acts. 
105 Zacklin (n 23) 541. 
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The importance of the interpretation of war crimes in the Tribunals highlights the 
development of international criminal law from the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials. 
Danner notes that the international prosecutions in Nuremberg and Tokyo led to 
‘decades of silence’ not further international prosecutions.106 However, with the 
establishment of the Ad Hoc Tribunals international criminal law expanded and 
continued to develop with the subsequent hybrid courts and the ICC. The statutes and 
jurisprudence garnered from the ICTY and ICTR have influenced the definition of 
crimes as well as their prosecution in later international criminal courts. The rest of 
the section will detail the definitions of the crimes included in the Ad Hoc Tribunals 
and the subsequent establishment of the ECCC.  
 
In the ICTY ‘violations of the law of war’ included grave breaches to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, Article 2, and Violations of the Law or Customs of War, Article 
3.107 War crimes in Article 2 refer to eight acts, which include amongst others, torture, 
wilful killing, and compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the hostilities.108 Article 3 
has been broadly interpreted, it includes five acts but is not limited by these listed 
acts, as the Appeals Chamber has expanded Article 3, to “all violations of 
international humanitarian law” other than the grave breaches referred to in Article 
2.109  The jurisprudence from the ICTR establishes that a violation of Article 4 of the 
Statute must be committed in Rwanda, during non-international armed conflict, 
related to the conflict, and a serious violation of Article 3, common to the Geneva 
Conventions and of Additional Protocol II.110 The Tribunal also concluded that the 
perpetrator must have been a part of the armed forces and that the victim be a 
civilian.111 The ICTR Statute in Article 4 included acts such as violence to life, health, 
                                                          
106 Danner, ‘Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in International Criminal Law Sentencing’ (2001) 
417. 
107 ICTY Statute (n 99). 
108 ibid. 
109 Prosecutor v Tadić (Trial Chamber Opinion and Judgement) ICTY-94-1-T (7 May 1997) para 
616;The Appeals Chamber Judgement stated four conditions must be met in order to trigger the 
jurisdiction of Article 3: (i) the violation must constitute an infringement of a rule of international 
humanitarian law; (ii) the rule must be customary in nature or, if it belongs to treaty law, the required 
conditions must be met . . .; (iii) the violation must be 'serious', that is to say, it must constitute a breach 
of a rule protecting important values, and the breach must involve grave consequences for the victim 
....; (iv) the violation of the rule must entail, under customary or conventional law, the individual 
criminal responsibility of the person breaching the rule. 
110 ICTR Statute (n 101) 70.  
111 Danner (n 106) 458. 
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physical or mental well being of persons, taking hostages, acts of terrorism, collective 
punishments, outrages upon personal dignity including humiliating and degrading 
treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault, pillage, the 
passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgement 
pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees 
which are recognised as indispensable by civilised peoples and threats to commit any 
of the aforementioned acts.112  
 
Crimes against humanity are similarly described by both the ICTY and ICTR. In the 
ICTY Statute they are defined under Article 5 as: murder, extermination, 
enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, persecution on political, racial 
and religious grounds, and other inhumane acts.113 For the acts listed above to be 
considered criminal under international criminal law, they must be done with clear 
intent.114 The reason crimes against humanity are considered to be different from war 
crimes is found in the ICTR Statute, which states the defendant must have committed 
the act, “as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population 
on national, political, ethnic, racial, or religious grounds”.115 The ICTY stated that the 
act must be both widespread and systematic against a civilian population, meaning 
that the accused must have the knowledge that the act will affect more than one victim 
and was done a result of a certain policy or plan.116  
 
Genocide is distinct from both of the two other crimes because of the special case of 
intent. Its existence in the ICTY and ICTR comes from the 1948 Genocide 
Convention which states, “Genocide means any of the following acts committed with 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group.”117 
The Tribunals continued that the victim must have been a part of the identified group 
and the perpetrator committed the acts with the idea to destroy said group.118 The acts 
                                                          
112 ICTR Statute (n 101) art. 4. 
113 ICTY Statute (n 99) art. 5; ICTR Statute (n) art. 3. Both Statutes state these acts are either ‘murder-
type’ or ‘persecution’ crimes. 
114 Danner (n 106) 455. 
115 ICTR Statute (n 101) art. 3.  
116 Danner (n 106) 459.  
117 ICTY Statute (n 99) art. 4; ICTR Statute (n 101) art. 2.  
118 Prosecutor v Akayesu (Trial Chamber Judgement) ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998); Prosecutor v. 
Jelisic, (Trial Chamber Judgement) IT-95-10, 66 (14 December 1999).  
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that could comprise genocide included “killing members of the group” and “causing 
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group.”119 The two Statutes also 
established crimes that are related to genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct 
and public incitement to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide, and 
complicity in genocide.120 
 
After the establishment of the ICTY and ICTR, other international courts were 
created, capitalising on international criminal law’s growth as a justice mechanism, to 
deal with the aftermath of violent conflicts. In 2001 the Cambodian National 
Assembly passed a law to create a court to try crimes committed during the Khmer 
Rouge regime, which lasted from 1975 until 1979.121 The Cambodia government 
wanted the assistance of the international community, but felt that the trials must be 
held in Cambodian using Cambodian people to comprise the court, with foreign 
assistance.122 The ECCC was created in 2003 through a legal agreement in 
conjunction with the Cambodian Government and the United Nations.123 The ECCC 
prosecutes crimes under the Cambodian Penal Code of 1956 and the Geneva 
Convention of 1948, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, crimes in the Hague Conventions for the Protection of the 
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 1954 and crimes in the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961.124 Since the Cambodian Code of 
Criminal Procedure was drafted in 2007, after the hybrid court drafted its statute, any 
inconsistencies would then refer to international rules of procedure.125  Hybrid courts 
theoretically are designed in order to embrace both local and international criminal 
justice systems with local courts having the benefit of trying the accused locally 
adhering to local legal principles. However, in Cambodia there is a question as to 
whether the ECCC has benefited the Cambodian legal system.126 This discussion will 
                                                          
119 ICTY Statute (n 99) art. 4(2)(a)-(b); ICTR Statute (n 101) art. 2(2)(a)-(b). 
120 Danner (n 106) 462. 
121Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution 
of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, as amended, Reach Kram No. 
NS/RKM/1004/006 (2004) [hereinafter ECCC Statute]. 
122 ibid.  
123 UNGA Res 57/228/ B (13 May 2003).  
124 ECCC Statute (n 121). 
125 Peiti and Ahmed, ‘A Review of the Jurisprudence of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal’ (2010) 168. 
126 Ainley, ‘Justifying Justice: Verdicts at the ECCC’ (Justice in Conflict Blog, 16 Sep 2014) 2. 
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be expanded in Chapter Six. Cambodia was not the only hybrid court in international 
law. Other institutions include the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Ad Hoc Court for 
East Timor, Iraqi High Criminal Court, Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 
South Africa, and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. 
 
Through the development of the concepts of individual responsibility and 
complementarity, with the expansion of international criminal law in the 1990s, the 
power and reach of international justice has become an influential element in a post-
conflict climate. From the establishment of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the subsequent 
hybrid Cambodian Court the manifestation of international criminal law has changed 
to respond to criticisms and the need to incorporate growing understandings of 
crimes, since the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials. The female defendant, while not a 
new phenomenon, has emerged in the Ad Hoc Tribunals and hybrid Cambodian 
Court, which was not the case in Nuremberg or Tokyo despite the fact women were 
involved in the atrocities of WWII. While the progression of female defendants 
visibility after WWII proceedings is a positive gain, as it aids in expanding the 
experiences women are presumed to hold during armed conflict, it also does not fully 
encapsulate the presence of female defendants with only two women brought before 
the Ad Hoc Tribunals, and two women brought before the Cambodian Court. The 
necessity in discussing the establishment of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the progression 
of international crimes, is to understand the development of international criminal 
law, which has resulted in both positive and negative gains, and its presence in the 
narrative around the lack of attention to female defendants.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In conclusion, this chapter undertook a brief survey of the field of international law in 
order to draw out the connections between international humanitarian law, 
international human rights law, and international criminal law. The recent 
development of international criminal law, starting in the 1990s, has also developed 
the rhetoric that equates victims and violators to female and males. This binary was 
aided by the Western radical and liberal feminist intervention, where sexual violence 
against women was positioned at the centre of their agenda. Along with the global 
movement towards humanitarian methods of international law, such as CEDAW, and 
a push to recognise human rights violations around the world, international human 
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rights law also simultaneously developed through both Western feminism and 
international humanitarian and criminal legal expansion.  The female victim of sexual 
violence develops as a result of the advancements in the aforementioned areas of 
international law and is further shaped by the work of the ICC and the Women, Peace, 
and Security agenda. What this analysis emphasises is the climate that exists in 
international law, which has prevented the disruption of the male violator/female 
victim binary. Therefore, the opportunity to learn from the female defendant, an 
active agent in armed conflict, is ignored.  
 
The discussion of the creation of the tribunals and courts framed the legal and 
historical context in which female defendants must contend. The female defendant's 
existence within the international legal system may not have been of chief concern as 
new international criminal courts and tribunals were created, but her existence is 
nevertheless a cause for analysis. Despite female defendants not being the primary 
target for prosecutors, the processes of international criminal law are presumed to be 
gender neutral and there is no legal barrier preventing female defendants from being 
brought before the tribunals. However, Western imaginations and international law 
prioritise men as military decision makers and then as soldiers and, by extension, 
defendants. Women, conversely, are thought of on the receiving end of men’s actions. 
In the following three chapters I take an in-depth look at three international criminal 
law spaces: the ICTY, ICTR and the ECCC to analyse further the presence, and 
absence, of female defendants in international criminal law. 
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Chapter Four 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the  
Former Yugoslav Republic 
 
1. Introduction  
The creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
in 1994 marked the first time international criminal law actively investigated and 
prosecuted sexual violence against women in armed conflict, as the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo Trials overlooked the greater range of harms against women.1 The framing of 
the armed conflict in the Former Yugoslav Republic (FYR) by the international 
media, and the lobbying and influence of Western and local feminists, helped to keep 
crimes involving sexual violence in the spotlight. With this attention, international 
criminal law made gains in sexual violence jurisprudence and along with the work of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the ICTY has been hailed as 
an important step in providing avenues for prosecution of sexual violence and 
highlighting a previously unacknowledged set of crimes that occur in times of armed 
conflict. This importance notwithstanding, the work of the international media and 
predominately Western feminists, reinforced by the work of the Yugoslav Tribunal, 
contributed towards a narrative that relegated women’s roles in armed conflict to that 
of victims. As such, the mainstream conflict narrative around the FYR, emphasises 
the binary of male/violator and female/victim, and therefore ignores the existence of 
female defendants.  
 
The ICTY tried and convicted one female perpetrator, Biljana Plavšić, while local 
courts convicted many women who committed crimes during the armed conflict in the 
FYR.2 However, the existence of female defendants within the armed conflict in the 
                                                          
1 See Plesch, Human Rights After Hitler: The Lost History of Prosecuting Axis War Crimes (2017). 
2 Martinez, ‘Kentucky Woman Indicted for Bosnian War Crimes’ (CBS News, 18 March 2001; Cerkez, 
‘US Extradites War Crimes Suspect to Bosnia’ (NBC News, 27 December 2011); ‘Bosnia Arrests 
‘Female Monster’- Wife of Warlord ‘Serb Adolf’’ (Mirror UK, 22 December 2011); Oliver, ‘The US 
Single Mother who was Actually a War Criminal: Killer becomes first Woman to be Convicted of 
Bosnian War Crimes’ (The Daily Mail, 1 May 2012). 
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FYR has continually been left out of the mainstream understanding of the conflict 
itself. This is further evidenced by the lack of nuance around the few representations 
of female defendants available. Women who committed crimes during the conflict in 
the FYR are represented as an aberration and remain outside of Western feminist 
scholarship.3 Female defendants also remain an uncomfortable topic for the media, 
evidenced by the headlines and commentary on their actions.4 The ICTY has 
reproduced the gender binaries found within the victimisation rhetoric of Western 
feminists and in doing so has failed to strengthen international criminal law by not 
allowing for the breadth of women’s experiences in armed conflict to enter into the 
mainstream conflict narrative. Furthermore, the representation of women as victims 
has subsequently dominated discussions on women’s roles in conflicts internationally.  
Others may argue that the lack of interrogation of female defendants is an acceptable 
concession for increased awareness and protection of women in armed conflict, 
particularly given the heinous crimes of sexual violence that surfaced during and after 
the conflict in the Former Yugoslav Republic. The narrowing of women’s roles in 
armed conflict has an effect on the international legal system, and ultimately harms 
women. This harm is not only due to lack of acknowledgement of the range of 
women’s experiences in armed conflict, but also the reinforcement of reductive 
gender norms and ideologies embedded in this approach. 
 
This chapter contributes towards the thesis through highlighting the reasons why 
female defendants have remained outside of mainstream narratives on the FYR. In 
doing so, the chapter details the ways in which the ICTY, as well as the FYR, has 
been interpreted along gender binaries that reaffirm women as victims and ignore the 
broader range of women’s actions in armed conflict. The discussion of the ICTY as a 
legal space that remains performative in its function, reaffirming a specific view of 
women and femininity, is directly linked to the way gender and thereby female 
defendants are understood.  What will be proven is that there is not one element that 
has relegated female defendants to anecdotal in the conflict of the FYR, it is a 
                                                          
3 Conklin, ‘Special Note’ in Vranić Breaking the Wall of Silence: Voices of Raped Bosnia (1996) 15, 
18. 
4 Barrouquere and Schreiner, ‘‘Lovely’ Ky. Woman Accused of Horrific War Crimes’ (NBC News, 18 
March 2011); ‘Bosnia Arrests ‘Female Monster’- Wife of Warlord ‘Serb Adolf’’ (Mirror UK, 22 
December 2011); Oliver, ‘The US single mother who was actually a war criminal: killer becomes first 
woman to be convicted of Bosnian war crimes’ (Daily Mail, 1 May 2012). 
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combination of misinterpretations centred upon ethnicity, the conflict’s history, as 
well as women’s roles, predicated by Western feminists, the media, and international 
criminal law. 
 
Section two of this chapter will briefly outline the context of the armed conflict in the 
FYR. By discussing the history of the conflict, it is possible to see the formation of 
the mainstream conflict narrative as well as the parts of the conflict that were removed 
from focus. This section will also analyse the international media response as well as 
the conflict’s links to ethnicity. The third section will discuss the ICTY in order to 
situate the legal framework as well as to highlight the courtroom as a performative 
legal space as well as analysing the case of Biljana Plavšić. The third section will also 
discuss local justice processes. The fourth section will critique the work of Western 
feminists in and around the FYR. Through analysing different tenets of both feminist 
legal theories and international criminal law, as well as representations of the armed 
conflict, in relation to the FYR, and drawing on post-colonial/poststructuralist 
scholarship,5 this chapter will explain why female defendants have not entered 
mainstream narratives on the FYR.  
2.   The Mainstream Narrative of the Former Yugoslav Republic   
The role of the international media shaped international understanding of the events in 
the Former Yugoslav Republic and where sexual violence was concerned, the media 
raised awareness of certain crimes being committed, while leaving the existence of 
other experiences and roles undertaken by women and men out of focus. The situation 
in the FYR was framed through the overemphasis of ethnic hatred and the focus on 
sexual violence against women. Moreover, this shaped the perception of the 
international community regarding the region’s influence in collective security 
matters. This section will articulate why the FYR is an important case study. The way 
ethnicity was misrepresented and how the international media incorporated the stories 
of sexual violence to encourage military intervention will be detailed in order to 
understand the way violence against women shaped the mainstream narrative of the 
armed conflict. 
                                                          
5 This is referring to Kapur and Mohanty’s work, which was discussed in Chapter One and Two, and 
will be utilised again later in this Chapter. 
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Macro financial issues, which led up to the armed conflict, remained on the periphery 
when the international community sought to discern the situation in the FYR.6 
Differences between ethnicities and religions were often highlighted as the motivating 
factor for the conflict, while in reality there had been a history of integration of 
ethnicities, and racial and ethnic dimensions were often overplayed in discussions of 
how conflict erupted in the region.7 Much of the response from outside the FYR to the 
armed conflict, was flawed from the very outset. Despite the discord faced by the 
people in Yugoslavia due to the local media,8 the rise of political leaders like 
Milosevic, or the periods of violence in the years leading up to the early 1990s, many 
Yugoslavs never imagined that these hostilities would actually bring about a war.9  
 
In Borovo Selo on May 2, 1991, the fighting began, for what would mark the 
beginning of the armed conflict in the Yugoslavian territories.10 The rise of Slobodan 
Milosevic in 1986 to the office of the president of the League of Communists in 
Serbia, has been highlighted as a key factor into the reimagining of Serbian 
consciousness and national identity.11 The political motives of leaders created ethnic 
divisions that inflamed underlying discontents. This can be seen in Orford’s work, 
which positions the economic hardship caused by international monetary policies as a 
key factor in the armed conflict.12 Between the years of 1991-1995 the war in the 
Former Yugoslav Republic claimed between 200,000 and 250,000 lives, created more 
than three million refugees, produced around 20,000 reported cases of rape, and 
approximately 50,000 reported cases of torture.13 However, as Zarkov writes there is 
no possible way of knowing the full extent of the sexual violence in the territories,14 
                                                          
6 See Orford, 'Muscular Humanitarianism: Reading the Narrative of the New Interventionism ' (1999). 
7 See Simić, Surviving Peace Surviving Peace (2014). 
8 Zarkov, The Body of War, Media, Ethnicity, and Gender in the Break-up of Yugoslavia (2007) 3; 
Zarkov compares the international media focus on the FYR to the ‘media war’ happening inside the 
FYR. 
9 ibid 5. 
10 Stitkovac, 'Croatia: The First War' in Udovicki and Ridgeway (Eds.) Yugoslavia's Ethnic Nightmare: 
The Inside Story of Europe's Unfolding Ordeal (1995) 153.  
11 See Pesic, ‘Serbian Nationalism and the Origins of the Yugoslav Crisis’ (1996). 
12 See Orford, 'Locating the International: Military and Monetary Interventions after the Cold War' 
(1997) 451. 
13 See Ivkoviac and Hogan, Reclaiming Justice: The Ideal and the Reality (2011). 
14 Zarkov (n 8) 6.  
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which could also be true of the amount of reported torture and deaths, during the 
conflict in the FYR.  
The international community’s response included both political and diplomatic 
actions, the creation of The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, and 
economic measures.15 The United States, the European community, and the United 
Nations understood the Serbs to be the aggressors of the armed conflict.16 There was 
also a belief amongst the international community that the conflict was a fight 
between democracy and communism, this in turn made the realities of the difficult to 
comprehend.17 Weller also highlights the lack of United Nations Security Council 
effectiveness and desire to respond to the violence, as well as the international 
community’s generally inconsistent policy.18 At the time there was no practise of the 
Security Council intervening in ‘internal conflicts’, once a conflict is considered 
‘international’ that the international community may display military force.  
 
From the start of the hostilities in the FYR the UN had focused on the armed conflict 
as an internal situation.19 The UN implemented ‘safe areas’ in the FYR, with Security 
Council Resolution 836 in 1993, mandated the United Nations Protection Force, 
UNPROFOR, as the peacekeeping force for Sarajevo, Bihac, Srebrenica, Goražde, 
Tuzla and Zepa.20 However, in July of 1995 the genocide in Srebrenica took place, 
and coupled with the increased reports of widespread sexual violence, the 
international community felt compelled to act. Tuathail describes the fall of 
Srebrenica as ‘unique’ due to its location, referred to in international media as the 
worst massacre in Europe since World War II.21 The US then pursued NATO action,22 
and the UNPROFOR was removed with the signing of the Bosnia and Herzegovina 
                                                          
15 McGoldrick, ‘Yugoslavia the Responses of the International Community and of International Law’ 
(1996) 380-381. 
16 ibid. 
17 Koch, ‘Conflicting Visions of State and Society in Present day Yugoslavia’, in `van den Heuvel and 
Siccam (Eds.) The Disintegration of Yugoslavia (1992) 191, 193. 
18 Weller, ‘The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia’ (1992) 569. 
19 Berdal, ‘The Security Council, Peacekeeping and Internal Conflict after the Cold War’ (1996) 76, 
77. 
20 UNSCR 836, S/RES/836, (1993). 
21 Ó Tuathail, ‘The ethnic cleansing of a safe area: The fall of Srebrenica and the ethics of UN-
governmentality’ in Smith and Proctor (Eds.) Geography and Ethics (1999) 121. 
22 Shattuck, Freedom on Fire: Human Rights Wars and America’s Response (2003)152. 
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peace agreement in November of 1995.23 After the armed conflict in the FYR the 
global pattern of intervening in internal armed conflicts that are seen as having 
international reach, has been more prevalent amongst UN Security Council actions 
regarding collective security measures. Amongst the narrative of international 
intervention into the FYR the other influencing factors, aside from Srebrenica and 
reports of ‘mass rape’, was the geographical location of the conflict in Europe and the 
characterisation of the armed conflict as a fight between communism and democracy. 
However, the financial hardships faced in the region by International Monetary Fund 
interventions, which Orford discusses, rarely became part of the mainstream narrative 
of the armed conflict.  
 
Prior assumptions about the people of Yugoslavia, and the role of assumed deep-set 
ethnic hatred fuelling the conflict influenced reporting, affected editorials, and 
changed the understanding of the events unfolding before reporters.24 Sadkovich 
writes that due to the fact many journalists could not speak the language or leave the 
major cities, the news that was reported internationally during the conflict in the 
Former FYR was often misleading.25 Since reporters did not understand the area’s 
history, politics, or culture the news was often “Americanized”.26 Sadkovich states 
that, “people and things familiar to the audience make up the bulk of the news.”27 
This caused much of the conflict to be unreported in the United States due to an 
assumed lack of similarities of Yugoslavians with US citizens.28  Sadkovich further 
writes that ‘ordinary’ people do not make headlines, and ‘victims’ or ‘dissidents’ are 
not relatable to US audiences.29   
 
Headlines reflected bias amongst news agencies and often the tendency when 
reporting on the Yugoslav conflict was to sensationalise.30 For example, The 
Guardian published an article on the 23rd of July 1992 entitled ‘Serb Jihad in a 
                                                          
23 Berdal (n 19) 84.   
24 Sadkovich, The U.S. Media and Yugoslavia, 1991-1995 (1998) xiii. 
25 ibid 80. 
26 ibid. 
27 ibid. 
28 ibid. 
29 ibid. 
30 Zohar, ‘Misrepresentation of the Bosnian War by Western Media’ (2012) 98. 
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Bosnian Town’.31 This headline reaffirms assumptions that the Serbs were the 
aggressors during the armed conflict and calling an event a ‘jihad’ reiterates to the 
audience that the conflict was controlled by Muslim aggressors. Similarly, Zohar 
references the demonising of Serbs and comments on the “barbaric” Balkan culture as 
common in media representations at the time.32  
 
Reporters have also garnered criticisms for their handling of reports. CNN's 
Christiane Amanpour is one such example. Amanpour has stated, "I am not a political 
reporter, I am not a diplomatic reporter. I do wars; I do crises. I don't do politics."33 
Kinzer of the New York Times has commented on Amanpour’s reporting, "She was 
sitting in Belgrade when that market massacre happened, and she went on the air to 
say that the Serbs had probably done it. There was no way she could have known 
that."34 UN report also blamed the Bosnian Muslims for the market massacre.35 
Foerstel notes that the CNN’s stance has been tied to the United States Department of 
State’s policy at the time.36 Foerstel states that the BBC's Nik Gowing recognised the 
common anti-Serb reporting in Bosnia and deemed it "a secret shame" for journalism 
as a whole. This example reiterates the tendency to blame Serbian people for the 
conflict, which produces consequences such as an assumption that all Serbs were in 
an advantageous position during the conflict, and that they were not also victims. 
However, this is not ignoring the rise of Serb nationalism and the atrocities produced 
as a result.  
 
The media reporting suggests the need to ascertain who are the victims and violators 
of the conflict, which denotes a lack of understanding of the nuances of armed 
conflict. Meaning that victims can be potential perpetrators and defendants can be 
victims. This relates to female defendants, as the victim/violator binary has been 
reinforced by the work of the ICTY in relation to gender, in order to associate women 
with the role of victim and men with the role of violator.  
                                                          
31 O’Kane, ‘Serb Jihad in a Bosnian Town’ (The Guardian, 1992). 
32 Zohar (n 30)108. 
33 Foerstel, ‘The Balkan Wars: A Media Driven Disaster’ (1999); Paper delivered to the First Hearing 
of the Independent Commission of Inquiry to Investigate U.S./NATO War Crimes Against the People 
of Yugoslavia, 31 July 1999, New York. 
34 ibid. 
35 ibid. 
36 ibid. 
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Dunkley writes how media coverage can have lasting effects on the conflict itself. For 
example, a British news team from Independent Television News (ITN) visited the 
Trnopolje refugee camps on August 5, 1992.37 They captured a photo of a heavily 
emaciated man behind a barbed wire fence. This image broadcasted the Serbs as the 
new Nazis.38 Broadcasting images of the Holocaust contributes to an understanding 
that the conflict in the FYR is international. Years after the conflict George Kenney, 
former State Department employee who worked on Yugoslavia, published an article 
entitled, ‘How Media Misinformation Led to Bosnian Intervention’.39 The article 
stated how ITN's pictures of the Trnopolje camp encouraged war and the use of 
Western troops.40 Dunkley writes that after the photo was released the British 
government readied 1,800 soldiers as peacekeepers for deployment, and US President 
Clinton requested military action against the Serbs while campaigning for the White 
House.41 The international media played a part in presenting a distinct view of the 
conflict in the Former Yugoslav Republic. 
 
Within the territories, as nationalism continued to gain strength, ideals around the 
female subject began to centre. The local media of Serbia and Croatia also influenced 
the population in the Former Yugoslav Republic within regards to depictions of 
gender and the female body. Zarkov states, that in both Croatia and Serbia the 
victimised body was represented in the media as female; however, the two images 
looked very different.42 In Serbia, Zarkov states, that the “media war” entailed a 
denial of any ethnic element belonging to the armed conflict, and instead focused on 
the victimisation of the Serbs.43 In Croatia, the nation-state was the focus of the 
‘media war’.44  During the conflict the media viewed ‘female’ and ‘ethnic’ as the 
same thing. The female body was represented as the place where the media 
                                                          
37 ibid. 
38 ibid. 
39 Kenney, "How Media Misinformation Led to Bosnian Intervention” (Living Marxism, 1997). 
40 ibid. 
41 ibid. 
42 Zarkov (n 8) 85-86. 
43 ibid. 86. 
44 ibid. 
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victimised.45 Through both gendered and sexualised scenes the Serbian media also 
portrayed the female body as a victim and a symbolic representation of all Serbians.46   
 
In Croatia, the female body was also often represented through images of 
motherhood.47 The nation-state was also a key figure linked to the image of the 
mother. The mother-child element mirrors the nation and the desire for the emergence 
of the new State.48 Representation is a crucial aspect in the way media portrays 
conflict, gender, and violence. Whether it is in the international or local media’s 
reporting on the conflict, or in the images of ‘womanhood’ or sexualised violence 
deployed within the territories, the understanding of the female body within the FYR 
was inexplicably linked to the understanding of the conflict itself. The female body 
was simultaneously to be protected as a physical bearer of the nation, or violated and 
destroyed, belonging to the enemy.  During the conflict in the Former Yugoslav 
Republic the focus on ethnicity was often used by the national media and scholars 
alike, and through this ethnic representation the female played an essential role in the 
way the collective state understood their place in the conflict. Through propaganda 
the female body was used to bolster a sense of victimisation and in turn strengthen the 
resolve of those fighting in the conflict, intended to effectively increase violence.  
 
While the international media contributed greatly to the Western understanding of 
sexual violence perpetrated against women in the Former Yugoslav Republic, it also 
shaped the way sexuality was comprehended, through its debates and silences. In 
particular, the international media distinguished between the male experience and the 
female experience in armed conflict. Fair views the media as having the ability to 
greatly affect the understanding of gender, stating, “The news media play an 
important role in the social construction of gender wherein news stories, carrying a 
variety of meanings about gender, interact, confirm, and contradict each other as they 
are decoded by audience members.”49  The lack of attention or recognition of male 
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victims of sexual violence is evident across reportage during the conflict in the FYR. 
Zarkov states, that the most typical and abundant images of the armed conflict was 
starving Muslim men photographed behind barbed wire and women, shown with their 
faces in anguish, over the rapes they faced.50 Men were simultaneously the victim and 
violator, yet their pain and often documented torture is almost permitted, as a 
punishment for the sexual violence they were assumed to have committed.  
 
During the conflict in the FYR the media played an influential role in developing the 
conflict’s narrative. Bratic states, that while the media is not capable of eliciting 
certain behaviour, it is capable of nurturing different beliefs, feelings and points of 
view.51 The media is not the only force of change and cannot create what does not 
already exist in a given society.52 Despite this the international media is capable of 
deciding, and representing, the meaning of an event, rather than the event itself 
determining the meaning.53 The importance of the media then, is to illuminate the bias 
underlying within a conflict or within the political system or agenda. However, media 
is complicit in constructing their version of reality.54 When the media highlights 
women as a certain type of member of the State these ideas are understood and 
reproduced, underscoring the media’s ability to pull out certain aspects of a conflict to 
bolster an agenda.  It is not surprising that the international media highlighted the 
conflict as an ethnic and religious strife and while misunderstandings of different 
ethnicities were apparent, centring the focus on ethnic terms that were unfamiliar to 
audiences was another way of directing attention away from the international 
involvement in the current conflict’s origin. The reports of sexual violence against 
Bosnian Muslim women bolstered the view that Serbian men were perpetrators of 
sexual violence. 
 
While there was an increased portrayal of Serbian men as perpetrators of sexual 
violence,55 Zarkov notes that there was an absence of Serbian victims of sexual 
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violence in the international media.56 Zarkov writes that, the Serbs residing in both 
Croatia and Bosnia had been largely ignored by the international community in the 
early 1990s, regarding the internal struggles they faced.57 This can be seen as 
contributing towards the ethnic discord in the conflict. Zarkov further notes that by 
the international media coverage failing to recognise the sexual violence committed 
against Christian Croatian and Serbian women, Muslim women were, therefore, the 
more prominent symbol of victims of sexual violence during the armed conflict.58  
Constructing Muslim women as sexually vulnerable during the conflict reinforces 
ethnic and religious lines respectively, between each region in the FYR and the binary 
of victims and violators. This construction emphasised that violence was not only 
perpetrated against women because they are women, but because they are also 
Muslim. Whereas the violence Serbian women experienced went largely unreported 
during the armed conflict.  
 
The use of differences, or religious difference, was a way of distinguishing between 
different ethnic and national alliances. Often the territories defined citizenship as 
synonymous with both religious and ethnic identity.59 Recognising the connection 
between ethnicity, religion, and nationalism is important to identify as the positions in 
this chapter are developed. This section has emphasised the representations of women 
in the FYR, where the focus on ethnicity and religion underscores women who are 
perceived to be need of Western intervention. This rhetoric still permeates to present 
day, as international law remains preoccupied with ways to protect foreign women 
from foreign men.60 The lack of visibility of female defendants in international law is 
the result of representations of gender and foreign bodies, which create differences 
between victims and Western agents. 
 
While the narrative expressed above rests within common understanding of the 
conflict and the FYR’s history, Orford notes that the cause of the violence is not only 
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related to ethnic or religious tensions.61 Orford suggests that counter to this 
conception is the idea that capitalism and international relations share the blame for 
the reasons behind the conflict.62  Tensions arose as a result of the ‘new world order’ 
being established.63 Klemencic highlights Germany’s support for the breakup of the 
Former Yugoslav Republic as an important element in the FYR conflict, viewed as a 
decision to advance German economic interests after its reunification.64 Klemencic 
also states that with all the States and different organisations working on the crisis in 
Yugoslavia proved difficult to coordinate efforts.65 Among other weaknesses in the 
international response to the violence, there was an overall lack of international 
interest at the outset of the conflict. European States, such as Germany, and the Unites 
States were themselves in the middle of economic shifts and were reluctant to enter 
into further international commitments.66  
 
The influence of international financial institutions during the decades leading up to 
the conflict, contributed to the environment within the Former Yugoslav Republic.67 
Orford notes, that the practices installed to manage Yugoslavia’s foreign debt all 
contributed to changes in policy within the territory.68 These changes implemented 
within the state ultimately encouraged instability and the inclusion of new alliances, 
with the rise of Milosevic.69  This account, taking into consideration the financial and 
international influence, displays a different viewpoint that situates the conflict in an 
environment outside of just an ethnic and religious history.  
 
Due to the continued economic and political changes from the mid 1980’s into the 
1990s the stability of the country was a certain risk, especially once programs and 
policies in the FYR were sped up to comply with International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
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pressure.70 As the FYR began implementing policies attached to the IMF loan to 
repay past debts, the domestic economic effects were drastic and often attached to 
political aims.71 Included in these changes were developments that favoured the 
financial process, ultimately benefiting certain nationalities, firms, and republics.72 It 
is not difficult to see why a nationalist sentiment was easy to cultivate with in a 
territory whose government was losing control due to neoliberal economic reforms. 
However, after seeing the influence of the IMF and other international financial 
institutions it is clear why the focus remained upon the region's history of conflict and 
the assumed minor ethnic tensions of the past.  
 
In order to understand the way female defendants are positioned in the Yugoslavian 
context one must look to the narrative that surrounded the conflict which includes 
economic influences as well as the use of media to effectively produce specific 
understandings of women, men, ethnicity, and religion. The female subject was 
constructed by the assumed understanding of the armed conflict by Western media, 
which was premised on the victim/violator binary along ethnic and religious lines. 
This promoted the trope that Bosnian Muslim women were in need if ‘saving’ from 
sexual violence deployed by Serbian men, further entrenching distorted views of 
ethnicity and religion. Due to the publicised sexual violence in the FYR by the media, 
international efforts focused on curtailing the abuse of women in armed conflict. The 
next section will begin to describe and problematise the Tribunal, established to 
address the aftermath of the conflict, as well as the Western feminist intervention in 
the ICTY. Both the ICTY and Western feminists have further embedded the 
understanding of women as victims, limiting the possibility of acknowledging women 
as potential defendants. 
3. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia  
This section will discuss the work of the ICTY as well as local understandings of 
femininity and masculinity during the armed conflict in the FYR. The work of the 
ICTY and the way the female body was represented in the FYR, I argue must be 
understood in conjunction with the Western feminist intervention, as both reproduced 
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the female subject as victim. The case of Biljana Plavšić will be discussed as an 
alternative experience to the female victim. Plavšić’s actions will be interrogated 
based on perceived constructions of female gender.  
3.1 The establishment of the ICTY and local understandings  
The ICTY was an unprecedented move for the international legal community and can 
be said to be a result of the increasing attention toward human rights, evident since the 
start of the 1990s.73 It was the first judicial organ created by the United Nations 
Security Council.74 The jurisprudence of the ICTY has resulted in an expansion of 
international criminal law and the defining of key international criminal legal terms.  
In 1999 an indictment was made against Slobodan Milosevic, an acting head of state 
for crimes committed in the FYR conflict as well as violence in Kosovo.75 As of 
2017, more than 4,650 witnesses have testified before the ICTY.76 The Tribunal has 
indicted 161 persons, and concluded proceedings for 154 accused.77 Of those 
concluded cases 83 were sentenced, 13 referred back to national jurisdiction and the 
rest either were sentenced, acquitted, had their indictments withdrawn, on the final 
stages of their trial, or are deceased.78Within these cases, one women has been 
brought to the Tribunal charged with international crimes, Biljana Plavšić. The ICTYs 
proceedings offer a documented account of the atrocities that took place in the Former 
Yugoslav Republic and are an insight into the way the international community 
negotiates the aftermath of an armed conflict.  
 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has contributed 
substantially to the jurisprudence on sexual violence crimes in international law. 
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Displayed on the Tribunal’s website is a section entitled Sexual Violence and the 
Triumph of Justice there are links to statistics, videos, and documents referring to the 
court’s notable advances in the legal understanding of sexual violence crimes.79 Since 
the ICTY began 78 individuals have had sexual violence charges included in their 
indictments, and of those 32 have been convicted, as of September 2016.80 Four 
others were convicted for failing to prevent or punish perpetrators of sexual violence 
crimes.81  
 
Prosecutor v Tadić, was the first international criminal trial since Nuremberg and 
Tokyo, and the first international trial to involve sexual violence, as well as the first 
trial for sexual violence against men.82 Duško Tadić was the President of the Local 
Board of the Serb Democratic Party in Kozarac and accused of forcing a detainee to 
bite the testicles of another detainee.83 He was found guilty of cruel and inhumane 
treatment as well as inhumane acts.84 Prosecutor v Mucić et al, included four 
individuals, three of which, Esad Landžo, Zdravko Mucić, and Hazim Delić, were 
charged with sexual violence when they were working at a prison camp in Čelebići. 85 
The charges included sexual violence against both men and women, and judgement 
noted that rape may constitute torture under customary international law.86 The trial of 
Kunarac, included Serbian Army officers Dragoljub Kunarac, Zoran Vuković and 
Radomir Kovač, who were accused for their roles in sustaining the ‘rape camps’ in 
Foča.87  The case was the first conviction in the ICTY that found rape and 
enslavement as crimes against humanity. During the trial women testified that they 
were subjected to sexual violence as well as forced to complete household chores.88 
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Prosecutor v Krstić, found that the rapes were tied into the overall consensus that 
rape, was a part of the consequences of the ‘ethnic cleansing campaign’.89  
 
Despite these prosecutions, criticisms centre on how prevalent sexual violence was 
during the conflict. Advocates and feminists wanted even more international case law 
to reflect the extent of sexual violence perpetrated during the conflict in the FYR. The 
sexual violence that occurred in the Former Yugoslav Republic was often based on 
gender in its application. The prevalence of sexual violence against women was 
significant; yet, it is almost impossible to know exact figures.  
 
The European Fact-Finding Team stated more than 20,000 Muslim girls and women 
were raped in Bosnia since 1992.90 The Coordinating Group of Women’s 
Organizations of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s report suggests a figure closer to 
50,000.91  Skjelsbaek and Smith state that the use of figures of sexual violence in 
different international and national publications instilled a sense of hatred and 
aggression as the conflict continued amongst all sides, which became another way to 
politically manipulate people.92 This manipulation of statistics that Skjelsbaek and 
Smith discuss can also be seen within the international media, as rape and sexual 
violence was often the main focus of Western and international media coverage,93 and 
Western and local feminist response also centred upon this topic. The sexual harms 
against women, was the main site for interrogation into the understanding of 
femininity in this conflict. However, assuming that the violence done to the female 
body is the only experience woman had during armed conflict limits perceptions of 
gender as well as women’s autonomy. Only focusing on what is done to the female 
body, rather than what the female body does, which includes acts of aggression and 
violence as well as acts of peace, limits the ability for international criminal laws to 
adequately address the aftermath of armed conflict. 
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Looking into the cases in the international court establishes men as the default 
perpetrators in the armed conflict of Former Yugoslav Republic.  Women were 
accused of committing criminal acts, but were not brought before the international 
tribunal, except in the case of Biljana Plavšić.94 Arguments that seek to account for 
this difference centre on a belief that women do not commit crimes on the same scale 
or frequency, and when women do commit crimes, it is often assumed that women 
commit crimes that are less severe or of a lesser scale than their male counterparts. It 
is important to note that the work done here is not meant to unearth the specific 
intentions of the prosecutors who seek out possible cases or to suggest that women 
and men share equal roles and experiences in armed conflict. This research is instead 
meant to expose the presence of female defendants, as well as issues within the 
international criminal system itself. This study also focuses on the possibilities that 
the women who perpetrate crimes, are ignored not only by international prosecution, 
but by the way women’s acts during conflict are understood.  
 
In contrast to the ICTY, of the prosecuted persons in local judiciaries, women have 
been among those indicted, charged, and sentenced, with more frequency than in the 
ICTY, which will be addressed later in the chapter. Sjoberg and Gentry point to 
gender norms as a way of punishing women for their criminal offences and 
highlighting that by committing crimes they have failed in their roles as a women.95 
Female defendants who are brought before international courts are shamed within the 
media and the focus often falls onto their gender. Reports of male defendants do not 
include commentary on their crime violating their masculinity, if anything war crimes 
would give evidence of their masculine identity.96 Criminal acts are then often 
masculine by definition.  
 
Within the FYR, the conflict produced a limited perspective of male and female 
bodies and further entrenched stereotypical conceptions of femininity and 
masculinity. The female body was used as a representation of the state, and often 
depicted as maternal.97 Kesić discussed the gender imagery used in the FYR conflict 
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as tied to a patriarchal past, and a way to strengthen public support in both the media 
and official government statements.98 Motherhood was seen as both positive and 
negative in certain cases. The representations of women’s bodies varied. The local 
media often focused on the female form as a nationalist signifier and enforced the 
view that ‘she’ must be protected.99 In Croatia and Serbia ‘the feminine’ was used in 
media propaganda as a prop to assert or bolster national and ethnic sentiments.100 
Femininity was seen as something that needed protection, and in turn the female is 
then vulnerable to violence. If she is signified through her body as a representation of 
the land she inhabits, then a violation to her is a violation against the state itself.  
 
The sexual violence women faced was assumed to be connect it with ‘being’ a 
women, or a part of their femininity. Zarkov’s work seeks to analyse the way 
femininity is comprehended and often used during the armed conflict in the FYR.  
Zarkov identifies femininity and women, as well as masculinity, during the conflict, 
as inhabiting both the universal and the particular.101 This is expressed when the 
female identity is used to represent general notions of the state while also inhabiting a 
specific lived experience as a Serb or Croat.102 Skjelsbaek and Smith also point to the 
universal and particular understandings of women during the conflict, they describe 
sexual violence as an act directly perpetrated with in a traditional male/female 
hierarchy, that sought to harm the woman specifically as well as the general ethnic 
group that she identifies.103 The position of the female body, as having the ability to 
be both general and specific, centres women’s roles on filling whatever aspect the 
State requires. Her existence is only to benefit the State.  Kesić writes that as the 
conflict in the FYR continued the roles of women were more and more based around 
passivity, and in turn strengthened a masculinity based on aggressiveness.104 The 
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imagery of the feminine and masculine was deeply tied to produce support for the 
war.105  
 
The existence of a female perpetrator disrupts the gendered understandings of 
violence that are premised on men perpetrating violence against women. Female 
defendants also dispel notions that a women’s relationship to the nation is tied to 
either maternal characteristics or the venerable body, as Biljana Plavšić’s case 
demonstrates. Plavšić was a Serbian official who used her position as a leader in order 
to further the extremist national ideals the Serbian Democratic Party. 
 
Masculinity in the Former Yugoslav Republic was demonstrated through an increased 
sense of nationalism and often ethnic pride. Slobodan Milošević was seen as the 
Serbian symbol of masculinity and in turn patriarchy as well.106 The violence that 
resulted on all sides demonstrated an extremely aggressive form of nationalism.107 
Papic states, that this type of masculinity was necessary to encourage participation in 
the military.108  Masculinity being tied to authority, power, and dominance.109 Enloe 
writes that the image of the soldier is tied to the masculinity of Serbian men.110 
Zarkov also points to some of the silences in the lived experiences of men in armed 
conflict, as further signifiers of masculinity. For example, the lack of attention to men 
who were the victims of sexual violence by the mainstream conflict narrative, 
identifies that men who experience this type of violence are not seen as masculine, but 
instead tied to the feminine.111 Zarkov writes that identifying the Croat man as a 
victim of sexual violence, which was tied to representations of homosexuality and 
emasculation, would subvert the work done to promote Croatia as a powerful 
nation.112  
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The differences and the understanding of masculine and feminine within the Former 
Yugoslav Republic is not limited to a linear account of men and women. Zarkov 
states that, masculinities and femininities in the Former Yugoslav Republic are both 
intertwined and not mutually exclusive.113 In order to comprehend the way these 
categories are displayed, it is necessary to acknowledge the relationships these 
categories have with one another, relating to and shaping each other.114 Zarkov also 
resists the urge to classify acts as feminine or masculine, this however, has been the 
way women and men’s experiences in war have been described. Acts displayed by 
women that fall outside of the traditional or appropriate feminine category are then 
seen as unfeminine.115  
 
In popular representations of masculinities and femininities in the Former Yugoslav 
Republic conflict masculinity is tied to violent nationalism and the feminine is linked 
to sexual violence inflicted upon women. The traditional modes of understanding 
gender are continually reproduced so that the masculine gender is imagined as the 
primary perpetrator of violence and the female gender receives this violence.116 The 
lack of acknowledgement of female defendants cannot be explained as simply as to 
say it follows traditional female/male relationships that observe certain 
understandings of femininity and masculinity.  
 
The female defendant sits in contrast to the identity constructed around women in the 
Former Yugoslav Republic, yet she is still a woman. Female defendants are said to 
display characteristics that are usually reserved for men, but also fills female roles of 
mother, wife, and daughter. I argue that identifying women as a defendant reinforces 
the idea that she inhabits multiple identities at once. If the gendered way of 
understanding people during the conflict was a part of a plan to bolster national pride 
and encourage a view of the State that maximises its possibility to fight battles and 
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gain land then these ideals of men and women are created. Then the female 
defendants cannot be said to be absent from this mind-set.  
 
Female defendants have always been a reality in armed conflicts, but within the 
presumed gender binaries of armed conflict she has been carefully forgotten. The 
female defendant’s identity as a woman seemingly becomes irrelevant, when she is 
seen as acting in accordance with an extreme nationalistic sentiment. The connection 
between the perception of the female and male body inside the FYR during the 
conflict directly relates to the work of local feminists, as their work reiterated a 
narrative of war that predominantly positioned women as victims amongst nationalist 
representations.117 This will be further discussed in the next section.  
 
The female body offers one explanation as to why violent crimes committed by 
women are not as easily understood as crimes committed by men.118 Sjoberg and 
Gentry highlight the belief that women who chose to engage in committing violent 
crimes defy the assumption that women are nonviolent, pure, and innocent.119 The 
female form is tied to its relationship to reproduction. Creating or destroying a nation 
centres upon birth, sexual violence then is a way to control this process. MacKinnon 
has discussed the sexual violence in the conflict in the Former Yugoslav Republic, as 
a specific strategy and plan.120 MacKinnon also writes that while generally violations 
of sexual violence can be perpetrated against men and women alike, when sexual 
violence is perpetrated against women specifically it is often tied to reproduction or 
sexual in nature.121 Fisher states that the role of sexual violence in the Former 
Yugoslav Republic was employed as a policy of forced impregnation, connected to 
the intent to destroy a certain population.122 As mentioned above, centring women’s 
roles on motherhood and reproduction focuses the role of females to a specific part of 
the nation. The universal and particular, as Zarkov noted, is a part of masculinity and 
femininity. However, it is a certain type of universal and particular: depicting women 
as members of a state or ethnicity and displaying the characteristics of motherhood is 
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seen as common place, but a woman who is both a mother and who engages in 
physical conflict is not something that is easily imagined.  
 
It is also important to stress that identifying sexual violence as a tool of war is not 
enough to solve all of the issues affecting women in armed conflict. Suggesting that 
rape is used specifically against women because they are women, does not then 
disavow women from committing acts of violence themselves. Women who were 
raped and also political or military actors in the conflict do not ‘fit’ preconceived 
notions of women’s lives during conflict. Women who commit crimes in armed 
conflict, crimes which have also been sexual in nature,123 have been brought before 
international and national courts. However, when examples of women who commit 
crimes are prosecuted within international courts and tribunals or appear in media 
headlines they are viewed as exceptional examples, and therefore their stories are not 
necessary to integrate into the mainstream narrative of an armed conflict. This 
diminishes the larger involvement of women and their capacity to perpetrate crimes. 
The ICTY has reproduced the gendered categories that existed within the violence 
itself: instead of disrupting, it recreates gender biases within the court.    
3.2  Interrogation of Biljana Plavšić  
There was only one case before the ICTY involving a female perpetrator, Biljana 
Plavšić. Plavšić was the Serbian representative to the collective Presidency of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, member of the collective and expanded Presidencies of the Bosnian 
Serb Republic, and had de facto control and authority over members of the Bosnian 
Serb armed forces.124  Subsequently, Plavšić plead guilty to crimes against 
humanity.125 The Trial Chamber gave weight to Plavšić’s guilty plea as well as her 
statement of remorse she made in court.126 In her plea she admitted that she 
‘victimised countless innocent people’, she suggested that a mix of fear and obsession 
led her to dismiss the allegations of criminal acts being committed.127 Plavšić 
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admitted that she did not seek to investigate the crimes against non–Serbs, but rather 
focused on ‘innocent Serb victims’.128 Plavšić’s guilty plea did not include any 
reference to specific crimes, both Del Ponte and Subotić have stated that the guilty 
plea was extremely general and therefore carried little meaning for Plavšić’s 
victims.129 Plavšić was eventually sentenced to 11 years imprisonment, but only 
served two–thirds of the sentence before being released.130  
 
What is particularly interesting about Plavšić’s case is her admission of guilt in front 
of the ICTY, which helped to reduce the charges against her as well as her sentence. 
What was not within the purview of the court was the redaction of her confession she 
published while in prison.131 The redaction was published by a Swedish newspaper, Vi 
Magazine. Plavšić stated, “I have done nothing wrong. I pleaded guilty to crimes 
against humanity so I could bargain for the other charges.”132 Plavšić was the only 
high-ranking officer to admit guilt before the ICTY. The reason Plavšić’s case is of 
note because her behaviour and attitude while serving her sentence casts aside 
preconceived notions of how women are presumed to feel and act, especially after 
committing a crime, yet the way her actions were framed in the media reaffirms her 
role as a woman.  
 
The connection between remorse and gender seems to presume that women are more 
likely to feel guilty after committing a crime.133 Therefore, when Plavšić retracted her 
statements in prison and instead displayed that she has not benefited from any 
rehabilitation, she contrasts herself from stereotypical gender roles. However, the 
treatment of Plavšić’s case by the ICTY and the international and local media 
reinforces rather than disrupts dominant understandings of women’s roles in conflict, 
through the reduced charge sheet and sentence, ultimately treating her more leniently 
than her male counterparts. Plavšić was seen as an aberration of the way women 
should act, while at the same time she still maintained her femininity. The crimes 
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Plavšić committed were highlighted in the international and local media, she was 
termed the ‘Iron Lady’ or ‘female Mengele,’ along with stories of her sexual 
relationship with a Serb leader names ‘Arkan’ or ability to encourage displays of 
violence.134 Both are characteristics that reference her feminine sexual appeal or 
‘whore’ like behaviour, with accounts detailing Plavšić’s relationship with Arkan and 
other members of the Republic Srpska and her nurturing mothering side by 
encouraging men to fight in the conflict.135  When Plavšić was serving her sentence 
her good behaviour was praised by ICTY Tribunal President Patrick Robinson, as was 
her cooking and baking, signs she was readjusting to ‘proper’ womanly life.136 Plavšić 
never seemed to slip outside designated female roles, even when her actions were less 
than desirable they were still framed within feminine gendered language.  
 
It is not strange that Plavšić’s actions were framed from a gender biased lens or that 
her actions do more to support the ‘female identity’ than to disrupt it. This work is 
arguing that to suggest female defendants somehow actually break the idea of what it 
means to be women would be false. Women have always committed violence and 
disruption. Maybe that is why when highlighting the ways specific women buck ideas 
of gender, it is actually doing more to support limited notions.  Every action ‘outside’ 
strict gender binaries can be explained back through femininity. If Plavšić is 
encouraging genocide, then she is like a mother encouraging children. If Plavšić is 
corrupt and viscous, then she is somehow enthralled in an influential sexual 
relationship and also a female monster. Every ‘wrong’ action can be attributed back to 
a traditional female role. Even when Plavšić is in prison serving a sentence for 
international crimes, she is still described to be on good behaviour by baking in her 
leisure time. Butler’s work on performativity links to Plavšić’s situation, her actions 
are described to reproduce her female gender as normal.137 Tyler and Cohen discuss 
Butler’s work on gender performativity, they detail that this includes the process of 
repeating ‘normal’ gender acts, allowing others to recognise and validate one’s 
gender.138  
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Plavšić’s statement of remorse in court and her reported actions while in prison all 
function to reaffirm her gender and ultimately mitigate her culpability. However, as 
Butler states that subversion is not simple, even when Plavšić admits to committing 
international crimes or redacts her confession in prison her actions still upholds 
‘heterosexual hegemony’.139 The relationship between the normative gender 
performance and heteronormativity then further embed a gender binary of different 
male and female behaviours. 
 
In a conversation between Butler and Braidotti, Braidotti stated that in the FYR 
nationalism was more prevalent than sexual difference as a means of identification, 
one was identified as Bosnian, Serbian, or Croatian woman.140 National identity 
remains essential, and in many ways a representation of the conflict as a masculine 
display of power, tied to the nation-state. Considering Plavšić’s case it is important to 
note her ethnic and national identities in order to frame Plavšić’s actions as a female 
perpetrator. If the goal is to offer a full narrative of an armed conflict, then gender 
cannot be utilised as the only tool, as it seems to reaffirm a limited understanding of 
the context of women’s actions in conflict.  Braunmuhl, using Butler’s work within a 
courtroom setting, illuminates why female perpetrator’s actions do not break through 
strict binaries around gender. Braunmuhl states, that while the performance of a 
woman in court who displays actions that are ‘assertive’ and ‘strong’, pushes against 
patriarchal and even colonial discourses, this performance is only set within very 
narrow set of limits, framed ‘by the norm of autonomy’.141  
 
While a female perpetrator’s actions can be seen as disruptive in some cases, her 
existence is framed through the ‘norm’. After Plavšić committed crimes, her 
remorsefulness is influential on the outcome of the case and her femininity stays 
intact even while serving her sentence. This does not however suggest that Plavšić’s 
actions are then considered to be masculine, falling on the opposite side of the 
male/female binary. Plavšić is a criminal, but never as ‘bad’ as a male criminal. Her 
actions never become masculine, they are only ‘non-feminine’, she enters a 
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subcategory of what is means to be female and therefore is permitted to remain 
unrepresentative of women’s experiences in conflict. Sjoberg and Gentry point to this 
notion as well, in Plavšić’s case they cite that both the prosecution and the defence 
pushed for a lighter sentence, as Plavšić was a women and therefore was assumed to 
be ‘less dangerous’ than a man.142       
 
Only one female tried in the ICTY would suggest that women’s involvement as 
defendants did not become a part of the narrative that surrounded the conflict, 
established through Tribunal proceedings.143 Identifying that women were charged 
with crimes in the FYR and other conflicts not only draws attention to their existence, 
but also allows a deeper discussion into the way other identities interact. It is 
beneficial to give evidence of female defendants and suspects both locally and 
internationally, but beyond this little else can be gained from merely citing examples 
of women who commit crimes without further analysis of the context and the factors 
that influence the exception of the female perpetrator’s actions. Plavšić’s case 
displayed a different story than the mainstream account of women’s experiences 
during the conflict in the FYR, but also unearthed the way gender is interpreted and 
reaffirmed though the media, biased analysis, and the law.  
The understanding of gender within the ICTY cannot be said to have been solely 
shaped by an acceptance of stereotypical gender categories. It is clear that there were 
tangible actions that reinforced ideals of female victimhood. The intervention of 
feminists led to important advances in international law concerning the prosecution of 
and awareness of sexual violence in armed conflict. However, feminists’ actions also 
supported an idea of women in conflict that can also be seen as limiting, reinforcing a 
victimisation narrative.  
3.3 Local processes  
In local judiciaries, women have been among those indicted, charged, and sentenced, 
with greater frequency than in the ICTY. Identifying that women were charged with 
crimes in the FYR and other conflicts not only draws attention to their existence, but 
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also allows a deeper discussion into the way identities interact. It is not beneficial to 
merely ‘count the women’ who perpetrate crimes, whether this is a strategy for 
political inclusion or in documenting crimes committed by women. Recounting the 
crimes in tremendous details, inspires shock that ‘a woman did that’, but this is not 
able to dislodge deep set gender binaries or gendered norms. Recounting female 
defendants’ tales or counting the number of women involved should only be seen as a 
first step in establishing female defendants as a large discipline of study.  
 
In an effort to relieve some of the Tribunal’s case load the ICTY began transferring 
cases to national jurisdictions. The Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is a 
domestic court of the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina which includes international 
judges and prosecutors. It was established on 3 July 2002 by the Parliament of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina with the Law on the Court of BiH and promulgated on 12 November 
2000 by the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina.144 BiH is based in 
Sarajevo. The Republic of Serbia Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor, based in 
Belgrade, was founded on 1 July 2003, following the passage of the Law on 
Organization and Competence of State Bodies in the Proceedings against War Crimes 
Perpetrators.145 The courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia have had the most 
success to date, issuing warrants, indictments, and commencing and completing trials.  
In 2012 Human Rights Watch reported that Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Special 
Department for War Crimes had completed over 200 cases dealing with serious 
violations of international law.146 The Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor in the 
Republic of Serbia has indicted 184 individuals.147 
  
In 2003 Croatia established new chambers that would deal specifically with war 
crimes cases were formed within the County Courts in Zagreb, Osijek, Rijeka and 
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Split.148 Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999, the Security Council established an 
international presence on the territory of Kosovo, United Nations Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) with the task of administering the territory and population of Kosovo.149 In 
April 2016 the Human Rights Advisory Panel released its final report on the UNMIK, 
stating that the UNMIK was a ‘total failure’.150  
 
The work of the Bosnian State Court has demonstrated their ability to try and convict 
individuals involved in the armed conflict in the FYR.  For example, Rasema 
Handanovic, participated with other members of her unit in the executions of three 
civilians and three soldiers.151 Handanovic pleaded guilty and agreed to testify against 
other former members of her unit under a plea bargain agreement.152 The Court of 
Bosnia & Herzegovina sentenced her to five-and-a-half years in jail.153 Albina Terzic 
and Marina Grubisic-Fejzic were both former members of Croat forces. The Court of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina sentenced Albina Terzic, a former member of the Croatian 
Defense Council, to five years in prison for crimes against Bosnian Serb civilians 
illegally detained in the northern Bosnian town of Odzak in 1992.154  
 
The Trial Chamber of the Bosnian State Court found Terzic guilty of inhumanely 
treating prisoners held in the Odzak elementary school and the Strolit factory 
buildings in the summer of 1992.155 According to the verdict, Terzic beat Bosnian 
Serb prisoners, let a dog loose on them and tortured, abused and molested them in 
other ways.156 While Terzic was initially sentenced to 5 years in prison her sentence 
was reduced to 3 years imprisonment.157 Marina Grubisic-Fejzic is on trial before 
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Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina war crimes section, as a part of the Zelenika et al. 
case.158 Grubisic-Fejzic is charged with taking part in crimes against several hundred 
Bosnian Serbs from the territory of municipalities of Mostar, Ljubuski, Capljina and 
Stolac, who were imprisoned in the Dretelj camp in 1992.159 The prosecution 
specified that Grubisic-Fejzic attacked prisoners on several occasions, and took part in 
forcing them to have sexual intercourse.160  
 
Nada Kalaba, a part of the Ovčara 1 (Vujović and Others) Case in the Republic of 
Serbia, Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor, was sentenced to nine years 
imprisonment in 2009 for taking part in the 1991 massacre in the eastern Croatian 
town of Vukovar.161 Monika Ilic-Simonovic, a native of Brcko, was married to Goran 
Jelisic, a convicted murderer and concentration camp torturer.162 The two allegedly 
committed crimes against imprisoned non-Serbs in Brcko at the beginning of the 
1992-95 Bosnian war.163 Jelisic, who called himself the "Serb Adolf", was sentenced 
in 2001 to 40 years in jail by the ICTY.164 Ilic was sentenced by the Brcko District 
Court to two and a half years in prison.165 The Cantonal Court in Bihac in north-west 
Bosnia indicted Bora Kuburic and Radmila Banjac for allegedly physically and 
mentally abusing the detained nurse, who was a member of the Bosnian Army’s Una-
Sana operational unit, in the summer of 1992.166 These shocking examples document 
the roles some women played in the violence in the FYR, roles that have not been 
documented or publicised in international accounts of the conflict. 
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Local judiciaries carried the ability to effectively contribute to the narrative around 
the armed conflict, especially evident as they began to investigate and prosecute war 
crimes and the prosecution of both female and male defendants. The ICTY is not 
where international criminal law ends for the armed conflict in the Former Yugoslav 
Republic, as it continued throughout State judiciaries. While the perceived value of 
the ICTY over local courts can be said to exist in certain cases internationally,167 a 
level of complementarity is necessary in order to fully address large scale violations 
after a conflict. Ideas of complementarity, reserved for the workings of the ICC 
notwithstanding, is a useful tool in the work this study intends to do as well.168   
 
Complementarity can be difficult to imagine in a post-war climate, where local courts 
are seen as embedded in corruption and discriminatory against difference, especially 
after a conflict that was so deeply entrenched in difference as the conflict in the FYR. 
However, recognising the ICTY as the primary space of post-conflict justice misses 
the larger story that surrounds the conflict. Looking into the local courts as a 
connection to the larger picture of post-conflict justice grounds this study’s focus by 
creating a way to trace the female defendant through multiple legal realms while 
identifying the way she is understood, through both inside and outside the courtroom.  
 
The link between the local and international also brings to light differences in the 
international perspective on female defendants and the local understanding of those 
who commit crimes during conflict. Theories of representation and differences in the 
way women’s contribution is discussed in a post-war society is not only evident in the 
way women’s connection to violence is viewed, but it is also essential to look at the 
way women as victims of sexual violence are framed. By understanding the way 
women’s role as the victim was expressed and understood at both the international 
and national level a deeper image of female roles in war is developed. The post-
conflict justice story told in local courts needs to feed back into the way international 
actors, and Western feminists, approach and understand conflict, as well as gender in 
conflict. 
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3.4 Feminist responses to sexual violence during the conflict in the Former Yugoslav 
Republic 
The role of feminists, lobbyists, and NGOs was paramount in the successful 
prosecution of sexual violence crimes in the ICTY. In order to promote adequate 
prosecution, civil society NGOs and activists wrote briefs, held seminars, were 
involved in press work, and requested meetings.169 A great deal of lobbying was 
required to encourage sexual violence to stay in the spotlight, during the ICTY’s 
creation and life. Feminists, especially within NGOs, credited themselves with the 
development of normative law.170 However, feminist and scholars have debated the 
effectiveness of international criminal judgements that dealt with women’s 
experiences as victims in war.171 It is amongst those who engaged with debates 
around sexual violence that a victim narrative was developed.172 Scholars encouraged 
the growth of this narrative, as it also positively facilitated an important step into the 
area of women in international law. MacKinnon was an advocate of international 
criminal law’s work on aiding women who have been victimised by sexual violence 
crimes, along with her view that law was a form of male power she advocated for a 
stricter reading of crimes that dealt with violence against women.173 However, it has 
been argued that the work done around the Tribunal concerning women in conflict 
reinforces the idea that women only hold the role of the victim and are generally 
acknowledged to be in continual need of protection.174  
 
In the debates surrounding the ICTY, many feminists pushed for rape to be seen as 
genocide. MacKinnon vehemently advocated that the rape by Serbs was genocide.175 
She said that the difference between “everyday rape” and rape in the legal definition 
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was a product of male dominance, and therefore suspect.176 MacKinnon saw rape as 
difficult to define because she also stated that male dominance is also implicated in 
sex.177 MacKinnon states that if sex is usually done to women then force should not 
be the focus, rather consent should be more debated upon.178 MacKinnon further 
argues that men engage in sex and often have no idea that they have violated women; 
therefore, the definition of rape should be defined by its meaning from a women’s 
point of view irrespective of whether the man believed he committed an act of sexual 
violence or not.179 The women’s perspective promoted within MacKinnon’s work is 
often noted a predominantly Western and white.180  
 
Feminists and journalists who interacted with the ICTY were frequently frustrated as 
they tried to elicit stories of sexual violence.181 Alongside the fact that many 
interpreted women’s silence on the issue of rape as acknowledgement, made it 
impossible to view Bosnian Muslim women as anything other than rape victims.  
Likewise, MacKinnon’s work is also often criticised for seeing all women as a unified 
group.182 Many of the advocates who wanted rape to be seen as genocide, in the 
ICTY, believed that rapes by Serbian men of Croatian and Bosnian Muslim women 
constituted genocide, but as the conflict continued and Croatia became an more of an 
aggressor, these same advocates shifted their definition of ‘rape as genocide’ to only 
the rape of Bosnian Muslims.183 It was then when MacKinnon began to favour a 
definition that distinguished between “every day wartime rape” and the wartime rape 
committed by the Serbs.184 This, Engle states, is the suggestion that rape during armed 
conflict is worse than “everyday rape”.185 
 
Other feminists disagreed with the focus on genocidal rape. Copelon argued that 
genocidal rape is horrific as well as obvious; therefore, associating rape with genocide 
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creates the possibility of rape becoming invisible. Meaning that if rape is elevated to 
the level of genocide, then when women are raped for reasons other than genocide 
their experiences will be invisible.186 Copelon further notes, “women are targets not 
simply because they 'belong to' the enemy [...] They are targets because they too are 
the enemy; [...] because rape embodies male domination and female 
subordination”.187  Copelon, states that with this rhetoric, once again Balkan women 
were assumed to be victims of rape in war.188 Autesserre, in her work on the Congo, 
also noted that focusing on the rape of women overshadows other issues, such as the 
sexual violence against men and boys as well as other equally horrific forms of 
violence.189  
 
Despite the difference in opinion, other misunderstandings were apparent.  Engle 
address these two positions by stating that despite their difference in opinion over the 
issue of genocide both sides carried large assumptions about the ethnic differences 
between Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims.190 Engle asserts that some journalist 
and advocates assumed all women were powerless victims, incapable of defending 
themselves, taking sides, and participating in war.191 Feminists, like MacKinnon, felt 
sexual violence by Serbs was genocidal, others disagreed. Those who disagreed 
argued that taking such a position would somehow deny the extent to which women 
were always harmed in war, especially in the conflict in the FYR. This latter camp 
believed that rape on all sides should be considered genocide, but not because they 
were perpetrated against a certain ethnic group but because they were perpetrated 
against “women” as a group.192  
 
Different feminist perspectives carried large assumptions about women’s response to 
sexual violence. Engle goes on to state that those who argued for greater legal 
protection for women from sexual violence often used the argument that rape brings 
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shame on women as well as the community.193 Engle’s argument is that this process 
of shaming gives power to rape and because rape is not in every war it is not universal 
or inevitable, therefore shame is not universal or inevitable.194 Engle explains that 
there are conflicts that do not deploy rape and sexual violence as tools of war; 
therefore rape and sexual violence do not necessarily occur whenever there is a 
conflict. She further notes that feminists and advocates who assume that all raped 
women are in some way shamed also increase the shame themselves.195 Engle states 
that the ICTY, at the urging of feminists, has limited women’s stories and denied 
sexual, political, and military agency.196 At the same time, all men, especially Serbian 
men, were seen as potential sexual perpetrators. This further solidifies women and 
men’s role in armed conflict along gender lines. Furthermore, this makes the visibility 
of female defendants unlikely, as the actions of female defendants is outside the 
typical parameters of female behaviour in armed conflict.  
 
While sexual violence was the focus of international feminist study, the work and 
nuances amongst local feminists was not recognised.197 The national debates amongst 
local feminist scholars underwent shifts as the conflict continued. Before the conflict 
began Benderly noted that Yugoslav feminism was directly opposed to nationalism 
and expressed solidarity across the different territories.198 After it was clear that the 
conflict would in fact continue many feminists began working to end the conflict; 
they established anti-war groups, groups for women refugees, centres for those 
affected by violence, and telephone lines for support.199 However, Zarkov goes on to 
state that as the conflict continued so did the divisions between different groups of 
feminists.200 Differences arose in the conceptualisation around nationalism and the 
conflict’s aims. Generalisations about feminists from Serbia were pervasive 
throughout the territories, and sexual violence accusations were directed at Serbs and 
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Croats.201 National feminists from Croatia were determined to argue that only Croat 
and Muslim women were victims of sexual violence and Serb men where the only 
perpetrators.202 In Serbia there were national women’s groups which moved away 
from feminism and then anti-nationalist feminists, which also existed in Croatia as 
well.203 “The Women in Black” movement, a feminist anti-war movement, went even 
further stating that it is not beneficial to strive to increase the amount of women cited 
with having been involved in sexual violence, as this changes nothing about the 
women’s suffering. Their focus was with each individual and less importance was 
given to the law and the international version of ‘justice’.204  While feminists of all 
sides were involved in many other projects, it is the characterisation of victims and 
violators by national feminist that is the most interesting point for this study. 
Feminists on all sides had difficulty in defining the perpetrators and the victims, 
during the conflict. Some groups did acknowledge that their own ethnic forces were 
also involved in acts of sexual violence;205 others focused their work on all women 
harmed by the conflict and established links with other States as well.206  
 
However, despite the nationalist or anti-nationalist perspective both sides focused on 
women and their experiences in the conflict, which was often displayed through the 
lens of the victim. Zarkov comments on this point as well, stating that all feminists, 
local and international, assumed women were powerless and men were active 
players.207 Women who were capable of perpetrating or permitting violence and men 
who were powerless were insufficiently acknowledged.208 Zarkov writes that this 
mentality grounded the stereotypical notions of masculinity and femininity, which 
relate to the construction of ethnicities and the armed conflict. Both international and 
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local feminist work entrenched the view of women as victims.209 Women who 
perpetrated crimes were not a part of the representations of women in armed conflict. 
The work of feminists resulted in a victim feminism that in turn perceives cases like 
Plavšić, as rare instances where women act contrary to the dominant narrative. 
4. Victim Feminism  
Undertaking an analysis of victim feminism not only illuminates the perception of 
gender, but also highlights the environment that was created within international 
criminal law in the 1990’s which as shaped the way women’s roles in armed conflict 
are understood. This section will detail the Western feminist intervention and the way 
limited perceptions of gender in armed conflict influenced international law as well as 
the development of feminist aims. The work of the Western feminists in international 
criminal law in the 1990s also underscores the relationship to the women in the 
Global South.  
 
The relationship between the masculine and feminine, seen within the Former 
Yugoslav Republic, is then reproduced via the court cases after the conflict. If the 
gendered interactions of the ICTY are interrogated, then it is clear that while not 
implicitly discussing the court's own preconceived genders ideals, it all the same 
produces these categories. The evidence of a gendered understanding of the court 
exists within the courts silences. It is not only the lack of female defendants within the 
conflict narrative that seem to signal a limited view of gender in the ICTY, it is also 
the lack of awareness of male victims of sexual violence. Despite the fact that 
examples of male victims of sexual violence entered the Tribunal and the 
jurisprudence contains prosecutions of male sexual violence,210 male victims have 
been given limited attention in the overall conflict narrative. This extends beyond the 
international community understanding that sexual violence against men took place in 
the FYR, but there is a need highlight the relatively limited interrogation of the ways 
in which masculinity in armed conflict has prevented male victims from seeking 
services and reporting crimes.  
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Referencing the discussion above, the male victim disrupts the understanding of male 
roles in armed conflict.211 Skjelsbaek discussed the use of sexual violence as a display 
of power, and sexual violence against men as a way of ‘feminising’.212  By intently 
focusing on women as victims of sexual violence, women’s roles in conflict become 
defined by the potential of violence inflicted, and men are specifically seen as the 
perpetrators of sexual violence.213 Butler notes that juridical power not only represents 
‘subjects before the law’, but also produces it, which in effect allows law’s hegemony 
to continue.214 What this means for women and their relationship with the law, as well 
as their relationship with feminism, is that often the entity that exists to end 
oppression is the very entity that fosters the oppression.215 Therefore, using the law to 
aid women’s lack of representation before it, comes at the cost of also limiting 
women’s roles, if the representation in law reinforces female vulnerability.  While 
Butler’s discussion of ‘law’ varies, in this case law is used as the juridical law, found 
in the international legal system. Relating Butler’s work to international criminal law, 
and more specifically, the presence of women as victims and violators, develops the 
idea that certain people are able to stand before the law and others are not.216 This is 
bound within a heteronormative system of power. Female defendants are not fully 
realised as subjects in international criminal law; however, it is not enough just to say 
that female defendants disrupt the binary of men and women.  
 
One reason why the female defendant cannot enter into the imagination as a violator 
in international criminal law, may be because laws that deal with violence against 
women are often based upon heterosexual notions of what men ‘do’ to women. 
Female defendants do not fit into this concept, as they act against both women and 
men in a way that does not uphold the heteronormative hierarchy between women and 
men in law. MacKinnon’s work on dominance theory is utilised in part by this thesis, 
as she states that women’s subordination is based upon a social construction of 
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sexuality, which men use as a mechanism for dominance.217 However, the “women” 
implied in MacKinnon’s work is not an aspect further relied on in this thesis. Harris 
highlights the need to acknowledge that MacKinnon’s understanding essentialises 
women, suggesting there is one ‘woman’ under all different forms of identity.218 This 
aspect of dominance theory is limited in the image of women theorised, as it appears 
women need to choose race or gender or another identity.219 Moreover, there is no 
universal truth of what women ‘are’ and having women choose between identities is 
counterintuitive.220 The heteronormativity that exists in law is bolstered when women 
are assumed their gender is the most important identity they inhabit, as women’s role 
as women is essential to maintain the hierarchy found in law between men and 
women.   
 
International media headlines often centre on women’s ‘femaleness’ and often imply 
traditionally female roles when discerning female defendant's actions. A justification 
is needed when women step outside of the strict binaries set to encompass acceptable 
behaviour. Examples of women committing acts of violence are often reported in the 
media with links to gender roles; an article on Monika Karan–Ilic, who was found 
guilty of torture, inhumane treatment, and mental abuse by the Court in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, read “Bosnia arrests ‘Female Monster’–wife of warlord ‘Serb Adolf”.221 
The article’s headline situates Karan–Ilic as a monster, emphasising the female gender 
which suggests women do not typically assume this role, while also highlighting her 
as a wife. Positioning her as a wife of a man referred to as the ‘Serb Adolf’, indicates 
that her alleged crimes may be similar to those of her husband and yet diminishes her 
agency as a violent perpetrator. The headline invokes the trope of the dominant 
husband who controls his wife, and therefore, sustains the heteronormative structure 
of marriage.222 The dominant husband in turn influences his wife’s actions and female 
violence is produced as an offshoot of male violence. Sjoberg and Gentry argue that 
where the law allows women to be seen as culpable for violent crimes, ‘sex-role 
                                                          
217 MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (1989) 217. 
218 Harris (n 155) 592.  
219 ibid 594. 
220 ibid. 
221 ‘Bosnia Arrests ‘Female Monster’- Wife of Warlord ‘Serb Adolf’’ (Mirror UK, 22 December 
2011). 
222 Blackwood, ‘Marriage, Matrifocality, and “Missing” Men’ in Geller and Stockett Feminist 
Anthropology: Past, Present, and Future (2007). 
  
154 
 
stereotyping’ is still common in punishment and perceptions of agency.223  ‘Othering’ 
occurs in and around these trials and happens on all levels of the courts.   
 
The accounts of local perspectives on masculinity, femininity, nationalism, sexuality, 
and ethnicity found in local feminist work, as well as in pro–nationalistic pro–war 
propaganda, discussed in the previous section, links to the intervention into the FYR 
by Western Feminists. Batinic states that the work done to unpack the meaning of the 
female body in the FYR by local feminists was represented in Western publications 
and in the work of Western Feminists after the armed conflict.224 The US radical 
feminist approach, characterised by the work of MacKinnon, focused on sexual 
violence as the epitome of gender inequalities and thereby ignored economic, cultural, 
political dimensions. The US feminist intervention also diminished the intersection of 
gender with other modes of power within the FYR. Therefore, feminist interventions 
focused primarily on instilling a focus on the sexual violence in the FYR into 
international criminal law. 
 
The binaries of victim/violator and woman/man were further embedded by the 
conflict in the FYR and illuminated and discussed by the work local feminists, only to 
then be utilised and reproduced by Western feminists who intervened through 
advocacy on behalf of female victims, both during and after the armed conflict. 
Batinic states that the Western feminist response into the FYR echoes the Western, 
primarily US, feminist agenda in the 1990s, which resulted in the women of the FYR 
being symbolised as the ‘other’.225  I argue that both radical US feminism at the time 
used the conflict in the FYR to further a specific mode of dominance theory that 
centred on identifying and emphasising the role of sexual violence in the 
subordination of women. The consequence, however, was to ‘other’ women in 
conflict zones, as victims identifiable through the sexual violence assumed to have 
been inflicted on them.  
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The way Western feminists have shaped the understanding of sexual violence and 
gender is also connected to the international media representations of the conflict. 
Zarkov discusses the Western feminist response to the conflict, stating that in the 
summer of 1992 the international media began focusing on the sexual violence in the 
FYR.226 Zarkov highlights the shift in Western feminist engagement from a discussion 
of war to an emphasis onto war rapes and a limited understanding of ethnicity.227 The 
classification of sexual violence as a result of ethnic identities was problematic, 
instead there should have been more effort to ascertain the way a certain identity 
becomes elevated and seen as desirable in a given society.228 The former approach 
does not question the structures of the conflict, but rather upholds them and 
perpetuates their existence. Zarkov states that women survivors of rape and rape 
camps have also been a part of the efforts to deal with the aftermath of women and 
rape as well as other conflict related issues.229 Yet, the international media and 
Western feminists have depicted these women as helpless and silent,230 and while 
sexual violence came to the forefront of international feminist study the work of local 
feminist was not always sufficiently recognised.231   
 
Through the combination of both local and international presumptions about women’s 
personal experiences within the armed conflict, the dominant narrative around 
women’s roles in the FYR were restricted to passive victims. From this understanding 
it is possible to see why female defendants have remained on the fringes of the armed 
conflict’s narrative. Butler discusses the universalisation of women’s experiences, 
rebuking the belief that there is one form of oppression based on masculine 
domination or patriarchy.232 The term ‘woman’, Butler states, has suggested a specific 
identity one that does not take into consideration the way women or rather gender is 
connected and influences by race, class, ethnic, sexual, and regional identities.233 
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Furthermore, it is important to recognise the way gender oppression exists differently 
in multiple contexts.234 Explaining the relationship between Western feminism’s 
relationship to the Third World, Butler writes; 
That form of feminist theorizing has come under criticism for its efforts to 
colonize and appropriate non-Western cultures to support highly Western 
notions of oppression, but because they tend as well to construct a “Third 
World; or even an “Orient” in which gender oppression is subtly explained as 
symptomatic of an essential, non-Western barbarism.235 
Since the urging of Western feminists has resulted in international criminal legal 
developments on the prosecution of and existence of sexual violence as international 
crime, which are characterised as a universal experience for women in conflict, the 
life, oppression, and experiences of women in the FYR was assumed to rest along the 
lines of Western interpretation, seen in the media, feminist dialogue, and then the 
ICTY.  
 
Revenge or other associated thoughts of women were seen as a product of the sexual 
violence that women experienced. If one wanted to join the army or even expressed 
vengeance, they were seen as exceptional or pathological. Once rape was involved 
women could be or do nothing else.236 Journalist Alexandra Stiglmayer equated the 
desire for revenge with atypical behaviour.237  She stated that most women who were 
raped were broken and unable to think about such things as revenge; therefore, those 
who did so were not normal.238 Stiglmayer also suggested that most ‘victims’ were 
powerless, unable to even take care of their families.239 Psychiatrists noted that 
women who have become pregnant as a result are often suicidal, but after an abortion 
their symptoms turn to aggression.240 In these instances women’s experiences are 
framed through violence she sustained and displaying agency by engaging in armed 
conflict is presumed to be impossible. The existence of the female defendant, one who 
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displays a form of agency and can be seen as capable for her actions, is impossible to 
reconcile with an image that women are harmed and then act out of pathology or 
revenge.  
 
These scenarios offer women very little agency: revenge is pathological, potential 
mothers are suicidal, and rape leaves women ‘broken’. By explaining every reaction 
in relation to rape, there are little options for women to express themselves without 
one of these stigmas being attached to their actions. Therefore, after experiencing 
sexual violence women are often solely defined by their experience of rape or sexual 
violence.  To expand on the assumptions about women’s other roles in war Engle 
refers to Conklin, who states, “Men fight other men in war. As a general rule, this is 
true. It is also generally true that women do not fight wars, though they may 
contribute in other ways to a war effort.”241 This effectively deletes women’s political 
agency during war as well. Through feminist critical engagement with the conflict in 
the Former Yugoslav Republic advances were made within international criminal law 
and in the recognition of the realities women often faced during times of armed 
conflict. By assessing the results of feminist efforts this study moves the debate 
forwards so as to re-examine the role of gender in armed conflict and the way 
narratives of women’s sexual violence has in some cases limited the acceptance of the 
extent and range of women’s involvements during conflict, including as violent 
actors.  
 
It is through the work of local and international feminists, and the ICTY, that a 
specific image of the female victim has been reproduced and managed. Jurisprudence 
that sought to recognise women’s role as victims of sexual violence narrowed the 
narrative around women’s participation and elevated men to the position of active 
participants whether it was in perpetrating crimes or negotiating peace. Women as 
active participants in the conflict are seen only in relation to “women’s issues”, for 
example the activists that protested in order to end the war on behalf of their husbands 
and sons.242 Local feminists, victims of violence, or even international feminist 
interventions are restricted to issues that primarily concerned women, and women 
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who have been harmed. Women who perpetrate crimes, seemingly display traditional 
‘male’ characteristics and are left out of these representations; however, male victims 
are also not discussed properly by feminist actors or addressed within the courts, even 
when their vulnerability would be seen as a ‘female’ characteristic. Instead of 
accusing feminists of focusing on the victim, which would have theoretically included 
male victims, there is rather a narrow focus on what constitutes a ‘feminist issue’. 
Widening the focus of women’s role in conflict or the role of feminists around the 
conflict is encouraged in order to acknowledge the histories and experiences of those 
whose situation fallows outside of the mainstream approach. However, analysing 
Plavšić’s case illustrates that female defendants either escape international notice 
when they do commit crimes or used their gender as a means for negotiating their 
culpability.   
 
Continually reaffirming women’s role as victims of violence again establishes that 
women are connected to a specific view of femininity. Criminal courts should be 
disrupting these binaries and encouraging the understanding of the diversity of 
women and men’s roles. This would establish greater recognition of women as active 
participants in conflict and prevent assumptions that women remain helpless during 
times of violence and in fact are as equally capable of extreme violence as men and 
should, thus, be held accountable for that. Men in the FYR were considered the 
aggressors, strong, powerful, and a forceful representative of the nation.243 
Conversely, men who were victims of sexual violence remain outside the mainstream 
understanding of sexual violence in the conflict of the FYR.244  It is through the 
positioning of rape and sexual violence against women, as a prominent part of the 
Tribunal that reinforces ideas of masculinity and femininity.  Many feminists were 
interested in men as perpetrators in order to validate their understanding that women 
were the consummate victims in conflict. Only identifying men as perpetrators 
reinforces a gender binary established in the conflict as well. However, work have 
been undertaken by feminists such as Zarkov to analyse masculinity and male victims 
of sexual violence. 
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Feminist interventions also highlighted the male and female tropes displayed in 
international law. Charlesworth discusses the role of men and women in crisis 
situations and states that women are only recognised as being a part of the crisis when 
they are violated, and when that violation is seen as a harm to their own social 
group.245  Through the focus on sexual violence in the ICTY the binaries between 
man and women, perpetrator and victim are seen as synonymous. Another binary that 
is maintained through law with the help of Western feminists, is the distinction 
between sex and gender. Butler’s work positions the distinction between sex and 
gender as a discourse that solidifies the male and female binary,246 a heterosexual 
hegemony.247 Within this hegemony, the male/female binary, women and men are 
limited to specific characteristics within the law, and those characteristics have been 
highlighted by the focus on women as victims of sexual violence. 
 
Without highlighting the different roles of women in the conflict examples of female 
defendants like Biljana Plavšić are seen as exceptional.  Another problem with the 
rhetoric of victim feminism and highlighting the sexual violence in the conflict is not 
just that it ignores the other roles women inhabit, but it also identifies rape as special 
to a particular armed conflict. By framing the Tribunal along the same gender lines as 
the conflict itself, international criminal law reproduces the same gendered outcomes 
as the conflict. If women are argued to be disadvantaged during armed conflict, which 
produces distinct understandings of masculinity and femininity, then creating a 
tribunal that also predominantly focuses on women as victims and men as 
perpetrators, reaffirms the gender binaries that helped fuel the conflict and does not 
allow the possibility that human experience in the conflict is nuanced and varied. 
Butler writes that sexual violence both disrupts and reaffirms the maintenance of 
gender binaries.248 Ethnicity in the case of the conflict of the Former Yugoslav 
Republic also warrants further consideration as the aftermath of the conflict was tied 
inexplicitly to notions of ethnic division that also depended on specific gendered 
meanings of violence, nation and victimhood.249  I argue that the gender and ethnic 
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binaries bolstered by the armed conflict further embed the binary of 
victim/perpetrator, which is essential for the maintenance of the international criminal 
legal system.  
 
The international criminal legal system, in reproducing these binaries, supports the 
distinctions between genders and their presumed experiences in armed conflict. 
Furthermore, international criminal law through its work has made contributions to 
the understanding of ethnicity,250 and in doing so has embedded ethnicity as a 
necessary element in order to understand gender and sexual violence. 
While there were debates between feminist scholars, many supported the judgements 
of the court that dealt with women’s experiences as victims in war.251  
 
During the process of criminalising sexual violence one thereby makes it all the more 
prominent. Sexual violence is elevated to a position that it becomes a ‘useful’ 
weapon. This relates to the debates around rape as a weapon of war.252 If a group of 
women who have been raped are seen as being shamed, like Engle notes many 
feminists used the topic of sexual violence as a way to advocate, which makes rape is 
all the more desirable to the aggressors of war and solidifies women in gendered 
notions. Rape and sexual violence becomes more of a tool in war because it is cited 
by the international community as holding such an important value. To be clear this is 
not to say that ‘future aggressors’ see the focus of international courts on crimes of 
sexual violence, and then proceed to commit crimes because of these actions or find 
sexual violence more desirable because of its centrality in the courts. When a tribunal 
focuses on a specific experience of women, as victim, it not only reinforces their one 
dimensional status it also further cements the general understandings and roles of 
women and men. Some feminist strategies have used international law to organise an 
international response to female victims in conflict, and it is within the debates around 
such strategies where notions of race, class, and gender have also played out.253  
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A great deal of literature and discussion around the Former Yugoslav Republic has 
been centred upon the sexual violence. Chinkin discusses this stating that sexual 
violence perpetrated specifically against women has a long history beyond a specific 
conflict.254 Chinkin highlights examples from the Second World War to East Timor to 
showcase sexual violence against women in war as a continual historical problem,255 
to see the sexual violence in a conflict as something specific to that situation negates 
the ongoing crisis of sexual violence perpetrated against women. Charlesworth’s work 
also centres on the movement away from a crisis centred approach of international 
law.256 Sexual violence occurs during both peace and conflict and a possible shift in 
focus on sexual violence in conflict to the sexual violence of everyday life could lead 
to an understanding of the perpetual violence perpetrated against women that is only 
magnified during a conflict. While it is not being denied that sexual violence can be 
used in conflict as a specific strategy, as Chinkin stated it can be used as a benefit for 
soldiers, as a symbol of the nation state, or as a symbol of an ethnic group, examples 
which are systematic, organised, and on a grand scale.257  
 
The differences between the ‘international’ and ‘local’ are also apparent in spaces 
beyond the courtroom. Zarkov discusses the difference between the ‘local’ and 
‘international’ identity. She suggests that as much as the acts that are associated with 
the conflict matter the location of these acts are just as important for international 
feminists.258 The location of the acts becomes a cause for their existence and ‘local’ 
men are classified as sexual perpetrators and women as victims.259 ‘International’ 
women and men are then signified as non-violent, non-rapists.260 This ontological 
shift produces more consequences, Zarkov notes. By using these signifiers to separate 
the ‘local’ and ‘international’ sexual violence in the conflict is then tied to the 
‘local’.261 This binary elevates the position of the international and dismisses and 
essentialises the realities of the local. Zarkov has noted that this is not dismissing the 
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cultural or ethnic impact, rather it displays the need to understand the impact of such 
sites and not their use as an excuse. Local and international identities should not be 
definitively defined and their use goes against a very different feminist desire, to 
break through these dichotomies that often carry gendered implications. Through use 
of clear delineations within the local context of masculine and feminine identities, 
little room is left for the rarely discussed male victims and female defendants. 
Assumptions about culture and the lived experiences of women were accepted in 
order to make gains in sexual violence jurisprudence.  
5. Conclusion 
Due to the work of the ICTY and Western feminist interventions, women’s roles in 
armed conflict have become overwhelmingly understood through the experiences of 
women as victims of sexual violence. The presence of local women within the ICTY 
remains predominantly as witness or victims, while women from outside the conflict 
appear as advocates, lawyers, and even judges, creating the binary of international 
women as saviours and local women as victims. While the ICTY raised awareness of 
the violence sustained in armed conflict, it has not led to an alleviation of sexual 
violence in armed conflict. The higher attention paid to women as victims of sexual 
violence has led to women being characterised before the law based on what is done 
to their body, as they are seen as sexually vulnerable, rather than what their body does 
during armed conflict.  
In contrast, Plavšić’s situation disrupts the assumption that women are always victims 
in armed conflict. Analysing Plavšić’s case illuminates the existence a female leader 
who chose to perpetrate crimes during armed conflict. However, despite the 
alternative perspective Plavšić’s case establishes, the way her situation was framed by 
the media and the court support the stereotypical ideals that women are not 
perpetrators of violence. Therefore, when women are identified as such their situation 
is either deemed to be less concerning than if a man were to have committed the same 
acts. Female defendant's actions are either shamed or displayed as a rare aside to the 
narrative of conflict involving male violence.  
 
Female defendants have been insufficiently acknowledged in mainstream conflict 
narratives in the FYR. Although the reasons for this do not solely rest with Western 
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feminist interventions or even a particular aspect of the conflict or tribunal, they do, 
however, all contribute to a specific understanding of gender within armed conflict.  
Gender binaries and the acts traditionally associated with gendered roles were 
reinforced in and around the Tribunal. I have also argued that these gender binaries 
permeate feminist interventions. Western feminist needed gender binaries when 
promoting the importance of sexual violence jurisprudence, positioning women as 
victims was necessary in order to emphasise violence at the hands of men, which had 
long been disregarded, as was the case in the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials.  Ethnicity 
and gender identity also become dependent upon each other, which was evident when 
the ICTY and Western feminists positioned all Bosnian Muslim Women as victims of 
sexual violence. The intersection of gender and ethnicity becomes only necessary to 
acknowledge in relation to the violence women sustained.  
 
The focus on sexual violence in the ICTY was bolstered by international media 
attention and encouraged this narrow view of women’s experiences in the FYR. What 
was overlooked in the armed conflict was the history of the FYR that lead to the 
outbreak of violence, the religious and ethnic divides within the territories, the role of 
macroeconomic interventions, as well as the biases carried by the actors who engaged 
with the FYR post-conflict. The climate that resulted was not able to fully 
acknowledge the presence of women as defendants, who disrupted the narrow binaries 
already established around the conflict. Even when women were identified as 
defendants, such as through the prosecution of Plavšić, their stories are filtered back 
through feminine language and actions. The female body as well as the male body, 
and gender, were given meaning via temporal space reflective of the political, social, 
and ethnic surroundings both inside and outside of the FYR.  
 
Engaging in these discussions, around female defendants, often brings up questions 
about the aim of this work. The critique of sexual violence jurisprudence does not 
dismiss its importance or suggest less cases of sexual violence should be prosecuted. 
However, looking at the instances of female defendants not only illuminates the gaps 
in international criminal law and feminist interventions into international law, but also 
problematises what questions are asked about a conflict. Examining the FYR, in 
particular, unfolds just one situation where female defendants have been left out of 
mainstream conflict narratives, but contributes to a larger and thereby more 
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representative understanding on the existence of female defendants in international 
criminal law. 
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Chapter Five 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda  
 
1. Introduction   
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and The 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) are often spoken of in tandem.  
With the establishment of the ICTY and ICTR in 1993 and 1994 respectively, it is 
understandable why the tribunals would be judged comparatively, as they both share a 
similar timeline and contribution to international criminal law. The Tribunals gave 
way to the expansion of international criminal law, which had been dormant since 
World War II,1 and ushered in a new focus on sexual violence crimes, at the urging of 
the wider international community. The two Ad Hoc Tribunals relied on one another 
for advances in sexual violence jurisprudence, as was the case with the Akayesu and 
Furundžija trials amongst others.2  While some combined successes and similarities 
exist between the Tribunals, the international analysis in the aftermath of the 
Rwandan genocide has fostered four predominant themes, unlike those found around 
the FYR. Namely, the brutality of the conflict itself, the chaos in Rwanda during the 
genocide and then after as transitional justice mechanisms took shape, local 
accountability in the violence, and the sheer scale of the violence and number of those 
involved.3 These themes are repeatedly acknowledged to be a part of the Rwandan 
genocide narrative, which contributed towards the work and knowledge around the 
ICTR. 
 
                                                          
1 Zacklin, ‘The Failings of Ad Hoc International Tribunals’ (2004) 541-542. 
2 Weiner, ‘The Evolving Jurisprudence of the Crime of Rape in International Criminal Law’ (2013) 
1210-1212; See Fabian, ‘Proof and Consequences: An Analysis of the Tadic & Akayesu Trials’(2000). 
3 See Liebhafsky Des Forges, ‘Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda’ (Human Rights 
Watch, 10 April 2014); Bijleveld et al, ‘Counting the Countless: Rape Victimization during the 
Rwandan Genocide’ (2009); Moghalu, ‘Image and Reality of War Crimes Justice: External Perceptions 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’ The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs (2002); 
Hakata, ‘Home Truths by European Journalists’ (New African, August 2001); Gourevitch, ‘After the 
Genocide When a People Murders up to a Million Fellow-Countrymen, what does it mean to survive?’ 
(The New Yorker, 18 December 1995); Thompson (Ed.), The Media and The Rwanda Genocide (2007); 
Straus, ‘How many Perpetrators were there in the Rwandan Genocide? An estimate’ (2004). 
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United Nations sources detail that within the 100 days of the genocide in Rwanda, 7 
April to 19 July 1994, between 800,000 to 1 million people died.4 The ICTR website 
states that the rate of killing was four times greater than the Nazi Holocaust.5 
However, these figures are often referred to in order to make presumptive judgements 
about the context of the armed conflict. Compared to the armed conflict in the FYR 
there are differences within the States the conflicts occurred, the way the media 
reported the events that took place, and in the international community’s reaction to 
the violence. The narratives around the Rwandan genocide and the ICTR, perpetuated 
a specific type of gender and racial understanding, encouraged by the continual focus 
on women as victims of violence. Outside of the focus of the international media, 
feminist intervention, and the ICTR, existed other lived realities of women, women 
who participated in the Rwandan genocide. While the previous chapter highlighted 
the focus on sexual violence in the FYR, this chapter will also describe the ways in 
which the Rwandan genocide was interpreted and therefore understood differently 
than the conflict in the FYR. 
 
Although, there have been reports on the presence of female defendants and suspects 
in the genocide, and the ICTR did try and convict Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, it will be 
shown in this chapter that these instances are embedded within a limiting 
understanding of gender and race, perpetuated by the heavy focus from the West on 
women as victims of sexual violence. For example, the way the events of the 
Rwandan genocide were characterised in the media, often represented a viewpoint of 
“African savagery”.6 Female defendants remain in the periphery, concerning stories 
around the Rwandan genocide and in the ways gender is represented within during 
conflict, but when stories do surface female defendants are treated along the same 
lines as the conflict, as both brutal and unlike those who exist in the West. Looking 
further back in to Rwanda’s colonial history offers a means of understanding the 
system that has shaped how gender and race are conceptualised, and the way these 
categories are then reproduced onto the ICTR. Examining the representation of female 
                                                          
4 ‘The ICTR Remembers 20th Anniversary of the Rwandan Genocide’, (UNMICT Website) 
<http://www.unmict.org/ictr-remembers/>.  However this could be inflated as well.  
5 ‘The Genocide’, (ICTR Website) <http://www.unictr.org/en/genocide>. 
6 See Carruthers, ‘Reporting War Journalism in Wartime’ in The Media at War (2011).  
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defendants in Rwanda and the ICTR, allows wider conclusions about the conflict and 
global inequalities to be understood. 
 
This chapter will analyse the Rwandan genocide by detailing how the Western 
perspective concepts of race, class, ethnicity, and gender are woven throughout the 
armed conflict and directly linked to Rwanda’s colonial past. The Western reaction to 
the conflict in Rwanda, when scrutinised from the perspective of race, can not only 
offer insight into the way the genocide is conceptualised in international spaces. This 
analysis can also shed light onto the armed conflict in the Former Yugoslav Republic, 
especially considering the misuse and misunderstanding of religious and ethnic 
identities in and around the ICTY. Establishing this premise from the outset affects 
the way race and ethnicity are seen as a part of the international reaction, as well as a 
part of the conflict itself.  Themes that occur in historical narratives and media 
analysis, like the brutality, chaos, and the scale of the violence are grounded in a 
certain racial perspective, with a comparative understanding of other conflicts. While 
the scale of violence was far from insignificant, my argument rest with the framing of 
the genocide as a particular African problem. This is where productions of race can 
assist the discussion, and Western accounts of the Rwandan genocide become suspect, 
as they can reproduce oppression likened to Rwanda’s colonial era. To be clear, 
comparing the differences between conflicts are to be expected; however, this chapter 
will assess whether or not these differences are based upon presumed racial and ethnic 
bias. The benefit of comparing the two conflicts, in certain aspects, is to explain how 
bias that manifests itself due to forms of discrimination and to highlight the reasons 
why certain parts of a conflict are overlooked.  
 
The international focus on the brutality of the violence in Rwanda can also be 
associated with the way the international community understood the sexual violence 
perpetrated by both males and females against both males and females. The media 
highlighted the female victims of sexual violence sustained as a result of the genocide 
perpetrated by males. Feminist interventions, like in the context of the ICTY, 
interventions into the ICTR encouraged the inclusion of sexual violence crimes in the 
tribunal’s proceedings. The female victim rhetoric that was evident in the feminist 
intervention in the ICTY was also apparent in the intervention in the ICTR, as many 
of the same feminists and advocates worked with both Tribunals. The unified efforts 
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around feminist intervention in the Tribunals is another reason why the ICTY and 
ICTR are often viewed in conjunction in the literature.  
The language used to define gender within the context of Rwanda confines women to 
victims of sexual violence. The upholding of femininity and the connection of sexual 
violence, to what it means to be a woman, is deeply embedded within Rwanda’s 
colonial past, and the colonisers encouragement of ideal female qualities.7 In the 
Rwandan context, as opposed to the Former Yugoslavia, the inclusion of women as 
defendants is more widely acknowledged within feminist scholarship; yet, female 
defendant's presence in the international courts remains just as minimal as in the 
ICTY, with one woman tried. I will argue that the higher prevalence of female ‘s 
defendants in texts on the Rwandan genocide is grounded in narrow racial 
understandings. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, the former head of the Rwandan Women 
and Children Affairs, was tried for multiple crimes, including the perpetration of rape, 
something never before attributed to a woman on an international context in the 
ICTR. Women, including Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, Valerie Bemeriki, Agnes 
Ntamabyariro, and Rose Kabuye,8 amongst others held positions of power in the 
government as well as positions of combatants in the military groups. Despite this, on 
an international level, and in mainstream legal discourse, the representation of women 
in the Rwandan genocide remains limited to victims of sexual violence, as was the 
case in the ICTY.  
 
The dissection of race and ethnicity also influence the way female defendants are 
understood in Rwanda. Tying women’s participation in the genocide to their ethnic 
identity limits the autonomy of female defendants. Ethnic hatred did not serve as the 
sole reason why women participated in the genocide, as this removes women’s 
agency.  If women in Rwanda are seen to have participated in violence solely due to 
ethnic hatred, then the understandings garnered around female defendants remain tied 
to the Rwandan genocide or to conflicts that mirror the same perceived level of 
                                                          
7 See Buscaglia and Randell, ‘Legacy of Colonialism in the Empowerment of Women in Rwanda’ 
(2012). 
8 Rose Kabuye, a former officer in the RPF, was indicted in a French court for her alleged participation 
in the shooting down of the plane that carried President Juvenal Habyarimana. The charges were 
dropped in 2009. 
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brutality. This would assume that the female defendants in the Rwandan genocide are 
an irregularity related to Rwanda alone.  
 
This thesis recognises that the women who participated in the Rwandan genocide do 
have unique experiences that relate to an intersection of identities of race, ethnicity, 
class, and gender. From a wider perspective, examining female defendants in the 
Rwandan genocide can aid in the way women are understood to participate in armed 
conflict. Acknowledging the existence of female defendants, adds to the nuance to our 
understandings of women’s roles in armed conflict and contributes to greater 
understanding of structural biases within international criminal law and Western 
feminists discourse. However, I argue if the women who participated in the Rwandan 
genocide are seen as being particular to an ethnic conflict within Africa, then their 
presence does not encourage a better understanding of female defendants in all armed 
conflicts. Moreover, it further solidifies the women involved in the Rwandan 
genocide as an abnormality of women’s roles in armed conflict.  
 
This chapter will develop the elements discussed in this introduction as a way to 
describe the Rwandan genocide and identify the surrounding environment that 
influences the way female it defendants are recognised. The second section in this 
chapter will briefly describe the history behind the conflict and international media 
coverage around the Rwandan genocide. The third section will detail the ICTR as well 
as the media characterisation of Nyiramasuhuko. This section will also examine 
female defendants found in local justice processes. The fourth section will analyse the 
feminist response to the ICTR as well as the work on female defendants in the 
Rwandan genocide. Section four will closely scrutinise race and gender in the ICTR 
and within Western feminist interventions. Primarily, this will focus on the way race 
and ethnicity has influence the ICTR and the writings around the Tribunal, unpacking 
the themes that continually reappear in work around the genocide. This chapter 
contributes to the larger thesis by interrogating the international media and 
international legal community’s racialised understanding of the Rwandan genocide, 
which influences the way female defendants are understood. 
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2. Colonialism, the Rwandan Genocide and Media Representation  
Ethnic divisions and hatred dominated the international focus of the armed conflict 
and influenced the stories and headlines of new reports.9 However, Western audiences 
knew little about Rwanda’s colonial past or the ongoing civil war. The Hutu, Tutsi, 
and Twa speak the same language, share cultural practices, they are not representative 
of different races, and have coexisted in the same communities.10 However, the 
distinctions between the groups were highlighted with the spread of colonialism. The 
Hutus largely focused on agriculture while the Tutsis herded cattle and often were 
better represented politically at the bequest of colonisers.11 Belgian colonisation of 
Rwandan society was organised on the bases of a class system, a hierarchy of Tutsi, 
then Hutu, and Twa hunter and gatherers, which did not always run smoothly.  
 
This was exacerbated with rebellions by Hutus was often brought about by severe 
exploitation of the lowers classes as different Tutsi kings or mwami came to power.12 
However, the difference in class was not founded on the basis of ethnicity.13 It was 
with the division of lands during colonialism that brought the West in as colonial 
rulers, which cemented the idea that the distinctions between the groups was based 
upon the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa being different races. Bornkamm states that the 
German colonisers believed the Tutsi to be superior, closely related to Europeans 
through facial features, and began supporting the Tutsi as the superior ‘race’ aligning 
themselves with the ruling class.14 After the German defeat in World War I, Rwanda-
Urundi was controlled by a League of Nations mandate under Belgian rule.15 This 
change in coloniser reinforced the Tutsi as superior, and through Belgium’s rule, 
compulsory labour was forced upon the Hutus.16 Identity cards became necessary to 
discern each individuals ‘race’, as either Tutsi, Hutu, or Twa.17 As described in the 
ICTR court proceedings, the difference between the Hutus and Tutsi was blurred, 
                                                          
9 Wall, ‘An Analysis of News Magazine Coverage of the Rwandan Crisis in the United States’ in 
Thompson (Ed.) The Media and the Rwanda Genocide (2007) 265. 
10 See Bornkamm, Rwanda's Gacaca Courts between Retribution and Reparation (2012) 9. 
11 ibid. 
12 ibid 9-11. 
13 ibid 10. 
14 ibid 10, 11. 
15 ibid 10, 33. 
16 ibid 17. 
17 Ibid 10. 
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through marriage or wealth one could change their status.18 The colonisers, first 
German, then Belgian, aligned with the Tutsi due to the belief that they shared 
physical similarities and began to rule by instilling meaning to supposed racial 
difference.19 Keeping these aspects of the Rwandan colonial past in mind is important 
when deciphering the events that unfolded during the armed conflict and as Rwanda 
began to decolonise tensions continued to rise. In 1956 Belgium setup elections to 
choose new local organisation members and during this the Tutsi tried to sustain their 
power.20 After realising the Hutu boasted the majority population, evidenced by 
groups voting along ethnic lines, unrest increased and so did the continual shifting in 
ruling bodies between majority groups of Hutu and Tutsi.  
 
Colonialismis also implicated in the Rwandan genocide. Akpome states that 
Rwanda’s colonial past created the groundwork for the genocide and not the 
impetus.21 Akpome does not suggest colonialism is in anyway removed from blame, 
instead highlights the identities that were created, an essential part of the genocide, 
were embedded in socio-political constructs.22 Akpome refers to Mamdani’s work 
which details how constructed identities of indigenous peoples were reinforced 
through discriminatory narratives perpetuated by colonial rule.23 Mamdani also 
discusses the narrative of victimhood present in Rwanda’s colonial past stating,24 
“ever since the colonial period, the cycle of violence has been fed by a victim 
psychology on both sides.”25 This victimhood had led to a cycle that produces 
perpetrators who were also victims.26 Within this cycle was a pattern of destructive 
behaviour that consistently reiterated the ethnic superiority of the Tutsis; these 
narratives were cited to have contributed to the psychology of the genocide.27 The 
Belgian introduced identity cards were just one of the ways the colonial era reinforced 
                                                          
18 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, (Trial Chamber Judgement), ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) para 80, 81. 
19 ibid para 82. 
20 ibid para 87. 
21 See Akpome, ‘The Narrative Construction of Identity in Contemporary Rwanda: A Study of An 
Ordinary Man by Paul Rusesabagina (with Tom Zoellner)’ (2014). 
22 ibid. 
23 ibid 96. 
24Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda (2002) 
267. 
25 ibid. 
26 ibid 267, 268. 
27 Apkome (n 21) 202. 
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divisions; however, despite the existence of different constructed categories the 
importance of agency and the fluidity of these categories is important to note.28  
 
Much like the colonial project of distinguishing between different groups of 
individuals, there was a desire by the West to distinguish who the aggressors were in 
the armed conflict. Mamdani’s work highlights the necessity of understanding victims 
and violators not as separate entities, but capable of existing within one individual. 
Likewise I have argued, the disrupting of the binary of victim/violator is necessary in 
order to see women as capable of perpetrating crime. Furthermore, the work of 
international criminal law has reinforced the category of victimhood in relation to 
women’s experiences in armed conflict. Conversely, the promotion of women in both 
Hutu and Tutsi populations, due to economic or educational access, allowed women 
like Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, Agnes Ntamabyariro, Valerie Bemeriki, and Rose 
Kabuye to commit crimes. Each of these women had accesses to power through their 
elite status. This is not to suggest that being a member of the elite also shielded them 
from experiencing possible harm based on their gender or ethnicity. However, it does 
highlight that the identity of a women is fluid and multiple, signalling the link 
between being both a possible victim and a possible perpetrator, as well as the 
complex relationship between leadership, gender, race, ethnicity, and class.  
 
The constructed categories, such as Tutsi versus Hutu or victim versus violaor, 
establish a hierarchy and encourages a power structure that influenced the lived 
realities of the women and men in Rwanda.29 Mamdani details the colonial definition 
of a “native”, as “an ethnic being” who is the product of a patriarchal rule.30  The link 
between colonialism and patriarchy relates not only to the way the colonial and post-
colonial Rwandan society views gender, but the way gender is understood during and 
after armed conflict. Burnet details the importance of women and female labour in 
Rwandan society in pre-colonial and colonial times despite the influence women held 
in the family and within their patrilineage as daughters, which allowed an increase of 
                                                          
28 ibid 203. 
29 Mamdani (n 24). 
30 ibid 31. 
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power and often land rights.31 The colonisation of Rwanda also encouraged men to 
enter the monetary driven economy.32 This push decreased women’s rights and 
strengthened patriarchal control in Rwanda.33 Instead of understanding the structure 
of precolonial Rwanda society, with a special attention to gender relationships, 
colonisers sought to remake Rwanda in the image of a Western society.  
 
The elevation of a female ideal in colonial times was also equally apparent in the 
colonial mission. Buscaglia and Randell discuss “female promotion” in colonial 
Rwanda.34 When Belgium colonised Rwanda they introduced initiatives to improve 
the position of women in society. As a result, women’s roles in Rwanda was 
dramatically harmed by the emergence of colonialism.35 Colonisers sought to 
empower women, while at the same time significantly altered Rwandan society to 
advantage men and encouraged an economically based patriarchal society.36 The 
specific “empowerment” of women that the colonisers supported was designed to 
create a more fully developed concept of femininity in Rwanda.37 Buscaglia and 
Randell identify issues with the Belgium expression of “female promotion”, as it 
assumed there was an ideal standard of femininity that is possible to attain.38 Women 
in colonial Rwanda were taught to make dresses and clothes, clean their homes, iron, 
cook family meals, launder clothes, and to be the moral cornerstones of the family, 
role models to their children and husbands.39 Rwandan women were taught domestic 
duties, as those who supported the colonisers mission purported that they could free 
women from an oppressive traditional culture.40 Buscaglia and Randell stated that 
“female promotion” was a key part of colonial social control and aligned with the 
European ideal of a proper family structure.41  
                                                          
31 Burnet, ‘Situating Sexual Violence in Rwanda (1990–2001): Sexual Agency, Sexual Consent, and 
the Political Economy of War’ (2012). 
32 ibid 101. 
33 ibid. 
34 See Buscaglia and Randell, ‘Legacy of Colonialism in the Empowerment of Women in Rwanda’ 
(2012). 
35 ibid 69. 
36 ibid. 
37 ibid. 
38 ibid. 
39 ibid 71, 72. 
40 ibid 72. 
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The act of colonising the women of Rwanda imposed specific ideals of gender roles, 
and indicated the importance of what are considered to be ‘proper’ female tasks. This 
reordering of gender also diminished the value of traditional culture and societal 
make-up.  Furthermore, the act of civilising and indeed imposing new gender relations 
positions the civilised against the uncivilised. When the coloniser reimagines 
definitions of what a Rwandan female should be, it is evident that any derogation of 
those characteristics would be deemed uncivilised. It is then that links between 
femininity, race, and colonialism become apparent. It is from this perspective, where 
the female perpetrator in the Rwandan genocide remains outside of the history of the 
armed conflict.  
 
Through reimaging Rwandan gender roles, colonialism positioned Rwandan women 
as in need of being saved, this rhetoric can be seen within the US radical feminist 
intervention in the ICTR where women are viewed as victims in need of assistance 
almost as if colonial mindset continued. While one could argue that after armed 
conflict women are in special need of assistance, I argue that the problems that result 
from positioning women as always already in need of aid relegates women to 
powerless positions incapable of displaying agency within armed conflict. Therefore, 
female defendants are not readily recognised as a part of the genocide’s history. The 
legacy of colonial mindset also distance the women in Rwanda from the perception of 
leadership capability. The presumption that women in Rwanda needed to be 
reimagined in the Western ideal also limits that presumed ability for Rwandan women 
to access realms of power in what was considered to be an uncivilised and tribal 
culture by the West. After the genocide, women are expected to step into leadership 
roles in Rwanda, as indeed they have. Little discussion of how women’s leadership, at 
least amongst elites, exists before and during the genocide. 
 
After years of violence, with a civil war beginning in 1991, and continued political 
unrest, on 4 August 1993 the Rwandan Government signed the Arusha Accords that 
ended the war which began in October 1990.42 Despite the accords the political 
tension continued, propaganda from the government permeated the social climate, as 
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well as assassinations of key political and government figures, all with Rwanda close 
to bankruptcy.43 Then on April 6th 1994 President Juvénal Habyarimana of Rwanda 
and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi, returning from a meeting in Dar-es 
Salaam to discuss the implementation of the Arusha Accords, were killed in an 
airplane crash at Kigali airport.44 Many deemed the plane crash an assassination and 
accused opposite party leaders of the deaths of Rwanda and Burundi’s presidents. 
Others accused Hutu extremists, for causing the incident in order to ignite further 
hatred.45 Afterwards, roadblocks were set up by the Rwandan Army around Kigali 
and by 7 April mass violence and killings began in Kigali and soon spread throughout 
the country.46 
 
The Rwandan genocide refers to a very specific period beginning after the plane crash 
and extending for 100 days. Despite the ongoing armed conflict, the ICTR, as well as 
global interest, focused only on the 100 days of the genocide and not the overarching 
conflict. A few of the earmarks of the conflict have been the high amounts of sexual 
violence as well as the use of the Rwandan media to spur, primarily, the killing of 
Tutsi and moderate Hutus. Yanagizawa-Drott’s research on the role of media in the 
Rwandan genocide shows that broadcasts encouraging the killing of Tutsis had a 
significant effect on civilian citizens as well as the military.47 This data even went so 
far as to show how a single popular radio station spurred around 51,000 perpetrators, 
accounting for 10% of the conflicts overall violence.48 However, numbers like these 
have very little way of being proven. Not only would one need to interview each 
perpetrator to see exactly what spurred their killing or taking part in the violence, but 
this line of thinking ignores the other factors that would have lead someone to 
participate, such as fear for their own lives and family or peer pressure and so on.  
 
While the broadcasts had the ability to influence the attitudes that contributed to the 
violence, I argue that one cannot use the Media Case as a way to judge all Rwandans. 
                                                          
43 ibid 102, 105.  
44 ibid 106. 
45 ‘Rwanda inquiry concludes Hutus shot down President's Plane’ (The Guardian, 12 January 2010). 
46 Akayesu Case (n 18) para 107. 
47 See Yanagizawa-Drott, ‘Propaganda and Conflict: Evidence from the Rwandan Genocide’ (2014); 
Prosecutor v Nahimana et al (Appeals Chamber Judgement) ICTR-99-52-A (2007). 
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To assume that the media can influence someone who had no intention of 
participating, but would hear a broadcast and then immediately take up arms, denies 
the people of Rwanda a great deal of agency and intellect. However, one cannot deny 
the ‘power of words’ as Judge Pillay discussed in the judgement of the Media Case 
before the ICTR. The use of words to inspire and encourage hatred is not unique to 
Rwanda,49 but the judgement of an international tribunal that recognised the influence 
of words is significant as it points to the media as an important agent in society that 
should bear responsibility for its misuse of power. Similarly, I argue that the 
international media also carries great power in its ability to shape the understanding of 
an armed conflict. The international media attention around the Rwandan genocide 
also significantly shaped the narrative of the armed conflict, indicating to viewers that 
Africa was a place of brutal tribalism. The US and UK media produced an 
understanding about the genocide that focused the scale and magnitude of the 
violence. The sexual violence portrayed in the international media solidified the 
binaries of victim and perpetrator. 
 
Sexual violence was perpetrated on a mass scale with Hutu militia groups, 
Interahamwe, and Rwandan Armed Forces baring the biggest blame, along with 
sexual violence perpetrated by ordinary citizens. Sexual violence was argued to have 
been perpetrated as a part of a larger plan of Tutsi destruction.50 The sexual violence 
was often perpetrated by multiple people at a time, with foreign objects, after other 
violence and torture, and on the young and old alike.51 Women who were raped often 
had just witnessed the death or torture of loved ones.52 Social stigma was another 
element that added to the desirability of rape against both men and women.53 This is 
where analysing the intersection of gender helps in understanding sexual violence in 
this context. Rape was seen as a social stigma, but that was not restricted to men 
trying to harm women in this way. During the Rwandan genocide women perpetrated 
rape against both women and men and men against both women and men. Much of 
the sexual violence sustained by women during the genocide can be tied to their 
                                                          
49 See Herf, The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda during World War II and the Holocaust (2006). 
50 See Nowrojee, ‘Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence during the Rwandan Genocide and its Aftermath’ 
(1996). 
51 ibid. 
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reproductive ability, which was a source of power for women in pre-colonial Rwanda, 
as well as the perceived superior beauty of Tutsis instilled by colonisation.54 Rape 
during the genocide was used a tool and a means to affect not only the lives of the 
women themselves, but their families, husbands/men, and society as a whole.55 In this 
way sexual violence is clearly identified as part of a power structure, a gendered 
hierarchy within the society, where women’s bodies are tied to the production of the 
State. Therefore, rape, which has the potential to produce children is essential as it 
would bolster the ethnicity of those who committed sexual violence. The destruction 
of an ethnicity through rape is based on an extremely gendered view of ethnicity, 
which would pass from the father and not the mother.  Colonialism is then reproduced 
within the way the violence was carried out during the genocide and again with 
international justice mechanisms.  
 
Misinterpretation of the armed conflict in Rwanda influenced the stories and 
headlines of global news reports.56 Much of the conflict at the beginning remained 
unknown to Western audiences, especially in the United States, irrespective of the fact 
that the war began over a year earlier than the armed conflict in the FYR. Audiences 
were more familiar with the political and historical circumstances that lead to the 
armed conflict in the FYR.  Despite the media shift from disinterest with regard to the 
Rwandan conflict to intense scrutiny of sexual violence victims, international 
audiences knew little about Rwanda’s history. Dallaire stated that early on the news 
reports of the genocide did not make it to the public, as editors choose to instead focus 
on local US issues.57  Dallaire recalls that once news of ‘mass killings’ spread 
reporters began coming in and out of Rwanda in mass.58  
 
Media reports then became centred on descriptions of excessive violence and 
brutality, which distance Rwanda from ‘civilised’ viewers, as well as shaped the way 
people involved in the Rwandan genocide are seen and understood. The international 
                                                          
54 Burnet (n 31) 109. 
55 ibid. 
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media has continually overlooked Africa or when they do report, do so with limited 
attention to specific topics, as was the case with Rwandan genocide,59 and the work of 
the ICTR. Establishing the way the media responded to the genocide in Rwanda is 
necessary as it underscores the international perception to the armed conflict, with 
regard to the sexual violence perpetrated and the embedded racial aspects evident in 
the initial disinterest to the more graphic news headlines and reports. Each aspect of 
the international media response contributes to a climate that reinforced gender roles 
in perceptions of the conflict and subsequently the manner female defendants are 
analysed in relation to the armed conflict.  
 
Much like the media framed the armed conflict in the FYR, the media also influenced 
the perception of the genocide in Rwanda. Myers, Klak, and Koehl have described the 
differences in the reporting on the conflicts in Rwanda and the FYR as being told 
through two different ‘frames’.60 For example, as Myers, Klak, and Koehl have 
analysed, on April of 1994 The New York Times reported that Rwanda’s conflict was 
‘tribal warfare’61 while the FYR was “everyone’s war”.62 The media went further, 
using terms such as “bloodthirsty”, “savage”, “gangs”, “orgy”, and “terror” to 
describe Rwanda suggesting that the conflict was not sophisticated, but embroiled in a 
primal type of battle.63 The FYR was instead seen by the media and in turn audiences 
as a strategic conflict involving the use of military tactics.64 Many reports indicated 
that the Rwandan conflict was simplistic, Hutu against Tutsi, with Tutsis seen as good 
and Hutus as evil.65 In the UK, Holmes stated that the media failed to differentiate 
between the RPF and government fighting on the front lines as well as the systematic 
killing taking place behind the frontline.66 The media coverage in the US and UK 
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created indifference about the conflict; the term ‘CNN effect’, was used to 
acknowledge that the media has the ability to influence government policy.67  
 
The US and UK media, perpetuated misunderstandings and fostered disinterest in the 
genocide. Mamdani, stated that the international response to Darfur was done to 
remedy the lack of response in Rwanda, even when the two conflicts where nothing 
alike.68 As the genocide continued UK media began highlighting the sexual violence 
against women during the Rwandan genocide affirming assumptions around brutality 
and savagery.69 Wall writes on Rwandan genocide media coverage in the United 
States, stating that the vivid language used in news reports encouraged the view that 
the armed conflict was ‘brutal tribalism’.70 Wall reiterates the words used by the US 
media when referring to the genocide, words like ‘ethnic’, ‘slaughter’, ‘carnage’, and 
‘tribal’.71 This positions international audiences as different from those involved with 
the Rwandan genocide. 
 
Since Raphael Lemkin coined the term ‘genocide’ to refer to Nazi politics and 
practice, the study of genocide has developed and evolved with the new 
understandings garnered from different conflicts.72 While genocide existed long 
before WWII, much of the early academic research is based around the Holocaust.73 
While many scholars seek to move beyond the Holocaust as a benchmark to judge all 
other mass killings against, many still find that the Holocaust lingers as representation 
of what is ‘genocide’.74 Moses states that genocides are not all similar, but there are 
certain elements that occur commonly, albeit in different ways.75 This thesis is 
concerned with the cultural and racist presuppositions that enter into the work of 
Western scholars when they relate and describe mass killing, especially in the 
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Rwandan context. Moses also writes that there should not be a strict adherence 
towards comparing contemporary situations to the Holocaust.76 Moses quotes Weber 
while encouraging others to uncover a true account of events saying, ‘uncomfortable 
facts and the stark reality of life’ are truly important to represent when detailing a 
genocide.77 In the case of the Rwandan genocide ‘uncomfortable facts’ would include 
the existence of female defendants, which have only rarely entered the mainstream 
discussion around the conflict or remain a cautionary tale, in the case of Pauline 
Nyiramasuhuko, or as a way to shame women for engaging in the genocide. This 
shame is not because they committed crimes, but because they are women who 
committed crimes and somehow their gender is assumed to create more guilt.  
 
The way gender is represented in the Rwandan genocide is not necessarily from a 
factual standpoint, but embedded within limiting gendered and racial ideals. When the 
Rwandan genocide is described using terms such as brutal, savage, and chaotic, it is 
distanced from the Holocaust and other genocides which are often described as 
orderly and exact.78 These descriptive words also distance the Rwanda context from 
‘civilised’ viewers when used by international media outlets, as well as shaping the 
way people involved in the Rwandan genocide are seen and understood. The Western 
media highlighted the sexual violence against women in the Rwandan genocide and 
coupled these descriptions of brutality and savagery. When the international media 
does report on Africa they do so with limited attention to detail, as was the case with 
Rwanda.79 Western media outlets continually offer reports, which tend to reproduce 
colonial biases. The accounts of Africa as a place of mystery and tribalism has long 
plagued the States within the continent,80 and despite this clearly biased and far 
removed account it is a dominant narrative deployed by those seeking to create a 
certain limited image or provoke a specific understanding.  
 
When looking deeper into the characteristics around genocide, certain elements are 
distinct, as Moses stated, these elements are present regardless of the presumed 
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assumptions made around the nature of the Rwandan conflict. Namely that genocide 
is a highly orderly process, despite what seems like an unruly chain of events, the 
killing of a specific group takes leadership and thorough forethought.81 Stokes and 
Gabriel state that genocide requires multiple elements in order to sustain mass 
killing.82 Genocide needs bureaucratic cooperation, technology, and is embedded with 
its own cultural values.83 It needs a military force, intelligence, as well as informal 
networks of communication and groups that contribute to the core goal.84 Stokes and 
Gabriel go on to explain that genocide is extremely controlled; aside from the killings 
themselves which need to be executed, resources must be available with people 
instructed to carry out certain tasks.85 Even the act of killing has elements of 
organisation, people need to be gathered and bodies need to be dealt with 
afterwards.86 Female participation in the planning and execution of genocide also 
denotes the leadership capacity of women in Rwanda and negates Western 
assumptions around the lack of female leaders in Rwanda.  
 
The Rwandan genocide was highlighted by the media in distinct ways, depictions 
focused upon: the brutality of the conflict itself, the chaos during the genocide and 
then after as justice mechanisms took shape, and the sheer scale of the violence and 
number of those involved. This tends to invoke a picture of disorganisation and 
purposelessness. The ICTR was also influenced by the media characterisation of the 
genocide, Mamdani refers to the submission to the Tribunal from Africa Direct, which 
summarised articles written in Living Marxism, from 1995 and 1996, stated the 
conflict was not genocide, but a ‘scramble for survival […] in the economic 
wastelands of Africa”.87 This, Mamdani argues, is indicative of the misunderstanding 
of the conflict, and the reason Africa Direct is seen as relevant is because this is just 
one example of a NGO who is directly informing the Tribunal, having the power to 
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speak with authority on an armed conflict while also misunderstanding the conflict.88 
Moreover, the Rwandan genocide was extremely well thought out and efficient. Any 
armed conflict along these same parameters that involves a large number of people 
following a specific mindset, requires a considerable amount of planning and 
organisation. Stokes and Gabriel also point out that within the organisation, planning, 
and management of genocide, issues of power and hierarchy also play a role.89  
 
Conceptions of power and a hierarchy amongst State manifested in Rwanda, evident 
when neighbours turned against each other. Stokes and Gabriel use Blok and Freud’s 
work to link the fact that groups, like the Hutus and Tutsi, who lived next to and with 
one another can perpetrate violence against one another.90 This large scale killing is 
seen as a way of re-establishing a group’s identity.91 Identity in the Rwandan case is 
shaped by the colonial and post-colonial process of separation of Hutu, Tutsi, and 
Twa through identity cards, as well as favouritism in political roles by both German 
and Belgian governments.  
 
The Rwandan genocide was discovered to have been planned months in advance, 
despite what seemed like a random and spontaneous outbreak of violence.92 A Human 
Rights Watch document detailing the Rwandan genocide, points out that long-term 
structural elements as well as immediate decisions created an environment that was 
ripe for genocide.93 A “civilian self-defense system” was used in order to encourage 
people to kill Tutsi and moderate Hutus.94 Tutsis were defined as the ‘enemy’ and it 
was believed that all Tutsi were unified behind the concept of Tutsi hegemony.95 Not 
only was there an armed element of the conflict, but it was also an administrative and 
political task that utilised the organs of the state.96 The reasons behind the genocide 
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were not based upon hatred of the Tutsi population for its own sake or an intense 
amount of fear, but rather entrenched in the legacy of colonial rule, poverty, scarcity 
of land, the ongoing war, and the use of multi-party politics.97 As detailed above the 
use of gender as a tool during colonialism underscored the differences between the 
civilised and uncivilised, or rather the coloniser and the colonised. Embedded within 
this is the colonial ruling elite’s elevation of one ethnic group, which also promoted 
an understanding of class relations within the society that favoured Tutsi.  
 
Colonialism shaped the gender relations in Rwanda as well as ethnicity, both of these 
factors in turn have contributed towards the way women are perceived in armed 
conflict. Furthermore, the experiences women are expected to have during armed 
conflict are limited to stereotypical feminine characteristics that were promoted 
during colonialism. Through examining the background colonial Rwanda and 
establishing its connection to the separation of so-called difference which was a 
predominant element of the armed conflict, it is then possible to see the connection to 
the way gender was understood during the armed conflict, after as international justice 
mechanisms took place, and when attempting to discern the existence of female 
defendants.  
3. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Status of Women  
This section will first detail the work of the ICTR, focusing on the prosecution of 
sexual violence crimes. The case of Pauline Nyiramasuhuko will then be analysed, 
highlighting the way her gender was perceived by the international media and 
academics. Nyiramasuhuko position as a female leader will also be examined. This 
section will end with a discussion of the Western feminist intervention in the ICTR. 
While Nyiramasuhuko’s case did garner international attention, the hypervisibility of 
the sexual violence against women remained the dominant narrative of women’s 
experiences in the Rwandan genocide.  
3.1  The ICTR and sexual violence  
The ICTR was established to address the genocide and serious breaches of 
international humanitarian law grave breaches of international humanitarian law that 
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occurred during the Rwandan genocide. Discussing the ICTR underscores the climate 
of criminal justice that influenced the ways in which gender, race, class, and 
ultimately how female defendants are addressed in international law and by the 
international community. Identifying that the situation in Rwanda constituted “a threat 
to peace and security” and determining that prosecuting those who violated 
international humanitarian law would aid in restoration of peace and the reconciliation 
amongst those affected, the UN Security Council created the ICTR in 1994.98  
 
The ICTR was the first international court to convict persons responsible for 
genocide, rape as a crime against humanity, and to include rape as an instrument of 
genocide, as described in the Akayesu case.99 The term rape was defined in 
international criminal law for the first time as, “a physical invasion of a sexual nature 
under circumstances which are coercive.”100 Ericksson states that while international 
law has long prohibited rape, there still was not a definition of ‘rape’ in international 
law until the work of the ICTR. Sexual violence was also defined in the Akayesu case 
as, “any act of a sexual nature … under circumstances which are coercive”.101 
However, despite the jurisprudence on crimes of sexual violence, the ICTR failed to 
capitalise on the success of the Akayesu judgement and the gender jurisprudence 
outside of the Akayesu case has been far from adequate, considering how common 
sexual violence was during the armed conflict.102 Askin also notes that there was very 
little effort by the Prosecutor’s office to investigate the allegations of sexual violence.  
 
The ICTR also contributed to gender crimes in other, less direct, ways.103 Askin notes 
that judges would often discuss crimes of sexual violence in the judgements of trials 
that did not include crimes of a sexual nature in the original indictment, this can be 
seen as a way of keeping sexual violence crimes in the jurisprudence.104 In the 
Kayishema and Ruzindana case, although the indictment did not include sexual 
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violence, the Trial Chamber did make reference to the rapes committed during the 
armed conflict and the overarching scale of sexual violence in the genocide.105 While 
the ICTR did influence sexual violence jurisprudence it is also important to note that 
the court has been criticised, as evidenced from the lack of sexual violence in the 
initial indictments.106 Charlesworth and Chinkin have stated that the ICTR was much 
slower to indict individuals for mass rapes than the ICTY, and many felt that the 
wider genocide in Rwanda would pull the focus from sexual violence crimes, due to 
its scale.107 
 
One criticism by feminists was that the ICTR investigators were less than adequate. 
Nelarva, references Neuffer, who states that the investigators were mostly white 
males, who had no experience in dealing with these specific crimes, the reference to 
the investigators appearance was made to illustrate the reason why many women did 
not feel comfortable talking about their experiences to the investigators.108 Nowrojee 
also stated, that case involving rape and sexual violence suffered from many 
obstacles, which was in direct relation to the investigations taking place, as well as a 
lack of attention by the prosecutor’s investigation on rape and sexual violence, and a 
lack of communication between the investigation teams and the trial teams.109  
 
The investigators lacked sufficient training but, not in investigative skills, rather they 
had no training to elicit information about sexual violence and this noted as having 
seriously damaged the effectiveness of the investigations.110 Nowrojee has criticised 
the ICTR for failing rape victims, as the process of international criminal law has, in 
addition to the failings listed above, caused further anguish and suffering due to the 
scrutiny of their lives, faced during a trail.111  Nowrojee questions if international 
criminal law is designed to aid justice for victims or if international criminal law was 
rather for ‘international justice’. This thought underscores the normative value placed 
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on international criminal law and will be revisited in Chapter Seven when assessing 
the future of international criminal law. 
 
While the prosecution of sexual violence crimes faced multiple struggles and was not 
to the level it should have been considering the amount of sexual violence within the 
conflict, it was nevertheless, a central focus of the Tribunal’s jurisprudence. 
Prosecutors, Richard Goldstone, Louise Arbour, and Carla Del Ponte, had assured that 
rape and sexual violence would be properly addressed, yet feminists have stated that 
there was no strategy in place to do so.112 Under Del Ponte, the sexual assault team 
was dismantled and in an effort to speed up cases some of the charges were 
eliminated, rape charges were the easiest to remove.113 What has remained outside of 
the Tribunal’s purview was the crimes women committed during the genocide.  
 
The next section will analyse Pauline Nyiramasuhuko’s case before the ICTR. This 
marked the first women brought before an international criminal tribunal. 
Nyiramasuhuko’s case also contained charges of sexual violence, which is significant 
as it was the first time a woman was charged with inciting acts of rape. It is beneficial 
to discuss the case of Pauline Nyiramasuhuko for two main reasons: first it creates the 
space for discussion around Nyiramasuhuko’s actions and the difficulty people, 
including news reporters, her family, and even Nyiramasuhuko herself, had 
reconciling her actions with her gender. Second, it moves the conversation from just 
an understanding of the biases found within public reaction to Nyiramasuhuko’s 
crimes towards a nuanced understanding of the complexities found when people try to 
makes sense of a female perpetrator. This, I argue, is not based on merely ‘making 
sense of her gender’ or role as a mother in relation to her crimes, but in the case of 
Nyiramasuhuko has more to do with Western constructions of racial difference and 
her geographical location in Africa.   
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3.2 Pauline Nyiramasuhuko 
Pauline Nyiramasuhuko was the Minister of Family and Women’s Development in 
the Interim Government of Rwanda at the time up to her indictment,114 a member of 
the National Revolutionary Movement for Development, and a political figure in 
Butare prefecture.115 She was tried in conjunction with her son, Arséne Shalom 
Ntahobali before the ICTR.116 Nyiramasuhuko’s indictment accused her of using a 
roadblock that was set up near her home to identify, abduct, and kill Tutsi.117 
Nyiramasuhuko was also said to have accompanied by her son and other militia, 
entered the prefecture offices to abduct Tutsi refugees.118  Nyiramasuhuko was 
accused of encouraging the killing of Tutsi on multiple occasions, and engaged in 
crimes of a sexual nature, by inciting rape.119  
 
Nyiramasuhuko was indicted with conspiracy to commit genocide, genocide, 
complicity in genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of Article 3 common 
to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II.120 Nyiramasuhuko was also 
charged with rape as genocide and crimes against humanity, for inciting Hutu men to 
rape Tutsi women.121 The charge of crimes against humanity included, murder, 
extermination, inhumane acts, and persecution on political, racial, or religious 
grounds.122 Nyiramasuhuko was convicted on 9 of the 11 charges.123 She was found 
guilty of conspiracy to commit genocide, genocide, extermination, rape, and 
persecution as crimes against humanity, and violence to life and outrages upon 
personal dignity as war crimes.124 Nyiramasuhuko was eventually sentenced to life in 
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prison, which was later reduced to 47 years imprisonment.125 Nyiramasuhuko was the 
first women to be tried by an international court and was the first woman ever to be 
indicted and convicted for rape as a crime against humanity. 
 
Nyiramasuhuko was considered by Prime Minister Kambanda as one of the ‘inner 
circle’, which was said to have been responsible for organising the genocide,126 and 
was the main instigator of the genocide in Butare.127 International news outlets 
expressed shock as Nyiramasuhuko stood trail; she was described as looking like a 
“dear aunt” and not a killer, due to her contradictory appearance and dress.128  Butler, 
questions if the use of a perpetrator’s face in the media serves to humanise or 
dehumanise, as “the face” then becomes representative of a specific frame of 
understanding about a conflict or military action.129 Pointing to Nyiramasuhuko’s 
appearance, which is supposedly portraying a motherly or nonviolent demeanour, her 
face becomes a call to all viewers as something to be afraid of, as the Rwandan 
genocide contained women who, although seemed harmless, were responsible for 
committing international crimes.  Conversely, the media also painted Nyiramasuhuko 
as a monster and especially highlighted her role as mother standing trial with her son, 
in order to distance her from the qualities of a ‘true’ woman.130 Other reports on 
Nyiramasuhuko’s role as a woman were centred upon the shame her actions brought 
to all women, and the exceptional nature of her participation in the genocide.131 The 
two qualities, women’s assumptions with regard to biological nature and women’s 
ability to commit crimes were positioned to be irreconcilable.  
 
News reports, writers, scholars, victims, Nyiramasuhuko herself, and her family all 
had a difficult time connecting her actions with her being a woman and a mother.132 
Writers and scholars pointed to sexist notions to explain Nyiramasuhuko’s actions. 
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For instance, Rowles stated that Nyiramasuhuko’s case is an example of the evils of 
feminism, which he blamed for caused Nyiramasuhuko to value power over life.133 
What Rowles assumes is that feminism is a new phenomenon and that it was 
feminism that spurred Nyiramasuhuko to commit criminal acts. In this way female 
defendants seem to fall in rhetoric that blames the ‘emergence’ of women into 
positions of power which is purported to encourage women to abuse that power, this 
falls into the stereotype that women are not capable of possessing the mental capacity 
to inhabit traditional male positions. However, the existence of women committing 
violence or criminal acts has been present throughout history and judging from the 
lack of feminists willing to engage with the topic of female defendants, it would 
appear that feminism is opposed to discussing the concept of women committing 
crimes.134  
 
In the same way Rowles accuses feminism as the reason for Nyiramasuhuko’s 
actions, feminists point to Nyiramasuhuko as an aberration, a rare example of women 
committing crimes on the same scale as men. Women committing crimes are similarly 
distanced from feminist debates, but I argue they should be a part of feminism. This is 
not to say feminists should celebrate female perpetrators and defendants the same way 
women are celebrated when holding careers previously only reserved for men, for 
instance. Feminism should instead be a focus on the construction and performance of 
gender. However, undertaking an analysis of female defendants illuminates the ways 
in which femininity and masculinity have influenced the way women’s actions are 
categorised as well as allowing the exploration of the personal biases revealed when 
women who commit crimes are exposed.  Both of these opinions, whether it be 
Rowles or Western feminists, signal a need for explaining away female perpetrator’s 
actions. I argue due to the feminist scholarship around women as victims, feminism 
has failed to fully integrate the possibility that women are both potential victims and 
potential agents.  What has been more common, is to understand women as needing to 
be saved, through the wok of US radical feminism, i.e. victim feminism, or as women 
who have been empowered through the work of US liberal feminism and strive 
towards formal modes of equality in law. Ultimately, there has been a lack of 
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engagement beyond this binary of women as needing to be save/empowered. 
Therefore women as defendants does not enter into the narrative when trying to 
discern an armed conflict, thusly the engagement with female defendants in armed 
conflict has been limited in mainstream feminist dialogue.  
 
Victims and Nyiramasuhuko’s family all signalled motherhood, as either something 
that made her crimes worse or as a defense.135 To view Nyiramasuhuko’s crimes as 
worse because she was a mother, points to a conception of motherhood that is wholly 
transformative for women in a gendered fashion. I am not arguing that some women 
do not find motherhood to be a life changing experience. However, to assume that 
when women become a mothers that they also are freed from the ability to commit 
violence or criminal acts, whatever the context, is not only limiting for women, but 
negates so much of the work done to give women autonomy in motherhood.136  
 
When men are on trial there is typically little mention of their parental status. Drumbl 
notes, that in the case of Ntakirutimana et al., Elizaphan Ntakirutimana was referred 
to in the media by his profession, disregarding the fact he was a father on trial before 
the ICTR, with his son, Gérard Ntakirutimana.137  Conversely, Nyriamasuho and her 
son’s relationship was heavily focused upon. Instead of focusing on female 
defendants relationships to their experience of motherhood, there needs to be further 
interrogation around how the gendered understandings of parenthood are used to 
dismiss women’s agency. This occurs to the extent that even when there is evidence 
of committing heinous crimes motherhood seems to offer a way to deny such 
allegations. 
 
Nyiramasuhuko stated that she had no power, no capability and therefore was not 
guilty.138 Nyiramasuhuko also cited sexism as the reason she was being prosecuted, 
because she was an educated woman.139 Sperling has noted that either Nyiramasuhuko 
chose to use gender as a means of casting doubt onto her actions, or she believed that 
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women truly did not have the capacity to commit acts that would require a substantial 
amount of power.140 It is not unthinkable that Nyiramasuhuko would chose to use her 
gender as a way to deny crimes, this a strategy that relies on the presumed bias of 
those judges within the ICTR. What is more interesting is if in using her gender as a 
defense Nyiramasuhuko truly believed that women did not have enough power to 
commit international criminal acts. However, it is clear from the research done around 
the genocide that women were involved in perpetrating crime.  
 
Nyiramasuhuko’s class, her position as a powerful government official in Rwanda, 
has been rarely discussed in media or academic work. Her role as a leader and as a 
women highlights the misconceptions in Western understandings of African women 
in power. Elite women did have access to power during the Rwandan genocide and 
therefore were more able to participate in leadership crimes, like Nyiramasuhuko. 
However, the Western intervention after armed conflict only highlights women’s 
leadership roles in Africa, in relation to peacebuilding efforts. Again, the usefulness 
of female defendants as a tool is expounded in order to discuss the way women are 
exceptionalised through Western feminist work or international law. Typically, 
women’s behaviour is excused when they are discovered to have engaged in violence 
or they are seen as deviant women.  
 
Moreover, classifying female defendant's actions moves the debate further away from 
making positive gains in the way women are understood to act in armed conflict. For 
example, the discussion needs to shift away from exceptionalising women’s actions 
that do not fit into the mainstream narrative around women in conflict, and instead 
question why powerful women’s propensity to commit violence is under discussed. 
Examples of Thatcher, Clinton, and Rice were discussed briefly in Chapter Three, as 
Western women who engage in violence, because their actions as leaders are not seen 
in the same way female defendants are understood. This positions women’s actions 
differently dependent upon their global location, which is directly related to the 
privilege of the Global North over the Global South, based on race, class, and 
different conceptions of gender.                 
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Nyiramasuhuko’s case is not the only time women were involved in the Rwandan 
genocide. Hogg states that of ‘Category 1’ genocide suspects, 47 are women.141 The 
list of ‘Category 1’ suspects includes those in leadership roles in the government, 
political parties, the military and religious organisations, as well as planners, 
organisers, instigators and direct perpetrators of genocide and crimes against 
humanity.142 It is important to note that during the Rwandan genocide that while there 
were no women Prefects or Bourgmestres, there were 1472 Conseillers, of which 17 
were women.143 Hogg writes that many more women were Responsables, 
administrative leaders.144 On a local level there are many more examples of female 
defendants. ‘ordinary women’, a category referring to those suspects not in leadership 
positions and accused of Category 2 or 3 crimes in the Rwandan justice system, 
perpetrated crimes during the genocide as well.145 
 
Examples of female defendants, like that of Rose Kabuye, have been exhibited in the 
work of Adler, Loyle, and Globerman as well as in Nicole Hogg’s research in 
Rwanda.146 Even though many of the participants in their studies are without names, it 
is evident that the number of women accused of genocide or genocide related crimes 
is far more prevalent than the single prosecution of a women at the ICTR would 
suggest. Hogg reported in 2010 that around 2000 women were still awaiting trial in 
Rwanda for crimes related to the genocide.147 Some women involved in the genocide 
denied their crimes using gender as a defence, like Nyiramasuhuko. Hogg has states 
that women who were awaiting trial were actively denying their involvement due to 
the fact they were women.148  During Hogg’s research she interviewed women in 
prison either serving sentences or awaiting trial, two of these women stated, “I am a 
women, I had no power” and “I am really surprised they put me in the first category. I 
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am a women.”149 Military leader Major Anne-Marie Nyirahakizimana, who was 
sentenced to death by a Kigali Military Court in 1999, claimed in her defence that she 
was powerless, and that being a women limited her ability to stand up to the 
Interahamwe militia.150 
 
If women are claiming that their gender equals a lack of power even while 
perpetrating violence, then it is possible that women are either using their gender to 
remove responsibility or do not see their gender as their primary mode of identity, 
meaning gender is not a relevant factor in their perpetrating or not perpetrating crime. 
Furthermore, they may not associate the ability to participate in the genocide as a 
form of agency. Analysing Nyiramasuhuko’s actions based on gender, highlighting 
her ability to disrupt gender ideals of typical ‘female’ behaviour only provide part of 
the context. She used her gender to deny criminal allegations, this it may be 
conceivable gender was also useful in order to obtain a ministerial position within the 
government, which happened to be a position that was related to the welfare of 
women. Nyiramasuhuko’s actions were more closely related to her extremist view of 
her Hutu ethnicity. Her place as a Hutu in Rwandan society, and her ability to 
perpetrate acts resulted from her position in society and extremist political view, had 
little to do with her being a woman. Extremist ethnicity, which was a main focus of 
the conflict itself, needed to become the central tool of analysis for academics and the 
ICTR. What it means to be a woman in Rwandan society and indeed an educated 
woman, may be very different from the perspective of the West. It is not beneficial to 
interpret the actions of female defendants in Rwanda from a gendered point of view 
without also taking into account the way class, education, and ethnicity intersect in 
the Rwandan context. 
 
International law often constructs the assumption that women, if acknowledged in 
legal discourse, are by default the perpetual victim. Therefore, when women are seen 
as the violator, international legal processes rest on the gender binaries found within 
its structure. International law and society both reiterate that women are the victim, 
women are not the violator, and likewise women in armed conflicts need to be 
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protected and saved. The case of Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, a woman in power who 
used her position to cause harm, is considered to be an aberration and decidedly not 
the norm, despite existence of evidence to the contrary. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko is an 
excellent example, in order to probe further into discussions on gender in female 
defendants. While this recognition of a woman as a perpetrator should have indicated 
a greater understanding of the role of women in conflict; however, the ICTR failed to 
indict any other women. There were other women in leadership roles within Rwanda, 
such as Agnes Ntamabyariro, Valerie Bemeriki, and Rose Kabuye, yet they remained 
outside the purview of the Tribunal. The trial and conviction of Pauline 
Nyiramasuhuko did not encourage a broader realisation of women’s active 
participation in crime during the Rwandan genocide, instead it gave evidence to the 
contrary.   
 
Women’s actions are therefore comparable to men within their specific involvement 
in the genocide. However, women’s contribution to the loss of life warrants further 
scrutiny in order to properly access the best way to restructure and reconcile a society. 
Women in Rwanda, after colonialism, had limited leadership roles, this directly links 
the mechanism of colonialism with the production of limited female subjectivity in 
Rwanda to the way Rwandan women are assumed to act during armed conflict. When 
women do act outside of the produced victim narrative, they are easily labelled as 
uncivilised exceptions to the way women as a whole act in armed conflict. However, 
there are examples women in high positions, elite Hutu women who contributed to the 
genocide, which reiterates the need to unpack the relationship of class to other 
identities such as ethnicity and gender. The smaller number of female defendants 
prosecuted at the ICTR is less about women’s nature and more about women’s access 
to leadership and the domestic roles forced onto women during colonialism. This 
allows the connection between female defendants and intersectionality to take shape, 
interrogating the way gender, race, and class construct privilege.  
 
Trying a woman internationally, for crimes committed during armed conflict, shows 
tremendous growth from the international legal community concerning women’s 
involvement in conflict. Nyiramasuhuko’s case would appear to disrupt the stereotype 
of women as victims without power, due to the fact that Nyiramasuhuko was a 
minister within the government and not only did she commit criminal acts, but she 
  
195 
 
was also found to be guilty of inciting rape. Finding a female guilty of inciting acts of 
rape is contrary to the way women are predominantly assumed to act during armed 
conflict. Despite the apparent disrupting of gender lines, Nyiramasuhuko’s case fell 
back onto stereotypical female roles.  
 
Nyiramasuhuko herself used her gender as evidence why she could not have 
committed the crimes for which she was accused. Nyiramasuhuko also was tried with 
her son, Arsène Shalom Ntahobali, which continually reaffirmed her roles as a 
mother. Not only is Nyiramasuhuko seen as a mother, but a manipulative controlling 
mother who pushed her son to commit crimes and then rewarded those crimes with 
the opportunity of sexual violence. Many would cite Nyiramasuhuko as a “bad” 
mother, and therefore braking the convention of women as doting mothers. However, 
there is a tendency to only allow women to inhabit one role. They cannot be both a 
criminal and a mother, or rather a criminal and a “good” mother. To be certain, 
Nyiramasuhuko is not being argued to be a model parent, but her case offers a way to 
discuss the multiple roles women inhabit during armed conflict. 
3.3 Local processes  
The government of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) did not want to encourage 
impunity or widespread amnesty by way of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
after the genocide, so it established special chambers of its ordinary and military 
courts and eventually a modern adaption of the traditional Rwandan Gacaca Court 
system.151 After recognising that the specialised chambers in Rwanda, setup by 
Organic Law No 08/96 to deal with those accused of committing crimes of genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and those crimes associated with the two categories, where 
unable to process all of those who remained in prison, a modern approach to the 
traditional Gacaca justice system was proposed.152 The Gacaca Courts are a 
reimagined traditional national justice system that centres upon truth and 
reconciliation.153  The system is grounded in the people of the community as well as 
in the hope that open confession will repair some of the damage brought about by the 
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armed conflict.154 Those who confess can reduce their sentence, and the court also 
allows anyone to accuse someone of wrongdoing.155 The rules of the Gacaca court are 
codified in the Rwandan Transitional National Assembly Organic Law 40/2000 on 
January 26, 2001.156  
 
The Rwandan justice system has three different categories of criminals relating to the 
timeframe of 1990 and 1994, as well as the genocide, which the Gacaca courts have 
also utilised.157 Category one includes rapists and those in leadership positions.158 
Category two is separated into three subcategories for the purpose of sentencing; one 
is for well-known murderers, torturers, and persons who committed dehumanising 
acts on a dead body, two includes ordinary killers and those who intended to kill, but 
did not, and three is for those who committed acts without the intent to kill.159 
Category three is for those who committed property offences.160 Some of the 
characteristics of the Gacaca courts were that the trials often took place in the village 
of the accused, confession had an effect on the sentence especially if the accused 
testified before identified as a suspect, and during the trial the judges and community 
members listened to the accused, accusers, and to anyone else who wished to speak.161 
 
The lack of access to court files, considering the large amount of cases it processed, is 
just one reason why the Gacaca Court system has been prone to criticism. Many have 
accused the Gacaca courts for being too idealistic or another arm of the government, 
State sponsored justice. Others have commented on the court’s lack of due process, or 
its connection to a corrupt post armed conflict society, as well as the court’s ability to 
be manipulated by the elites of the community.162  However, Clark suggests that this 
                                                          
154 ibid.  
155 ibid. 
156 See Organic Law No. 40/2000 of 26/1/2001 Setting Up Gacaca Jurisdictions and Organizing 
Prosecutions for Offences Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity 
Committed Between October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994 (2001) [hereinafter Organic Law No. 
40/2000], available at http://www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/pdf/Law.pdf (amended in 2004 and 2007). 
157 Westburg (n 153) 339. 
158 ibid. 
159 ibid. 
160 ibid. 
161 ibid 339-340. 
162 Clark, ‘Bringing the Peasants Back in, Again: State Power and Local Agency in Rwanda’s Gacaca 
Courts’ (2014) 8 Journal of Eastern African Studies 195. 
  
197 
 
understanding of the court discounts the agency of the people of Rwanda.163 Clark 
goes on to say that despite arguments against Gacaca, which cited the courts as 
unengaged with the population, there is overwhelming evidence of open debate and 
discussion as well as active local involvement.164 Gacaca courts setup after the 
genocide also signalled the involvement of women, who comprised around 40% of 
the judges in the court.165 The representation of women in an extremely public space 
allows the narrative of the genocide as well as the country’s reconciliation to be 
enhanced by different perspectives. There is a great deal of work done around Gacaca; 
however, this research is not delving into these debates, but recognises the need to 
acknowledge the larger discussion surrounding the Gacaca Courts.  
 
It is estimated that the Gacaca Courts tried around two million suspects, of which 
approximately ten percent were women.166 Further examples of female perpetrators 
include: Valerie Bemeriki who was tried by the Gacaca Courts and received a life 
sentence; Dr. Jeanne Marie Nduwamariya was also tried in absentia by the Gacaca 
Courts and received a life sentence; Agnes Ntamabyariro was tried by national courts 
in Kigali and received a life sentence; and Virginia Mukankusi, was one of 24 people 
publicly executed in Rwanda after the genocide.167  
 
In the local context where the Gacaca Courts have tried female defendants, Brown 
states that female suspects before the Court made up 10% of the total population of 
those tried, after acquittals this eventually resulted in around 60,000 women being 
incarcerated.168  The reason why the inclusion of Gacaca is important is because a 
reinvented traditional Rwandan transitional justice mechanism was capable of 
recognising the participation of women in the genocide. I am not implying that 
Rwanda, therefore, has disrupted gender binaries or dispelled limited notions of 
female and male experience in armed conflict. However, I am suggesting that there 
needs to be a greater discussion between local and international legal mechanisms 
                                                          
163 ibid 194. 
164 ibid 202. 
165 ibid 203. 
166 Brown, Gender and the Genocide in Rwanda: Women as Rescuers and Perpetrators (2017) 92, 92. 
167 Maier, ‘Women Leaders in the Rwandan Genocide: When Women Choose To Kill’ (2013) 12. 
168 Brown, ‘Female Perpetrators of the Rwandan Genocide’ (2014) 461. 
  
198 
 
after a conflict in order to situate not only the conflict narrative, but also the 
experiences and subsequent needs of a post-conflict community.  
3.4 Feminist intervention in the ICTR 
When the establishment of an international tribunal in Rwanda began many Western 
feminist started to focus their efforts on sexual violence crimes. While initial reports 
on sexual violence in the FYR and Rwanda were ignored, reporting on sexual 
violence by the media was substantially greater in the FYR.169 Bedont and Martinez 
describe the publicity surrounding the “mass rapes” in both the FYR and Rwanda, as 
the driving force in the creation of the ICTY and ICTR.170  Feminists along with 
NGOs urged indictments in the ICTR to include rape and sexual violence and were 
paramount to the prosecution of sexual violence crimes as well as keeping sexual 
violence in focus.171 Mackinnon, writes that the prosecutors often did not charge rape 
when murder charges were present.172 MacKinnon states,  
A parallel judicial pattern can be discerned in the seeming reluctance of the 
Tribunal, at times, to hold a man responsible for a sexual violation another 
man committed, when it is willing to hold the same man responsible for 
murder committed on virtually the same evidence, at the same time and place, 
by and against the same people.173  
The ICTR found it difficult to charge men, not with the acts they committed 
themselves, but, acts that other man committed on their behalf, which was key when 
accusing someone of inciting rape.174 MacKinnon further states that the underlying 
impression given by the prosecutors is that men would not likely commit murder 
without orders, yet they would rape on their own without the orders of a superior.175 
This, she says, falls into the ‘boys-will-be-boys’ theme and shows that the Tribunal 
does not believe that the rapes were truly the leaders fault. Seeing rape as an 
ultimately probable action, says more about the underlying nature of sexual violence 
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crimes. If sexual violence can be seen to be an act that does not necessarily require 
coaxing, then there is more work that needs to be done uncovering the strong social 
aspects of gender and power, in particular the myth that male physiology leads them 
to have strong sexual urges to the extent of committing acts of sexual violence when 
the opportunity presents itself.  
 
The act of men committing sexual violence and women the victims of that violence is 
perceived as inevitable during armed conflict. These roles, both that of the victim and 
violator become synonymous with the gender of the individual. Men are the 
perpetrators, which reinforces masculine qualities and women are the victims, 
highlighting their passive femininity.  MacKinnon also states that the willingness to 
drop rape charges, as previously noted, was present especially when murder charges 
were retained shows the lack of importance placed on prosecuting rape, in the 
Tribunal. MacKinnon further describes that there seems to be a higher standard of 
credibility for witnesses to rape than for witness to murder and that all of these 
instances combine, MacKinnon states, demonstrate a push towards impunity.176 
Female leaders who perpetrate rape would be even more difficult to charge as their 
gender defies the male perpetrator/female victim of sexual violence binary. 
 
In the ICTR, there was a lack of financial resources, political will, administrative and 
technical problems, survivors-witnesses were not protected properly, and sexual 
violence, and although it was widely known to be widespread throughout the conflict 
did not take centre stage.177 Nelarva writes,  
Genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity must "shock the 
conscience of mankind" to qualify as international. Whether or not rape and 
sexual violence should be viewed in such terms is largely a determination 
made by legal professionals, primarily the Chief Prosecutor.178  
The ICTR in many ways was considered to be an afterthought when compared to the 
ICTY; Mutua describes the ICTR as, “a sideshow to the Yugoslav Tribunal” and only 
in existence because the conflicts in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were 
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showcased simultaneously in the media.179 The lack of interrogation around the 
context that led up to the ICTR adds to the misunderstanding around divisions in 
Rwanda and determined the conflict was a specific problem for the African continent. 
This also raises questions around international perceptions of the conflict; viewing the 
genocide as merely ethnic may shift the need to explore the deeper issues around 
Western perceptions of the African continent, lingering colonialism, and the 
assumption of all non-Western women as oppressed, are present within the conflict 
and relegates the lessons learned from Rwanda to an ‘African issue’.    
 
The international and local binary can also be seen in the work of feminists. 
Mohanty’s work counters the work above done by the Western “white middle class” 
feminist, who have often been criticised for universalising their own experiences and 
projecting them onto the international community as a whole, as well as 
universalising “Third Word” women as victims.180 The assumption made by Western 
feminists is that their perception of gender, or the way gender and race interacts, 
mirrors the experience of the rest of the world. This is then projected onto Third 
World women, as their lives are understood through the lens of the West and their 
voices are assumed to be united as one ‘Third World woman’ perspective. This 
position taken by Western feminists is one of privilege. Mohanty sees the Third 
World as being created by the First World,181 and in doing so the First World actors 
dictate the way agency of women in the Third World should look. The agency of the 
Third World woman is often assumed to revolve around women’s disadvantage due to 
the corrupt or instability of the governmental or socio-economic system they find 
themselves.  
 
The assumption that Rwandan women ‘need’ saving, embeds the Western failure to 
see women leaders as already existing in Africa, and in Rwanda in particular, which 
automatically reinforces a form of victim feminism and dismisses the very possibility 
of female defendants. Kapur also discusses the interplay between Western feminism 
and post-colonial feminism, and see the international women’s rights movement as 
strengthening a female victimisation rhetoric through a focus on violence against 
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women.182 Kapur notes that the discussion of ‘metanarratives’ around women as 
victims has equated all women with the same experience of sexual violence and 
objectification.183 Kapur has criticised MacKinnon’s work for essentialising women 
and gender, though assuming gender is the basis of women’s oppression and that 
women must “prioritise issues of sexuality and sexual violence”.184  
 
This brief review of the work of feminists in the ICTR displays the overarching focus 
on securing sexual violence jurisprudence. While it is evident that sexual violence 
was a large part of the genocide, by limiting women’s roles in conflict to victims of 
sexual violence, the ways colonialism, race, ethnicity, and gender interplay within the 
ICTR cannot be adequately addressed. The lack of initial indictments with sexual 
violence charges and the lack of will in the ICTR, occurred at a time where there was 
an increased awareness of sexual violence in armed conflict by Western feminists, 
coupled with the beginnings of a turn from the international legal community to push 
women’s issues.185 Constructions of ethnicity in the ICTR and within the genocide 
itself entered debates, influencing international perceptions of the violence, but not as 
a tool of analysis. The international media effectively ‘othered’ those involved in the 
armed conflict, and referred to ‘ethnic issues’, but did not recognise the extent to 
which this influenced actions of those involved in the violence. Therefore, instead of 
focusing on sexual violence, as something done to women because they are women, 
there needed to be more work done around the way Hutu and Tutsi ethnicity, and 
military extremism influenced the perception of vulnerability during the conflict. This 
would have allowed for a reading of the conflict that incorporated both men and 
women as victims of sexual violence and both women and men as perpetrators of 
violence. Understanding the extremist perception of ethnicity would have also 
disrupted gender, race, and sexuality, as sexual violence and the perpetration of 
violence would not have been assumed to rest along gender lines.  
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Discussion of sexual violence also infer notions of masculinity and femininity. 
Campbell argues that sexual violence reinforces ideas of masculinity and femininity, 
through continually repeating sexual acts, norms associated with either the male or 
female body.186 Law needs the masculine and feminine to order bodies in a specific 
way, focusing on a masculine understanding of sexuality, or as Campbell terms it, “an 
active masculine body that penetrates a passive female body”.187 Campbell gives an 
example of the sexual nature involved when a woman is forced to take her shirt off 
versus the absence of the sexual perceptions when a man is forced to take his shirt 
off.188 That is why often when men are victims of sexual violence, there is often the 
notion that this ‘feminises’ the victims in the eyes of the perpetrator. With the focus 
on sexual violence the binary between men and women remains even more rigid. The 
distinction between gender and sex is therefore enhanced, as gender becomes a 
societal/cultural interpretation of sex. A woman who rapes a woman, is a ‘man’, as 
rape is a male offense and there are only two genders a person is allowed to inhabit. 
These notions problematise the presence of sexual violence and rape in international 
criminal law, and highlight the complexity of both issues.  
 
The female defendant, and especially a female defendant who is involved in 
committing acts of sexual violence and rape, is then left in a limbo, she is equivalent 
to a man in committing the act, but is never allowed to fully retain the rights a 
responsibilities of a man in the view of international law and the media. When 
Nyiramasuhuko argues femininity as a defence she reaffirms the narrative around 
women’s lack of culpability for committing crimes in armed conflict, and reinforces 
the notion that women are not active agents displaying autonomy in armed conflict, 
even when that autonomy means committing violence.  
 
Through only focusing on the narrative of women as victims, Western feminists 
centred upon gender as a mode of analysis and thereby ignored the other factors that 
influenced the conflict. This in particular leads to missed opportunities to gain 
valuable insights into the ways in which gender intersects with other identities. If 
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these identities are not scrutinised, in order to discern their influence on the ICTR and 
in the genocide, then the narrative of the conflict renders itself inadequate to aid in 
post-conflict justice. By highlighting, in this case, the role of women who perpetrate 
crimes it then becomes possible to create a space that can address the injustices within 
an armed conflict and to theorise the complexity of gender norms and the diversity of 
gendered experiences.  
4. (In)Visibility of Female Defendants  
Despite the existence of female defendants, present in the armed conflicts in the 
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, female defendants remain on the fringes of a 
conflict’s history. When female defendants are discussed, their gender is often used as 
an attempt to explain the reasons why they committed crimes.189 This does not assume 
that women commit crimes based on gender, but rather that their gender holds the key 
as to why they would be involved in such actions. Their actions are in need of 
explanation, not just because they committed crimes, but because they sharply 
contrast with what people deem to be appropriate female behaviour.190 Shock and 
confusion when women are involved in violent crime is common,191 but the need to 
continually tie women who commit crimes to their gender moves this chapter’s 
discussion away from merely fact finding examples of female defendants, and toward 
a deeper commentary on what it means to be a woman in an armed conflict situation.  
 
The work in the previous sections details the context around the history and 
transitional justice in the ICTR, and shows not only the system female defendants are 
surrounded by, but also the opinions of the Western feminists working around the 
ICTR, which give evidence as to why female defendants remain outside of a common 
understanding of armed conflict.  The intersection of class and gender, shown in the 
Western understanding, as well as the understanding of those who engaged with 
female defendants was also highlighted. This section will consider the reasons behind 
the higher visibility of female defendants in Rwanda than in the Former Yugoslavia. 
By listing the works that have discussed female defendants, this section will link the 
chapter’s discussion with the publicised characteristics present in the Rwandan 
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genocide. Namely, this includes the Western notions of African brutality and 
savagery, which connect with the perceptions of female defendants in the Rwandan 
genocide. Despite the fact that the texts on the Rwandan genocide recognise female 
defendants more often than in the Former Yugoslavia, it will be demonstrated that this 
recognition of female defendants is closely associated with a Western perspective of 
race and femininity, and does not contribute towards acknowledging women as 
defendants more broadly within Western feminist discourse or international law. The 
higher visibility of women who commit crimes in Rwanda is not due to a more 
inclusive understanding of women’s roles in conflict. Rather, it is due to a highly 
racialised understanding of Rwanda that stretches back to Rwanda’s colonial history. 
The depiction of the Rwandan genocide as uncivilised and tribal was also highlighted 
in the introduction and second section of this chapter, this contributes towards the way 
female defendants were understood in the genocide as well.  
 
Female defendants exist within different contexts, influenced by tradition, local 
society, and often, colonial history. There is not one type of female defendants and it 
is not possible to identify women who do perpetrate crimes by placing them into 
certain traditional female archetypes. This thesis does not support a dialogue that 
focuses on establishing categories to define women, but instead shows that while 
societal gender roles play a part in influencing the way women commit genocide, war 
crimes, or crimes against humanity, it does not prevent women from being active 
participants in their communities during armed conflict. Men and women can be 
involved in armed conflict in different capacities, and their actions are not necessarily 
the same; however, this does not diminish their influence on the conflict.  
 
Understandings of gender in a society will often influence to what extent a woman is 
capable of being involved in armed conflict, but these understandings are is far from 
absolute. The idea that people actually fit into specific roles with no deviation has 
never been the case, instead it is the perception of those in society who reinforce these 
gender specific messages. One of the arguments in this chapter, and the thesis in 
general, is that female defendants do exist and have existed throughout history, yet 
somehow they remain thought of as an uncommon occurrence when discerning the 
events of an armed conflict. There is a need to understand why female defendants 
remain on the periphery and to ask how the discussion around female defendants 
  
205 
 
allow gender to be reimagined. Looking at the traditions, the colonial aspects, and the 
work of international law is also important to show that there is no formula or 
standard conclusions that can be made around female defendants in any conflict.  
 
Women in the context of the Rwandan genocide were predominately visible as 
victims of sexual violence and/or violent crimes. The jurisprudence of the two Ad 
Hoc Tribunals influenced one another and often advances in sexual violence 
understanding in one tribunal benefited the cases of the other, as was shown in the 
Akayesu trial when rape and sexual violence were defined.192 The other aspects of 
women’s roles in armed conflict, outside of their status as victims of sexual violence, 
is extremely varied between the FYR and Rwanda. The discussion of women in the 
Former Yugoslav Republic as perpetrators of crimes is limited despite their existence 
in both international and local courts. However, in Rwanda the existence of female 
defendants has been more widely written on and discussed. Field work and research 
into the women in Rwanda in prison awaiting trial, as well as discussions around the 
shocking nature of Rwandan women’s crimes all contribute to an alternative view of 
women in the genocide. Yet, this scholarship seems to signal a troubling aspect of 
Western engagement into the Rwandan genocide that is coupled with the notions of 
chaos and brutality.  
 
Texts that discuss the acts of Rwandan women in relation to gender do so to expose 
the different roles of women in the genocide or specifically confront notions about 
what femininity means in conflict. However, the topic of race is not as clearly 
identified in these instances. It seems imperative to inject an understanding of race 
from the perspective of both the local Rwandan context as well as the outside 
perspective. Highlighting women who have engaged in violent crimes during the 
genocide indicates how these women have failed in upholding their gender and need 
to either be condemned or explained. Explanations around the inner workings of the 
gender roles in Rwandan society can also be understood as the West taking what is 
interpreted to be brutal, tribal, and unorganised actions and making them relatable to 
Western standards.  
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Nyiramasuhuko’s actions were read along gender lines only, and the ways in which 
her extremist ethnic views as well as her class influenced her actions were not 
discussed.193 Due to this Nyiramasuhuko exists as a one dimensional character, an 
aberration of women’s participation in the Rwandan genocide and unique due to her 
position within the government. In reality she was one of many women who 
participated in advancing the agenda of the genocide, but because her presence 
contrasts so strongly with the victim narrative that was bolstered by Western feminist, 
female defendants have not become part of the genocide narrative. When women are 
found to have been defendants in Rwanda the reaction the media and scholars deploy 
is based on the view that all women were victims and therefore female defendants 
actions are seen as even more shocking. The women who have perpetrated genocide 
undo their femininity by displaying characteristics contrary to the strict female gender 
roles set out by Western standards during the colonial era. Considering Rwanda’s 
colonial past and the reimagining of Rwanda’s gender roles, the link between 
colonialism and imposed Western ideal of femininity is apparent within the text 
surrounding female defendants in the Rwandan genocide.   
 
In the Rwandan context, scholarship has highlighted women as defendants more often 
than in the Former Yugoslavia, for example. Maier states that more female 
defendants' crimes are documented in the Rwandan genocide than any other armed 
conflict.194 While the Rwandan genocide’s short time frame and large death toll make 
the conflict unique, the higher visibility of female defendants in the published work 
surrounding the conflict relates to stereotypical notions of femininity, masculinity, 
and race as well as Rwanda’s colonial history. I argue the higher number of texts 
around women’s involvement in the genocide infers that Western writers and 
academics are more comfortable associating violent behaviour to African women. The 
international media perceptions of the genocide, which included language of brutality 
and savagery, facilitates the acknowledgement of the existence of female defendants 
in armed conflict. Positioning Rwandans as tribal and chaotic creates the image that 
affirms colonial understandings of an uncivilised population, one where women 
display the opposite of stereotypical feminine qualities.  
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The examples of text not only demonstrate the inclusion of female defendants in the 
scholarship, but also the way gender is used in the author’s conceptions of female acts 
in conflict.  Hilsum discusses the emerging evidence of female defendants after the 
genocide.195 Gulaid wrote on women as female defendants of the Rwandan genocide, 
highlighting their need to retain agency, instead of viewing their actions as a result of 
male dominance and conditioning.196 Jones highlights the inclusion of women at all 
levels of the genocide as well as the tropes that constrain women to innocent 
bystanders and men as continual violators.197 Fielding also echoes Jones’ work by 
seeking to use the Rwandan genocide as a way to shift the focus away from a victim 
narrative that seems to have dominated studies on gender and conflict.198 Sharlach 
discusses women as agents of the genocide as well as victims of its violence.199 
Sharlach also highlights the roles of women pre-genocide, and establishes that despite 
their political underrepresentation women still were amongst the political elite.200 
Adler, Loyle, and Golberman undertook extensive research in Rwanda in order to 
reveal the motivations behind women’s participation in the genocide.201 Holmes 
pointed to the role of the media and their focus on either female victims or ‘hyper 
masculine’ killers.202 Brown discussed the role of female defendants suggesting that 
by continuing to ignore women as active participants negatively affects post-conflict 
peace and justice.203 Hogg has done extensive research in Rwanda around women’s 
role in the genocide as well as gender relations within the country.204 Hogg also 
discusses the use of gendered imagery as either mothers or monsters, the status of 
women in power, and the lack of representation of women tried in the judicial 
system.205 As previously mentioned, Sperling, Smeulers, Linton, Sjoberg and Gentry, 
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as well as Drumbl, also discuss the participation of women in the Rwandan genocide, 
paying particular attention to Nyiramasuhuko.  
 
There have also been blog posts regarding women’s roles as defendants; Luft warns 
against merely separating people into victims or violators and that both male and 
female narrative are harmed by the lack of fluidity between gender ideals in the 
Rwandan genocide.206 Each of these works support that idea that post-conflict 
reconstruction and rehabilitation will not be as effective if female defendants are left 
out of discussions. Ignoring the crimes women commit and expecting them to 
reintegrate into society not only misses the opportunity to rehabilitate women who 
participate in armed conflict, it also prevents individuals from receiving justice after 
suffering harms committed by female defendants.  
 
Many authors have used female participation in genocide as a platform in order to 
discuss female roles in armed conflict, others have similarly focused on women’s 
roles, and in doing so called attention to the assumptions about femininity and 
masculinity. Waller discusses that both men and women are capable of committing 
genocide.207 African Rights and Yvonne Leggat-Smith discuss the role of women as 
defendants in the Rwandan genocide describing the women who actively participated 
in the genocide, detailing their profession and the high number of educated women, as 
well as the reasons behind their participation.208  Mother Jones published an article on 
women rebuilding Rwanda post-genocide and briefly mentioned women’s role as 
defendants, choosing to focus on the ways women have positively impacted Rwandan 
society.209  
 
Despite the surge in text around female defendants in the Rwandan genocide, which is 
as Maier suggested is unique to the Rwandan armed conflict, the greater awareness of 
women’s involvement in genocide does not necessarily reflect a greater understanding 
of what roles femininity and masculinity play in armed conflict. While many texts 
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seek to reimagine the way femininity and masculinity co-exist in female defendants or 
how being female should not automatically infer that a woman is inclined to act in a 
certain manner; other texts infer that women who kill or commit crimes such as 
genocide, unlike men who do the same, require explanation and are themselves 
exceptional. They are viewed as exceptional not just because of the acts they commit 
in relation to their gender, but because the situation of the Rwandan genocide is 
exceptional.  
 
The existence of women who perpetrate crimes is not novel or in any way unique to 
approach the conflict and genocide in Rwanda. However, through especially 
highlighting the actions of female defendants in Rwanda, actions that need less 
explanation when perpetrated by men, authors contribute to the implied divide around 
gender roles in conflict. It is not to say authors definitively support the separation of 
gender roles, or write on this topic out of shock. However, it does not seem authors 
subversively highlight female defendants' actions in order to overturn dominant 
narratives and expose areas of women’s lives that are often ignored. The topic of 
female defendants contains an uncomfortableness for many feminist generally.210  In 
contrast, authors seem more comfortable discussing Rwandan women who perpetrate 
crimes in the genocide. 
 
The existence of so many account of female defendants in Rwanda also indicate a 
local and international divide. Butler discusses the topic of violence in relation to US 
engagement with Afghanistan or regarding the situation in Palestine; however, this is 
also useful in relation to the existence of female defendants. Butler questions, “What 
is real?” and “Whose lives are real?”211 The existence of victims of sexual violence in 
Rwanda was more readily dismissed based on the fact that women who were victims 
experienced violence that was perceived as occurring as a result of the 
dehumanisation of Rwandan and African societies. Due to the modes of power that 
exist through Western discourse in feminist work, the media and international law the 
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lives of those without power are all the more precarious.212 This is evidenced by the 
initial disinterest in the genocide or preceding conflict by Western audiences. When 
the media did report it positioned Rwanda as distinct and distant from its viewers, 
unlike the case in the FYR. Within the non–recognition there is no grieving, as the 
people of Rwanda are always situated between life and death, with no common 
connection to the Western viewer.213  
 
Female defendants then exist in the Rwandan genocide as women, who because of 
their actions as defendants, often fall into the male position in the male/female binary, 
yet are reaffirmed as well by the reaction many scholars and writers have had in 
relation to women taking part in the genocide. The texts around Rwandan female 
defendants represent Rwandan female defendants as different from ‘normal’ women 
constituted by Western feminism, but it is unclear if these women were ever 
considered to be ‘real’ in the first place.  
 
Exposing the actions of Nyiramasuhuko and the other female perpetrators and 
defendants in Rwanda, exposes understandings of both race and gender within 
Western feminists and international legal interventions. Crenshaw’s work on 
intersectionality discusses the way women of colour are often constructed by 
identities such as race and gender, and it is when these identities intersect 
vulnerabilities are created.214 When speaking of women of colour within the context 
of the thesis I am referring to the perception of women of colour, regardless of their 
geographical location, from the perspective of Western white feminists. Women of 
colour, or in this case women on the African continent, fall into a space between 
identities of gender and race, as their experiences transcend both categories.215 This 
argument is often used when noting the lack of will to prosecute those who have 
perpetrated sexual violence against women, somehow, because the lived realities for 
women in Africa are more complicated, their situations are easily ignored.216 This can 
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be seen in the ICTR, where there was a lack of will to prosecute sexual violence 
claims, despite the widespread knowledge around sexual violence crimes. The ICTR 
has been cited as failing the people of Rwanda for many reason, but what proves to be 
a connection between the view toward female defendants and the way the aftermath 
of the conflict was situated is the media characterisation of the genocide.      
 
Female defendants remain largely ignored in conflict narratives, although in Rwandan 
genocide have become more visible. This visibility can be attributed to the way ethnic 
divisions were highlighted during the conflict and throughout Rwanda’s colonial 
history and the international media attention related to these instances. The attention 
paid to female defendants place these women in a space between discussions around 
race, gender, and ethnicity. The vulnerabilities created by the intersection of race and 
gender categories are argued to be one of the reasons why sexual violence becomes a 
weapon of war.217  Female defendants' actions exist along the divide between Hutu 
and Tutsi, as Hutu women participated during the genocide, which supports the 
presumed distinction created during colonialism between the groups. The work 
around female defendants in Rwanda highlights how constructions of femininity and 
masculinity, which need to be reimagined, especially concerning armed conflict. 
However, women participate in criminal acts in all armed conflicts. Therefore, 
perceptions of strict gender roles need to be broken down in every armed conflict. The 
issue with especially focusing on the women in Rwanda, which is reinforced by the 
substantial amounts of texts regard female participation, makes it seem as if this 
problem is contained within Africa alone. Women who disrupt patterns of expected 
gendered behaviour and engage in genocide are positioned as problem specific to the 
Rwandan situation and a cautionary tale to the rest of the word. The mission of the 
coloniser to import Western feminism did not work and therefore women are acting 
against presumed proper standards.   
 
The international media, through the use of graphic language in order to depict the 
genocide in Rwanda as particularly chaotic and uncivilised, shaped the way the 
conflict was understood and in many ways relatable to the larger public in the US and 
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UK. Consequently, the conflict in Rwanda did not carry the same level of parity to the 
lives of Western audiences. The way race and ethnicity was misunderstood extended 
to the aftermath of the armed conflict, including both justice processes and the 
scholarly material written on the topic.  
 
Women’s role in the Rwandan genocide is easier to discuss and point to if the conflict 
itself is seen as chaotic, brutal, and shocking. Women’s participation would be a 
product of this. However, women’s participation in genocide is not new or relegated 
to Rwanda alone. The argument that women were more involved in the Rwandan 
genocide because of the access to weapons, does not ring true. My argument is not 
indicating that there were more women involved in the Rwandan genocide, but that 
more women are recognised. As far as the access to weapons, often the female 
defendants in Rwanda was involved in crimes void of direct physical violence, 
examples include women pointing out hiding places of Tutsi, and making the militia 
aware of Tutsi friends or family or looting Tutsi property: given these are leadership 
crimes the failure to recognise Rwandan women as defendants because they were 
political actors offers an important insight into perceptions of gender and race.218 The 
media within in the US and UK as well as the international legal response’s own 
positionality has limited discussions around Rwanda and kept highly racialised 
understandings of the events that took place.  
5. Conclusion   
Within the context of the Rwandan genocide the female defendants was an important 
aspect of the conflict. Despite the lack of attention in the ICTR, female defendants are 
acknowledged throughout scholarly work on Rwanda. In the scholarship surrounding 
the genocide, female defendants were more visible and discussed more often than the 
female defendants in the Former Yugoslav Republic. Accounting for the awareness of 
female defendants in Rwanda leads to discussions around gender and race in order to 
offer a broader understanding of the interactions that interplay within the way female 
defendants are viewed.   
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The surrounding climate of the genocide, focus in international criminal law on sexual 
violence, as well as the text written on female defendants is used by this thesis to 
argue that there is not only one way to see women who perpetrate crimes in armed 
conflict. By looking at female defendants, dialogues on the spectrum of women’s 
experiences and engagements in armed conflict are possible, in this instance 
examining the role of women as political leaders. Butler highlights the dichotomy 
between a need to strive for a world where vulnerability of the female body is 
protected while at the same time the body does not then become eradicated.219  
 
One of the main issues with discussing female defendants in conflict, or rather women 
in armed conflict is that women’s bodies need to be protected from violence as all 
bodies do, however there is an issue in retaining vulnerability. Some would say that 
the victim rhetoric by Western feminists has pushed women’s bodies to be too 
vulnerable; however, the female defendants body in many ways is not allowed to be 
vulnerable. The ability for women to be violent is considered by many feminist as a 
negative, amplified by the uncomfortableness feminists have in discussing women 
who perpetrate crimes, as recognising these women allows them to be ‘just as bad as 
men’.220 On the contrary this work suggests that vulnerability, evident when women 
are publically shamed as defendants and often signified as ‘bad’ women, is not 
allowed to reside in female defendants.  
 
Regarding the texts on female defendants in Rwanda, it is not being suggested that 
they are strictly unnecessary or detrimental, but it is their volume that is being 
critiqued in comparison to texts on female defendants in other conflicts. Gender, race, 
colonialism, ethnicity all weave themselves into the discussions around female 
participation in Rwanda and question why texts on women who perpetrate genocide in 
Rwanda are more widely available than other conflicts while recognition of women as 
leaders in Rwanda seems to be told as a predominantly post-conflict narrative. If race 
is a part of the way female defendants’ actions are carried out and observed, then it is 
also possible that the way these actions are understood by those who write on the 
subject is also embedded within a racial misunderstanding. The depictions of 
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brutality, chaos, tribalism, and savagery are all reaffirmed when the amount of female 
participation, in conjunction with the written work on female defendants. Rwanda can 
then be wrongly read to be a society so violent and ‘backwards’ that even ‘their 
women’ chose to commit genocide.   
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Chapter Six 
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
 
1. Introduction 
The Khmer Rouge attemoted to create an environment in Cambodia where men and 
women were treated equally.1 During the Cambodian genocide women played a key 
role in supporting the Khmer Rouge regime (Communist Party of Kampuchea, CPK). 
Some women choose to take part in the regime while others were coerced. The entire 
population was forced to undertake various tasks based on age. The crime of forced 
marriage, evident within the armed conflict, relied on women and men inhabiting 
strict gender roles.2  The regime encouraged pregnancies within marriage, in order to 
expand the population, which would in turn assist Cambodia with its expanding 
agricultural production under the CPK.3  Women attained high levels of leadership 
within the Khmer Rouge, and some were indicted for grave breaches of international 
humanitarian law as a result.4  While information that supports the high presence of 
women in the CPK is not as apparent in the academic literature around the Cambodian 
Genocide, female defendants are visible within the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC).  
 
In Cambodia, female defendants appear more frequently in the court and court 
transcripts, but this has not necessarily translated a wider acknowledgement of their 
existence. The existence of four women, who were a part of the leadership of the 
Khmer Rouge, Ieng Thirith, Khieu Ponnary, Yun Yat, and Im Chaem, offer examples 
of women in power documented as allegedly committing criminal acts.5 While some 
women attained high levels of leadership in the Khmer Rouge, other women inhabited 
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lower level positions as cadres.6 However, wider accounts of the genocide fail to 
acknowledge women in positions of power who committed crimes and limit the 
stories of female experiences during this period. This is evident in the intervention of 
international criminal law, the Asia Pacific Regional Women’s Hearing, as well as 
within Cambodia.  
 
Ieng Thirith’s case before the ECCC was dismissed due to her being deemed unfit to 
stand trial,7 and Im Chaem was initially charged in absentia and later her case was 
dismissed. In addition, Khieu Ponnary and Khieu Thirith were given amnesty by the 
Cambodian government.8 The silences within the histories around the genocide are 
not only evident within the ECCC, but in the lack of interrogation around the 
experiences within the Khmer Rouge as well. While most justice mechanisms, news 
reports, and feminist interventions, around armed conflicts focus on women as 
victims, the experiences of women and men during this period of Cambodian history 
is quiet on multiple accounts. Recent work has started to bring discussions and 
understandings of the genocide to light, prior to this there has been a culture of 
denying the events that have occurred.9  
 
Focusing on the importance of post-conflict justice and the international community’s 
interaction with armed conflict and criminal law, the ECCC offers a unique 
perspective on the effectiveness of hybrid courts and opens up the opportunity to ask 
questions regarding the relationship between international and domestic law and the 
intersection of gender and class. The ECCC, due to its lack of proximity to the time 
period of the actual crimes committed and the length of the trials themselves, has 
made few gains. Many of those who have been brought to trial were too elderly and 
unwell to see the process through.10 Multiple cases are currently incomplete and few 
have begun, in comparison to other international criminal tribunals/courts. Some 
would suggest this is the product of a hybrid court like the ECCC, where the merging 
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of international and local understandings results in a delayed and difficult process.11 
Others would blame the slowness of the creation of the ECCC as the main issue.12 
The female defendants involved have either been dismissed, given amnesty, or tried in 
absentia. Looking into the international criminal cases of female defendants in 
Cambodia as well as the connection between the local and international justice system 
progresses this thesis from the chapters on the ICTY and ICTR. This chapter expands 
the discussion around the way law in multiple forms regards women in armed 
conflict.   
 
One of the larger goals of this thesis is to assess the usefulness of international 
criminal law’s mechanisms in a post-conflict climate. To this end, it is important to 
interrogate the work of other forms of post-conflict justice, like the Asia Pacific 
Regional Women’s Hearing, as these spaces may allow the experiences of those 
affected by the conflict to be heard without the limitations found within international 
criminal law. By creating the space for alternative forms of justice, specifically those 
focusing on women’s experiences in armed conflict, discussions on female defendants 
should be theoretically more likely to become a part of the conversation. It is 
beneficial that women’s tribunals offer a space for healing and understanding of a 
conflict; however, these spaces do not always open up the possibility of alternative 
viewpoints on women’s lived experiences. Women based tribunals do offer a way for 
survivors to move on and a method for articulating experiences. However, women 
based tribunals or people’s tribunals often do not dislodge the underlying gender 
norms found within the armed conflict or within Western understandings of the 
conflict and post-conflict justice. This aspect is an important part of progressing the 
dialogue around female defendants and lends itself to understanding the boundaries of 
law. Yet people’s tribunals as a method of justice should not be abandoned, this 
chapter will continue the conversation. 
 
In section two, I will first address the period of the Khmer Rouge, acknowledging the 
historical and colonial aspects related to the conflict, while especially focusing on the 
situation of women. Gender, culture, and class will be used as tools of analysis. The 
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third section will include a description of the ECCC and the trials. Section Four will 
look at female defendants within the Khmer Rouge and specifically Ieng Thirith, 
Khieu Ponnary, Khieu Thirith, and Im Chaem. This section will also explore the lack 
of evidence of female crimes in the literature and history on the conflict in Cambodia, 
using this to further the discussion on the victim/agent paradigm.  
 
The fifth section will discuss what the Cambodian genocide contributes to 
understandings of marriage and sexuality, as three of the women mentioned above 
were connected to the Khmer Rouge through their marriages to key figures in the 
government. Questions around marriage in Cambodian culture, and its implication in 
the disavowal of agency when one’s husband engages in crimes is an important and 
unique facet of female defendants in this instance. Considering the majority of female 
defendants evident within ECCC documentation were the wives of Khmer Rouge 
leader and in many cases were leaders themselves, this thesis will discuss the 
presumptions around marriage in South East Asian culture from a Western 
perspective. This is done to dispel the idea that the wives involved in perpetrating 
crimes only did so because their husbands were also committing crimes.  
 
Section sex will examine the Asia Pacific Women’s Hearing and the story of victims 
in the region. The Victims Support Section of the ECCC, in partnership with 
Cambodian Defenders Project and Transcultural Psychosocial Organization began the 
project “Women and Transitional Justice in Cambodia” in 2011, this project offers a 
different perspective on women’s own interpretation of the armed conflict as well as 
the process of alternative forms of justice. The seventh section of this chapter will 
analyse the limits of law in connection with the subject of female defendants in 
general. Feminist intervention and the undesirable ness of highlighting the instances 
when women commit violent/criminal acts build on the analysis in previous chapters. 
In this chapter, I argue that gender is not a sufficient tool on its own to interrogate the 
existence of the female perpetrator and that law and the international community 
continue to deny the existence of women who commit crimes while employing the 
female gender as an excuse. 
 
 
  
219 
 
2. History of the Khmer Rouge  
This section begins by focusing on the background surrounding the Khmer Rouge 
regime as a way to give context to the genocide as well as the Court. A brief look to 
the colonial history of Cambodia draws out both the gender norms that emerge during 
the period of French colonial rule. This section will also highlight Cambodia prior to 
the period of French colonisation. While the focus on precolonial Cambodia is a 
departure from the previous two chapter’s contents, it is important in this case in order 
to trace the understanding of both gender, and marriage. Cambodia, the Khmer 
Rouge, and the makeup of the ECCC offer a unique backdrop for exploring these 
concepts further. The history of the Khmer Rouge’s reign of power in Cambodia will, 
for these purposes, be limited to the period of 1975-1979, despite its reach beyond 
these dates.  
 
While the colonial context is the starting point for this section and provides a lens for 
analysis, I am not suggesting that the modern day or 1970’s Cambodia is solely the 
result of the colonial project. For this section’s purpose, the point in drawing on the 
pre-colonial past is done to understand the various discriminations, land 
reconfigurations, and political undercurrents that continue to be relevant during 
colonialism and when the Khmer Rouge took power in 1975. The 18th century saw 
shifts in relations between Cambodia and its neighbours. This included the expansion 
of Vietnamese presence in parts of Cambodia as well as the backlash to this presence 
by the Khmers, which again shifted into a Khmer Vietnamese cooperation during the 
Vietnamese Civil War in 1771.13  
 
During the 19th century Siam and Đại Việt (Vietnam), Buddhist and Confucian 
Kingdoms, both vied for control of Cambodia, as had been the case in earlier time 
periods as well.14 Power shifted from each Kingdom and the migration of Vietnamese 
to Cambodia spurred genocidal murders of ethnic Vietnamese at the hands of 
Cambodians.15 Siam’s rule was also severe, ethnic Chinese were killed after migrating 
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from Vietnam to Cambodia, the Siam forces burned down villages and forced 
migration of Khmer and Chinese civilians, while Khmer anti-Siam forces are recorded 
as killing Siam troops.16 During the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia those who 
resisted such rule targeted and killed ethnic Vietnamese, and when Vietnamese forces 
withdrew in the 1840s Thai forces also targeted and murdered Vietnamese as well.17 
Throughout this time period reconstruction of settlements and shifts in boundaries 
continued. In 1859 French gained control of Vietnam and by 1863 Cambodia was also 
a French Protectorate, which signalled a halt to the Vietnamese and Thai quest for 
control of Cambodia and the start of European expansion into Southeast Asia.18  
 
When the French took control of the Cambodian territory, in 1863 the resistance to 
the colonial regime encouraged Cambodian and Vietnamese populations to work 
together against their coloniser.19 What is evident when researching the pre-colonial 
history of Cambodia, besides its continual shift in land and peoples, is that religion 
and race play very prominent roles in shaping key events. The summary above is 
partial and focused on few major instances, in order to show that the history of 
Cambodia is interwoven with the presence of religion. Hansen states that ‘Khmer 
Buddhist thought’ was a way to respond and analyse the ‘sociopolitics of modern 
experiences’ in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.20 Hansen also 
reiterates that religion is not national, but moves across multiple borders.21 Cambodia 
needs to be understood through the lens of religion and the politics and aim of the 
French in preventing and managing certain religions.22 Before discussing the reign of 
the Khmer Rouge, I will highlight the way gender was understood and demonstrated 
prior to the presence of European colonisers and then during French colonial rule. The 
topic of female defendants in the Khmer Rouge benefits from the discussion on 
colonialism and religion in Cambodia, as the way women and their actions are 
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understood is directly linked to the society they exist within, which has been shaped 
by political and religious modes of power.  
 
While the wide variety of roles women have inhabited in Cambodian culture have not 
always entered into the Western understanding of Southeast Asian culture, women 
were essential part of its history and development. Frieson notes that the presence of 
women as warriors in Cambodian territory can be traced back to the Angkorean 
Kingdom (which began around the 9th Century), and that women were political 
consultants, revolutionaries, protectors of Buddhist temples as well as conduits of 
peace.23 Cambodian women have protected territories and upheld certain ideals of 
racial superiority, but they also have been viewed as figures representing the nation 
state.24 Furthering such claims, Jacobsen highlights the legend that the first ruler of 
Cambodia was an unmarried female warrior named Liu Yie.25  
 
Women of high standing were able to appeal to upper classes for legitimation similar 
to men, allowing political authority.26 Although it is acknowledged that women have 
participated actively in a long and complex history. Cambodian culture’s range of 
narratives around women details a picture that is extremely complex. Jacobsen 
describes the high levels of power women achieved in the early part of Cambodian 
history and the subsequent shift during the nineteenth century.27 However, as 
Jacobsen also points out in the Angkorian period even though matrilineality remained 
prevalent, and there were women that were often held in high esteem, women’s lives 
for the most part still remained inexplicably linked to marriage.28  
 
Importantly, in 1837 the Cbpab Srei was written by Ang Duong, as a set of guidelines 
for women.29 These guidelines created an image of the ideal woman: one which does 
not question the ways of the men in her life and who is fervently pleasant, diligent, 
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quiet, and hardworking, in order to support her husband and family.30 The Cbpab Srei 
also gives examples of women who are arrogant and disobey the conditions of ideal 
behaviour, all the while warning Cambodians of what can happen when women do 
not follow this specific set of rules.31 The Cbpab Srei’s influence in Cambodian 
society seems to have been enhanced by French colonisers.  
 
The French colonisers created an atmosphere of strict gender roles relating to not only 
their ideas about gender, but their views on Cambodia’s culture and religion. The 
coloniser had contradicting ideas of women in colonial Cambodia, seeing Cambodian 
women the modest female and the other as the seductive sexually inhabited 
temptress.32  Jacobsen noted that nineteenth and twentieth century French novels 
represented French men as heroes and Cambodian women as passive sexual beings.33 
Many French colonisers took Cambodian wives, and instilled a situation where 
women gained materially as a result. 34 French women sought to educate Cambodian 
women whether it be in the home or in school, a part of the civilising mission.35 
Women’s place and importance in Cambodian history was diminished or dismissed 
all together and practices were implemented in order to force women to take their 
husband’s surnames.36 The educational system in colonial Cambodia encouraged the 
use of the Cbpab Srei and wrongly assumed that the Dhammayut literature, from 
which the Cbpab Srei was a part of, was an accurate representation of Cambodian 
society and daily life in the 19th century.37 Jacobsen writes that these concepts were 
then viewed as traditional concepts that existed before colonialism in what was 
considered to be Cambodia’s golden age.38  
 
The colonial shift in gender expectations illuminates the reasons why when post-
colonial Cambodia began searching for its pre-colonial past, there was a sense of 
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return to assumed ‘traditional’ and narrow ideals of women’s roles in society. Post-
colonial Cambodia also saw the first women’s movement which like the CPK flowed 
from a nationalist perspective, despite the general acceptance that men still remained 
in the leading position within society.39 Women in these movements encouraged 
nationalism and emphasised ‘traditional’ ideals of women, and yet many women 
outside the movement wanted Cambodian women to reach for the same rights as 
European women.40 The nationalist movement, like noted above, was mixed with the 
French view of women as well as strict hierarchies promoted during colonialism.41 
Jacobsen points to French colonialism as a major influence for the modern 
understanding of Cambodian identity.42  
 
Like the Cbpab Srei, ‘Khmer Daughters’, the work of  the Kampuchea newspaper is 
an example of the inclusion of women into the nationalist struggle, as well as another 
set of guidelines women must conform.43 The article suggested how Khmer daughters 
and wives should act and keep the house in order, focus only on the family, and do all 
things with the purpose of benefiting the family and State.44 The unique approach 
newspaper articles had was not to exclude women from its effort, but to make women 
the conduit through which messages about appropriate female behaviour were to be 
passed. All the while, only allowing women to possess agency and independence to 
the extent that it served the patriotic purpose of extreme nationalistic Khmer Rouge 
movement. Other literature also supported women’s roles within the specific brand of 
nationalism. During the armed conflict in Cambodia during the 1970s against Lon Nol 
rule and the United States, which was led by the Khmer Rouge rule, women were 
involved in the fighting. Frieson states that women were on the frontlines fighting, 
transferring weapons and messages, and taking care of male soldier’s wounds and 
food preparation.45  
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The creation and advancements of the Khmer Rouge regime can be traced to the 
Communist Party of Kampuchea, as a resistance to French colonial rule which ended 
in 1954.46 The CPK, officially founded in 1960, began their armed rebellion in 1967 
with the Samlaut uprising.47 The CPK took control in 1975, invading Phnom Penh.48 
After the Khmer Rouge attained power they subjected citizens to forced labour,49 and 
forcibly transferred individuals, with many being relocated to the countryside from 
the capital.50  The CPK strongly opposed Vietnamese-Cambodians as well as any 
Cambodians who did not approve of the Khmer Rouge.51 Many died of starvation 
during the Khmer Rouge’s reign, others were killed because they opposed the CPK or 
did not have the desired ethnic background, with Chinese, Vietnamese, and Chams 
facing the largest threat as well as Thai and Lao people.52 By 1979, around 1 million 
people died from causes related to being overworked, starvation, disease, lack of 
medical care, and execution.53 Religion was another target of the Khmer Rouge, 
Buddhism was expelled and Marxist ideals were seen as paramount.54 Uniformity and 
equality were also promoted by the Khmer Rouge as the cornerstone of their new 
policy; however, this did not correlate between the general population, soldiers, and 
leaders of the CPK. 
 
While the Khmer Rouge created an atmosphere of genocide, forced labour, migration, 
and communal living, it also propagated a specific idea of equality between all 
‘accepted’ peoples based on their ability as workers. This supposed equality did not 
translate into actual lived equality and it becomes evident that there are two primary 
starting points from which gender needs to be addressed within this time period. First, 
the understanding of gender roles within the practices of the Khmer Rouge and 
second, the gender consciousness within the ranks of the Khmer Rouge itself. Frieson 
states that Cambodia, like other South East Asian populations, sees women as 
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prominent in the family, having the ability to inherit wealth and property as well as 
paramount in the economy and marketing.55 Frieson further states that on the surface 
Cambodian women fall into the public/private divide, but in reality their role in the 
economics of the State, even from the position of ‘typical’ household duties, brings 
their work into the public realm.56  This links to the understanding of gender 
throughout this thesis, as social organisations are paramount in shaping how gender is 
perceived and lived. Likewise, the identification of certain tasks that men and women 
undertake create a hierarchy both politically and socially.  However, when the Khmer 
Rouge took over control and the family structure was destroyed women lost a great 
deal of the agency they held in this realm.57 Frieson identifies the effect of this type of 
communism mixed with nationalism had on women in Cambodia.  
 
Within the Khmer Rouge, women who were married and over 30 years of age worked 
alongside men, women over 50 years old took care of infant children, and adolescent 
girls were agricultural workers.58 Women offered themselves to male cadres who 
rewarded their sexual interactions with food.59 Women who then became pregnant as 
a result of intercourse with cadres were seen as tarnishing the State and punished 
accordingly.60 With sex outside of marriage not permitted and the severe toll of poor 
care and food resulting in many women not menstruating, young Cambodians were 
forced into mass marriage ceremonies in order to encourage the birth of new 
revolutionaries.61 There are estimates that around 250,000 women were forced to 
marry soldiers in the Khmer Rouge.62 As the conflict continued, the Cambodian 
population continued to decline due to starvation, disease, and regime killings. The 
extent to which women were seen to participate in the Khmer Rouge is unknown. 
Women’s roles in the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) leadership will be explored more 
thoroughly in the next section, this section however, sought to contribute to the 
general understanding around those subjected to the DK regime. Harms such as 
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starvation, malnutrition and improper medical care upon women in Cambodia 
suggests the possibility that these effects of conflict may have had a greater influence 
on women’s lives than sexual violence, which has tended to take focus when 
discussing women’s experiences in armed conflict.    
3. Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
The role of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia in providing an 
account of the events during the genocide, as well as the courts creation and its 
progress will be detailed in this section, as the politics around these developments 
helps to assess the court’s successes and failures. Understanding the way gender is 
conceptualised in the ECCC further develops the discussion around female defendants 
by assessing the narratives on the conflict. With the DK regime ending in 1979 the 
extent of the damage sustained in the region was only beginning to be realised by the 
rest of the world.  
 
While a request for a Cambodian Tribunal was made by the Co-Prime Ministers of 
Cambodia to the United Nations Secretary General in 1997,63 the Court did not come 
into existence until 2003. The creation of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia was a difficult process; due to its delay in commencement and resulting 
lack of proximity to the armed conflict itself has produced countless negative 
critiques. The United Nations and the Cambodian Government signed an agreement in 
June of 2003 while the local legislation was created by the Cambodian Parliament in 
2001 and modified in 2004.64  
 
Despite the issues within the court, the ECCC created the circumstances which lead to 
the international community cooperating with the local criminal justice system, 
creating a hybrid court. The connection between the international and local and its 
importance in the progression of the international legal system will be detailed much 
more fully in the sixth chapter. The negotiation process between the United Nations 
and the Government of Cambodia was long and difficult, as the UN wanted to ensure 
that the court kept the ideals of international law at its core and the Government of 
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Cambodia wanted to retain Cambodian characteristics.65 The Tribunal itself, in both 
the Pre-Trial Chamber and the Trial Chamber have noted that the court exists within 
the Cambodian system, but with special characteristics, as it is an independent entity 
that is not reviewed by, nor reviews other court’s decisions.66  
 
Since beginning operations the court’s caseload consists of just four cases, with the 
second case being divided into two smaller cases. Case 003 against Meas Muth and 
004 are still in the investigation phase with Ao An, and Yim Tith,67 having been 
charged.68 Kaing Guek Eav was tired in Case 001 and was convicted of crimes against 
humanity and grave breaches of the Geneva Convention, initially sentenced to 35 
years imprisonment with 16 years deducted for time served and illegal detention by 
the Cambodian Military, his sentence was then increased to life-imprisonment by the 
Supreme Court Chamber.69  
 
Case 002, split up into two separate cases 002/01 and 002/02, included indictments 
against Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith, Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan. Ieng Sary died in 
March of 2013 and Ieng Thirith was found unfit to stand trial. In Case 002/01 Nuon 
Chea and Khieu Samphan were convicted of crimes against humanity and 
subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment in August of 2014. They are currently 
appealing this decision.70 Case 002/01 was the first case to reach a verdict, which took 
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eight years and a cost of over 200 million US dollars.71 Case 002/02 is the second trial 
against Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan with additional charges filed from the initial 
Case 002, which include genocide, forced marriages, internal purges, treatment of 
Buddhists in Tram Kok Cooperatives, and targeting of former Khmer Republic 
Officials with limited locational scope. Trial hearings started in 2014 and evidence 
began being presented in January of 2015.72  
 
While the court has provided procedural and substantive jurisprudence, as authors 
Peiti and Ahmed, have suggested, it can also be argued that the advances in 
international law are not substantive and marred with accusations of corruption and 
personnel strikes due to months of overdue wages.73 This is all in conjunction with a 
court that has spent more than hundreds of millions of dollars, with only four cases in 
its caseload with varied levels of completion. However, Stephen Rapp, US 
Ambassador for War Crimes, stated that the ECCC showed people that they would 
not escape prosecution.74  
 
The Office of the Prosecutor at the ECCC highlighted the transparency witnessed by 
Cambodians through the workings of the court and claimed that the court 
strengthened the work of the legal professionals in Cambodia and its beneficial 
influence would be felt long after the court closes.75 Ainley analyse the way the 
ECCC influences the perception of international justice by Western politicians, 
lawyers, and NGOs. Ainley argues that there has been no evidence that the ECCC has 
benefited the Cambodian legal system, as a focus on fair trials, and an end to impunity 
and corruption persisted in Cambodia since the ECCC began.76  
 
While there is no denying the symbolic and beneficial act of having victims to recount 
their experiences, it was beneficial to publicly acknowledge the pain and suffering 
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they survived, as well as illuminate the narrative around the conflict.77 However, 
Ainley has suggested that while the value of justice in the Court is important, the 
consequences are just as important to interrogate. Ainley states that the gains made by 
the court are “too little and too late”, with very few leaders taking the blame for large 
levels of violence. These criticisms, along with the lack of will on behalf of Prime 
Minister Hun Sen to participate in the Court, as well as corruption and delays, have 
also been expressed by Amnesty International as well as Human Rights Watch.78  
 
The ECCC, being a hybrid court, would seem to be a pragmatic way to approach 
international criminal justice, especially considering the length of time between the 
conflict and the establishment of the court. With the age of the leaders, many found to 
be unfit for trial and others already having died, it would be impossible to expect a 
thorough and complete understanding of the conflict and a legal process that tries the 
individuals most responsible. However, this would also assume that if the court was 
set up closer to the end of the hostilities that it would have been more beneficial. The 
ICTY and ICTR had the benefit of being close in proximity to the conflict, however 
both Tribunals were not without their array of problems.  
 
What the ECCC highlights is the issues within international criminal law that extend 
beyond mere timing of prosecution, local governmental support, or the continuation 
of justice aims after trials. Due to the ECCC being a hybrid court, it has tended to flag 
up the tensions between the international and local. Within this tension is the 
understanding of women’s roles in armed conflict that do not necessarily move from 
the local to the international context. The local conflict included women within the 
Khmer Rouge Regime, and in the ECCC women who were involved in the armed 
conflict have been included through either prosecutions or within court 
documentation. While this seems to be a positive development, especially in light of 
the work done within this thesis, I argue this has less to do with a nuanced 
understanding of women’s role, but rather the result of the long period of time 
between the conflict itself and the establishment of the court. This discussion will be 
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expanded in the forthcoming sections, however now it is important to also interrogate 
the other ways in which the ECCC has been beneficial.  
 
Discussing the ECCC allows further analysis of the effectiveness of international 
criminal law more generally. International criminal law, and with the creation of the 
ICC, is a criminal justice system that in theory requires the acceptance and 
endorsement of the States involved. Rwanda and Cambodia publicly distanced 
themselves from the workings of international criminal law after the trials did not 
develop in line with the desires of the State. The ICC needs States to have actively 
subscribed to its tenets in order to benefit from them, unless a UN Security Council 
referral has been made. The reluctance of governments to involve themselves in 
international criminal law may be due to political motives that safeguard impunity of 
its leaders, and an embeddedness of the governments in corruption, much like what 
existed in the armed conflict. The unwillingness of governments to cooperate with 
international courts and tribunals are often based in a worry over the international 
community’s misrepresentation of the State’s people, culture, and history. Heller 
suggests that the international criminal law has been accused of only selectively 
picking certain armed conflicts to intervene. This idea is further sustained by the 
international media’s focus on certain types of conflicts and geographical areas.79  
What underlies most of the issues presented here is the lack of understanding between 
the international and local. While this topic will be explored more fully in the 
subsequent chapter, it is clear that the differences between the local and international 
process and understanding of justice has limited the ECCC. This may seem to be too 
simplistic or an easy suggestion, to merely blame the entire structure of the 
international legal system. However, the international system and international 
criminal law’s focus on binaries is a source of many of these problems. Us/them, 
good/bad, international/local, these pairs highlight the differences carried by 
international law when it enters the space of the domestic. Assuming that domestic 
justice concepts cannot be adequate to aid in transitional justice within a State post-
conflict, also assumes that the culture itself is also somehow wrong or inadequate. 
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This reads as hypocritical, as many Western governments have been involved in grave 
breaches of human rights while they simultaneously censure other States’ behaviour.80   
 
The lack of trust given to the work of international criminal law by certain 
governments, evidenced after armed conflict, is also apparent in the signing and 
ratifying of the Rome Statute. Many States are reluctant to place their citizens in the 
hands of the International Criminal Court, and with good reason as many treaties, 
conventions, and great amounts of customary international law are made with great 
advantages to powerful States. While the less powerful States, whose citizens have 
been the target of international criminal law prosecution, remain in a position of less 
influence within international law’s mechanisms. Even powerful States such as the 
US are reluctant to let the International Criminal Court have access to its citizens and 
former heads of State, and while that may be based upon a strategic plan to save face 
in the international community, it can also be read as a lack of faith in the 
international criminal legal system. If less powerful States do not see their values and 
culture reflective in international law more broadly, then international criminal law is 
a site where a State’s rich and nuanced history might be easily ignored within the 
court. The contribution of powerful States to the issues that underpin armed 
conflicts,81 and the international community’s lack of assistance in issues that are 
insufficiently framed under military crisis narratives,82 would signal that international 
law is too often focused on crisis and not conflict prevention.83 
 
What the ECCC shows is that the issues within the international criminal legal system 
cannot merely be addressed by changing prosecutors, adjusting administration, 
providing funds, or speeding up trials. The challenges to international criminal law are 
the same challenges international law faces. At the heart of this discussion is a lack of 
equality amongst States, and this idea of inequality extends to the existence of female 
defendants, or rather the dismissing of female defendants in international criminal law 
and armed conflict narratives.   
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4. Female Defendants  
The presence of women within the leadership or cadres of the Khmer Rouge has not 
been fully detailed and I question whether it would ever be possible to understand the 
full extent of female participation in the organisation, planning, execution, and 
maintenance of the Khmer Rouge regime. The first part of this section will examine 
the women who were identified in the court documents of the ECCC as holding a 
leadership role within the Khmer Rouge and in doing so were accused or assumed to 
be implicit in committing criminal acts. Due to the fact that no cases of female 
defendants before the ECCC have made it to the judgement stage of trial and some 
women have received amnesty from prosecution, the knowledge of female defendants 
actions are not explicitly derived from the court. The names of these women have 
been listed in court documents, which is an important development not seen in the 
ICTY or ICTR, akin to the way judges in the ICTR discussed sexual violence crimes 
within judgements even if no such charges were present.84  
 
The ECCC, by listing names of influential women, has also kept the knowledge of 
these women within the court’s understanding of the genocide. The women that will 
be discussed below are those who the court listed as wives of high powered Khmer 
Rouge leaders, with the exception of Im Chaem.85 Women who inhabited lesser roles 
in the Khmer Rouge are also evident within the Khmer Rouge Regime; however, this 
literature is not as abundant.86 The second part of this section will also assess the 
victim-agent paradigm in relation to the cases of female defendants. The association 
of the female defendants in Cambodia to their roles as wives will also link into the 
discussion around victims and agents, in particular their levels of assumed agency.  
 
Ieng Thirith, Khieu Ponnary, and Yun Yat, are all examples of women in positions of 
political and military power and who have been accused of using their station to their 
advantage in order to commit criminal acts. Ieng Thirith was the Khmer Rouge’s 
social affairs minister. Her husband was Ieng Sary, foreign affairs minister, and her 
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brother-in-law was leader Pol Pot, Saloth Sar. Thirith is described by Chhang as being 
an influential member of the CPK party, able to exert her power as the social affairs 
minister during the regime’s rein.87 Chhang further stated that Thirith was 
documented denying basic healthcare, ordering the “re-education” of traitors, and 
participating in the organisation of mass forced marriage.88 Thirith was also in control 
of the main radio station in Hanoi, entitled National United Front of Kampuchea 
(FUNK), which encouraged the spread of propaganda, censored news reports, and 
broadcasted the interrogations of prisoners of war.89 Despite receiving amnesty in 
1996 from the government, she was arrested in 2007 to be tried in the ECCC.90 
 
In Case 002, the prosecutor alleged that Thirith was directly responsible for having 
aided in the planning and instigation of crimes against humanity including murder, 
extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, persecution on 
political and racial grounds, and other inhumane acts, genocide, and grave breaches of 
the Geneva Convention, which included wilful killing, torture, causing great 
suffering, depriving prisoners of war or civilians the rights of a fair trial, unlawful 
deportation, and confinement of a civilian.91 The prosecution alleged that she was 
directly responsible, due to her position as Minister of Social Affairs, for ordering the 
commission of crimes against humanity, other inhumane acts, and persecution on 
racial grounds.92 Joint Criminal Enterprise was also alleged for crimes against 
humanity, genocide, and grave breaches of the Geneva conventions in conjunction 
with Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, and Khieu Samphan.93 Ieng Thirith was indicted on the 
15th of September 2010 on the charges listed above in relation to international 
criminal law and she was also charged with homicide, torture, and religious 
prosecution under the 1956 Cambodian Criminal Code.94 In September of 2012 
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Thirith it was determined to be unfit to stand trial in 2011, due to dementia, and later 
released.95  
 
Khieu Ponnary was the former spouse of Pol Pot and sister of Ieng Thirith, who like 
her sister studied in Paris during the 1950s and was the first Cambodian women to 
receive a baccalaureate degree.96 Due to mental health problems she did not retain a 
prominent public position in the genocide, despite her marriage to Pol Pot Ponnary. 
Ponnary was nevertheless considered to be the “mother of the revolution” and along 
with Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, and Ieng Thirith were the centre of the ruling party.97 
Ponnary was granted amnesty in 1996 and died in 2003.98 Ponnary was documented 
as having ‘direct’ involvement.99  
 
Yun Yat, listed in ECCC court documents, was the wife of Son Sen, Deputy Prime 
Minister for National Defence, who held the position of Minister of Education in the 
Khmer Rouge Cambodia, and in 1977 took control of the Ministry of Propaganda, 
which merged into the Ministry of Culture, Training, and Education.100 Yun Yat and 
her husband were accused of treason and espionage in 1997 against the still 
functioning Khmer Rouge movement, allegedly spying for Second Prime Minister 
Hun Sen and the Government of Vietnam. They were then executed along with nine 
of their relatives.101  
 
Im Chaem, who was a soldier under the Khmer Rouge and put in charge of worksites, 
was charged in absentia in March of 2015, with crimes against humanity including 
murder, extermination, enslavement, imprisonment, persecution on political grounds, 
and other inhumane acts at the Phnom Trayoung security centre, and crimes against 
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humanity including murder, enslavement, imprisonment, and other inhumane acts at 
the Spean Sreng work area. Chaem was also charged with homicide as a violation of 
the 1956 Cambodian Penal Code, at both the Phnom Trayoung security centre and 
Spean Sreng work area.102 Cheam who at the time was living as a Buddhist nun, was 
accused by a witness before the court, in connection with Case 002/02, as being 
especially cruel and responsible for the death of his parents.103 The case of Im Chaem 
does not follow the typical pattern of focusing on key leaders; Im Cheam has claimed 
in an interview with Time that she had no idea that the Khmer Rouge was practicing 
said policies and was following their superior’s orders.104 Chaem was indicted with 
Case 004/01, but the case was subsequently dropped in February of 2017.105  
 
Im Chaem’s position as a female cadre of the Khmer Rouge is not an anomaly in the 
Cambodian genocide. Linton’s work states that the participation in the atrocities of 
the Khmer Rouge was not limited to men and despite knowledge of the involvement 
of women in the atrocities during this period, their existence has been downplayed in 
official records.106 Within the ruling elite women were promoted to positions of 
power, Ieng Sary's daughter, was appointed head of the Calmette Hospital although 
she was still in secondary school.107 Ieng Sary’s niece was given a job as English 
translator for Radio Phnom Penh, despite the fact she had not mastered the 
language.108 Linton’s focus on female cadres in the Khmer Rouge has uncovered that 
women participated in all levels of the regime, but this inclusion of women into the 
ranks of the Khmer Rouge did not happen immediately. Linton, So, and Chhang have 
stated that initially civilian women were in low level, low publicity roles that stayed 
in line with strict gender ideals around what is considered “women’s work”.109  
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A woman’s role was initally to provide for male counterparts: transporting weapons, 
supplies and food. However, as the reign continued women were able to move 
through the ranks and by the end of the regime’s years of power, had positions in all 
levels. Tuy Kin was a female cadre under the Khmer Rouge having joined when only 
14 years old, she was arrested, charged and jailed for her role in the killing of 300 
prisoners at Phnom Penh’s S-21 prison.110 Linton’s work demonstrates that women in 
the Khmer Rouge committed mass atrocities and that their participation was not due 
to the fact that their agency was taken away and they were forced to participate. On 
the contrary, women were committed to the cause and ideals of the Khmer Rouge 
regime, as were their male colleagues.111 Linton’s work dismisses the assumption that 
if women are targeted due their gender, they would not participate in the politics of 
that regime. By understanding that women were often simultaneously, violators and 
victims in Cambodia, dialogue is created expanding on the diversity of women’s 
experiences. This argument does not deny the existence of women who were forced to 
join the Khmer Rouge and only appeared to have subscribed to the party’s political 
aims.   
 
In the previous chapters on the ICTY and ICTR, many women contributed towards 
the violence and crime in the conflict, irrespective of the larger amount of sexual 
violence against the female body. Therefore, reading a conflict along gender lines is 
not enough, as it would support the assumption that female participation is minimal 
due to the violence against the female body and that ‘women’ all share one 
experience. Rather, looking at class, nationalism, and extremist ethnicity, allows for 
the agency of women and the beliefs of those women who participate in armed 
conflict to begun to be understood. Instead of moving through each one of these 
identities in relation to the women of the Khmer Rouge, this section will explore what 
has prevented women from being acknowledged to possess multiple modes of 
identity. It is through the lens of international criminal law, which focuses on a certain 
perspective of victor and violator that does not look to the women who participated on 
either side and committed crimes therein.  
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The discussion around the presence of female cadres in conjunction with the evidence 
of women high in the Khmer Rouge leadership not only disrupts the notion that 
women do not play a central role in armed conflict, but also disrupts images of 
cultural stereotypes, prominent in Western accounts of Southeast Asia.112 This also 
disrupts the Western construction of a Cambodian female subject within the 
international perception of the genocide which links to the construction of the strict 
gendered female subject during French colonial rule. While the existence of lower 
level female soldiers who participated in the regime may have been denied or 
ignored,113 the acknowledgement of female leaders is more visible because of the 
ECCC.  
 
Ieng Thirith, Khieu Ponnary, Yun Yat, and Im Chaem have all been identified in the 
court documents of the ECCC, with charges filed by the court directly against Ieng 
Thirith and Im Chaem. Only eight persons have come within the purview of the court 
and two of these are women. This signals a shift from the previous tribunals in the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, which did not represent the larger presence of 
women or named women in positions of power in the court documents. The existence 
of female defendants, within the documents of the ECCC not only suggests an 
awareness of the participation of women, but that their acts are more or less on the 
same level as the males accused. Yet, the existence of charges against female 
defendants within the court does not dismiss the issues the ECCC faces with 
completing cases. 
 
Due to the structure of the armed conflict and the society in place under the Khmer 
Rouge, women were afforded positions of power. Moreover, as it has been 
demonstrated in previous chapters the existence of female defendants in the Former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda is evident albeit more often in lower level roles. Women did 
exist at various levels in both the former armed conflicts. Whether it was because 
male counterparts had higher roles within the conflict and were therefore more 
desirable to pursue by the Tribunals or possibly because limited gender ideals still 
hold sway in the minds of the prosecutors and investigators; women were not as 
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evident in the Ad Hoc Tribunals. Of the few cases before the ECCC two women were 
focused upon and court documentation points to the involvement of other women, 
although it does not discuss their level of participation. It can be suggested that due to 
the timing of the hybrid court, and its distance from the events, prosecutors were 
desperate for any involved person still living and able to stand trial and even willing 
to put women before the court. Drawing on the last two chapters, which identified a 
general uneasiness to see women as a part of the leadership who perpetrated genocide, 
it would appear in some ways Cambodia is different.  
 
When women’s participation in armed conflict is ignored, dismissed, or seen as a 
cause for concern, which followed in the way women were written on and represented 
in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, then it is in Cambodia where a different 
narrative has developed. The next part of this section will look at the concepts of the 
victim and the agent and how Cambodian women in power during the Khmer Rouge 
straddled this binary. The higher visibility of female defendants in leadership roles 
identified by the work of the ECCC will be explored by first contemplating the role of 
agent and victim. This will be done in this section and then carried into the fifth 
section on the Asia Pacific Women’s Tribunal and victimhood.  
 
To categorise female leaders who were accused of perpetrating crimes in Cambodia as 
either victim or violator would be counterproductive; however, the Cambodian 
conflict gives a perspective into the way women are commonly perceived in armed 
conflict and aids discussions around what makes someone an agent. People who 
perpetrate crimes are most commonly seen as actors in charge of their own lives, but 
those who are commonly seen as defendants tend to be men, therefore beyond what 
makes someone a victim or violator there is the presence of a gendered element. 
Unless duress is involved in the perpetration of crimes, men remain capable of making 
their own decisions. Women in armed conflict are often seen to be victims and even 
when agency appears to be displayed they are relegated back to their victim status, as 
was the case when women are assumed to have been raped regardless of actual 
admission of this fact.114 Women in the Former Yugoslav Republic who were raped 
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and then took up arms were seen as only making such a decision due to the after 
effects of sexual violence.115 Some women in Cambodia entered into the higher ranks 
of the Khmer Rouge believing in their cause and choosing to participate actively in 
the regimes activities. In some cases, after the fact, women denied their knowledge of 
the extent of the activities or their willingness to partake.116  However, while men’s 
agency is automatically assumed, women are assumed to be victims first, and agents 
only after their autonomy is proven.  
 
Despite the international denial in regards to the high amounts of lower ranked female 
participation in the Khmer Rouge, as Linton pointed out, which harkens back to 
earlier chapters on Western denial of violent women, the situation in Cambodia can be 
said to take on a different viewpoint entirely. Women have garnered a stronger focus 
in the ECCC, considering their prevalence in relation to the number of persons 
brought before the court, and their actions would seem to be looked at alone, with 
their gender seen as irrelevant to their culpability, evident merely by the fact they are 
publicly brought before the court. However, the little work done both academically 
and institutionally around the contribution of female defendants in general in the 
Cambodian genocide, who have been left out of the greater memory and history of the 
Khmer Rouge reign until recently, might suggest to some a wider gendered denial of 
women participating. The lack of acknowledgement of female defendants affirms a 
stereotype that women do not participate in armed conflict and that South East Asian 
culture does not accept women as defendants. However, this assumes that the lack of 
work on female defendants in Cambodia is based on gender stereotypes, and not a 
larger denial of the genocide from all standpoints. If many Cambodians themselves 
want to forget about the genocide, then some of the push to remember and recounting 
history would be a Western influence.  
 
Furthermore, since female defendants in Cambodia were often associated with their 
position as wives it still sits uneasy in a Western mind-set of marriage in South East 
Asia. As traditional Cambodian marriage has been dominated by what would be 
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termed in the West as ‘arranged marriages’,117 scholars such as Pande and Chantler, 
who discuss South Asian marriages, have suggested that the traditional Western ideas 
of marriage which rest on romantic love, are a result of a hegemonic neoliberal 
system.118 This would position the Western idea of marriage as constrained by modes 
of power, which further embed patriarchal dominance. At the same time, the Western 
conception of marriage understands arranged marriage to be limiting and problematic. 
Relating the work of Pande and Chanetler to South East Asian marriages, I would 
argue that the same presumptions found around non-romantic based Western notions 
of marriage in South Asian spaces, also exist in the minds of the West when viewing 
South East Asian marriages. As a result, female defendants who are wives of high 
Khmer Rouge office do not enter into the international narrative around the 
Cambodian genocide. 
 
Armed conflict and genocide produces a specific understanding of agency, usually 
bolstered by a narrow conception of gender roles. A woman is physically engaged in 
committing crimes, but often her actions justified or explained through a victimised 
state. The presence of female defendants within armed conflict sits uneasily between 
victim and agent. While in many cases women and men are simultaneously victims 
and violators, the association of certain actions as either masculine or feminine, 
further separates women and men to victims and violator. From this perspective, it 
would appear that in order to be a violator one would need to have complete 
autonomy within their society. However, I argue that this is essentially an irrelevant 
component in identifying women as violators, as it is not autonomy that is necessary 
for women to be in positions in order to commit crimes and be prosecuted before 
international courts.  I further argue that the intersection of gender, race, class, 
ethnicity, religion, and geographical location create the conditions that limit women’s 
perceived possible autonomy, which thereby establish women at the bottom of the 
‘hierarchy of autonomy’.  
 
Acknowledgement of the actions of female defendants tends to lead to the labelling of 
a feminine stereotype. This is also demonstrated in Sjoberg and Gentry’s work as 
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well, as women who engage in violence are on one hand labelled a ‘mother, monster, 
or a whore’, or the actions of women who commit violence are described in detail. 
However, when Weare writes on female killers, she notes that women are either, 
‘mad’, ‘bad’, or ‘victims’.119 This was seen with the characterisation of female 
defendants described in previous chapters.  Furthermore, there has not been the same 
amount of vilification of female defendants in the Khmer Rouge, which differs from 
the female defendants in the FYR and Rwanda, possibly due to their lack of visibility 
in Western consciousness and media.  
 
Despite the limited news headlines condemning the female defendants of Cambodia 
and labelling them as monsters, the stories that have been cited around the actions of 
women cadres or leaders in Cambodia find women, like Im Cheam, denying their 
responsibility in committing criminal acts. Women in lower level women positions in 
the Khmer Rouge were documented denying their involvement in the genocide.120 
Often when women deny their participation in the violent side of armed conflict it is 
attributed to women out of line with traditionally accepted female behaviour or rather 
their gender is used as a reason why they could never have done such an act. This was 
shown to be the case in Rwanda, where Nyiramasuhuko and other female defendants 
denied wrongdoing due to the fact that they were women and claimed that women do 
not act in such a manner.121 This perspective should not then carry on to all armed 
conflicts, as any denial of involvement in the genocide can be the result of a cultural 
denial of the armed conflict and not issues arising from a gendered lens. The claiming 
of innocence supports the argument that labelling is done as a means of making sense 
of women’s actions. Even if in these cases women are not being labelled, but rather 
labelling themselves as unaware or innocent, they contribute to a passivity or lack of 
intention towards the crimes they are accused of committing.  
 
Weare and Morrissey, both state that in an effort to explain the behaviour of ‘women 
who kill’, a woman is labelled as a victim, but this simultaneously erases rationality, 
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responsibility, and agency.122 The ‘bad’ woman is seen as evil or a monster, and thus 
without humanness.123 Since she is seen as a monster she is abnormal and not a part of 
the society, but a threat to it. This ignores the influence of society and culture on a 
women’s actions, and takes away ‘human agency’.124 Agency is not automatically 
assumed for female defendants, as it is with men. By placing women into the category 
of ‘bad’, ‘evil’, ‘monster’, ‘victim’, ‘helpless’, or ‘whore’ she cannot disrupt binaries. 
Instead, Morrissey states, the woman is kept in a state of silence and passivity.125 This 
also bares long lasting effects, even for those who adopted the assumed appropriate 
female characteristics of women who commit crimes, as they solidify feminine 
stereotypes within the law and society.126 Weare states, “The use of these labels may 
allow individual women, in particular circumstances, to win their battle but they do 
little to allow women to win the war against having to conform to appropriate 
feminine behaviour or asserting their individual agency.”127  
 
I argue that there is an issue with naming and shaming the women who commit 
crimes as monsters, or similar terms, since their actions are seen far from acceptable 
societal behaviour, this is due to the fact that most of the shame that comes with 
identifying female defendants is based on their gender. When confronted with female 
defendants, it is easier to label women in order to make sense of their actions.  While 
it is not being suggested that women who commit crimes should be celebrated 
because their crime breaks the stereotype of femininity; conversely, allowing women 
to be seen as capable human beings with the propensity to act in all manner of ways, 
does more to aid the overall status and ability of women in general. Of course, the 
harms committed by women and men need to be appropriately dealt with while caring 
for their victims. However, when women commit crimes and are then labelled, their 
agency is taken away, which leads to issues for women globally, as this contributes to 
a denial of individual agency and a reaffirming of strict feminine behaviour.128  It also 
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does their victims a great disservice, by suggesting the actions female defendants 
commit are of little consequence. This bolsters a further denial of criminal justice for 
both female defendants and their victims. Weare notes that when women are brought 
before courts their cases often involve a ‘trial of character’, which does not focus on 
the actual crimes being committed, further gendering the criminal justice system.129  
 
The victims who suffers at the hands of female defendants are harmed again when 
society and criminal justice does not take the crimes committed by women as displays 
of agency, without the need to make sense of their actions through the process of 
labelling. Pearson states, “…it radically impedes our ability to recognise dimensions 
of power that have nothing to do with formal structures of patriarchy.”130 Pearson 
goes on to state that if women and their acts of aggression, and agency in that 
aggression are ignored, then the way violence exists in society, and certainly during 
and after armed conflict, cannot be properly addressed or stopped.131 When female 
perpetrator’s actions are ignored then male violence becomes reaffirmed as ‘normal’ 
violence. The existence of female defendants and the way they are ‘dealt’ within 
society and the law should be a concern for everyone.  
 
5. Marriage in the Khmer Rouge 
Another facet of female participation in the Khmer Rouge which needs to be explored 
is marriage. Marriage carries with it many assumptions of status, power, and freedom 
which often vary depending on the geographical location and culture of the couple. In 
Cambodia three of the female defendants mentioned by the ECCC were married to 
high ranking Khmer Rouge officials which allowed them access to a different realm 
or society not afforded to other married women in Cambodia. Marriage for these 
women led to their higher visibility within society, regime, and access to political 
appointments, which allowed them to carry out acts causing severe harm. While the 
West has stereotypically viewed marriage in South East Asia as extremely limiting, 
the institution of marriage in these cases needs to be scrutinised. The perception of 
traditional South East Asian marriage by the West as merely just ‘arranged marriage’ 
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echoes the French colonial ideological mandate of seeking to civilise non-Western 
concepts or institutions like marriage.132 At the same time, the concept that wives are 
automatic defendants when their husbands commit harm, due to men having more 
power in marriage, will be discussed.  
 
The women in Cambodia who were in positions of power due to their marriage to 
party leaders, were also active in the CPK party and ideology around the Khmer 
Rouge. Ieng Thirith, Khieu Ponnary, Yun Yat were all the wives of men in high 
political positions. Khieu Ponnary was the wife of Pol Pot, and Ieng Thirith, the sister 
or Ponnary, was married to Ieng Sary, the four together making up the most powerful 
part of the Khmer Rouge regime, with the two sisters becoming the most powerful 
women in the State. Yun Yat and her husband Son Sen were also part of the CPK 
Standing committee, as was Pol Pot, Ieng Thirith and Ieng Sary.  Ieng Thirith was the 
only women brought before a court, contributing to the process of identifying the 
women who are visible within the consciousness around the genocide. The relation of 
these women to marriage is important, as the stereotype of marriage in most cultures 
is seen as traditionally limiting for women. The methodology of this thesis has been to 
look at the surrounding environment to fully understand what influences female 
defendant's visibility. In this case it is not marriage that has limited women, but has 
aided in elevating them to a publicly visible status. It is therefore required to look at 
marriage in relation to the cultural environment and how marriage influences the way 
women are understood in Cambodia.  
 
Marriage is an important cultural milestone in Cambodia for both men and women.133 
Women gain in marriage a position in society and access to areas that would typically 
be out of reach for single women, such as politics and economics. The Khmer Rouge 
regime destroyed many of the traditions common to Cambodian society, kinship 
responsibilities, religious ceremonies, and private land ownership all suffered; 
marriage like many of these other arenas was also harmed due to forced marriage 
ceremonies that did not adhere to previous rigorous matching process, and the effects 
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of this change in marital relations were felt even after the Khmer Rouge fell.134 
Within the politics of the Khmer Rouge there was a desire to remove the bourgeoisie 
and capitalist classes, forming an entirely proletariat class of peasants.135 Despite this, 
the leadership of the Khmer Rouge resided amongst the bourgeoisie middle class, 
who were, as Vickery stated, “petty bourgeois radicals overcome by peasantist 
romanticism”.136 The marriage arrangements amongst the leaders in the Khmer Rouge 
was decidedly different than the newly imposed marriage conditions forced upon so 
many ‘lower level’ Cambodians.  
 
While the leadership married for connection and alliances, amongst other qualities, 
the majority of Cambodians under the CPK were forced into situations that negated 
their family ties, previous marriages, and living arrangements. Others were forced to 
undergo marriages that the ruling class deemed necessary for the survival of the 
regime, without the typical benefits or earmarks associated with traditional 
Cambodian marriages. This construction of the new ‘type’ of Cambodian marriage, 
what would later be criminalised as forced marriage, was in many ways used to 
control sexuality within the newly reformed State. The ruling class was able to shape 
their ideal society through a combination of forced marriage, undertaken to ensure a 
survival of the party’s ideology for future generations, banning sex outside marriage, 
and promoting sex inside marriage. Controlling sex can be seen a desire of power by 
the ruling class over the working class, the control of working class sexuality is a way 
to solidify the ruling class’ place. The Khmer Rouge regime claimed that its aim was 
to break down the previous societal structure. However, in reality they bolstered their 
own ruling elite at the cost of the rest of the population.   
 
This discussion, in addressing female defendants during the Khmer Rouge, is 
focusing on marriage within Cambodian society before and while the regime came 
into power. Marriage for both women and men was a way to secure alliances, 
showcasing power and strength amongst families, and benefited other members of the 
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family as well.137 Through this contract women gained respect as mothers and wives; 
Surtees states that within this process the boundaries within the public and private 
blurred and allowed women to transition between.138 Marriage is not an arrangement 
viewable only from the perspective of romantic love, but takes root deep within the 
fabric of Cambodian society and relations. If the understanding of marriage is shifted 
to focus on strong units and partnerships and away from the disillusions around 
gender and power within family units or even romance, then the status of female 
defendants can be seen from a new perspective. This means that without the pretext of 
the debates around the way marriage disproportionately harms women, marriage is 
addressed from the stance of a social contract done to promote the betterment of both 
parties, albeit in ways directly relating to the genders of each party.  
 
Accepting that marriage was approached in this way in Cambodia prior to the reign of 
the Khmer Rouge regime and that both members, however gender specific their tasks 
were, existed within a marriage to create a certain product for society whether it be 
offspring, political or business alliances, or land ownership. This product was most 
easily attended through men and women following particular gender specific tasks, 
notwithstanding the fluidity women experienced within marriage. This research starts 
from the realisation that marriage exists in society, and discussing it is not making a 
judgement or supporting the way it manifests. While feminists may endeavour to 
break apart or reform these (often oppressive) institutions, like marriage, ignoring the 
benefits marriage brought for women in the leadership of the Khmer Rouge, even 
within an assumed restrictive environment, does not help to illuminate the situation of 
women or female defendants in the Cambodian genocide. While it is impossible to 
completely remove oneself from a deeply entrenched perspective on marriage based 
upon their culture and geographical location, by looking at marriage outside of typical 
gendered ideals, it is possible to better understand the context in which women and 
men existed in Cambodia and therefore offer a more nuanced approach to marriage in 
this context.  
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The presence of female defendants holding leadership positions in Cambodia is not 
necessarily detailed through a lens of gender, but marriage. It is not useful to make an 
argument that women are less likely to become defendants because of their gender, as 
in some cases it is their gender in relation to their ability to become wives that 
elevates them to the position of power. A leader is then capable of committing crimes 
through the power their married status entails. This is not to say that there are not 
gender forces that affect female leaders in their daily interactions, but that blaming 
gender for not allowing women to act or be recognised as defendants is not valid. 
There is still evidence that women, despite their leadership gains, were often relegated 
to gender typical domestic tasks, as mentioned above. However, the way women 
transformed their status in the Khmer Rouge from domestic tasks to leadership 
positions, including those in lower level leadership positions, can be likened to the 
way women have continually navigated through marriage, blurring boundaries, and 
attaining higher levels of power and mobility. As was the cases with the Schutzstaffel 
(more commonly known as the SS) in World War II women who were married to SS 
or Gestapo men were directly involved in committing crimes taking part in shootings, 
encroachments, robbery, and exploitation, or indirectly by domestic or emotional 
stability.139 Szejnmann states that women were not passive, but actively worked in the 
same way as their male counterparts within the SS and Gestapo.140  
 
If women in positions of power are given greater access through a traditional mode of 
gendered category in marriage, but their access to power is not restricted by their 
gender, as long as it is attained through the specific means of marriage, then gender 
does not serve as the sole mode their lives should be analysed through or are affected 
by. Likewise, women who are lower level defendants are not necessarily denied their 
place in Cambodian history because they are women, but because society as a whole 
seeks to dismiss a genocide. The government in Cambodia has battled the denial of 
the genocide and have fought to make the history of the conflict visible to future 
generations; despite these efforts, for long periods of time many people refused to 
recognise certain important places and events of the Khmer Rouge regime.141 Until 
                                                          
139 Szejnmann, ‘Perpetrators of the Holocaust: A Historiography’ in Jensen and Szejnmann (Eds.) 
Ordinary people as mass murderers: perpetrators in Comparative Perspectives (2008) 42. 
140 ibid. 
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quite recently, and in some cases still today, the memory of the genocide was limited 
to certain spaces, almost mentally compartmentalising the trauma and its effect.142 
Stereotypical notions about gender are no longer a definitive reason for female 
defendants’ lack of acknowledgement. This also can aid in removing gender as a 
convenient excuse for why female suspects and defendants deny their participation or 
why more female defendants are not recognised through history. If this is the case in 
Cambodia, then this it is a unique situation, as it makes female defendants somehow 
on one hand less visible in Western media and detailed literature around the conflict 
and on the other visible in court proceedings and thereby within the conflict’s history 
from inside Cambodia.  
 
In fact, from the above discussion, it might be concluded that gender is more of a 
preoccupation drawn from Western feminist influences. The international focus of the 
conflict remains tied to defining women’s roles through gender and using gender to 
analysis the entirety of women’s participation.  Gender becomes ultimately unhelpful 
as the only mode of analysis when discerning the position of female defendants in the 
Cambodian armed conflict, since it is not only ideas on gender that has limited the 
acknowledgement of female participation, but general genocide denial combined with 
local concepts of marriage and elitism within the Khmer Rouge, as well as a limited 
Western feminist intervention. In an effort to discern the way marriage influenced the 
Khmer Rouge the Western intervention centred upon forced marriage, and missed the 
opportunity to recognise the way marriage amongst the leadership influenced politics 
and women’s roles, often enabling women’s access to the public sphere. Adopting a 
narrow focus that assumes women’s suffering during the armed conflict was only the 
result of forced marriage or sexual violence, misses the ways such as lack of medical 
attention, and starvation harmed women during the regime. Focusing concern on the 
elements around female defendants that prevent recognition and thereby limit all 
women’s autonomy shifts the starting point of women in armed conflict and does not 
assume all were powerless victims. 
 
 
                                                          
142 Buncombe, ‘Cambodia Passes Law Making Denial of Khmer Rouge Genocide Illegal’ 
(Independent, 7 June 2013). 
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6. A Brief Comment on the Asia Pacific Regional Women’s Hearing   
The Asia-Pacific Regional Women’s Hearing on Gender-Based Violence in Conflict 
was held in Phnom Penh, Cambodia on October 10 and 11 October 2012, by the 
Cambodian Defenders Project in partnership with Transcultural Psychosocial 
Organization Cambodia and the Victim Support Section of the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.143 While it was not constructed for just 
Cambodian testimonies, its objectives were to uncover the truth about armed conflict, 
uphold a sense of justice, address reparations, and encourage the non-recurrence of 
widespread and systematic State violence.144 The Hearing’s approach was victim 
focused, offering a way for those affected during the armed conflict to publicly state 
their version of events and the harms done to them. The Hearing provided a non-
judicial means of support for the work of other transitional justice mechanisms within 
Cambodia by addressing gaps and extending to areas not yet fully developed. This 
process has also added to international awareness and incorporating international 
actors has also widened the net, showcasing the attention paid worldwide. Some may 
argue that the scope of the Hearing was narrow and due to its role as a non-
governmental organisation created a limited impact.145 While these criticisms are 
noted in order to encourage governmental participation in non-judicial transitional 
justice mechanisms, they do not necessarily discuss the value of such mechanisms.  
 
Focusing a women’s hearing on gender-based violence within a conflict highlights 
women as the victim in armed conflict and further elevates the story of the victim as 
the main narrative of women in conflict. This suggests that the primary way women 
faced harm during the Khmer Rouge regime was through sexual violence. The 
experience women had during the Khmer Rouge included a multitude of traumas 
which are not linked to sexual violence: starvation, lack of medical care, forced 
labour, the breaking up of families, loss of religion, personal property, and so on, 
were all problems encountered by both women and men during the armed conflict. 
Women who sustained sexual violence seem to be the sole focus when alternative 
                                                          
143 See Panel Statement from Asia-Pacific Regional Women’s Hearing on Gender Based Violence in 
Conflict, (10 and 11 October 2012).  
144 Ye, ‘Transitional Justice through the Cambodian Women’s Hearings’ (2014) 28, 30, 31, 32. 
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transitional justice mechanisms take place, due to the silences in the ECCC on sexual 
violence. It is not being suggested that sexual violence is not a worthy focus or a 
serious problem that needs addressing; however, it seems that it is the only issue 
being addressed from the female perspective.  
 
When conflict enters and exits, the devastation that is left behind spans through 
people’s everyday lives and while pinpointed traumas like sexual violence are often 
life changing events themselves, there is little being done to address the totality of 
women’s experiences in armed conflict. From the international perspective, women 
within armed conflict are only valuable and in need of assistance when she is the 
victim of a gender based act of violence, in particular sexual violence. This does not 
dismiss that other NGOs are in place to deal with the other after effects of conflict, 
but these are done so separately. Instead, a hearing that looks at the experiences of 
women in an armed conflict which range from starvation, loss of children, loss of 
identity, and as well as sexual violence might be more useful. The sexual violence that 
occurs in armed conflict is just that, within an armed conflict and exists next to a 
multitude of other harms, therefore it is necessary to address the surrounding climate 
of women’s lives as well. If the point of such hearings, is to understand the ‘truth’, as 
problematic and embedded as this may be, then it needs to do so in a process that 
understands that each act of gender based violence does not happen in a vacuum.  
 
Another after effect of projects like the Asia-Pacific Regional Women’s Hearing is 
that it reveals the barometer that the international community operates through. The 
strength of tribunals like the Asia Pacific Hearing (2012), the Women's International 
War Crimes Tribunal on Japan's Military Sexual Slavery (2000) or the Guatemala 
Women’s Tribunal (2010) amongst others,146 is found in their ability to distance 
themselves from the control of Western State powers. Much like the premise of the 
                                                          
146 While this list is not exhaustive, Otto references these as alternative mechanisms. They include: The 
World Court of Women against War, for Peace, Cape Town (2-9 March 2001), The World Court of 
Women against Racism, Durban (30 August 2001), The International Court of Women against 
Neoliberal Policies in Latin America, Havana (February 2005), The African Court of Women on 
Poverty, World Social Forum, Nairobi, Kenya (22 January 2007); The World Courts of Women on 
Poverty in the US, Oakland, California (10-13 May 2012), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (18-20 October 
2013), The Court of Women on Crimes against Women related to the Violence of Development, 
Bangalore (28 January 1995), The World Court of Women on US War Crimes, World Social Forum, 
Mumbai (18 January 2004), Nga Wahine Pacifika: The Pacific Court of Women on Uranium Mining, 
Nuclear Testing and the Land, Auckland (2-3 September 1999). 
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Gacaca Court, which was established after the Rwandan genocide. While the Gacaca 
Court contained punitive measures, it also focused on communal rebuilding.147 The 
Asia Pacific Hearing was specifically informal and cathartic in focus, emphasising 
restorative not retributive justice. However, analysing the Western focus on post-
conflict justice displays the eagerness to fund initiatives on conflict-related sexual 
violence, evident in the Asia Pacific Hearing. This eternally casts women not only as 
victims of war, but as always sexually vulnerable. By choosing to intervene on behalf 
of women when they are the victims of sexual violence the international and local 
community is signalling how they believe women exist in armed conflict, dictates 
what gender harms are important, and how such judgement is necessary to elevate 
domestic institutions and governments.  
 
The focus on women in armed conflict is primarily done through sexual violence 
rather than the multitude of experiences women face; therefore gender norms are set 
within narrow boundaries without taking account for the nuances in women’s 
understanding of their own position within their society. Women who deviate are not 
taken into account. When this happens gender is reaffirmed in international spaces as 
looking a specific way and domestic practices viewable from the outside, fall into 
gender stereotypes. The thought of disrupting stereotypical practices does not enter 
the discussion, such as women who perpetrate crime or the status of marriage in 
Cambodia. It does not help that in these situations the domestic arena has just been 
through conflict and large scale upheaval, but this should not indicate that there is 
nothing to be learned from the cultural practices and societal gender interpretations.  
 
The importance of discussing the Women’s Hearing in this chapter is to draw 
attention to the ways the international community can shape and uphold gender norms 
in the international and local through international mechanisms that do not follow the 
standard judicial pattern set by courts. Using the example of the Women’s Hearing 
highlights the international perspective beyond the direct work of the courts. Due to 
the process of the Women’s Hearings it is evident that some stories do not fit within 
these limited guidelines. The Hearing demonstrates a feminist space and another 
                                                          
147 See Clark, ‘Bringing the Peasants Back in, Again: State Power and Local Agency in Rwanda’s 
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opportunity to gauge where female defendants sit within a discussion around 
women’s experiences in armed conflict. Female defendant’s experience in armed 
conflict does not fall into the gender norm supported by international organisations, 
like the Women’s Hearing. The process in Phnom Penh only focused on the women 
who were victims of sexual violence and therefore limited the narrative around 
women’s experience. However, Otto has stated that the process at the Hearing was 
cathartic for the participants.148  
 
The Hearing, while a different form of engagement with armed conflict, still 
emphasises that women’s primary experience in conflict is one of sexual violence. 
Women’s ability to engage with violence and crime is unrelated to the way they 
understand their role in conflict, which includes the possibility of committing crimes. 
Some may question the value of such processes and aim, others may suggest that 
regardless of their benefits, female defendants have no place in hearings on sexual 
violence against women. The emphasis placed on sexual violence against women 
rivals any other understanding of women in international law; the reason hearings like 
the Asia Pacific Women’s Hearing exists is to address the harms experienced by 
women in the Cambodian genocide that are predominately overlooked by the courts. 
If this is the case then, the Hearing’s would ideally encompass all instances that did 
not find proper acknowledgement within traditional legal institutions.  
7.  The Limits of Female Defendants and Feminism  
The discussion throughout this chapter and the discussions in the previous chapters on 
the ICTY and ICTR all display the limits surrounding the topic of female defendants 
within international criminal law and Western/mainstream feminist understandings. 
Looking more broadly at this topic seems to hold a mirror up to the practices and 
mind set of feminist scholars. Meaning that by exposing female defendants, this topic 
exposes feminism. Western feminists and their reaction to women who perpetrate 
crime has often been negative or has garnered a general dismissal of female 
defendants’ actions.  Feminists must be weary of their own agendas and assumptions, 
in order to live up to the claims they have made of aiding women. What needs to be 
                                                          
148 Chapter on file with author, Otto, ‘Testimonies of Protest and Survival: People’s Tribunals and the 
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included in the mainstream feminist agenda is the understanding that women are 
human beings capable of displaying the range of emotions and actions. From the work 
discussed above, on Women’s Hearings, it is often the case that women are presumed 
to be on the side of ‘the good’, making positive moral choices and therefore are to be 
praised and protected. Once women attain the same level in society as men, it is 
assumed by many feminists and scholars that they will change and better the 
organisations and institutions they inhabit.  
7.1 International Perspectives  
In 2004, the US television show, 60 Minutes II featured a story on prisoner abuse, 
highlighting the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and publicising the torture committed 
against Iraqi detainees by US soldiers.149 Afterwards, many were outraged over the 
undeniable torture and the US government’s policies and practices, more broadly. 
However, after these initial reactions the debates on this topic quickly became centred 
on a new focus. It was as if suddenly, upon examining the pictures more closely, that 
people realised the US soldiers were not all men.150 It was a female US soldier that 
was holding the other end of the dog leash, it was a female US soldier giving a 
thumbs up next to a dead body and behind a pile of naked and handcuffed Iraqi men. 
These women were said to have done the unthinkable, and not just because they 
engaged in torture, but because they are women who should know better.151 Many 
people could not come to grips with the reality of the way these women voluntarily 
acted.  
 
These photos challenged the stereotypes of women because as it was said that women 
are expected to kind, peaceful, and less violent, women do not behave this way, 
women are better than ‘this’.152 This assumption of goodness was only related to the 
female soldiers and not the male soldiers who were often pictured next to the women. 
Ehrenreich, Melone, Gronnvoll, Engle, Holland are just a few of the authors who have 
written on the topic and in doing so expressed their own or the public’s reaction to the 
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female soldier’s participation.153 While Engle has referred to female perpetrators in a 
book review, Ehrenreich, Melone, Gronnvoll, and Holland have argued that when 
confronted with women who commit crimes their own assumptions about women’s 
roles are brought to light, which this their case meant an assumption of stereotypical 
female roles and actions.  What the presence of female defendants in Abu Ghraib 
reveals is a tendency for scholars and the media to fall back to the presumed 
characteristics of women, which in many cases reinforces the idea that women are 
calm, mothering, nurturing, and peaceful. This is the mind-set that also makes women 
vulnerable during times of conflict.  The harms that women face other than sexual 
violence do not enter into focus.  
 
The focus on the gender of the US female soldiers in Abu Ghraib also ignores the 
often embedded masculine hegemonic military culture that has influence regardless of 
a women’s female gender. Sasson-Levy writes that female soldiers in “masculine” 
roles adopt characteristic of male combat soldiers.154 Sasson-Levy states that the 
female soldier assimilating into masculine culture shows both resistance to and 
compliance with the military gender order.155 Therefore, women’s adoption of 
masculine hegemonic State-centric identity practices can be interpreted as in 
compliance with military norms, and the act of being a soldier is tied to an identity 
that often exudes both hyper-masculinity and the importance of the State. I 
 
When women act as combat soldiers, they reproduce a perception that embeds the 
soldier within a type of masculine performativity. From this perspective, the violent 
acts of female military personnel are of less of a challenge to the gendered aspect of 
the military order.156 My argument is not to promote military participation, but to 
recognise that women’s identity within military spaces is influenced by a military 
culture that affects both men and women. Men in military spaces are also bound to 
reproduce a version of extreme masculinity that has been developed as an ‘effective’ 
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way to achieve gains for the State. Men are also constrained and manipulated by the 
culture within the military.157 Highlighting the culture that exists within the military 
displays another element of the environment that influences the perception of female 
defendants. Further work into military culture, from the perspective as female 
defendants who undertake roles of military actors, can address persistent issues that 
influence the understanding of gender in armed conflict in international law.    
 
The reaction to female defendants relates to the larger subject of international law’s 
engagement with conflict. Charlesworth has highlighted that the crisis approach to 
international law is evident in mainstream international lawyers, and subsequently 
mainstream feminist engagement with armed conflict. Charlesworth states that these 
actors only focus on issues when they reach a critical point and because of this, it is 
possible to ignore the problems that could be addressed prior to avoid such a 
situation.158 A crisis mentality has emerged around conflict related sexual violence, 
due to this, other harms women face besides sexual violence are not addressed, for 
example the disproportional effect everyday economic harms have on women.159 
Charlesworth’s work on the crisis approach also relates to the higher percentage of 
female defendants in the purview of the ECCC.160 Due to the fact the ECCC was 
established decades after the crimes took place, this naturally allowed for more time 
to ascertain the events of the conflict, allowing for the roles women played in the 
regime to become more apparent. Following the work of Charlesworth distance 
between the conflict and the court allowed for the context of the armed conflict to be 
ascertained with far more nuance than if the court was established immediately after 
the conflict. Nevertheless, I would not argue that waiting multiple decades for a 
justice mechanism to take place, is the best path towards justice. 
 
Female defendants can offer a site of analysis for feminists to confront their 
assumptions and biases. If women are to be seen as, fully human, then they must be 
seen as capable of committing violence or breaking the law. Using female defendants 
as the centre of this discussion allows feminists the space to question different gender 
                                                          
157 Unfortunately, this is outside the scope of this thesis, but offers an area of future research. 
158 Charlesworth (82) 389. 
159 ibid 391. 
160 ibid 384-386. 
  
256 
 
ideals within a conflict and creates the opportunity to interrogate gender more fully.  
There seems to be a worry that if it is discovered that women make questionable 
decisions, then somehow women’s credibility is diminished and the practices in place 
to protect them will become less desirable or supported by international or local legal 
mechanisms. While combating sexual violence has made substantial gains in 
international law and produced important jurisprudence, there are questions as to 
whether this has actually lessened the amount of sexual violence committed.  
 
However, if women and men were viewed in armed conflict within the range of 
actions they continually enact/experience, as both victims and violators, and if 
international law did not limit women and men to the binary of female victims and 
male perpetrators, then it would stand to reason that the way international criminal 
prosecution is approached and the aims of post-conflict justice mechanisms would 
also be more effective in dispensing post-conflict transitional justice. If the trials and 
processes after armed conflict addressed what occurred during the conflict, then 
society has a greater possibility of rebuilding community relations, rather than 
ignoring the existence of women who participated in armed conflict.  
 
In Sierra Leone, Coulter states that women were involved in armed conflict and the 
experiences of women in Sierra Leone did not fall into the men as violators and 
women as peacemakers, however these women were not recognised by ‘Western’ 
preconceived ideas about women and armed conflict.161 Coulter states that the women 
who fought in the armed conflict, were not integrated back into society after the 
conflict ended.162  As was the case in Northern Ireland after ‘The Troubles’, female 
combatants were not integrated into the transitional justice mechanisms, and therefore 
services and care in order to reintegrate former female combatants into society did not 
exist.163 Ignoring this problem only further stigmatises women who participated and 
pushes them outside the official record of the conflict. 
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7.2 Local Processes  
The connection between the international and the local within the context of the 
Cambodian armed conflict is not relevant only to the fact that the ECCC is a hybrid 
court, but the understanding of gender norms and their movement between both 
arenas. While the hybrid court is meant to encourage the flow of knowledge and 
acceptable norms of law between the whole of the international community and its 
local legal counterpart, there is not as much understanding around the ways in which 
typically unspoken norms of gender and gender roles permeate both planes. If 
knowledge moves between and across the local and the international, then attention to 
how concepts of gender, class, marriage, and power requires further interrogation.  
The study of female defendants shows how expectations with regard to gender are 
reproduced in law without understanding of the diversity of gender. I accept that 
while it is clear elements from the international move to the local, there is very little 
movement in the reverse.  
 
Local practices should move to the international plane nuancing arguments and 
opinions on what is acceptable treatment for women, for example. Instead 
international, or in most cases Western insights, shape and give limited meaning to 
the occurrences that take place on the local stage. Amongst transitional justice 
mechanisms there needed to be an acknowledgement that some of the most significant 
harm women faced during the Khmer Rouge regime was not necessarily from sexual 
violence, but rather lack of food, water, and medical care and possibly at the 
instigation of other women. Instead the Western viewpoint of women as victims of 
sexual violence in armed conflict dominated the understanding of women’s 
experiences. This perspective does not ‘leave space’ for women who commit crimes 
in armed conflict. 
 
Concerns around the limitations of the study of female defendants, typically rest with 
the idea that while women do participate in armed conflict and do commit crimes their 
existence is minimal in comparison to the number of male perpetrators. It also 
assumes that beyond mere identification of women’s existence as defendants, little 
else is necessary. However, this thesis has accounted for the reasons why women who 
commit crimes need to be recognised and that the reality that these women are not a 
part of dominant conflict narratives is often a result of multiple elements, including 
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Western feminist intervention, international media biases, and the central structures of 
international criminal law. After the discussions on female defendants in the chapters 
on the FYR and Rwanda, the topic has developed further by including the experiences 
in Cambodia. At the centre of my thesis, autonomy presents itself as the main 
aspiration. I do not seek to simplify the topic or to reduce this research into pushing 
for autonomy amongst women and men. On the contrary, it is much more difficult to 
realise that in an effort to give prominence to women’s lives and actions. The ability 
of women to be seen as capable of committing a violent act without explanation 
predicated by her gender is essential if women are to push off oppressive assumptions 
related to her gender. However, upon exploring this topic I have also found that 
gender is not the sole mode of identity needed to understand female defendants’ 
experiences relating to race, ethnicity, or class.  
 
This topic does not see female defendants’ actions as valuable or beneficial to women, 
as in there is no need to celebrate their crimes or encourage more crimes. What must 
occur is a discussion that pushes for the same realisations in reference to men. Men 
need not be the continual perpetrator incapable of kindness.164 There is a silence 
around men who are victims of crimes and women who commit them, yet men who 
commit crimes are rarely defined by their gender. While this work is striving towards 
a nuanced form of equality, I also recognise that the concept carries with it 
heteronormative assumptions around gender. The autonomy I hope this work pushes 
towards is the realisation that both women are capable of committing criminal acts 
despite the societal influences which affect the way women and men’s needs are 
categorised and defined.  
8. Conclusion 
Gender was situated in the ECCC partially within the context of Cambodian society 
and partially within international norms. The Khmer Rouge sought to create a system 
where women and men were treated equally. Women participated as cadres,165 as well 
as in considerable positions of power like Ieng Thirith, Khieu Ponnary, Yun Yat, and 
Im Chaem. While the presence of women brought before the Court or mentioned in 
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proceedings as leaders, might be assumed to be because of the Court’s hybrid nature. 
Hybrid courts are designed incorporate local understandings. Cambodia, therefore, 
recognised the experiences of women as defendants and leaders due to local 
understanding of marriage and the role of women in society, which shaped the 
perception of the agency of females who participated in the armed conflict. However, 
the recognition of female defendants and women in positions of power I argue has 
more to do with the length of time between the conflict and the court proceedings, 
which would allow a greater understanding of the events in the court system.  
 
The denial amongst female cadres in the Khmer Rouge of their actions during the 
genocide can be linked to the general denial of the genocide in Cambodian society. 
Furthermore, strict gender norms that have been encouraged since the fall of the 
Khmer Rouge are themselves situated in a society that is recovering from severe 
schisms which encourage a shift to earlier ideas of gender roles, embedded in French 
colonial mind sets. Interrogating the Women’s Hearing exposes the ways in which the 
influences of Western feminism on post-conflict justice processes. Much like the 
discussion in the introduction of this chapter, it is useful to see the instances where 
Western feminists intervene and how this often supports Western ideas of gender. 
This Western intervention exists alongside the local Cambodian context where gender 
plays out differently, yet still seems to allow women to enter into spaces Western 
feminists often ignore. While the end of this chapter has discussed the need for 
autonomy and at the same time possibly generated more questions than answers, the 
next chapter on the international and local will expand this topic further.  
 
Cambodia and the ECCC offer a different perspective on female defendants and how 
gender exists within transitional justice. It is through the understanding that sexual 
violence is not the only way women have experienced the armed conflict in Cambodia 
and that female participation in the armed conflict does not only occur when women’s 
daily lives follow the Western concepts of equality and agency. Cambodian women 
gain a form of power through marriage and lower level female cadres straddle local 
concepts of gender and still manage to attain potions that allow them to perpetrate 
harm, albeit in ways that were seen in some cases to be coercive. This questions the 
connection of agency with the ability to commit violence. Cambodia is then another 
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example of how there is not a pre-set understanding of female defendants or their 
everyday lives.  
 
The larger problem that exists within this work is in configuring where feminist 
spaces lay. Female defendants seem to sit outside of the conceivable topics feminists 
engage with, and therefore the boundaries of gender and law are also put into 
question. As a result, the possibilities open to law and gender are limiting and prevent 
discussion on certain topics. Feminists need to look to all of the spaces that women 
inhabit and use this to strengthen their discipline, likewise they need to include the 
experiences of men that rival traditional norms. In the case of Cambodia, it was not 
possible to make one specific statement on female defendants. It was also not 
beneficial to state that there were not enough women brought before the Court, or that 
gender prevented women from being recognised as defendants. 
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Chapter Seven  
Female Defendants in  
International and Local Legal Structures 
 
1. The Importance of Discussing Female Perpetrators, Defendants, and 
Suspects  
This thesis opened with a description of Rasema Handanovic, whose story signalled a 
familiar narrative of a woman faced with the harms of armed conflict, seeking to 
regain control of her life. However, as the story progressed it was evident Hadrovic 
was also a perpetrator of international crimes during the conflict in the Former 
Yugoslav Republic. While Handrovic’s tale would appear to be unique or particular, 
this thesis has shown that the existence of complex relationships with violence, within 
the lives of women who are involved in armed conflict, is not unique or particular. 
The contrast between Handrovic’s experience of sexual violence and the actions she 
was found guilty of before the Bosnia-Herzegovina Court illustrates that women 
involved in armed conflict cannot be relegated to merely victims. I have argued for 
the importance of studying women as female defendants in order to disrupt 
assumptions that women are only victims or peacemakers in armed conflict. 
Throughout the thesis this was achieved through an analysis of international criminal 
law and of Western feminist interventions. The issues identified within the structures 
of international criminal law, as well as within international legal discourse, on 
women and their roles within armed conflicts create biases that solidify women as 
victims and men as defendants.  
 
Female defendants have thus provided a means to identify the inadequacies in the way 
gender has been interpreted by international law, international criminal law, and 
Western feminist interventions.  Subsequently, my analysis of the existence of female 
defendants highlighted the way race, class, ethnicity, and gender influence the actors 
involved during and after armed conflict. These actors exist both in positions inside 
the boundaries of the armed conflict itself and outside the armed conflict. I have 
argued throughout this thesis that female defendants’ lack of visibility, which has 
contributed to missed opportunities in the development of gender, racial, and classist 
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understandings in armed conflict, is particularly due to the way international criminal 
law has been framed by the Western feminist intervention. By interrogating 
international criminal law’s relationship with female defendants, I have proven that 
the implications of the lack of visibility of female defendants in international legal 
studies and feminist studies is symptomatic of greater issues around the Western 
perceptions of gender and the way gender is understood during armed conflict. 
 
The reasons why this thesis focused on the armed conflicts in the FYR, Rwanda, and 
Cambodia is due to their specific contributions to international criminal law, as stated 
in Chapter Two. The Ad Hoc Tribunals, ICTY and ICTR, expanded the tenets of 
international criminal law that had remained dominant since the end of WWII, and the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials. From the jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR, 
international criminal law was developed and evolved through the work of subsequent 
hybrid courts. However, the Ad Hoc Tribunals displayed one type of post-conflict 
justice, which emanated primarily from the international community, with little 
engagement in local justice processes.1 Discussing the failures of the Tribunals are 
also a necessary part of understanding the narrative of international criminal law’s 
development. Through the work of the international community around both 
Tribunals, a preoccupation with women as victims of sexual violence emerged. The 
hyper focus on sexual violence became a key element in unpacking the existence of 
the female perpetrator for this study, and provides another reason why the FYR and 
Rwandan conflicts were the focus of two chapters of the thesis.  
 
The ECCC being a hybrid court that took into account the need for a greater link 
between the international and the local, in many ways should have been an answer to 
the failures of the Ad Hoc Tribunals. Unfortunately, the Cambodia court did not 
achieve its initial aims or respond to the issues that resulted from the proceedings of 
the ICTY or ICTR. Another reason for choosing to highlight the work of the ECCC is 
because of its failures.  The ECCC was established decades after the atrocities of the 
Cambodian genocide took place, and as a result failed to indict the vast majority of 
leaders responsible, with only four cases before the court. The ECCC also failed to 
                                                          
1 Maogoto, ‘The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: A Paper Umbrella in the Rain? Initial 
Pitfalls and Brighter Prospects’ (2004) 14. 
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significantly address the sexual violence that occurred during the conflict, suggesting 
the hypervisibility of sexual violence in the ICTY and ICTR did not extend to the 
work of the ECCC.2 This thesis has critiqued the Western feminist intervention for 
focusing on women as victims of sexual violence which resulted in a narrowing of 
women’s roles in armed conflict. However, I am not suggesting the prosecution of 
sexual violence be diminished, only that the Western feminist agenda include the 
range of women’s actions in armed conflict within its purview. Therefore, the limited 
charges relating to sexual violence crimes before the ECCC is most certainly a failure.  
 
As a result of the analysis found in Chapters Four, Five, and Six there is a question as 
to whether international criminal law in its current manifestation is the correct or most 
appropriate avenue for post-conflict justice. The issues facing the International 
Criminal Court, which continues to lose membership, as this thesis is being written, 
compounds the urgency for alternative transitional justice methods. This is especially 
significant for the Syrian armed conflict: the atrocities that have been committed, and 
continue still, will need to be properly discerned. There will also need to be a form of 
transitional justice that initially will likely involve the cooperation of other States, as 
well as local justice mechanisms inside Syria to begin to rebuild. All the more 
concerning is the congruent terrorism related atrocities committed by ISIS that reach 
beyond the borders of its self-proclaimed caliphate in Raqqa. The questions that arise 
over how justice is to be achieved and how best to serve victims of the armed conflict 
most certainly will need to include the work of the Syrian population. Local 
transitional justice processes may appear more effective, than an internationally 
managed justice processes. However, this will depend greatly on how the conflict 
ends, which immediately reasserts the importance of continuing to interrogate 
international criminal law. For example, if international criminal trials are desired by 
the Syrian population for the leaders of the armed conflict, irrespective of who 
remains in power with the cessation of hostilities, then international criminal law will 
need to confront the criticism that it supports victor’s justice by prosecuting those on 
both sides.   
 
                                                          
2 Oosterveld and Sellers, ‘Issues of Sexual and Gender-Based Violence at the ECCC’ in Meisenberg 
and Stegmiller  (Eds.) The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia Assessing Their 
Contribution to International Criminal Law (2016) 349. 
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In the previous chapters, I considered local justice processes. The ICTY, ICTR, and 
ECCC demonstrated the need for the dichotomy between the international/local to be 
disrupted, as the international has been positioned as superior to local legal processes. 
This is reiterated in the visibility of the international justice processes over local 
justice mechanism, as well as the progress and outcomes of local mechanisms not 
filtering back to and influencing the international reaction to the aftermath of armed 
conflict. Moreover, the presence of female defendants has entered into local post-
conflict justice spaces with greater frequency than in international law and due to the 
limitations found in the international criminal justice system the representation of 
women as both victim and perpetrator has been impossible to achieve.  
 
In the following section of this chapter I explore Knop’s work as a way to understand 
the relationship between international courts and tribunals and local courts and 
processes. At a conceptual level, I use Knop’s work on the flow of legal knowledge 
between the domestic and the international.3 In the third section, I provide a short 
summary of each chapter before concluding the chapter, and the thesis,f in the fourth 
section. In the last section I detail the way this work can benefit forthcoming 
international criminal legal prosecutions and mechanisms.  
2. From the International to the Local 
Arguably, the primary focus of international criminal law is to end impunity of 
leaders and punish grave breaches of international humanitarian law. The 
international criminal law structure operates on a punitive rather than restorative 
basis, unlike alternative justice mechanisms, such as the Asia-Pacific Women’s 
Hearings. International criminal law must not only follow the general principles of 
criminal law, but also reconcile itself as a part of the international system, dealing 
with the critiques on the lack of enforcement, the restraints of State consent, and 
questions with regard to legitimacy. International criminal law responds to crimes 
across varied social and cultural structures, as well as legal structures, while 
predominantly entering into a situation post-conflict, prosecuting extreme levels of 
violence linked to complex conflict dynamics and histories. These characteristics 
make international criminal law a unique form of criminal law.  
                                                          
3 See Knop, ‘Here and There: International Law in the Domestic Courts’ (2000). 
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The international criminal legal system, in addition to focusing on punishing leaders 
for grave breaches of international humanitarian law, including jus cogens violations, 
should also incorporate stronger mechanisms attentive to history telling as well as 
taking more active roles in contributing towards repairing a community. International 
criminal laws structure is already implicated in both activities, but because these are 
not focused on enough during proceedings it misses the opportunity to develop these 
elements further. It is essential to punish leaders, tell an accurate history, charge 
people from each side of a conflict, and rebuild the relationships in a given society, 
after armed conflict ends. Whether or not the goal of international criminal law 
includes providing a more nuanced view of gender in the conflict, international 
criminal law is already implicated in this practice. The mechanisms of international 
criminal law highlight an understanding of gender that confines women to either 
victims in armed conflict, usually of sexual violence, or as peacemakers, necessary in 
post-conflict justice mechanisms in so far as they facilitate UN peace processes.  
 
International criminal law’s role as an international project and through the normative 
value placed upon it by the international community it is a part of shaping the way 
gender, race, culture, and ethnicity are understood by the international mainstream 
political actors post-conflict. The background provided in each court case judgement, 
the international media focus, the way prosecutors pick cases and conduct trials, the 
witnesses that are chosen to tell their story, and the way the public responds to all of 
these actions situate international criminal law as an authority when trying to decipher 
the nuances of an armed conflict, especially by audiences that exist in spaces outside 
of the armed conflict.  
 
On the domestic level the existence of alternative justice mechanisms and local courts 
must attend to the majority of post-conflict justice needs, as international criminal law 
only focuses on the leadership. The emphasis of many local justice mechanisms 
centres on dealing with the communal aspects after a conflict, something international 
criminal law can be said to contribute to, albeit in a limited way. Millar argues that 
“Western-generated theories” and a professionalisation of the transitional justice 
occupation by the West has meant that Western perspectives on post-conflict justice 
  
266 
 
remain paramount.4 Moyo also recognises the imperialistic tendencies of transitional 
justice mechanisms, embedded in a ‘liberal bias’ that remains ignorant of the needs of 
a post-colonial State, in a post-conflict environment.5 I argue that international 
criminal legal mechanisms remain the dominant transitional justice paradigm after a 
conflict has taken place, and many alternatives to international criminal legal 
proceedings still reside in an international, Western neoliberal, perspective of justice. 
Despite my criticisms, while the reality that international criminal law will continue to 
exist in its current manifestation remains uncertain, the Western influence over post-
conflict justice remains ever present. Therefore, international criminal law, for 
instance, needs to be held up to task, and simultaneously downgraded as the only 
satisfactory option after armed conflict.   
 
Knop writes on the relationship between international and domestic law and the 
tendency by international lawyers to assume that domestic practices and techniques 
do not measure up.6 Knop’s argument focuses on how domestic judges have the 
ability to interpret and apply international law and that while international law may 
appear different in the local context, it still retains the elements that make it 
internationally acceptable.7 Due to the diversity in local situations and the wide range 
of governmental and political mechanisms that differ between States, international 
law cannot function the same way in each instance. Knop recognises that in many 
cases local courts are required to apply international law when they themselves had no 
part in its creation on the international level.8  
 
The idea that international law is translated into local understanding is useful, as 
international law cannot be assumed to be planted into the local without undergoing a 
transformation.9 To this end it can be also inferred that while certain concepts in 
international law lay at its core, international law as a system, prevents the 
understanding of nuances in domestic law. Knop writes, “the traditional model 
                                                          
4 Millar, ‘Local Evaluations of Justice through Truth Telling in Sierra Leone: Postwar Needs and 
Transitional Justice’ (2011) 530.  
5 Moyo, ‘Feminism, Postcolonial Legal Theory and Transitional Justice: A Critique of Current Trends’ 
(2012) 273. 
6 Knop (n 3) 502. 
7 ibid 534, 535. 
8 ibid 504. 
9 ibid 506. 
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simplifies how these courts actually use international law and therefore neglects the 
potential of domestic interpretation as a practice for recognising difference in 
international law.”10  There is an presumption of neutrality in international law and 
universality; however as Knop suggest this idea is typically based on a white Western 
male, though it can be argued sometimes white Western female, point of view.11 
International law is said to exist somewhere above culture; however, through the 
domestic this notion can be challenged and used to show how international law should 
be transformed and informed though local interpretations.  
 
The work in this thesis unpacks the nuances of female defendants and the way their 
actions are framed. In the discussion of the ICTY, Plavšić’s case displayed a different 
story than the mainstream account of women’s experiences during the conflict in the 
FYR, but also unearthed the way gender is interpreted and reaffirmed through a 
biased media analysis. In Plavšić’s case gender was used as an affirmation of her 
humanity, with Plavšić being reported as cooking and baking during her spare time in 
prison.12 Yet in the media she was characterised as sexually deviant as well as being a 
female monster.13 In contrast, the multiple women tried within the domestic courts in 
the Former Yugoslavian provinces, detailed in Chapter 4, have not entered 
mainstream international consciousness and certainly not Western feminist analysis of 
gender and conflict.  
 
When confronted with this perception of the relationship between the female 
defendants of Rwanda and Western understandings of the genocide, there is the 
tendency to deny that fascination on the presumed higher levels of Rwandan women 
participating in the genocide exists. I argue that this understanding stems from the 
stereotype that Crenshaw discusses, which positions Black men, or as I would suggest 
all people of colour, as ‘uncontrollably violent’.14 What Crenshaw dissects in her 
work is the relationship women of colour have to the law regarding sexual violence. 
She highlights the tendency for the US legal system to perpetuate serotypes that 
                                                          
10 ibid 518. 
11 ibid 527. 
12 Subotić, ‘The Cruelty of False Remorse: Biljana Plavšić at The Hague’ (2012) 49. 
13 Sjoberg and Gentry, Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Women’s Violence in Global Politics (2007) 156. 
14 Crenshaw, ‘Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women 
of Color’ (1993) 1253. 
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identify both Black men and women as over sexual and sexually deviant.15 I would 
argue it is this attitude towards Rwandans, predominately the reaction by white 
Western women and men, that allowed women in Rwanda to become more widely 
represented as violent. This may seem like an argument that is attempting to draw a 
tenuous connection to the female defendants of the Rwandan genocide from the 
stereotypes prevalent in the US legal system. However, the international response to 
the Rwandan genocide both in international media coverage and in the literature on 
the Rwandan genocide often originates in the West,16 and is reflective of colonial and 
racial stereotypes. These stereotypes are illuminated by Crenshaw, amongst others,17 
and are therefore the basis by which women in Rwanda are more readily accepted to 
have committed acts of violence.  
 
Marriage in Cambodia has historically offered women in Cambodia a form of access 
to the public realm as well as respect within the community.18 However, the cultural 
elements that are unique to Cambodia, for instance, elevate women to positions of 
power and enable them with the ability to transfer between the public and private; at 
the same time, they are viewed by the international community as not conforming to 
the concepts of gender equality. The majority of examples of women who were in 
leadership positions and committed or were suspected to have committed crimes 
during the reign of the Khmer Rouge, were the wives of the men who were in high 
political positions.  
 
The international community has argued that practices of marriage, inheritance, and 
divorce have prevented women from gaining greater autonomy especially since they 
are often embedded in cultural practices.19 It is also unhelpful when governments 
blame culture and tradition as reasons why they have not adjusted practice to meet 
international conventions on gender equality.20 This perspective embeds cultural 
                                                          
15 ibid 1280. 
16 See Norridge, “Writing Against Genocide: Genres of Opposition in Narratives from and about 
Rwanda” in Hiddleston and Crowley (Eds.) Postcolonial Poetics (2011). 
17 See Harris, ‘Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory’ (1990). 
18 See Jacobsen, Lost Goddesses: The Denial of Female Power in Cambodian History (2008); This 
does not diminish the ways in which marriage can be limiting and disproportionately harmful for 
women.  
19 Engle Merry, Human Rights and Gender Violence (2006) 91, 92. 
20 ibid. 
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practices as ultimately harmful towards women, and at the same time positions them 
as backwards and impossible to reconcile with present day international standards.  
Certain institutions, like marriage, are engrained within society as a practice that 
upholds the hegemonic and heteronormative values of the State, albeit there are 
historical, cultural, religious, gendered, and other understandings that shape and give 
meaning to the institution of marriage. Marriage is also viewed by those of the Global 
North as a contested space for women in the Global South. Due to this, when women 
are observed as gaining positions in society or actively taking part in hostilities during 
armed conflict because of their marriage, international law has a difficult time 
comprehending female agency outside of the marriage.   
 
Any institution, marriage or otherwise, will have differences depending on its 
surroundings and problems there in, this is not dismissing this reality. However, by 
only seeing marriage in the domestic as a site of cultural limitations and gender 
inequality, stops analysis of the situation of female defendants in the Cambodian 
context. It is important to look at all of the aspects that surround female defendants in 
order to understand their situation and within the context of the armed conflict, this 
can then filter back to the international informing the perception of gender and 
women’s roles in armed conflicts. 
 
This discussion is one of the core reasons for choosing to highlight the Cambodian 
genocide and court: as it allows an argument to be broached that addresses the 
continued gap between local and international understandings, an element that is 
essential to cover if trying to effectively reach any form of post-conflict justice. 
Furthermore, the presence of female defendants complicates the situation, as the 
presence of female defendants in the ECCC indicates a higher percentage of 
indictments than other tribunals and suggests that it is possibly due to the local nature 
of the court. If local processes are able to indicate and potentially prosecute female 
defendants, then maybe the Western notions that seek to build women up, make them 
more present, facilitate justice for female victims and so on, are actually extremely 
limiting for women and constrict the perceivable range of actions in armed conflict.  
 
The existence of female defendants complicates the understanding of women in 
international law. International law predominately views women as victims, whether 
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it be as victims of sexual violence or through the denial of rights. As stated in 
previous chapters, Charlesworth notes that women most often come into the purview 
of international law when they are harmed.21 Women who commit crimes act against 
the presumed behaviour their gender typically denotes, which is a denial of violence 
and a tendency to choose ‘the good’. When women enter international law as 
defendants their actions are contrary to the way international law interacts with 
women, especially within international criminal law. The general and universal nature 
of international law takes the assumption that women are predominately viewed 
through their gender and that this plays out as the primary way their experiences are 
identified. Post-colonial and critical race scholars would counter this claim with 
ethnicity, culture, class, and race as other equally important ways women’s identity is 
shaped.22  
 
Echoed in Knop’s work is the thought that international law is predominantly from 
the perspective of white Western men, which does not allow for a neutral reading or 
the creation of international law without bias. If this is taken as the starting point from 
which international law develops, then its product is embedded within a system that 
does not recognise difference. Female defendants are then outside of what women 
‘do’ in armed conflict and when they do exist they are seen as an aberration of typical 
behaviour. In Cambodia women appeared before the ECCC or within its court 
documents more often, yet their presence has not filtered to the international in the 
sense that it has not influenced the way women are thought of during armed conflict. 
The flow of knowledge between the international to the domestic is increasingly 
acknowledged and informs one of the mechanisms through which international law is 
given operative effect, but the flow from the domestic to the international is not as 
widely encouraged. The conversations on the relationship between international and 
domestic law usually centres on, how can international laws be integrated more fully 
into domestic law and policy. As Knops states, it is international law and international 
lawyers that presume local judges are not up to the challenge of incorporating and 
interpreting international law correctly.23 
 
                                                          
21 Charlesworth, 'International Law: A Discipline of Crisis' (2002) 377-381. 
22 Kapur, ‘Erotic Justice: Law and the New Politics of Postcolonialism’ (2005) 15. 
23 Knop (n 3) 502, 503. 
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Each State takes a different approach to the integration of international law into their 
domestic legal system, which typically falls into the category of monism or dualism, 
or a combination of the two. Monism views international law as a part of domestic 
law, while dualism underlines the need for international law to be explicitly 
incorporated into the domestic legal system.24 Yet, amongst mainstream approaches to 
international law there is a sense that domestic law needs to ‘catch up’ to international 
legal concepts and that domestic policies on the whole are in many ways detrimental 
to the understanding agreed upon in international spaces. Knop highlights the focus 
on the traditional model of international law, where the relationship to the domestic is 
focused on how domestic law will enact international law.25 This is evident in the 
need for domestic legal system to identify their relationship to international law as 
either monist or dualist. Knop argues that with the focus on binding quality of 
international law in domestic law, lawyers ignore the “persuasive value of 
international law and its function as a signifier of community”, which is highlighted in 
her transjudicial model.26  
 
Within international legal scholarship, there remains insufficient discussion around 
domestic concepts or understandings and their ability to help shape international legal 
spaces. Some may argue that due to the presence of different State parties, 
international law is by its very nature influenced by local ideals. However, 
international law often removes the particular and unique aspects brought in by local 
culture and creates a so-called neutral law. The general principles of international law 
do stem from domestic practice and there is an acceptance that once principles are 
common amongst different domestic systems they are then incorporated into the 
international.27 This is excellent in theory, although in practise general principles are 
still a subsidiary source of international law and traditionally speaking were restricted 
to ‘civilised nations’, or common law systems, as the creators of general principles.28 
This example does not offer much hope in the way of domestic law filtering up to the 
international.  
                                                          
24 Roughan, Authorities: Conflicts, Cooperation, and Transnational Legal Theory, 189 
25 Knop (n 3) 516. 
26 ibid 520. 
27 United Nations, ‘Statute of the International Court of Justice’ (18 April 194) Article 38. 
28 ibid. 
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Due to the placement of the domestic as a system outside, separate from the 
international, or below the international, the knowledge, interpretations, and 
development in the domestic system does not move to the international level. 
Speaking specifically about international criminal law, it is evident that its practices 
encourage the idea of complementarity, evident in the Rome Statute,29 and the ECCC 
is a hybrid court, which combines both systems of law allowing a sense of 
partnership. The hybrid model offers a hope that international criminal law can work 
between two systems of governance and incorporate local ideals. However, as many 
scholars have argued, the ECCC is one example of this partnership, which has 
achieved much less than was hoped for at its outset. A hybrid court is embedded 
within the local legal system, a system that has gone under dramatic shifts during and 
after armed conflict. Although the ECCC was created decades after the conflict itself 
it is still influenced by politics and corruption, which signal for many, issues with the 
concept and structure of hybrid courts.30  While politics and corruption can be seen 
within international law as well, domestic law’s contribution to international law is 
not valued in the same way as international law and even when it is incorporated into 
international legal systems it is only seen as able to handle the overflow of Tribunals.  
 
The situation of female defendants relates to this discussion on domestic and 
international courts generally, as gender norms formed in international law are 
reproduced in the domestic as well as in international courts designed to deal with 
local situations, like the ICTY and ICTR. These norms are related to women in the 
position of victims whether it be sexual violence or the aftermath of armed conflict. 
Women in positions of power within the conflict and women who use that power to 
harm others are not a part of the understanding of gender within international courts. 
Even when women are evident as defendants during the conflict and within hybrid 
tribunals the understanding of the nuances of their situation does not move back to the 
international plane in order to transform gender norms more broadly.  
                                                          
29 Rome UNGA,’ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’ A/CONF.183/9 (1998) (Last 
Amended 2010). 
30 See Gee-kin Ip, ‘Fulfilling the Mandate of National Reconciliation in the Extraordinary Chambers in 
the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) – An Evaluation through the Prism of Victims’ Rights’ (2013).  
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One of the reasons for the lack of movement between the two planes is due to the 
conceptions around the status of women in States where conflict occurs. The 
relationship international law has with the domestic is similar to the way the 
international community assumes gender should or should not play out in the local. 
As Knop suggests the “authority of international law is persuasive rather than 
binding,”31 I would argue this point can be pushed further, highlighting the Canadian 
court interpretation of international law in the Baker case. In Baker v Canada the 
Canadian court ruled that Canada’s signing of The Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, despite the fact it was not considered binding in Canadian law, was evidence of 
Canadian values and social mores.32 What this indicates is that the way States act 
internationally, through signing or refusing to sign international conventions, or more 
broadly the resolutions produced through the United Nations, give evidence towards a 
State’s values and perceptions. Therefore, on the topic of women in armed conflict 
due to the hyper visibility of women as victims of sexual violence, the international 
legal community remains tied to binary understandings of gender, without the 
inclusion of other identities, such as race, ethnicity, class, sexuality, or ability.      
 
After moving through the FYR domestic courts, the Gacaca Courts, and marriage in 
Cambodia, found in Chapters Four, Five, and Six, the connection to Knop’s argument 
becomes lodged within the need for greater communication between international and 
local spaces in a post-conflict climate. The FYR domestic courts displayed the ability 
of local criminal justice processes to incorporate female defendants, albeit this is not 
necessarily indicative of a lack of gender binaries. Likewise, the Gacaca Courts tried 
more female defendants than the ICTR, and similar to the domestic FYR courts 
recognised more nuance in women’s roles in armed conflict. The complexity of 
women’s lives during armed conflict is more apparent in the domestic spaces of the 
FYR and Rwanda. However, the reliance on gender as the linchpin of women’s 
involvement in post-conflict justice mechanisms is inaccurate. The preoccupation 
with gender in the West does not exist to the same extent in the domestic spaces of the 
FYR and Rwanda, as identities beyond gender influence women’s capabilities in 
conflict and the way women’s actions are perceived.  In Cambodia the institution of 
                                                          
31 Knop (n 3) 535. 
32 ibid 511. 
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marriage offered some women access to power and privilege, women also appeared 
within the documents of the hybrid court more frequently than in other armed 
conflicts. Despite this, the awareness of female defendants in the domestic spaces of 
the FYR, and Rwanda, and within the hybrid Court of Cambodia have not filtered 
back to the international.  
3. Three Post-conflict Institutions 
Chapter Four detailed the way the ICTY, Western feminist intervention, and the 
international media reaffirmed women as victims and ignored the broader range of 
women’s actions in armed conflict. The discussion highlighted the ICTY as a legal 
space that remains performative, reaffirming a specific view of women and 
femininity.  The conflict of the FYR resulted in a combination of misinterpretations 
cantered upon ethnicity, the conflict’s history, as well as women’s roles, predicated by 
Western feminists, the media, and international criminal law which lead to female 
defendants remaining in the periphery of the narratives around the FYR. Chapter Four 
also detailed how macro financial issues leading up to the armed conflict, did not 
enter into the understanding about the armed conflict, especially when the 
international community sought to comprehend the situation in the FYR.33 The media 
focused on certain crimes being committed, while leaving other experiences of 
women and men out of its purview.   
 
It was argued that subject of female defendants are not fully realised as subjects in 
international criminal law. Butler’s work was utilised in order to develop the idea that 
certain people are able to stand before the law and others are not.34 ‘Law’ was seen to 
be bound within a heteronormative system of power. Therefore, law that address 
violence against women are based upon heterosexual notions of what men ‘do’ to 
women. Female defendants do not fit into this conception of ‘women’, as female 
defendants act against heterosexual versions of women and men in a way that does 
not uphold the hierarchy between women and men in the law. National identity 
remained an essential element in the scholarship and media representation of the 
conflict in the FYR. After analysing Plavšić’s case it became clear that, analysis based 
                                                          
33 Orford, 'Locating the International: Military and Monetary Interventions after the Cold War' (1997) 
451. 
34 Butler, Gender Trouble Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (2006) 2. 
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on ethnicity and nationalism was needed to better understand Plavšić’s actions as a 
female perpetrator. 
 
The work of Western feminists as well as the work of local feminists intermixed with 
national and international perspectives on masculinity, femininity, nationalism, 
sexuality, and ethnicity. This meant that Western feminists incorporated the work of 
local feminists on the armed conflict to bolster their support for the ICTY, while using 
the conflict to highlight the importance of the Western feminist agenda. Binaries 
based on gender and assumptions about ethnicity were created by the conflict in the 
FYR and highlighted in the work local feminists, these binaries were then reproduced 
by Western feminists who intervened after the armed conflict. The Western feminist 
response into the FYR echoes the Western feminist agenda in the 1990s, which 
resulted in the women of the FYR being symbolised as the ‘other’.35  
 
This discussion is linked to the way Butler has described the term ‘woman’, which 
typically refers to a specific identity that does not take into consideration the way 
gender is connected and influences race, class, ethnic, sexual, and regional 
identities.36 This ultimately fails to recognise the way gender oppression exists 
differently in multiple contexts.37 Gender oppression is seen as symptomatic of non-
Western barbarism, a perspective highlighted in the Western feminism’s relationship 
to the Third World.38 Furthermore, focusing attention on cases of sexual violence by 
Western Feminists makes this particular violence during armed conflict seem 
somehow worse than other forms of violence women experience. This is not explicitly 
stated by international law, but it is evident in the lack of attention to the sexual 
violence many women face as a part of their normal lives. This chapter demonstrated 
that by examining the instances of female defendants the gaps in international 
criminal law and feminist intervention are illuminated. Looking at the FYR in 
particular unfolds a situation where female defendants existed, which represents the 
initial step in this thesis towards a discussion of the greater relationship between 
female defendants and international law.  
                                                          
35 Batinic, ‘Feminism, Nationalism, and War: The ‘Yugoslav Case’ in Feminist Texts’ (2001) 18. 
36 Butler (n 34) 3.  
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
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In Chapter Five, the narratives around the Rwandan genocide promoted by the work 
of the ICTR, international media, and Western feminist intervention, perpetuated a 
specific type of gender and racial understanding. Amongst these narratives where a 
few central themes, which included the brutality of the conflict itself, the chaos in 
Rwanda during and after the genocide, the accountability of the larger population 
during the violence, and the scale of the violence and number of defendants.  
Moreover, female defendants have remained in the periphery, concerning stories 
around the Rwandan genocide and in the ways gender was represented within during 
conflict. Likewise, when stories do surface female defendants are treated along the 
same lines as the conflict, brutal in their actions and unlike those women who exist in 
the West. Looking to Rwanda’s colonial history offers a means of understanding the 
system that has shaped how gender and race are conceptualised by outside influences. 
Mamdani stated that the narrative of victimhood present in Rwanda’s colonial past 
has been based on continuous violence that had led to a cycle that produces 
defendants who were also victims.39 Within this cycle the ethnic superiority of the 
Tutsis was constantly reiterated. 
 
From the promotion of certain understandings of race, ethnicity, and gender in 
colonialism to the outbreak of the genocide in 1994, Rwanda was often ignored by 
Western audiences or seen as backwards. Dallaire recalls that once news of ‘mass 
killings’ spread reporters began coming in and out of Rwanda.40  Media reports then 
focused on descriptions of excessive violence and brutality, which distance Rwanda 
from ‘civilised’ viewers. In April of 1994 The New York Times reported that 
Rwanda’s conflict was ‘tribal warfare’41 while the FYR was “everyone’s war”.42 This 
was further emphasised by the language used by the US media when referring to the 
genocide, words like ‘ethnic’, ‘slaughter’, ‘carnage’, and ‘tribal’.43   
                                                          
39 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda 
(2002) 267. 
40 Dallaire, ‘The Media Dichotomy’ in Thompson (Ed.) The Media and the Rwanda Genocide (2007) 
15. 
41 McFadden, ‘Western Troops Arrive in Rwanda to Aid Foreigners’ (The New York Times, 10 April 
1994). 
42 Kifner, ‘The World; Through the Serbian Mind's Eye’ (The New York Times, 10 April 1994). 
43 Myers et al, ‘The Inscription of Difference: News Coverage of the Conflicts in Rwanda and Bosnia’ 
(1996) 22. 
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These depictions of Rwanda made the actions of Pauline Nyiramasuhuko all the more 
intriguing to Western audiences. When Nyiramasuhuko was on trial media outlets 
commented on her dress, her appearance, and how being a woman made her crimes 
more appalling.44 Nyiramasuhuko countered this by saying she had no power, no 
capability as a woman and therefore was not guilty.  Sperling has noted that either 
Nyiramasuhuko chose to use gender as a means of casting doubt onto her actions, or 
she believed that women did not have the capacity to commit criminal acts during the 
genocide. As discussed above, Nyiramasuhuko’s case was not the only example of 
female defendants in the Rwandan genocide.  
 
Amongst the scholarship on the Rwandan genocide the existence of female 
defendants features more than in other armed conflicts. I have argued that despite the 
higher visibility of female defendants, their existence still does not enter into the 
mainstream conflict narrative. The higher visibility of women who commit crimes in 
Rwanda is not the result of a need to understand women’s roles in conflict. I have 
stated that this is due to a racialised understanding of Rwanda that extends back to 
Rwanda’s colonial history. Highlighting the actions of female defendants, actions that 
need less explanation when perpetrated by men, authors contribute to the implied 
divide around gender roles in conflict. This is not to say authors definitively support 
the separation of gender roles, or always write on this topic out of shock that women 
commit crimes. On the contrary, authors seem more comfortable discussing the 
women who perpetrate crimes in the Rwandan genocide, which confirms that limited 
notions of gender and race, on an international scale.   
 
Chapter Six analysed the Khmer Rouge regime and the role women played. Some 
women choose to take part in the regime while others were coerced. In Cambodia, 
female defendants appear more frequently in the court and court transcripts compared 
to other international criminal courts or tribunals, but I argued this has not translated a 
wider acknowledgement of female perpetrator’s existence in the Cambodia armed 
conflict or in armed conflicts generally. Chapter Six also highlighted the history of 
                                                          
44 Landesman, ‘A Woman’s Work’ (The New York Times Magazine, 15 September 2002); Hazeley, 
‘Profile: Female Rwandan killer Pauline Nyiramasuhuko’ (BBC, 24 June 2011).  
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women in Cambodian culture, as they were an essential part of its history and 
development. Frieson stated that the presence of women as warriors in Cambodian 
territory can be traced back to the Angkrean Kingdom (which began around the 9th 
Century), and that women were political consultants, revolutionaries, protectors of 
Buddhist temples as well as conduits of peace. Cambodian women have also 
protected territories and also have been viewed as figures representing the nation 
state.45  Nevertheless, this understanding has not entered in to the Western perception 
of women’s roles in Cambodia.  
 
The Asia Pacific Regional Women’s Hearing focused on the failings of both 
international and domestic institutions as well as sexual violence experienced during 
the conflict.46 By choosing to intervene on behalf of women when they are the victims 
of sexual violence, the international community is signalling how they believe 
women‘s experience of armed conflict are important, this further dictates which 
gendered harms are deemed important. The importance of discussing the Women’s 
Hearing in Chapter Six was done to draw attention to the ways the international 
community can shape and uphold gender norms in the international and local through 
alternative justice mechanisms. Through the processes of the Women’s Hearings it is 
evident that existence of women as defendants of violence do not fit within the 
purview of the Hearings. 
 
The other harms women experienced during the Cambodian genocide such as 
starvation, malnutrition and improper medical care, indicate the possibility that these 
effects of armed conflict may have had a greater influence on women’s lives than 
sexual violence and that crimes were perpetrated by men and by women. Concerning 
the experiences of female defendants, women have garnered a stronger focus in the 
ECCC, considering their prevalence in relation to the number of persons brought 
before the court. While this seems to be a positive development, especially in light of 
the work done within this thesis, I argued that this has less to do with a nuanced 
understanding of women’s role, but rather the result of the long period of time 
                                                          
45 Frieson, ‘In the Shadows: Women, Power and Politics in Cambodia’ (2001) 1. 
46 Chapter on file with author, Otto, ‘Testimonies of Protest and Survival: People’s Tribunals and the 
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between the conflict itself and the establishment of the court. Charlesworth’s work on 
the crisis approach was used to understand the higher percentage of female defendants 
before the ECCC.47 This means that it is not due to a broader understanding of 
women’s roles in armed conflict, but rather the distance between the armed conflict 
and the hybrid court allows for greater understanding of the armed conflict, which 
included the existence of women as defendants.  
 
Moreover, there has been limited work done around the contribution of lower level 
female defendants, who have been left out of the memory and history of the Khmer 
Rouge reign, until recently. Women were committed to the cause and ideals of the 
Khmer Rouge regime, as were their male colleagues.  Linton’s work states it is false 
to assume that if women were the targets of gender based violence, then they would 
not also participate in the politics of that regime.48 Marriage is an important cultural 
milestone in Cambodia for both men and women and it was discussed in this chapter 
due to its ability to link understandings of gender and female defendants. Through 
marriage women gain a position in society and access to areas that would typically be 
out of reach for single women, such as politics and economics. The Khmer Rouge 
regime destroyed many of the traditions common to Cambodian society, kinship 
responsibilities, religious ceremonies, and private land ownership all suffered; 
marriage like many of these other arenas was also harmed due to forced marriage 
ceremonies that did not adhere to previous rigorous matching processes, and the 
effects of this change in marital relations were felt even after the Khmer Rouge fell.  
However, the marriages between the ruling class of the Khmer Rouge proved 
beneficial for women and allowed women such as Ieng Thirith, Khieu Ponnary, and 
Yun Yat, to become key figures in the regime.  
 
Finally, the material presented in this chapter aided in the progression of the topic of 
female defendants by offering another perspective of women engaging in armed 
conflict and the external factors that leave female defendants out of the Western 
conception of the armed conflict, even though women featured more predominantly in 
the ECCC. I argued that due to perceptions of women in Cambodia, women are tied to 
                                                          
47 Charlesworth (n 21) 384-386. 
48 Linton, ‘Women Accused of International Crimes: A Trans-Disciplinary Inquiry and Methodology’ 
(2016) 171. 
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assumptions based on marriage, the visibility of women in the hybrid court did not 
translate to a greater understanding of women’s roles in armed conflict. Ignoring this 
problem only stigmatises women who participated in armed conflict and pushes them 
outside the conflict’s history, further limiting their access to services and care in order 
to reintegrate former female defendants into society.  Highlighting the importance of 
the relationship between the international and the local adds to the narrative around 
the armed conflict. Local justice processes offer a perspective on armed conflict 
which differs from the international and need to be further interrogated in order for 
further nuances in armed conflict to be revealed.  
4. Conclusion  
This thesis has analysed the existence and representations of female defendants in 
order to critique international law, international criminal law, and Western feminist 
interventions. I have detailed the ways in which international criminal law, as well as 
international law more broadly, benefits from the study of female defendants. Female 
defendants have also been discussed as a means for strengthening feminist’s 
engagement with the law. I have argued throughout that the desire for justice after 
armed conflict will only ever be partial unless women are acknowledged to have the 
potential to commit crimes. When women do commit acts of violence they must enter 
into the history and narrative around the conflict as well as international and local 
justice mechanisms, as more than victims of conflict: as participants, as change-
makers and as defendants.  As this chapter concludes, I find myself concerned with 
the future of international law, international criminal law, and Western feminist 
engagement in international law. Taking into account the relationship between female 
defendants and the law, which has unfolded in this thesis, I will now detail some of 
my final thoughts and suggestions for the future. 
 
International law, through the work of Women, Peace, and Security agenda and 
specific feminist interventions to push conflict-related sexual violence on to the 
agenda within international criminal law, has been heavily influenced by a binary that 
positions women as victims and assumes men as defendants. While women have also 
been identified by international law as peacemakers or potential advocates against the 
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harms of terrorism,49 this still limits women, only capable of displaying stereotypical 
feminine attributes. Recognising women’s potential to commit harm is the first step in 
disrupting these damaging feminine stereotypes that limit the acceptable female 
behaviour. Alongside international law’s preoccupation with women as victims, it is 
equally preoccupied with international criminal law’s achievements. With the 
normative value placed upon the performance of international criminal law, 
international mediated justice is seen as essential post-conflict.  
 
Some of the aims pursued through international criminal law are to punish leaders, 
end impunity, and provide justice to victims.50 However, when female defendants are 
left outside of the scope of international criminal law, their experience is ignored, 
their crimes made trivial, and the few women who are charged have their actions 
represented as a very specific, gendered form of aberration, all the while the victims 
of FPs are not given full justice because although made out to be monsters female 
defendants have used sex-stereotypes – from Plavšić’s confusion to Nyiramasuhuko’s 
use of her position as mother – to mitigate their culpability. In this chapter, I have 
examined how alternative forms of transitional justice that are not constrained by the 
traditional parameters of criminal law may provide a more complete account of the 
armed conflict as well as greater potential for post-conflict healing. One of the 
constraints in international criminal law is its reliance on binaries, guilty/not guilty, 
woman/man, and victim/perpetrator. Local justice processes and soft law instruments 
then provide a way to disarm these limitations by offering alternative methods for 
dealing with the complexity of armed conflict.  
 
Western feminist interventions into international criminal law has also often focused 
on women as victims, especially those who were exposed to sexual violence. My 
nuanced critique of US radical feminism did not intend to detail the extent of Western 
intervention, but to highlight the construction of women’s experiences post-conflict, 
which was untimely detrimental to the visibility of female defendants. The 
construction of the victim in armed conflict, shaped by international criminal law and 
Western feminist intervention does not allow for the reality of armed conflicts 
                                                          
49 UN Security Council Resolution 2242, (2015). 
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nuances. Primarily, that many individuals are both victims and violators during armed 
conflict and that neither category need be sexed or gendered.  The binary of 
victim/violator has featured throughout this thesis, and the reason it is being returned 
to in this conclusion is due to its importance in the solution to the problems I have 
posed in international criminal law. The discussion of victims as violators or violators 
as victims renders itself impossible within the current parameters of international law 
and international criminal law. The reliance on gendered binaries by international 
criminal law cannot accept the complexity of armed conflict, as a result gendered 
binary is reinforced and women remain tied to a victim status. The dichotomy of 
victim and violator holds specific gender implications: so while the Western feminist 
intervention into international criminal law emphasised women as victims, the status 
of victim has the possibility to be held by all people in armed conflict and ignoring 
this, ignores the gendered experiences of male victims. I have discussed gender 
throughout this thesis and emphasised that the term is not synonymous with the 
experiences of women.  
 
At the same time, I have constantly referred to ‘men’ and ‘women’, this is not to 
suggest I see these categories as self-evident. On the contrary, I see the existence of 
the terms ‘woman’ and ‘man’ as a social and linguistic construction. I also locate 
these categories within legal discourse, and have explored how these terms are often 
used by institutions and movements for their own gains. Follow on research to the 
thesis might expand interrogation of gender constructions within international 
criminal law through analysing the instances. I will continue to develop this topic by 
analysing these instances when individuals who perpetrate crimes do not identify as 
either man or woman, or when one’s appearance does not conform to idealised 
standards of gender. Transgender and queer individuals who act during armed conflict 
highlight the need to learn from the interrogations around female defendants and the 
laws inability to move away from binary understandings.  
 
I recognise the power in the legal institutions, like the Ad Hoc Tribunals, Hybrid 
Courts, and International Criminal Court that aim to uphold ideals of justice. 
However, it seems evident that these institutions remain paralysed by their own 
constraints due to the difficulty in dealing with the multitude of harms that exist in 
armed conflict. Feminism is a tool that can facilitate the interrogation of legal topics, 
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questioning the assumed universal or neutral elements within the law. This thesis has 
revealed that within Western feminist interventions and international criminal law 
there exists an uncomfortableness in addressing a topic that confronts presumed 
gender binaries, which is assumed to question the work done to make the harm 
against women visible. I have detailed that female defendants do not negate the work 
on women as victims of sexual violence. Moreover, the lack of research into the 
defendants of armed conflict, irrespective of gender, does not allow for a more 
nuanced history of the conflict or an understanding of the actions that took place. The 
background and motivations of Akayesu, for instance, are impossible to explore, as 
giving attention to defendants through academic scholarship is often seen as 
detrimental to the aims of international criminal law or Western feminist pursuits into 
armed conflict.  
 
There should not be a limit on what legal critique is allowed to be explored, especially 
when the aim of this critique is to prevent future atrocities or secure justice. By not 
analysing the way female defendants are shaped and given meaning by feminism and 
the law, then it is as if we have allowed her actions to remain anecdotal, an aberration. 
‘She’ is an anomaly and becomes almost the exception that proves the rule that men 
are agents, men are violent, men are defendants, and men are (therefore) leaders in 
both war and peace times. As a result, the opportunity to prevent future atrocities is 
impossible, as the only acceptable avenue to learn from past conflicts remains tied to 
the experience of victims who are feminised and assumed to be predominantly 
female. In contrast, female defendants need to become a part of research, 
representations and legal redress in post-conflict climates, if justice and reconciliation 
are to be achieved.  
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